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ABSTRACT

Public Space:

Congress and the Republican Political Tradition

(February, 1984)

Joseph

W.

Martin, B.A., University of California, Berkeley

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Directed by:

Professor Jerome King

Public space is defined as

a

place ordained by law or custom

to be the point of public assembly at which the political

taken by the governing authority are made.
cal

because they are

a

decisions

Such decisions are politi-

necessary part of the general

responsibility

for the welfare of the whole society which has been consistently

regarded as the special

function of the political

order.

The

assembled group represents the generality of society, speaks

in

name and is concerned with society's attempt to articulate what

common or general

to

its life.

its
is

The decisions taken in the public

space are "public" when those who are to be affected by them have physical

access to the place where they are made, and the privilege of

either directly participating
and political

in or at least of observing

the debates

processes through which the decisions are taken.

The theory of the public space was outlined in its "pure"

classical

form in the Politics of Aristotle.
v

i i i

This work lay behind the

actual

practices of men and informed the state structures they

designed at several points in subsequent European history.

Both the

theory and practice of state constitution based on a public space

politics can be seen to constitute an Atlantic Republican tradition.
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore ancient and modern

articulations of Republican ideas, as theories and as practices, in

order

to

develop a model

through which the political processes of the

contemporary United States Congress can be explored and evaluated.
The rules and procedures of Congress were drastically altered

during the 1950s and 1970s.

These changes profoundly affect the

nature of the politics that takes place there.

Professional

students

generally agree that the fundamental basis and range of Congressional
power is subject to periodic shifts and that these can be better

understood by analyzing the body

di

that while Congress serves special
constituency

is being

ignored.

achronical ly.

Further, they assert

interests well, its national

Given our classical model

and

a

sum-

mary of the history of Congress, can we determine whether it functions
as a public space?

ix
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CHAPTER

I

THE FAILURE OF CONGRESS: CRISIS IN PUBLIC SPACE POLITICS

We lived in a time of troubles, when the very torpor of
our momentum let us see what monsters and what heroes we
could make of ourselves in imagination--the monsters of our
behaviour newly seen, and the heroes of our struggle with
that conduct newly construed.
Newly seen and newly
construed: for not only did we live in a time of troubles, we
lived also in a time when we were learning a whole set of
techniques for finding--even creating--trouble new ways of
undermining personality and conviction and belief and human
rel ation.
:

R.P. Blackmur

The Concept of Public Space

The following dissertation is an attempt to explore some of
the philosophical

and historical

space" politics.

Public space is defined as

dimensions of what
a

I

call

"public

place ordained by law

or custom to be the point of assembly at which the political
sions taken by

political

a

governing authority are made.

Such decisions are

because, in the words of Sheldon Wolin, "they are

necessary part of the general

deci-

a

responsibility for the welfare of the

whole society which has been consistently regarded as the special
function of the political order. "^
the generality of society,

The assembled group represents

speaks in its name and is "concerned with

society's attempt to articulate what is common or general
life."

to

its

The decisions taken in the public space are "public" when

1

2

those who are to be affected by them have physical
access to the

place where they are made, and the privilege of either
directly par-

ticipating in or at least of observing the debates and
political processes through whicb the political decisions are taken.

Hence this

"space" of meeting often comes to have great symbolic significance,

for it sets apart that association which is directed

to

the welfare

of the whole from any lesser association, and so represents general

or common, rather than particular goods.

The activity which public

space makes possible is an integrating activity, above and beyond the

heterogeneity of the private sphere, in which

a

living reality of

active collaboration for individuals comes into being precisely
because the issues raised there affect everyone.

What "happens" in

a

public space is political

integration of diverse elements and interests through

action: an
a

dialogue

between uncoerced participants about common issues or concerns such
that

a

policy.

general

consensus is created and its decisions enacted into

The concrete opportunity for political

action saves the

people from lethargy and inattention to public business, i.e.,
from lapsing into letting others take care of that business for
them.

No multiplication of fragmentary constituencies or partial

interests will provide

a

substitute for

a

common public space open to

all.

Theories of direct democracy stress that the relationship

between the individual citizen and the public realm be unmediated.

3

Democracy means government literally by the social
estate of the
people, that is, not simply

a

government electively derived from the

people, but a government actually consisting of all of
the citizens.

Nearly all business is conducted by the assembled multitude
of citizens, and such theories thus describe a government of all over
all.

The public space at the heart of such

a

government must be large

enough, then, to physically accommodate everyone who lives in the

society and who has been granted the right to participate in

deli-

beration and action.
Republic theories of government, on the other hand, are

a

logical consequence of the growth of large polities: once the city

reaches
all

a

certain size it becomes impratical

to

frequently assemble

of the citizens to deliberate upon every matter of public

tance.

impor-

Hence arises the theory of the elective derivation of

government from the people

to

public space persists as

constant element here; still seen as

a

representatives chosen by them.

The
a

necessary condition for the determination of the common good; still
the central

element in

a

political

theory which associates the con-

cepts of justice, participation and public life.
in the society does not have equal

But now, everyone

access to the public space.

Those

who have access to its debates and political processes are generally

accorded the label

"representative" and receive the power to act

politically for others through some kind of election or selection
process.

Historical

constructions of the concepts "citizen" and

4

"representative" have been characterized by considerable fluidity as
the following study will
this:

although

a

show, but one constant element seems to be

person need not always be

a

representative to have

citizen rights, representatives are drawn exclusively from the body
of citizens.

Debates in the republican tradition, then, center first

on what criteria legitimately admit one to the represented group,
second, on the proper nature of the relationship between represen-

tative and represented, and third, on the qualities that must be present in each of the participating individuals if the process is to
work as intended.

Behind all

that citizenship itself

is

such discussions lies the common view

not a right but a privilege restricted to

qualified individuals on the basis of criteria established by the
community.
Both democratic and republican versions of the public space

politics are, ultimately derived from Greek conceptions and practices.
At various times, each was brought into being by some of the ancient

city-states that dotted the Hellenic sea coasts and countryside.

Fran

their practical experiments with such forms of government we have

inherited many of our traditions and much of our vocabulary about
pol

i

tics.

For what has come to be known as the republican political

tra-

dition, the earliest and most important theory of politics is the
fonn of two

pol itika of Aristotle,^ which has come down to us in the

separate texts, the Nichomachean Ethics and the Politics

.

The former

5

deals

wi.th

ethical

of individual

questions involving individual arete and the ends

life;

it is primarily concerned with the problems of

living a "good life" insofar as that life is private and personal.

The latter takes up similar questions but in the context of the political

society and the role of the citizen; it inquires into the nature

of the "good life" insofar as that life is lived and shared with

others in the public realm, and insofar as its attainment can be

established as an object of common action.
Though the influence of both of these texts on subsequent
generations of scholars and political actors has been immeasurable,
we shall concentrate primarily on the doctrine of "polity" or "mixed
government" which is presented for the most part in the third and
fourth books of the Pol i tics
find the notions of

a

.

Here, more than anywhere else, we

free citizenry actively participating in the

power of government, and

a

doctrine of citizen equality and political

ethics that merges private and common goods through the activity of

collective participation
ideal

in public

affairs.

This is not Aristotle's

form of government, nor is it by any means the only possible

form of government that he considers, but it is the form that he

claims to have the greatest practical efficacy for the organization
of the majority of states and the majority of men.
the Polity is not the "ideal

government.

For Aristotle,

best" but the "practical

best" form of

The reading of Aristotle which follows emphasizes the

theory of the polity at the expense of other possible schemes of

s

6

government, and while some may feel

him

a

that

I

am in danger of making

theorist of the pol i ty--which he is not--it is
this concept

of the mixed government design which has served
as the basic

blueprint for countless succeeding political theories and
revolutions.
In

formulating the mixed government theory, Aristotle's

question seems to have been as follows: "given the nature of men
as
they are--i.e., as history and our contemporary societies show them
to be--what is the most effective formula for ordering the polis that

we can find which will allow them to express the social

human experience and interests, yet contain them in

based upon common values, friendship and
gives rise to ancillary questions:

political

unity

shared public life?"

This

a

What is the role that values must

play in the evolution and maintenance of

can the frictions of social

a

diversity of

a

common way of life; how

inequality be minimized and the stability

and daily functions of a shared way of life be maintained?

assure stability and the long continuance of our city

in

Can we

such a way

that the end result will be of demonstrable positive benefit

citizen

in

the pol

i

?

Can we arrange our affairs in such

not only will our material

a

to

every

way that

needs be taken care of, but also that

decadence and luxury for the few at the expense of the many become
impossible, and the highest potentialities of mankind thus nurtured
and flourish here?

Aristotle's answer to the last questions seems

to

be a

7

qualified "yes" provided that some set of institutional
arrangements
be discovered which provides for broad participation
in the daily

search for answers.

around

a

For Aristotle, such arrangements will evolve

public assembly of legislating citizens who gather together

in a public space.

These citizens are the ones who make the law and

change the law, and it is through

a

combination of education and the

concrete experience of participation in politics that their emotional
and intellectual

support of the constitution and the public life of

the pol is are established and maintained.

this center, important consequences follow.

provides

a

When citizens so gather at
First, the public space

symbolic point of entry for the individual

common, public realm of shared experiences.
tely from private, personal

which impel

citizen into

a

This is set off absolu-

realms of human life, for the factors

the assemblage involve common concerns and common needs.

Second, the gathering together of heterogeneous citizens, qua members
of different and even opposed social

classes makes it possible for

them to mediate their differences through public discourse,

establish consensus through that dialogue, and hence
tively.

act collec-

Thus the public space provides individuals the opportunity
action, and society the possibility of collective

for political
action.

to

to

For

a

society must act, despite its internal

without breaking apart, and the only way it can do
tically overriding some interests

decisionmaking process--i

.e.

,

is

to

so

conflicts,

without systema-

incorporate them into the

by making political

actors out of every

8

citizen and insuring that his interests shall be articulated

in

the

public dialogue.
In what follows,

then,

I

hope it will

become clear that the

public space itself is the defining characteristic of any system of

politics based upon collective participation of unlike citizens, and
that having or not having access to it is what distinguishes citizens
of polities from other members of society.

We shall

see that it is

the citizens who emerge from tbe privatized background of social

life

to create and use the public space and to participate in public life.

We shall

also see that having access to the public space is what

determines
name.
tical

a

citizen in fact and distinguishes him from

Such a citizen, of course, has power; and such
life offsets the centrifugal

forces of social

a

a

citizen in

mode of poli-

diversity by pro-

viding access to political power among them severally: as long as the

various social

forces are physically present within the public realm,

political power is truly divided and shared.

None can come to syste-

matic and constant dominance over the others, and the public realm
can become the crucible for whatever is common to all of those citizens.
We are trying to walk

a

fine line here.

We are trying to

emphasize the notion that political communities exist first as generalities and second as complex entities characterized by clashes of com-

peting interests.

As we shall

see later, Aristotle's "polity"

is

a

society riven by class conflict of such severity that unless some kind

9

of recognition and power are extended to each of
the varying interests,
civil

strife and the breakdown of the whole will ensue.

Since, for

Aristotle, it is impossible for men to attain eudaimonia or
happiness
in

a

context of social breakdown, the causes of such breakdown must be

anticipated

the structure of political

in

institutions.

Hence the

central ity of the public space and the emphasis placed upon its

integrative functions.

ment of even

a

This assumption is crucial

working definition of what

a

to

the establish-

public space may be, and

it is logically prior to any examination of the kinds of politics that

take place there, or of the nature of the issues to be considered
there.

Throughout the following dissertation, then, we will accept

the following as an adequate definition of the fundamental

political

problem in

life:

If one of the main functions of the political association is
to render "public" judgments in those situations where the
plans, aspirations, and claims of its members are in
conflict; and if, at the same time, it is an association that
desires to retain a sense of community among its members--if,
in other words, it is to be not only a community of wellbeing but of bel onging--then there must of necessity be some
clearly defined procedures whereby the "opinions" of the membership may be incorporated into the decisions affecting that

community.^
For Sheldon Wolin, opinion ceases to be exclusive and private
and begins to become politically relevant at the moment it transcends
the merely private concerns of the individual

common problem.

and can be related to a

This in turn indicates that there is

a

kind

special

of rationality demanded of judgments whenever such judgments are to

apply to the whole community.

Such rationality should possess

a

10

general

character while not ignoring the actual
tendencies of par-

ticular political

forces "such as the attitudes and strategies
of

active social groups."

This, of course, shifts our fundamental

understanding of the political situation away from

a

mode of thought

based upon abstract principles, for what we have
to deal with

multiplicity of perspectives upon
historical moment.

a

particular problem in

a

is

a

concrete

Hence, should we wish to base our policies upon

the axiom that it is desirable to seek integrated and
consensual

solu-

tions, we must persuade the participating citizenry to abandon
as far
as possible alternative principles or theories of politics that
pro-

mote the interests of one segment of the social order at the expense
of others.

This is

the general

assessment in political

a

kind of triumph of the particular moment over
life, and it is based on the

realization that while philosophical elegance is unattainable
solutions, expediency and compromise are necessary if

mon viewpoint

is

to

a

in

lived

genuinely com-

emerge:

The reason is not simply that it is a good thing to formulate
policies that will reflect a sensitivity to variations and
differences throughout the society, but rather that a political society is simultaneously trying to act and to remain a
community.^

These considerations permit us to see more clearly the

connection between political decisions and political participation or
citizenship.

The political

actions of diverse citizens contribute to

the generality of decisions and simultaneously constitute methods for

expressing the resident differences of the society.

But this does

11

not solve the problem of action on the
collective level, because no
political

decision can affect everyone who lives
in the society

the same way,

indeed, agreement about the inclusion or
exclusion of

particular items on
tention.

in

a

political

agenda itself may be

a

bone of con-

Further, it is frequently the case that politics
is con-

cerned with both benefits and burdens and these, of
necessity, must
be based on some discriminatory scheme of classification.
general

agreements are often but necessary preludes

to

Thus,

discrimina-

tion, and participation can be seen as the basic method for

establishing agreements and political consensus about such distinctions

.

In

its political

aspect, then,

a

community is not held

together by truth but by consensus, and this carries with it

a

necessity that often causes modifications in both means and ends which

differ from what an "objective" or purely technical judgment might
dictate.

Therefore,

This gives to political judgments a character different from
that of a "true" philosophical or theological proposition.
In large measure, a political judgment is usually "judicial"
in quality; that is, for the inost part it involves a judgment
concerning conflicting claims, all of which possess a certain
validity.
As Aristotle shrewdly pointed out, there is no
problem of political judgment when one claim alone is admitted to be valid and enthroned above all the rest. The result of this condition, however, is that the political
association is replaced by the state of seige. But once the
political association is defined as a compound of many
diverse parts, and once it is allowed that these "parts" will
have different opinions, interests, and claims, the politicalness of the judgment will depend on a sensitivity to
diversities.
A political judgment, in other words, is "true"
when it is public, not public when it accords to some standard external to politics.^

12

What this does is to elevate procedure over substance and
compromise over principle.

It assumes

that justice, if there be any

such thing, is predicated of public rather than private affairs, and
it entails that the outcome of public political

prescribed

in

advance.

If,

processes cannot be

after all, we knew what "justice" was,

that is, if we could define justice as
resources, or as a set of institutional

a

particular distribution of
arrangements, or as something

predicated of the individual psychologies of the members of the community, then we might be willing to beg the question of how it might
be attained in order to be able to get there.

Our starting position

here will be, however, that not only are competing theoretical views
of justice possible, but that

a

number of such competing theories will

doubtless be scattered among the individual citizens of
munity.

One takes

a

a

given com-

diversity of inters ts and views as given, then,

and the problem of acting for the good of the whole as the desideratum

.

It is precisely because

the concrete situation is constantly

changing, and the interests of the parties involved varied and hetero-

geneous that we give priority to

kind of collective epistemology

a

with respect to collective problems.
comes in advance--only to provide

a

We do not try to stipulate out-

"space" in which consensus can

emerge.
Given these assumptions and our definition of the nature of
political judgment, it is clear that we are speaking of

a

a

political

realm of collective decisionmaking that is secular and limited

in

its

13

scope.

The matters to be considered in the public space are all and

only those which involve the generality of society; they are taken
up
and considered by those whom the political community has decided are

qualified to participate; the activities that take place in this
public space therefore have

a

peculiar quality and a peculiar focus

because only here is that business which affects the common interest
considered, and only here are the compromises worked out that allow
its carrying forward.

Given these restrictions, it is not difficult

to support the claim that political

activity is an autonotnous realm of

action, that "political action" concerns something quite specific, and

that the private beliefs and concerns of the various individuals who

gather in the public space will not be proper items on its agenda.

What we want to do here then, is to work our way through some of the
philosophical and historical

treatments of

a

conception of political

life that explicitly denies the contemporary notion that "everything
is political."

At stake in this argument is the problem of

participation: if everything

is

political, then we can point to no

specific realm of collective life which has responsibility for

ordering and regulating the others, and we shall find no kind of human
activity or art peculiar or appropriate

everything is political, then it

is

to

such responsibility.

impossible to discover

action from which anyone might be or has been excluded.

ception of the political

a

If

realm of

Such a con-

threatens to homogenize the specifically

political out of existence and sink it permanently beneath the waves
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of "social" life.^
We shall

return to some of these themes later.

sufficient to let these general

For now it is

remarks stand for the basic notion of

the public space, the kind of politics that takes place there, and the

aims of purposes of that politics.

Given this much, let us see if it

is possible to outline the primary characteristics of a public space

in general

that one might take up any given political

so

and see whether it is organized around

Following is
full

a

a

arrangement

public space or not.

list of considerations, baldly and simply stated

recognition that each requires

a

in

thesis of its own if all of its

implications are to be spelled out.
1)

The assembled body will be sovereign with respect to the
common affairs of the polity, i.e., it will have the
power to ensure that its decisions become policy.

2)

The methods of its conduct will be collegial, i.e., power
and authority will be vested equally in each of a number
of colleagues.

3)

The individuals assembled will engage in debate and
dialogue, using language comprehensible to the general
Any restrictions upon debate will be unifomily
body.
imposed.

4)

The assembly will dispose of various items of business by
majority vote, unless it agrees to different stipulations
for special cases.

5)

Exclusion or inclusion of items of business on the agenda
will be determined by the members of the assembly at
large, or through the agency of its own appointed
magistrates or officers.
One feels something of

open up

a

a

fool.

These general

stipulations

Pandora's box of political and philosophical problems.

It
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is absolutely impossible that the simple notion of a public
space

will

not erupt into byzantine complexities as soon as it is set

either in
historical

a

full-blown theory of political
situation.

The philospher will

curiosity about whether

a

life or applied in

dov<n

a

seek to satisfy his

public space exists or not by carefully

delineating its formal characteristics and then matching them up with
their possible treatments in various treatises on the subject.

The

historian will see the rough outlines of concepts battered beyond

recognition by political accident and misconception as they are
pushed and hauled by

a

body of desperate and excited men who,

someplace, try somehow to get

a

larger society to see things their

way with respect to institutional arrangements.

explore what

a

public space might be, and make

If we
a

would really

realistic appraisal

of its strengths and weaknesses, we need to combine the methods of
the philospher and the historian.

First, if the Aristotelian polity serves as the earliest

example of the notion we wish to explore, it is by no means the only
one.

The idea of a publicly accessible political

space in which the

major decisions that affect the community at large are taken is at the
heart of all republican forms of government.

It was

the spirit of

this idea which animated the Roman Republic, the Florentine Republic
of 1494, the Whig doctrines of Parliamentary supremacy of seventeenth

century England and, finally, the Congress of the United States itself
as it was conceived at Annapolis in 1787.

Each of these, obviously.
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presents us with

a

distinct cultaral context and unique historical

tradi tion.

Second, there is

sense in which we might say that the

a

bodies of writing which formulated and explained this kind of govern-

ment are simply theories, and that the notion of

public space is

a

nothing more than an elaborate rationalist daydream unless it can

somehow be brought to birth politically and given
world.

a

life in the

Hence, the plausibility of the notion of public space with

•

respect to the actual practices of men is something that can only be

studied and tested historically.
theoretical

we shall

What have men done with this

notion in specific historical contexts?

Here,

I

think,

see that the notion can mean little by itself no matter how

thoroughly its theoretical
matters is that political

underpinnings might be explored.

What

theories, like great religions, are depen-

dent upon specific contexts and the daily practices of the ways of
life of the people who adopt and institutionalize them for their

ultimate form and political

issue.

One could look,

for example, at

the various treatments Christianity has received in Madrid, in Rome,
in Sao Paolo,

in Kiev,

or in Seol

,

to

see that the actual working out

of a single set of doctrines is subject

variation.

to

considerable local

Therefore, if we really want to know what the notion of

a

public space entails, we need to look not only at such theoretical

formulations as have been provided by Aristotle and Machiavelli among
others, but also at the practices to which these and other theories
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have given birth.

Once having done so, we can then raise the

question whether this notion of an open space at the heart of things

might find critical application with respect

to

the present conduct

of the United States Congress.

Now there are

a

number of obvious logical

and theoretical

difficulties which arise almost in constant conjuction with the
notion of

a

public space politics.

them briefly, and wait until

All

I

can do here is allude to

the appropriate moment to develop them

further.

The Distinction Between The Public and the Private

First we must confront the implications which our central
notion has for the perennial clash between particular and general
interests.

What is being emphasized above all

is that the primary

function of the assembled group is to articulate what is common or
general

to

the life of the community as a whole.

a whole must be capable of making

Hence the group as

"political" judgments.

Note that

it is this integrative aspect of public space politics that sets

political

action apart from other kinds of human activity, and the

realm of politics apart from the particularistic and heterogeneous
array of concerns which the participants in the process bear with

them as they enter the public space.

ticipant in such
of

a

a

political

Here we can see that any par-

process must find himself in something

bind: he must articulate his particular interests or lose the
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game of power; he must defend and promote his separate,
individual

views or they will

not emerge from the shadows of the private realm

to enlighten the public realm; he must urge his
particular interests

forward as forcefully as possible in order to ensure that
they will

not go ignored or be systematically overriden.

Such activity is

necessary in order that the product of the deliberations be truly
integrative.

At the same time, however, he must know when to compro-

mise or even to abandon his personal

interests in order that the

strength and vitality of the community be promoted.

He must be

genuinely capable of listening to others and of modifying his own
views because he recognizes that no-one ever attains complete grati-

fication if the consensus to be established is truly genuine.

Much

attention has been devoted to the problem of developing the kind of
individual who will abandon particular interests at the right moment,

and for many writers in the republican tradition, this capacity to

find the balance between the particular and the general within them-

selves is an essential characteristic of the ideal

political

actor,

and the one element which ensures that the public realm will always

be that place where the art of politics is practiced and can
flourish.

Aristotle presents us with the phronimos as the person who

best combines the attributes needed by the political actor
pol ity

.

Machiavelli discourses on the subject of virtu

;

in

the

the

English of 1688 saw the problem of personal characteristics pri-
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marily in terms of

a

"patriotism" that bowed neither to the king
nor

to popular opinion.'^

The Americans upheld the notions of
genius,

ability and virtue.^

In

all

of these cases,

the vitality and longevity of political
a

function of the moral

institutions would be partly

and psychological

duals who vivified them.

it was recognized that

qualities of the indivi-

Why were such concerns so important?

Why

could it even be said, to take the language of modern social
science
for just

a

moment, that it might be the case that political

institu-

tions were the dependent variable and human psychology the primary

thing?

The answer lies in the word "corruption" in its old-

fashioned sense.

Political

institutions, like all artifacts, are

subject to the forces of time and decay.
fragile because they embody

genuine balance between the

a

conflicting forces within society.

were to fail

to

Republics are particularly

If the

participating individual

seek the common good, his logical

be to promote his particular goods instead.

alternative would

Under these conditions,

either one faction having private goods in common v/ould cane

dominate in the assembly, or the body would fail

consensus necessary for action.

to arrive

to

at the

Readers of the French press, for

example, have known for six generations now that

to

read,

"The

disorder was at its height" as

a

description of the activities in

the Chamber of Deputies is but

a

succinct rendering of the problem

of legislative immobilisme

.

Therefore, whether the assembly came to

be dominated by faction or paralyzed by self-interested heteroge-
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neity, the integrative functions of the public
space would be lost

and the way opened for

a

transfer of power to political

arrangements

that would systematically favor one viewpoint or
interest over the
rest.

9

Thus the institutional

integrity of the public space qua

institution rests upon the personal
their several

integrity of the citizens and

capacities to abandon personal

moment in order

to work

interest at the right

together in the common interest.

between the public space and the citizen is

so

This bond

strong that they

might be thought of as two sides of the same coin: the common
interest will emerge only insofar as the participants genuinely work
toward it.
At the same time, it may be possible to distinguish between

issues which involve the common interest and those which do not.
could, for example, introduce
the sort of distinction C. Wright Mills draws in The
Sociological Imagination between "the personal troubles of
milieu" and "the public issues of social structure."
Personal troubles. Mills says, "occur within the character of
the individual and
his immediate relations with
others." So their "statement and resolution" properly lie
with "the individual as a biographical entity and within the
scope of his immediate milieu--the social setting that is
directly open to his personal experience and to some extent
A trouble is a private matter."
his wilfull activity.
Public issues of social structure, however, transcend "these
local environments of the individual," and concern "the organization of many such milieux into the institutions of an
historical society as a whole, with the ways in which various
milieux overlap and interpenetrate to form the larger strucAn issue is a public
ture of social and historical life.
^0
matter.
,

.

.

.

We
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Perhaps we can best express the essence of the public-private

distinction as follows: particular interests are predicated either of
indi duals or segments of the social

of the society as

a

whole.

order; general

interests are those

Particular interests are, for the most

part, adequately dealt with in the private sphere, or among those

groups or associations whose immediate concern they are.

The public

realm, again is that place where issues involving the whole are raised

and dealt with.

The political

tension between the particular and the
capacity that importunate citi-

general, then, lies in the potential

zens always have to claim that their "troubles" are really "issues"

and then to trammel

them into the public space and make them matters

of public deliberation and policy.

Where the line between them ought

to be drawn, however, has historically been treated as a public issue

and this has played havoc with the distinction.

The twentieth century

at least is showing us that it is possible that the citizens can use
the public space for logrolling and tradeoffs with the result that

public deliberations have come to be increasingly occupied with the

consideration of "troubles" which are handled as though they were
issues, in

a

constant round-robin of mutual gratification of par-

ticular needs.

This development was nowhere anticipated by the

ancients, so far as

I

can tell, and it seems that modern experience

may be in the process of teaching us

a

brand new lesson about poli-

tics.
In any case,

perit was the awareness that the private and

s
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sonal

could eruct within the public space and
displace consideration

of public and common goods that drove Hannah
Arendt to try to

distinguish between the two realms so forcefully.
importance to say about the basic concept of

She has much of

public space and it is

a

through her writings primarily that the notion has emerged
in American
political

theory since the second world war.

In Arendt' s

writings,

the distinction between public and private, i.e., the
distinction bet-

ween public issues and private troubles,
subtle.

is complex, varied

and

A comprehensive treatment of these notions would take many

pages, but her basic idea seems to be drawn from the simple fact that
the public assembly itself is

experience.

a

unique form of association in human

none of the concerns appropriate to private or lesser

If

associations are brought before the public assembly, the line between
issues and troubles can then be mapped out with relative ease.

at least is my understanding of her fundamental

This

position though she

nowhere explains it in these terms.
For Arendt the distinction between public and private

corresponds to that between the household and the political
first emerged in ancient Greece.
realm,

a

12

The household was a pre-poli tical

necessary condition for citizenship, but always

higher end.

It was,

realm that

by contrast, the public realm,

a

means to a

i.e., the polis

way of life, that set off the Greek from the barbarian and made
and truly human way of life possible.

Greek life, pol

i

citizenship was

a

13

In Arendt' s

a

free

reconstruction of

relationship of equality among
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individuals who might be unequal with respect
lity in the private sphere.

to

This "equality" was

cially created equality of status as citizens.
equal

i

either wealth or abia

special

artifi-

The polls guaranteed

ty

not because all men were born or created equal, but on the
contrary, because men were by nature ... not equal ....
Equality existed only in this specifically political realm,
where men met one another as citizens and not as private
persons .l**

For Arendt, then, it is in the public space and there alone

that men can encounter one another as equals and coexist in the realm
of free speech and political

action.

The Problem of Representation

If the distinction between the public and the private is one

of the fundamental
a

theoretical

questions bound up with the notion of

public space, the problem of representation is the second.

Representation in general has been justified on
cal

a

host of theoreti-

grounds, and emerged historically in many times and many places.

It presents us with something of a vexed question, however, because

while it attempts to preserve the attributes of

a

genuine public

space, it puts that space at one remove from the people themselves.

Thus, theories of representation first try to justify the removal of
the public space from direct access by all of the citizens, and

second supply rationales for whatever particular form of represen-

tation is advocated, in order to show that the relationship between
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the people and their representatives preserves

a

kind of mapping of

the one upon the other.

Hannah Pitkin has provided one analysis of the

her Concept of Representation.^^

proble.Ti

Pitkin distinguishes between four

elements which, in some way or other, have been combined
theories of representation.

in

First, formal

in

most

representation is the

transfer of authority to act in one's behalf, brought about
through
an institutional

arrangement such as an election process.

Second,

descriptive representation takes as primary the question of the

extent

to

which representatives reflect the characteristics of

those they formally represent.

Such characteristics as ethnic

background, social class, age, place of residence, and occupation
are considered important.

According to this measure,

a

represen-

tative legislature should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the

people at large.

Third, symbolic representation is less concerned

with either the transfer of authority or
social

a

possible mapping of

characteristics than it is with the belief systems of the

individuals involved: how

constituents?

is

The crucial

believe in or have faith

in

the representative perceived by his

question here is, "do the represented
their representative?"

The fourth kind

of representation taken up by Pitkin revolves around the now-ancient

debate over the behavior of the representative once he reaches
office: is he to act as a trustee or

a

delegate?

When the

representative enters the realm of political action, he carries
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with him

a

complex set of relationships with those for whom he

acts:

Representing here means acting in the interest of the
represented, in a manner responsive to them.
The representative must act independently; his action must involve
discretion and judgment; he must be the one who acts. The
represented must also be (conceived as) capable of independent action and judgment, not merely being taken care of.
And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between
representative and represented about what is to be done, that
conflict must not normally take place. The representative
must act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it
occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found
persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented
without good reason in terms of their interest, and without a
good explanatioOgOf why their wishes are not in accord with
their interest.

Other considerations flood in from other sources.

The

American colonists took up the delegate/trustee question in terns of
the general

relationship between the people as

legislature.

a

whole and their

While preserving the form of the basic question, they

saw it as a matter of choice between "virtual" and "actual" represen-

tation.

The English were in the habit of telling the colonists that,

as British subjects, they were "virtually" represented in
Pari iament--i .e.

,

that

to represent one there.

from England by

a

a

man didn't have to be one's neighbor in order
The Americans, finding themselves separated

variety of geographical, political

and social

fac-

tors demanded that their representatives "actually" represent them,

that is that they be able to hold them individually responsible for
their actions.

According to Gordon Wood, neither the debates which

then took place throughout the colonies nor their ultimate resolution
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in the institutions they founded at both state and
national

levels

ever completely resolved the basic tension between the two
approaches.

Republicanism
with its emphasis on devotion to the transcendant public good
logically presumed a legislature in which the various groups
in the society would realize "the necessary dependence and
connection" each had upon the others.
"Our situation
requires their being firmly united in the same common cause"
with "no schism in the body politic." And this kind of
legislature presumed a particular sort of representation--"a
house of disinterested men" who "would employ their whole
time for the public good."!^

At the same time, the colonists frequently put it forward that
such

a

scheme of representation left rather more distance between the

people and their agents in the legislature than their desires for
"actual" representation would permit.

ultimately evolved

uniquely American theory of representation which

a

attempted to ensure that "equal
equal

Bernard Bailyn holds that they

interest among the people should have

interest in [the assembly]."

The result would be, if not a wholly original contribution
to advanced thought, at least a reversion to a radical concept that had long since disappeared from the mainstream of
For such arguments led to a
English political theory.
of
conceptions of government by
recovery and elaboration
the active and continuous consent of the governed that had
flourished briefly a century earlier, during the
Commonwealth period, and had then faded during the
Where government was such an accurate
Restoration
mirror of the people, sensitively reflecting their desires
and feelings, consent was a continuous, everyday process.
In effect, the people were present through their representatives, and were themselves, step by step and point by
Mo longer
point, acting in the conduct of public affairs.
merely an ultimate check on government, they were in some
Government had no separate existence
sense the government.
was
by the people as well as for the
it
them;
apart from
from their continuous conauthority
people; it gained its
.

.

.
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P^o^l^inied by Blackstone no
less
thln by
sfunhJl
less than
Hobbes,"'l.Tf
that law was a command "prescribed
bv
^
source superior and which the inferior
is bouSd t^
obey --such a sense of law as the
declaration of a person
or body existing independently above
the subjects of law
and imposing its will upon them, was
brought into question
by the developing notion of
representation.
Already in
these years there were adumbrations of the
sweeping
diation James Wilson and others would make
of
Blackstone's definition of law, and of the view
they would
put in Its place: the view that the binding
power of law
flowed from the continuous assent of the
subjects of law
the view that the only reason why a free
and independent
man was bound by human laws was this--that he
bound
himsel f ."^o
'

Unfortunately, the foregoing considerations do not
even

begin to exhaust the difficulties inherent in the
concept of repre-

sentation or the related issue of consent.
people "consent" to institutions let alone

How can we tell when the
to

their specific acts?

When the citizens of Massachusetts Bay Colony began

to

debate the

form of representation that would hold between themselves and
their
central

government

in

Boston in 1774 and 1775, the question they

wished to raise was one of apportionment: how were the commercial
interests of the Boston merchants to be meshed with the agricultural

interests of the farmers in the western part of the state?

Convinced that representation must be "equal" and grounded

in

something more permanent than mere population, the citizens of

western Massachusetts had held, since 1691, that every town, no

matter how small, could send one representative

to

the legislature.

Hence the question: were towns to be represented, or individuals?
Some may see this as an illustration of the sort of question that
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arises with respect to the problem of formal

representation which we

noted as the first of Pitkin's four elements.
that once

a

general

The point here is

body of citizens moves to constitute an assembly

that will act in its name, the question of the formal

ween the two will turn out

to be political

result in the emergence of

a

tative system.

,

relations bet-

and its disposition may

particular interest within

a

represen-
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To exhaustively treat of these and other questions would

take us far afield.

What counts here is that there is nothing

simple about making the jump from direct democracy to representative

government; that whenever this apparently elegant idea

jected into the real world of politics,

a host of

is

inter-

very particular

and specific complexities emerges, and that behind all theories of

representative government, no matter how elegant or how publicly
arrived at, the discerning student can discover

a

maze of pipes and

wires and Rube Goldberg devices designed to confer upon the whole
the illusion of harmonious function.

refers to the whole representational

Gordon Wood at one point

process as

a

"fiction" which

the Americans of the 1770s nearly exposed for themselves.

20

Whether

this is true or false is not something we shall try to settle here.

But the Massachusetts example shows that if the tension between the

common and the particular is seen from the standpoint of geography,
the fundamental

dilemma can be stated, not in terms of

neity of diverse interests arranged against

a

a

heteroge-

common one, but of
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centralism vs. localism.

Unable to discover

a

formula for the ulti-

mate resolution of the problem, the writings and
speeches of

Americans throughout the revolutionary period frequently
show them
reaching out to grasp both horns at once:

Submerge all particular and partial interests into the
general good was still the common cry.
James Winthrop was
very daring and unusual indeed but very honest in 1737
when
he impatiently retorted that "it is vain to tell us that
we
ought to overlook local interests," for no free government
could disregard them.
"No man when he enters into society
does it from a view to promote the good of others, but he
does it for his own good. "21

Intellectual Origins of the Republican Tradition

At this point, let us return

concept of

a

to

the basic notion behind the

public space: society is comprised of

a

heterogeneity

of interests and views and it is the function of the political
order, as representative in some sense of the whole, to integrate

whatever centrifugal

forces may be present into

a

consensus and

so

make political action possible.

If

into being in the world, it will

not habitually or regularly occur

such political

action can

corne

at the expense of one particular minority or class interest among
the citizens.

The writings of Plato, Aristotle and Thucydides all

display, in various forms, the horrors and injustices that followed
the utter domination of

democratic element.

a pol is

by either its oligarchic or its

Plato sought to design a set of political

arrangements that could make such political one-sidedness
impossible, first in his Republic and later in The Laws

.

Similarly,
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Aristotle, as suggested earlier proposed his
theory of the polity or

mixed form of government as

mote an end

to

civil

a

design for the state which would pro-

strife by permanently embodying

a

compromise

between the constantly warring class interests
present there.
will

review Aristotle's theory in detail

below.

We

What is important

to note here is that the Greek experience taught
the lesson that

neither oligarchy nor democracy would result

in

the kind of vivere

^ivi^g which would be the practically best possible for
most men.
The one suppressed political

liberties and individual

diversity,

while the other made excellence impossible and encouraged the
ignorant to pretend to an art of which they knew nothing.
advice on how the demos might never lose power, Hesiod

is

Asked for
said to

have replied, "Cut off the tops of all the corn that grows above

average height."

The polity of Aristotle, then, is

a

"middle

constitution" in which the middle class rules by serving as
balance of power between the two extremes.

organization of the polity

is

government designs that were
to citizens drawn from all

a

The political

simple compared to some of the mixed
to come later:

the assembly is open

classes of society.

From it, officers

the state are elected and serve terms of relatively short

duration.

Everything revolves around the assembly or gathering of

citizens in the public space.

The mix of diverse interests is

established not by designating separate executive, judicial and
legislative branches, but

in

the admissions criteria for the
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assembly.
social

general, Aristotle's intention is to mix diverse

In

forces so that they may balance.

Now it is co.nmon knowledge,

or should be, that large assemblies of Athenian
citizens exercised

judicial
council

functions outside of the assembly, and that the boule
or
of four hundred carried out administrative and
executive

functions--but these institutions are not expressly treated

in

those

books of the Politics which are directly concerned with the polity
itself.

Instead, what Aristotle does explicitly stress is that the

polity is

a

mix or balance of virtue, wealth, and numbers, and then

goes on to offer

a

variety of fonnulas through which it might be

institutionally composed.
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The constant element in any of these

possible sets of institutional
of social elements.

arrangements, however, is the mixture

To claims of different social

classes, then,

a

mixed constitution either distributes political power or awards it
entirely to the middle class, which
rich and poor.

political

In

in

this recognition of

itself is
a

diversity of claims,

authority is divided and shared.

authority is

to

Insofar as that

be exercised by a sovereign assembly,

the Aristotelian polity is organized around

history by tracing the idea of

throughout the writings of various theorists

Neither do we intend

to

we find that

public space.

a

Now it is not our primary purpose here
in intellectual

combination of

a

in

to

perform an exercise
mixed constitution

a

the Western tradition

exhaustively explore every instance

it might be said that some significant variant of

a

in which

republic or mixed
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constitution came into being.
of Jean Bodin and we will

important.

I

We will

ignore the political

ignore the Republic of Venice.

thought

Yet it is

think, to search out the constant
elements in the basic

idea as they have appeared in both
theory and practice at selected

moments so that we might determine, if
possible,

to

what extent our

present institutions embody the basic
assumptions of that tradition of
which they form

a

part.

What we finally want to do is to discover

a

standard through which we might understand and
evaluate the political

activities and representative functions of the United
States Congress.
The reason for this is not difficult to state: the
present United

States is, by historical
society.

The political

standards, an amazingly heterogeneous
order, as we have claimed, has the potential

to integrate diversity into political

interest can emerge.

action such that

a

common

Our project is to see to what extent the public

space of theory continues to serve as the open point of access for
the

diversity of interests and views presently at large here.
standard cannot be derived simply from theory alone.

But the

Suppose that in

selecting certain past republics for study, we find that in no case
was

a

"pure" public space ever instituted?

absurd,

I

In

that case it would be

think to castigate the present Congress for failing to com-

port itself as one.
The idea of the mixed government with the public space at its

centre has exercised an incalculable influence on the Western
tradition:
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There IS

a tradition of thought on these
matters of which the
Pol2ti_cs^ formed part, but its role in that
tradition is difficult to assess precisely because it is so
vast and allpervasive.
The tradition in question may be referred
back to
Anstotle in nearly every respect, but (leaving aside the
fact that certain decisive formulations of its
doctrines were
made by Plato before him) so many subsequent authors
restated

parts of it and were influential in their own ways that,
especially under Renaissance conditions, it is hard to
define
with certainty the particular writer exerting authority
at a
particular point. We are, in short, confronted by the
problems of interpreting a tradition of thought; but that
tradition (which may almost be termed the tradition of mixed
government) is Aristotelian, and the Politics as well as
forming the earliest and greatest full exposition of it,
makes explicit so many of the implications which it might at
one time or another contain that- -apart from the enormous
direct authority which the book exerted--it is worth
rehearsing the theory of citizenship and polity which it contains in order to see what might (and did) result and what
importance the theory might (and did) possess for intellects
in the problem-situation of civic humanism. 24
,

That rehearsal will come

in

the next chapter.

Meanwhile, Kurt

Von Fritz has traced the influence of Aristotle's theory of the mixed

constitution as it was embodied by Polybius, first
to St.

Thomas.

to

Cicero and later

While Cicero was an important influence, widely and

frequently acknowledged by the founders of the American republic,
these two writers do not immediately concern us here.

What does con-

cern us, however, is Von Fritz' assertion about the influence of this
theory upon Machiavelli:

Machiavelli, who, according to a very widely accepted opinion, stands on the threshold of modern political philosophy,
in his Discorsi (Chapter VI) repeates several pages of
Polybius' sixth book in a paraphrase sometimes approaching a
From
literal translation without mentioning Polybius' name.
remained an
then on the theory in its Polybian form
important thread in modern European political thought, a
,

.

.
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development which in
esprit des Lois 25

L'

a

way culminated in Montesquieu's^ De
h

.

Mow in aiming ourselves at the Congress, it
would be a

pointless and fruitless exercise to trace out the various
national and
legal

traditions which influenced the Founders of the American

Republic.

Pocock sees the dominant line running through Aristotle
and

Machiavelli. 26 Von Fritz, as we have just seen, holds that
Polybius is
a

central

figure.

Felix Raab discovers Machiavelli exerting

but unfocused influence on the metaphysical

and moral

a

strong

assumptions that

underlay Tudor and later English conceptions of political authority
and power.
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Charles Mcllwain worked his way laboriously through the

lex publicam of Roman law and its spreading influence over the ius

gentium of English common law, citing cases as he went, and found
little modern authority for the English version of the mixed

constitution outside that of Jean Bodin, and little ancient authority
before the Roman period.

Polybius is not mentioned.

Corrine Weston

also holds that the theory of the mixed government was central

to

the

entire Anglo-American political tradition, but traces its genealogy
through yet

a

different route.

to understand the fundamental

29

The contemporary student, seeking

issues bound up in the theory is reluc-

tant to enter the controversies of intellectual and legal historians

about who was responsible for precisely which lines of influence and
which lines of influence exerted the greater force.

For the purposes

of the following, however, it has been necessary to adopt

a

design,

and that has been taken more or less intact from the more recent
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scholarship of J.G.A. Pocock.

It is Pocock who

most responsible

is

for placing the U.S. Constitution in the
mainstream of

tradition which he traces back first to England, then
and ultimately to Aristotle.

In

a

political

to Machiavelli

looking for a plan about which to

organize not only theories about the public space but
historical
attempts to implement one, Pocock

's

genealogy has its advantages: if

one takes Aristotle, Machiavelli, the men who brought about the

English Revolution of 1642 and, finally, the founders of the American
Republic themselves, one will be able

to

read directly the thoughts of

men who have actually lived during times when
known thing.

a

public space was

a

Since part of the attempt to shed light on the modern

Congress involves understanding the intellectual and political

incorporated in its design, this seems to be

issues

reasonable path to

a

follow.

The Contemporary Congress

When we turn to the Congress, however, and start examining

what the contemporary scholarship has

to

say about it, we discover

that it is widely held to be failing in its duties.
larship is voluminous and we must be content with

ments here and more detailed analysis later.

a

Again, the schofew sample com-

At bottom, most of the

criticisms can be traced back to the assumption that Congress

is

some-

how failing to make use of the public space which was its original
raison d'etre

.

For many,

the

itself again and again into

a

fact that the Congress has divided

set of competing internal

institutions
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means—whether they acknowledge this consciously or not--that
it

has

made itself institutionally incapable of performing
those acts of
synthesis which are the essence of political judgments and
the basis
of consensus.

Congress, it is held repeatedly, upholds special

interests at the expense of investigating and acting upon questions
of

broad policy.

This criticism appears someplace in the writings of

nearly every one of its professional

students.

What the bulk of the following more specific criticisms points
out is that many of the problems which we have been discussing with

reference to
general

a

public space and the conflict of social

forces in

have in fact come to light over the course of the history and

development of the United States Congress.

In

short, the Congress

embodies the realm of human politics writ small, and he who finds himself curious about nearly any aspect of political

life would do well

to study it.

... In large part, the history of the House of
Representatives has been a struggle to mold a coherent policymaking instrument out of a large disparate collectivity.
It has been, one might say, a struggle of the general versus
the particular, in which the particular seems the more powerful

force.

The role of the particular in Congress has been institutiona-

lized and strengthened through the emergence of an elaborate system of

committees and subcommittees.

As long as a hundred years ago, Woodrow

Wilson decried these developments, claiming that the theatre of debate
has permanently shifted from the floor of Congress to the comparative

privacy of its committee rooms.

Here, the representatives of the
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American people concerned themselves primarily
with private rather
than public business.
as it occasionally did,

The House, when it finally did gather
together
for the most part simply ratified substantive

decisions taken in its committee rooms.

Both Wilson and James

Sterling Young, by the way, have gone out of their ways
to note that
the accoustics in the House chamber are atrocious--hardly
what one

would expect of the architectural meeting place of an assembly
the
essential

purpose of which is to engage in speech and dialogue.^^

J. Mclver Weatherford claims that the enactment of public ritual

has

replaced the substance of legislative work thoughout most of the daily
round of the average member of Congress.

David Mayhew finds that the

"entrepreneurial member" has emerged with particular prominence since
the reforms of the 1970s.

This individual

is

primarily concerned with

his own reputation and the activities of getting re-elected.

individuals, of course, can be expected

to

Such

uphold neither the institu-

tion of Congress nor the public business of which it was instituted

take charge.
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Other critics find that the House is decentralized

to

the

point of paralysis; that the party system, which once focused member
energies on selected problems and promoted consensus when the time

came to vote, has declined in power and been replaced by an

endlessly shifting set of ad hoc caucuses comprised of entrepreneurial members, which promote no consistent program in the broad

public interest.

Others point out that leadership in the chamber is

attainable only after years and years of service--thereby denying

to
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the public the positive benefits of the
insights of those in the

prime of life and skewing the scheme of
representation

to

favor the

results of elections held long ago by an older
generation.

Finally,

David Vogler points out the sheer range of particular
issues upon
which the contemporary member of Congress is called

to

exercise

judgment:
The scope of these decisions is mind boggling.
During the
course of one day in June, 1969, the House discussed the
following subjects: financing of airport facilities, disposal
of surplus lead, the use of Defense Department facilities
in making movies, aid to the arts, treatment of laboratory
animals, creation of a national wildlife refuge, textile
imports. Post Office salaries, chemical and biological warfare research, and patents and copy rights. 35

Vogler goes on to make the obvious point that such

a

number

and variety of "issues" frequently puts legislators in the position of

having to decide about questions of which they know little or nothing.
He quotes two members:
have to vote on 150 different kinds of things every
year--foreign aid, science, space, technical problems, and
the Merchant Marine, and Lord knows what else.
I
can't
possibly become an expert in all these fields."
"It's not uncommon for me to go [to] the floor with bells
ringing, votes being taken, and it's on a bill or issue that
have never heard of before.
I
I
haven't the remotest idea of
the issues involved.
You've got to make up your mind; you
can't vote "maybe" and you can't vote "present"--you don't
want to.
So you have to make a decision on the best basis
"I

you can. "36
Among the most important cricisms, however, is that in its

inability to address the broad problems of public policy. Congress has

repeatedly made unwarranted grants of power to the presidency.

If

this allegation turns out to be true, it should come as no surprise to
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students of the republican tradition of government.

The Americans of

the revolutionary period in particular, advocated
the Whig thesis that

executive power would grow unchecked in the absence of

strong

a

parliamentary counterforce.
Here, then, seems to be the problem.

Congress specializes.

It divides itself up into subunits for the purpose of coining
to

grips with specialized issues— "troubles" if you will.
dual

Its indivi-

members are encouraged to be self-interested by both the struc-

ture of their daily occupations and the nature of their electoral
ties to local

constituencies.

upon Congressional

The influence of particular interests

deliberations is enhanced by both these factors.

Meanwhile, the growing independence of individual members makes it

increasingly difficult for the leadership

facilitate the kinds of

to

compromise and bargaining that are precursory
sus.

Professional

political

to

consen-

students of the body are nearly unaminous in

holding that while able to serve particular issues extremely ably.

Congress is unable

ought to confront

to
in

address the broad general

issues which it

its role as representative of a national

constituency.
If this makes sense,

classical

then

I

think we will

be able

to

use the

traditions of public space politics to support the following

claim: Congress has abandoned the use of its public space.

Virtually

nothing of importance takes place on the floor, and no political

scientist in his right mind would expect

to

learn anything about the

body by sitting in the gallery and following the debates there.
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Everything of importance takes place in the caucuses
and the

committee and subcommittee rooms.

The result is that Congress is

institutionally incapable of making political judgments in
the sense
outlined earlier.

What dominates its attention is private business;

what rules the roost are special interests.
consequence of all this

is

And the institutional

that, especially since the 1930s, Congress

has steadily allowed its power to ebb away to the executive, thus

altering the balance of power in
classical
a

a

mixed constitution.

view, on Aristotle's view, the fundamental

Mow on the

attribute of

morally bad state is that one section or interest of the social

order comes to dominate the rest and orchestrate public affairs
according to its own preferences.

37

The mixed constitution sought

to make the emergence of such interests impossible by granting a role
in the formation of general

actually present

in

policy to each of the several

society.

interests

When approaching matters of common con-

cern, then, the many particular interests converged through

a

general

public dialogue.
Now suppose

a

system in which matters concerning the common

interest are not raised, but matters concerning special

handled with dispatch.
special

In

such a case, not one but

a

interests are

multiplicity of

interests constantly comes to the top of things one by one as

it were and exerts dominant influence over its particular sphere of

concerns.

Once its interests are taken care of, it recedes to be

replaced by another.

Where we generally think of despotism as

unshared power over the whole by

a

part,

that power is usually con-
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ceived as persisting over time.

Suppose, instead, a temporarily

unshared power, or an endless succession of moments
of unshared power,
in which the agent continually changes bu the form
persists.
a

case, the general

such

interest is pushed out of the picture as surely as

if it had been displaced by
general

In

a

single abiding interest.

But now the

body discovers no dissatisfaction or pain because the
consti-

tuent interests severally find that their most urgent requirements
have been satisfied.
tuency.

If this

is,

All
in

that goes begging is the national

fact,

a

consti-

fair representation of contemporary

events, it makes sense to raise questions about the long term fate of
the general

order itself.

To explore the implications of these and other developments

and the present state of the Congress, then, we will take

space model

a

public

of politics, briefly trace selected moments in its history

in thought and action,

inquire into the attributes of the citizens who

were deemed necessary to sustain it and ask the following questions:
First, is Congress organized around
sense?

Is

tradition?

a

public space in the traditional

it a legislative assembly as defined in the republican

Second, does the contemporary member of Congress exercise

the prerogatives and display the attributes of the traditional

of a republic?

Does he have the personal

and institutional

that republics traditionally conferred upon their citizens?

citizen

powers
If the

answers to these questions turn out to be "no," then we might make

brief foray into yet another question: what form of government now

prevails in the United States?

a

—
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CHAPTER

II

THE REPUBLICAN POLITICAL TRADITION

I.

Philosophical Background:

Aristotle's Corpus

In laying bare the fundamental

differences that separated

Plato and Aristotle, Whitney Oates holds that that which ultimately

distinguished them could have no rational basis, and uses

a

remark

from Origen to illustrate his point:

Celsus has brought the reproach that the Christians make this
demand
"Don't examine or investigate, but believe."
Origen admits the reproach in a way, by observing that few
men have the time or the inclination for investigation. But,
Origen goes on to say that the gentiles really do the same
thing:
"For it is not by waiting to hear the arguments of
all the philosophers and of the different sects, and by
learning how some may be upset and others established, that a
man chooses to be a Stoic, or a follower of Plato or a
Peripatetic, or an Epicurean
but it is by a certain
unreasoning impulse alogoi tini phora though they will not
admit the fact." One way to express the difference between
Plato and Aristotle may be this: Whereas the alogos phora of
Plato led him to feel the reality of the other-world and the
illusion of phenomena, the alogos phora of Aristotle led him
in the opposite direction.
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

;

(

)

Divergence is strikingly evident

ments of the political
social

realm.

in

their respective treat-

The Republ ic envisioned

a

political

and

unity conferred by the authority of the philosopher-king and

derived in its turn from

a

vision of the Forms themselves.

But the

Pol itics occupied itself with the variety of existing modes of politi-

cal

life and explored not one but several
45

possible solutions to the

46

fundamental problems of politics-solutions that
found their genesis
in history as well

men of the Republic

as
is

metaphysics.

The bond that finally unites the

that of knowledge; the common element in the

life of Aristotelian political

actors is that of citizenship.

The

former is true and unchanging, but there are many ways in
which
son can be

a

a

per-

citizen.

If we take the notions of unity and diversity as the
fundamental

motifs of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, we will have

made
cal

large step toward understanding the basic ethos of the politi-

a

philosophy of the Stagirite:

diversity of political
of political

the emphasis is on diversity--

forms and diversity of individual

experiences

life.

There are two elements which, together with the political philosophy of Plato, form the necessary background for
Pol itics

a

reading of the

First is Aristotle's emphasis on the multiplicity of being

.

and heterogeneity of methods for studying it which clearly emerge as
fundamental

results of the multitude of studies that comprise his

corpus as

whole.

which

in

theory.

a

Second is the Greek city-state itself:

somewhat idealized form is the subject of his political
If Aristotle's metaphysical

and logical

predisposition to discover multiplicity

in

all

treatises reflect

areas of formal

this was undoubtedly reinforced for him by his political

matter.

the pol is

a

study,

subject

When he turned to examine the variety of existing fourth-

century city-state forms--each with its ruling divinity, peculiar
customs and way of life, he also found an equal diversity of political

2
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orders--each with its roots

in

that lay outside the political

historical

and sociological

realm proper.

factors

Constitutions, unlike

birds and syllogisms, could not be studied
separate from their

background conditions:
In tracing the constitution to social
conditions, Aristotle
gives explicit recognition to an important truth,
which Plato
had certainly not recognized with equal clearness,
though the
facts which pointed to it were familiar enough.
The genesis
of the constitution of a State was perhaps studied by
Aristotle more closely and more successfully than it has been
studied till recent times, for the "social contract" theory,
so long dominant in political science, tended to disguise
the
circumstances under which a State comes by its constitution.
The pictures drawn under its influence of a people meeting
together and selecting its government, as a man might select
a house or an article of furniture, were of course
consciously ideal, but they obscure our recognition of the
fact which Aristotle had long ago pointed out, that the
constitution of a State has its roots in what moderns term
its social system.

It was ultimately political

variety which was to become the

subject of Aristotle's vast empirical

studies of politics.

The mixed-

government theory of the polity, with its class structure, balance of
institutions, active participating citizen and system of distributive

justice based on property and merit reflect an attempt
balance within

a

single political

interests that characterize

a

to

unify and

order all of the diverse forces and

city.

As such,

these forces can be seen

as expressions of phenomena in the human world for which parallels can

be found in logic and in nature.

As but one of several

alternative

models of the "wel 1 -governed" state, the mixed government theory

simultaneously Aristotle's acknowledgment that political

is

theory can

only recommend, never prescribe, and that the plausibility of its
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prescriptions rests on the extent to which it
incorporates an

understanding of the dilemmas of its era and of its
audience.

Though one may regard Aristotle's works or their
parts as
stages in the unfolding chronology of his thought,
written at dif-

ferent times and evincing
from Plato

3

a gradual

but uninterrupted movement away

or as constantly-revised notebooks which served him
as

lecture notes for students on different levels of understanding,^
the
themes of equivocality and multiplicity constantly recur
throughout

them in ways that Plato could never have intended or permitted.

A few

examples should serve to illustrate this.
First, and perhaps most fundamentally, for Aristotle "being"
(

to 0£) is a manyness rather than a oneness.^

dent of being in its concrete particularity
face up to the equivocal

(

Further, even the stu-

ousia

nature of the essence of

)

eventually must

a

particular

substance^--nei ther immanent nor transcendent; always

matter and form.

a

combination of

Thus the basic "stuff" of things is multiple and,

furthermore, the words we use to speak of them have multiple implications and uses.

Second, then, is

when we talk about the world.

a

claim about the language we use

This is summed up by the observation he

repeatedly makes that "'being', or 'is', or 'to
ways." To say that

homonymously

,

a

be'

is said in many

word has many uses is to say that it is used

and in Categories lal, Aristotle explains:

Things are said to be homonymous that have in common only a
name; the definitions corresponding to the name are different.
Thus, for example, both a dance and a sphere are
balls.
So the name of these two things is common to them
both, but the definition that corresponds to the name is dif-

'
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ferent.
For if one gives an account of what it is for
each
of them to be a ball, one will give a separate
definition for
each.

One can reasonably regard the homonymy of terms as

a

problem

of language, or of perception or of ontology, but for our
purposes

what counts

that if, for Aristotle, "is"

is

(

einai

)

can signify

o

existence, identity or predication

we should beware of misun-

derstanding him by oversimplifying the implications of his terms or
seeking out consistency where none

is

found.

to be

At many important

points in Aristotle's philosophy, denying universality seems

equivalent to asserting

a

to

be

multiplici ty of senses, and it is important

to bear this in mind, not only with reference to his efforts to deve-

lop a technical

vocabulary of terms for

a

science of politics, but

also as one attempts to make sense of his theory of political morality
and justice.

Failure to take homonymy into account is also

nent feature at times

in

his criticisms of others.

a

promi-

g

Professor Owen, for one, has explored Aristotle's use of terms
as well

as

the techniques of investigation he developed to separate

and distinguish

many uses:

them.''"^

For example, einai

is

not the only word with

"one" and "good" are also members of

ready to marry subjects from any category.

example of homonymy in Topics A(107a4-17).

ments on homonymy reveal basic patterns

in

11

a

rootless family,

"Good"

is

a

primary

For Owen, Aristotle's comhis analysis of existence.

For that purpose it is enough to say that his later theories
do not in the least entail the discarding of these patterns.
he is announcing
His disclaimer in Metaphysics r is politic:
his own "general science of being qua being," and it was on
the homonymy of "being" that he had earlier built his objec-
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tion to any such enterprise.
But
more important than
these labels is the fact that his own theories
were worked
out wholly within the framework of those techniques
on which
the analysis that we have been reviewing here
relies. 12
.

.

.

A good example of the application of such basic

techniques to

politics is Aristotle's study of the different kinds of
"democracy"
Book VI, Ch. 1-5 (1330bff) of the Politics
slide into ontology as we go further.
and

"

einai

"

in

But language begins to

.

Mot only is "being" multiple

said in many ways, but such diversity must be reflected

back into our formal methods of study and theories of knowledge.
Hence "being" must be studied in many ways if we are to understand it.
To

oil

must be broken up still further--beyond matter and form; beyond

substance and attribute:

we find that "it" becomes "they" and they,

qua objects of knowledge, cannot be the subject-matter of

unified science of knowledge.

a

single,

Instead, for Aristotle our knowledge of

"being" will be neither singular nor uniform but based on principles
1

given through experience and peculiar to each subject.
can and must be divided up, and the various sciences

(

o

"Science"

epistemai

)

having different subject-matters, will necessarily differ from one-

another

in

terms of both the methods to be followed and the possible

precision or clarity of their results.

In

Topics 1,4, for example,

Aristotle divides propositions into ethical, physical, and logical and
thus suggests the standard Hellenistic division of philosophy into

logic, physics, and ethics;

14

elsewhere

15

he

introduces distinctions

about the purposes and ends of knowledge itself, further complicating
the study of being with a diversity of possible human reasons for
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undertaking it.
(theoria:

practical
(

poesis

Hence, knowledge may be pursued for its own
sake

theoretical

knowledge), for the sake of actions

praxis

:

knowledge), or for the sake of making or producing
something

productive knowledge)

:

(

.'"^

It is thus possible to follow Aristotle through several

distinctions:

major

first, between the ends of knowledge; second among the

various sciences; third, between kinds of propositions; fourth,
among
the multiple senses of terms such as einai

and last--though the

,

significance of this does not emerge until we get
the realms of the necessary and the contingent.

to

pol

i

tics--between

Given such distinc-

tions as a background framework of techniques, it should come as no

surprise to find that he has very firm convictions about the nature of
political

theory and its limits as

study of politics and ethics

with some precision:

(

a

branch of knowledge.

pol itika

)

it is a practical

theoretical or productive science.

First,

the

can be located qua science,
as

distinguished from

Its aim is to

a

indicate what fine

and just actions may be and to instruct us on the nature of virtue in
general

and to show us how to live well.

Ultimately,

matter is action, something that takes place
tingent.

Second, in its technical

have to account for

a

in

the realm of the con-

aspects, political

diversity of actual

its subject-

science will

constitutions, explaining

their appropriateness to different kinds of societies, their origins,
and their place on scales as diverse as their degrees of conformity to
a moral

actual

ideal

on the one hand and their plausibility qua programs for

cities on the other.

17
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How then are practical

and theoretical

Professor Newman pointed out four ways:

in

sciences distinguished?

subject-matter; in aim or

end; in the subjective faculty employed; and in scientific
method or

procedure.

The subject-matter of Theoretic Science is either
"things

self-existent, unchangeable, and separable from matter" (i.e.,
the

subject-matter of first philosophy), or "things unchangeable and
separable from matter only in logical conception" (the subject-matter
of Mathematics), or "things inseparable from matter and subject to

change" (the subject-matter of Physics ).^^ What these things have in
common, qua objects of knowledge for science, is that we make disco-

veries about what they, in fact, may be--we play no role in making

them what they are.

Newman shows that Aristotle draws

line between these and the objects of

a

practical

a

very firm

science

both things done, which are the subject of pol i tika
and "things produced" ta prakta have their originating
principle (arche) outside themselves in an agent or producer.
It is thus that "things done" lie as it were passively at the
disposition of the agent, just as "things produced" do at the
disposition of the producer. They are therefore said to be
in our power eph hamin
(Nic. Eth.
1112a31), and we are
said to deliberate about things which "come to pass by our
agency, but not always uniformly" (1112b3).
The defective
exactness of practical science is perhaps due to this subjection of "things done" to human arbitrium but it is still more
due to the fact that practical science, being concerned with
action, is concerned with particulars. ... 20
.

.

.

,

)

(

(

)

,

If both the subject-matter of action and the agent himself can

be changed, the purpose of practical

science becomes that of promoting

right action, i.e., not understanding in simple but bringing something
into being.

This makes

doctrine that the soul

a

neat archetectonic fit with the Aristotelian

(psyche) is divided into

a

rational

and

irra-
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tional

part, and that the rational

part can be further separated into

scientific and calculative aspects.

Both tecna, the faculty which

operates in productive science, and phronesis
practical

the chief virtue of

,

reason, belong to the calculative part.

then, call

Different sciences,

for the exercise of different faculties of the soul,
and

the faculty that is concerned with moral

action is the same as that

which deals with the science of moral action.
Thus what we would call the subject or agent comes to have
central

place in practical

virtuous political
phronesis must have
bring into being.

science, and through him

action, comes into being.
a

conception of moral

In

(

phronesis

)

,

a

or

order to act at all,

virtue which it wishes to

That is, it has to adjust its choice of means to

the end suggested by moral

virtue.

Thus phronesis needs to be

completed by moral virtue, just as moral virtue

is

merely potential) without phronesis

operation, phronesis

conducts
actual

a

In

.

actual

whole process of deliberation, until

incomplete (because

it lights on the

step which must be taken in order to attain the end it forsees.

This is the last point reached in deliberation, the point at which

action begins.

23

The crux of the methodological

and theoretical

distinctions between practical

sciences, then, lies in the difference between their

respective ends, i.e., between analysis and the bringing of something
into being.

Theoretic science takes

inquires into its cause.

given fact or thing and

science, however, starts from an

Practical

end to be attained, an artifact or

a

a

policy, and asks after the means

-
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of attaining it-until

it arrives at one which lies within
the power

of the inquirer to set into motion.

sciences are always teleological

This means that practical

and must,

in a sense,

borrow their

modes of explanation and knowledge from the
intentional
the activities of agents and producers.

structures of

One important implication of

this is that the student of pol i tics--unl ike the
student of physics-will

participate directly in the subject-matter of which he is

dent.

a

stu-

He cannot sit back and contemplate the forms of
politics, or

seek to inquire abstractly into the causes of political

events-

indeed, he cannot: if he is to develop the faculty through which
he

would learn about the political, he must do
tical

so

in

the context of poli-

experience itself, and in active dialogue with the various

agents who follow its pursuits. Aristotle's method of traveling around
Hellas and gathering up 158 constitutions
This

in

is

a

reflection of this.

turn gives rise to two additional

further distinguish theoretical

from practical

degree of precision with which one can claim

subject-matter of practical
case for Theoretical

to

factors which

sciences.

First, the

know or understand the

science is far less rigorous than is the

science.

Second is the matter of experience:

the life-experiences of the student of pol i tika are crucial

his knowledge of his subject-matter and the moral

envisions.

for both

ends of action he

First let us take up the matter of precision.

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness
as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be
sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the
Now fine and just actions, which
products of the crafts.
political science investigates, admit of much variety and
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fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be
thought to exist
only by convention, and not by nature.
And goods also give
rise to a similar fluctuation because they
bring harm to many
people; for before now men have been undone
by reason of
their wealth, and others by reason of their
courage.
We must
be content, then, in speaking of such
subjects and with such
premises to indicate the truth roughly and in
outline, and in
speaking about things which are only for the
most part true
and with premises of the same kind to reach
conclusions that
are no better.
In the same spirit, therefore, should
each
type of statement be received; for it is the mark
of an educated man to look for precision in each class of
things just
so far as the nature of the subject admits;^^
The final

subject-matter of political science

through the exercise and development of phronesis
the theoretical

,

is

reached

rather than through

reason we find in the logical works or the empirical

observation which underlies Aristotle's studies of the natural world.
But if the subject-matter of political

science is the realm of free

and just actions for individuals, and the search for practical

solu-

tions to the problem of finding the best life for most people in the

polis, the issue of such enterprises for knowledge is immedaitely

clouded by the reappearance of diversity within the audience
the student of politics addresses himself.

to whom

First he encounters

a

diversity of opinion about which actions are truly fine and just; and
then he discovers that no action can have consequences which will

affect all people the same way.

Since we have given up both Plato's

metaphysics and epistemology, we have
that political ends are knowable

in

al

so had to

any universal

they are truly "objects" of knowledge.

phronesis

)

are inescapably conventional

sense, i.e., that

It is upon this

rests his claim that the activities of moral
(

relinquish our faith

in

that Aristotle

and practical

judgment

character and not handed

down by either nature or the gods.

The only truths at which we can

arrive are those "true for the most part," and
he cautions, or rather
begs the indulgence of, his reader to recognize
the tentative nature
of his arguments and receive them in the spirit
with which they are

offered.
As students of politics we will

scientific simplicity

find that the precision of

characteristic of the more exact sciences will

be unattainable for us given the nature of our subject-matter
and the

peculiar
it.

In

rel

ationship--part paticipant, part observer--that we have to

the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle notes that

"the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate
to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or

navigation."

27

The political

theorist may advise, then, but he must

do so in collaboration with those who may seek him out; he cannot

prescribe absolutely in the manner that an engineer, for example,

might determine for

a city

exactly where

how it should be constructed.
knowledge, and politics

constructed according

to

is

a wall

should be placed and

The theorist simply lacks this kind of

simply not something like walls, to be

specifiable rules.

As a participant in the

affairs of his time, the theorist can recommend and give reasons, but
he lacks the authority to command which even the technical

on occasion, can muster.

"expert,"

The major reason for this lies in the

problem of the political consequences that follow for the inexact
nature of political knowledge.
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Aristotle s reason for saying that precision
beyond a certain
degree is not to be expected in ethics is that
(a) any
general account is bound to obscure the
variations in obligation that arise from the varieties of
circumstance attending
the performance of any action, while (b) the
particular
account will have to be so hedged with qualifications
if it
IS to fit the particular case (as the general
account does
not), that it will inevitably lack the simplicity
which
Aristotle regards as characteristic of precision. ...
in a
work which treats generally of ethics the discussion
cannot
fully reflect the complexity of the particular cases;
and
accordingly, Aristotle says that the account which he
will
present in the Nichomacbean Ethics can only be a rough and
outline accountT^°
Ultimately, of course, one studies polities' not

know but

do.

to

It

is

in

order to

not knowledge but action that counts.

The

problem that confronts both the student of politics and the man of
affairs is that action always unfolds in

a

concrete particular

situation, and no amount of general or theoretical or

knowlege can guide the agent at the moment he
decide.

Aristotle

is

necessarily addressing

a

priori

called upon to

But this means that in speaking of political
is

a

action,

circumscribed audience: those

who have already developed some insight into particulars by practicing the role of political agent; and we are told that those who are

excessively dominated by emotion or young--ei ther

character--are not expected
of conduct.

29

to be able

to

in years

or in

listen to reason in matters

Newman says:

.particular judgments need to be correct, and this they
can hardly be without experience: experience, though it arrives at a sort of Universal
never wanders far from particulars.
It is evident, then, that the faculty which is
concerned with practical science, is to be developed in life
and in life only.
Its beginning lies in habituation, its
growth in experience. The young fall short in both respects.
It is a faculty which cannot be passed from hand to hand.
.

.

,
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Hence, though the sphere of Contingency
(and this is the
sphere of Practical and Productive Science)
is that which is
most amendable to human influence, the faculty
which is concerned with It can only be produced by a
circuitous and
indirect process beginning in infancy--a slower
process than
that by which speculative virtue comes into being
though
intellectual virtue generally, which includes speculative
virtue no less than phronesis and tecna is said to
"stand in
need of experience and time." (Eth. Nic. 1103al5.)30
,

At the same time, hovever, politika differs from teckna
qua
practical

science, precisely because the certainty of the outcomes
of

aims and projects undertaken through political

guaranteed.

action is by no means

Politics is the realm of the uncertain and contingent,

and entire social

structures, not to mention individual

projects are

subsceptible to the vagaries of accident and the unpredictable: the
state is not

a

creation of man which man can mold as he likes, and

in

this respect whoever seeks to manage state affars has nothing like the

artisan's control over his material.
"The accidental," says Zeller, "arises when a free or unfree
activity directed to an end is brought by the influence of
external circumstances to produce a result other than that
end."
Spontaneity is predicated in the case of such a
disturbance generally, whether the activity disturbed and
impeded is that of a being exercising Moral Choice or not;
Fortune, only when the agent whose activity is thus
modified, is a being exercising Moral Choice.
.Chance
plays round the ordered process of Nature, careless whether
it mars or aids it or does neither.
Its essential characteristic is to be without design and irregular; it is the
negation of Intelligence and Nature ... 31
.

Thus we have

a

.

paradox: contingent (as opposed to necessary)

matters are precisely those about which men can meaningfully deliberate and choose;

32

yet spontaneity, fortune or accident--to say

nothing of necessity and nature--may contribute

to

the frustration of
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political

action, and to the erosion of
the confidence with which

either the student of politics or
the political actor can safely
.ake
pronouncements about possible future
events.

nature of political

theory:

Thus the tentative

neither knowledge (the realm of
the

scholor) nor power (the realm of the
political actor) can establish or
maintain complete control over its
subject-matter.
To ask how political

science is possible at

al

1

,

then is to ask about the efficacy
of

its judgments upon the most appropriate
presently apparent means

required to bring about the future moral
ends envi sioned .33
only serves to introduce

a

tion between theoretical

and practical

gut this

further problem-this time in the distinc-

is that the knowledge of the political

science.

For what emerges here

theorist becomes contingent

upon his apprehension of actual conditions, and insofar
as this is

precondition of right recommendations
tical

to action,

the

"facts" of poli-

life how somehow to be sneaked back into consideration
and

practical dimension into theory.

a

a

Therefore, the normative and

descriptive elements of political theory are inseparable.

Finally, we

come up against the realization that even moral ends in general
must
be recommended to some one in particular, and that the possibility of

their articulation in action entails the presence of an audience that
finds the recommendations acceptable; further, that the means to

attain such possible recommended ends can be realized

in

practice only

through an active process of dialogue between those whose efforts will
be required to bring them about and the theorist himself.

Such com-
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munication will depend upon shared values and
the persuasive qualities
of rhetoric as necessary conditions.
ties, of course, is provided by

possible.

a

The context for all

such activi-

space in which a dialogue is

Id

When all these things are taken together, they do
not result
in the clear and methodical

exposition that characterizes, say, the

Posterior Analytics: they result
Politics

35
.

Richard Robinson,

a

in

the aporetic method of the

recent translator of Aristotle,

explains:

Aristotle is not writing out elementary principles of politics to be learned by docile and ignorant beginners.
He is
discussing difficulties felt by those who have already
reflected on political matters. His word for such a difficulty or problem is "aporia." After indicating an aporia
he recites the considerations that have made it an aporia
including arguments both for and against a certain solution.
These arguments may or may not have true premises, and their
premises may or may not be strong grounds for their conclusion.
Aristotle by no means personally recommends all the
premises and inferences to which he draws your attention. He
merely lays them before you as things to be considered in
making up your mind.
He believes it worth your while to know
the arguments that have been given, or might be given, for
and against a certain view.
He does not write for those who
only want dogmatic conclusions, which they can then adopt on
the authority of Aristotole.
Usually he does give his own
conclusion; but sometimes he gives it in such a tentative
form (for instance, as a question) that it is easy not to
recognize it.
In his aporetic discussions we are liable to
mistake the beginning for his own view when it is not, and to
mistake the end for a question when it is his own
conclusion|36
,

,

What we have here, then, in contrast to Plato's theories,
far less idealistic and more trenchant view of human political

and the craft of the political

theorist.

is

a

life

Many important consequences

follow upon the Aristotelian emphasis on the particular event and cri-
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tique of the possibility for precise knowledge
of political

phenomena;

not the least of these is pointed out by
Sheldon Wolin:

Plato's distrust of political participation, then
rested on a
definite notion of what constituted a relevant
source of
political knowledge.
If a case is to be made for popular
participation, it would have to be shown that Plato's
conception of political knowledge was unduly narrow and
that a (nore
adequate conception, one that would be more in keeping
with
the nature of political decisions, is directly connected
to a
more inclusive sceme of participation. The first thing
to be
noted is that Plato vastly exaggerated the degree of precision that political knowledge might attain.
The belief that
political science was a body of absolute knowledge was closely conneted with the static character that Plato attributed
to the objects of knowledge; there could be no valid
knowledge where the objects of thought were unchanging and
lacking in proportion. Conversely, because the true objects
of thought were fixed, unchanging, and symmetrical, it was
possible for thought to achieve an absolute precision and
accuracy.
But Plato's argument about the absolute character
of political knowledge was not the consequence of a close
examination of politics or of political situations, but was
drawn from other fields.-^'
Evans makes a similar argument, but reasons more closely,

emphasizing the formal elements
epistemologies respectively.

in

the Platonic and Aristotelian

It will

be

remembered that one function

of the Forms is to resolve difficulties in our understanding of
things, and that reference to the different views that different persons may take of the same thing serves to help Plato distinguish bet-

ween the expert and the inexpert.

One way to see the contrast between

Forms and particulars is to represent it as

a

distinction between

context-free and context-dependent cases of concepts.
expert understanding or Knowledge

is

For Plato,

not something that varies from

person to person and hence is not qualified by reference

to

its human

subjects: the Forms are pure objects, and knowledge of them is always
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the same regardless of the life-situation
or experience of he who con-

templates them.

Both the nature of the philosopher-king
and the

object of his knowledge are unqualified by
context. But Plato gradually became aware of this, and he raised

a

problem for himself in the

Parmenides which, had he discovered it earlier, might
have changed the
form of the Republic

.

In

the former work,

he applied the principle

of

correlatives (that as sets of beliefs vary from person to
person so
does the world as it seems to each) to the relation
between human

faculties and their objects.

For Evans, the arguments

.show that insofar as each person's faculty is subject
to the qualification of being hrs, its object cannot be the
'
object of the faculty: moreover, if some exercise of the
faculty may be counted an unqualified exercise in virtue of
its expertness, its object cannot be something other than the
object of the faculty.
In terms of the distinction between
Forms and particulars, this makes it incoherent to assert, as
Plato does in the Republ ic that the expert recognizes the
distinctness of the two, while the inexpert confuses them. 38
.

.

The political consequence of this, which Aristotle refused, was to
reduce all

political

conflicts to conflicts about knowledge.

If we reject Plato's distinction between expert and inexpert

on the grounds that it cannot account for real
vidual

differences in indi-

understanding and experience, who--if anyone-does Aristotle

select as more likely to be superior in knowledge of political

things?

First, in politics we should praise not wise but practically wise men;
for, in speaking of wise men, this is "why we say that they know

things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, divine, but useless;
viz., because it is not human goods that they seek."

39

Practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with things
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human and things about which it is possible
to deliberatefor we say this is above all the work of
the phronimos to'
deliberate well, but no one deliberates about things
invariable, nor about things which have not an
end, and that
a good that can be brought about by
action.
The man who is
without qualification good at deliberating is the man
who is
capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the
best
for man of things attainable by action. ^0
The object of understanding for the phronimos is the
citystate itself, a diverse collection of human aims and interests,
of

which he is

a

member and

a

citizen.

But for much of what he knows he

must rely upon the opinions of those whose lives and interests
directly or indirectly constitute the political

context

in which

he

acts.

situation which is the

The role of opinion, which Plato had

assigned to the epi stemol ogical

nether realm of mere belief, becomes

highly significant for Aristotle, whose phronimos can be seen to
depend upon it as one of the chief means through which he acquires the

experience that makes practical judgment possible.

Of the various

human sources of political knowledge, and this includes the many, few

may measure up to Aristotle's standard of the ideal

political

actor,

but each is indispensable to the buildup of the kind of experience

prefigured
political

in

right action.

As Wolin noted, Aristotle's theory of

knowledge, for all of its inherent imprecision, makes the

validity of claims for wider political

participation in decisionmaking

for more plausible than Plato would allow, insofar as Aristx)tle too is

offering us

a

political

philosophy based on

a

concept of knowledge.

Newman says,
.neither the end of man, nor the means to its attainment
can be ascertained, at all events in detail, except by an
.

.

s
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appeal

to

the judgement of the phronim os and
also to the
sifted
and
corrected
as we have
c^ll^^iTu^^'P^^''^""
Pl^to does no?
^'^^
th?n\ that a knowledge 'r'''^'
think
of the ideas will suffice to ,nake
his
^^'^^^"^ ^'^^^^^ ^^^'^
practical

experience!4lM"

The Politics of Aristotle

The Pol is is a Koinonia
As we turn to Aristotle's Politics
be mentioned.

First is

,

two preliminaries should

Aristotle's teleological mode of explanation

of the subject-matter of political

science.

This is a mode of expla-

nation in terms of ends which assumes in its very
structures that

individuals and states alike have the capacity to move forward
on the
basis of consciously formulated aims or intentions about
possible

future arrangements and projects.

Any existing state can be seen as

the embodiment of a telos of collective aims.

his conception of the pol

koinonia

i

The second factor is

as a species of human association or

.

This notion is prior to his concepts of state and com-

In

politics, as well as in personal

munity.
life, then, the political

actor manifests arete (excellence) when what he does fulfills the
telos of his community:

understood

in

eudaimonia

any of the usual

.

This last term should not be

modern senses of our English

"happiness," which is often taken to indicate being in

a

state of

satiated desire; or of physical comfort or spiritual joy; or even as

designating

a

way of life free of constraints and full of leisure.
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Rather, it indicates a 'state of
psychological

self-fulfillment and

general well-being brought about through
the successful acco.npl

of meaningful

activity.

i

shment

It is always associated with arete
and with

doing something well.^^

^^^^^^ ^^^^ briefly, the true end

of the state is the eudaimonia and highest
personal

development of the

greatest possible number of its citizens consistent
with their
character as

a

people and the form of its constitution.

Now the polis itself is
says

a

species of koinonia

.

a

species of associ ation.44 Aristotle

The term has no English equivalent and

this makes it difficult for the Greekless reader to
understand what

Aristotle

is

getting at.

Barker translates it variously as

"community," "association," and even "aggregate"--vastly different

words with substantively distinct and important implications for
the
political

theorist.

Robinson usually translates it as "community."

The problem is that it means something different from and more than
any of these: when Aristotle says

"

koinonia " he does not mean

munity of the sort that Helen and Scott Nearing founded

in

distance than is to be found

in

It implies

the one;

tarianism than characterizes the other.

a

com-

Vennont

after World War II; neither does he mean an association such
American Association of Manufacturers.

a

as

the

little more

considerably less utiliThe noun-form cognates of

koinonia include "the political," "the common," "communication,"
"community," and (also) "sexual union. "^^

translated "unite" or "unify."
together of men and

a

In

Verb-form cognates can be

general, it indicates

form of their common life.

a

living

Newman says that all

s
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koinoni^ are held together
plural

in

its

form because, for the Greeks, it
signified the household and

the village as well
tical

by friendship^^ and uses the
word

as

the polis.

When Aristotle speaks of the poli-

koinonia, then, he means that this particular
koinonia is that

human association which embraces and is superior
not only to individuals but also to all lesser forms of koinoniae .^^

The household and

the village are "like" the polis in the sense that
all are charac-

terized by friendship and

a

common life; but when Aristotle applies

the term to the polis itself he is making

a

double move: he is first

setting the polis above and beyond the lesser koinoniae as
something

which includes them; but he is also trying

to

express something of the

bonds of warmth and personal connectedness that characterize
them.

The political koinonia thus expresses

a

that the household and village express

unity in much the same way
a unity

of common experiences.

Note, however, that the political koinonia should not be confused with
the sort of unity to which Aristotle believed Plato had reduced the
pol

in

i

the Republic

.

If we recall

our earlier arguments about the

heterogeneity of political communities, it should come as no surprise
to find that the political

koinonia of Aristotle

is

"home" for

a

diversity of human interests and experiences:
the cause of the fallacy into which Plato falls must be
held to be the wrong character of the premise on which he
bases his argument [i.e., that the greatest possible unity of
the whole polis is the supreme good.
[1260b37-38.]
It is
true that unity is to some extent necessary, alike in a
household and a polis; but total unity is not. There is a
point at which a polis, by advancing in unity, will cease to
be a polis: there is another point, short of that, at which
it may still remain a polis, but will nonetheless come near
.

.

s
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to losing Its essence, and will thus
be a worse polls
It is
as If you were to turn harmony into .nere
unison, or to reduce
a theme to a single beat.
The truth is that the polis
as
has already been said, is an aggregate
([koinon] of many
members; and education [paideia] is therefore
the means of
making it a community and giving it unity.^^

Thus a polis

,

as a specific kind of koinonia has
neither the

homogeneous unity of the Republic nor the haphazard and
accidental
union of human energies that might be conferred by
geography, migrations or even common habits.

varied and reciprocal

It is a unity

in

consciousness of

parts that become unified through coimnon

language and an education which improves the character of the
•

.

citizens,

50

and in democracies provides the basis for the decisions

that political agents make together about their common mode of life
itself.

Individuals are here "made one by the pursuite of

a

common

aim in which their nature, their habits, and their training lead them
all

1

to join."
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The pol

unifies its parts without reducing them to

i

uniformity, and when we conceive of it as

"whole"--which it is some-

a

times possible to do--then Aristotle holds that it exhibits the same
formal

relationships that wholes and parts are said

his wider corpus.
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to

have throughout

Ernest Barker summarizes:

The terms "compound"
syntheton and "whole" hoi on are both
technical terms of Aristotle's philosophy.
The "compound" is
the genus: the "whole" is a species of that genus.
"Compounds," as defined by Grote in a Passage quoted in
Newman's note, "are of two sorts--aggregates like a heap
(mechanical) and aggregates like a syllable (organic)."
"Wholes" are aggregates of the second or organic kind: they
have a form which gives them an organic unity, and an End or
Final Cause which gives them a single purpose.
The polis is
such a "whole. "53
(

)

For Aristotle, "a part is not only

(

a

)

part of something other

s

.
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than itself: it also belongs entirely
to that other thing. "^^
this primarily metaphysical

Given

relationship between parts and wholes, it

is no great leap for Aristotle to assert
that the destruction of

whole deprives the part of ousia or being.

a

Since the specific nature

of any part depends upon its function in relation
to the whole, in the
case of the polis the identity of the individual
depends upon what he
does within the koinonia

neously self-complete

(

.

no case can the

In

autarkis

)

individual

simulta-

be

and separate from the polis

Thus

.

the very substance of individuality is conferred by
the polis which

stands in relation to him as
(

a

beginning or occasion of origin

archa )

Much the same account is given by Aristotle of the archa (et.
1060a)
archa gar to sunanairoun or the ousia of a thing
(De An. 412bl8f7D".
Severance from the Whole, in fact,
involves the loss of the Form or ouisia and the loss of this
involved "destruction" ... but a hand destroyed is a hand
unfitted to discharge the functions of a hand, or in other
words is not a hand at all. Thus we may almost say that in
Aristotle's view the polis is the ousia or archa of the
,

(

)

,

i

ndi vidual .^^

The point is crucial

reason for thinking that it

first because it illuminates Aristotle's
is

possible for the political

association

to become a unity of diverse and heterogeneous elements without sacri-

ficing the integrity of the elements; second, because it is the

background for his later assertions that the interests of individuals

must be subordinated

to

those of the whole in the event of

between them; third, it forms part of Aristotle's effort
the authority of the pol

i

and promote

a

revival

to

a

clash

strengthen

of civic virtue at a

time when these things were coming under severe pressure.

For him,
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the poljs does not come into being in
opposition to or as a limitation

upon man's natural

rights: for man has no natural

rights he may have

in

rights.

Whatever

fact are called into existence by the
constitu-

tion, i.e., by men themselves.

While this last doctrine may give

rise to disagreement, it is Aristotle's practical

solution to the

problem that he can find no transcendental argument for
justice that

would be good

in

all

times and places.

Hence the ends of the city cannot be given by

a_

priori

ciple, but must come in a general way from the sociological

prin-

and

historical conditions which are such important elements oP
collective

life itself.

Following Newman's suggestion, then, if we pay as much

heed to Aristotle's method as we do his doctrine, we will see that the

phronimos

,

or man of practical wisdom, cannot himself be the final

court of appeal

about what the collectivity is to do.

must converse and engage

in

dialogue with the other inhabitants of his

city if he is to attain the practical
a

Instead, he

grasp of daily affairs which is

necessary condition for his exercise of arete.

Given the express

role that Aristotle grants the opinions of others in the marshalling
of facts by the phronimos

,

it is difficult to conclude otherwise than

that the ends of the state cannot be given
through

particular except

process of intersubjective examination of available alter-

a

natives by the inhabitants of the city.
state is not
historical
personal

in

a

universal

By

Therefore the "end" of the

but subject to contingencies rooted in its

conditions; and the power of the phronimos

arete is at least partly

a

,

as well

as

consequence of his ability to

his
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grasp what they tell

him.

Under some forms of constitution, such

dialogues must take place in public because large
numbers oF people
are expected to exercise the arete of the
phronimos

And this is the

.

form of constitution that we are specifically
interested in.

Hence

the following emphasis upon the "pol i ty"--that form
of constitution

which places an assembly of citizens at its head and

public space at

a

its heart.

Aristotle distinguishes between higher, social
lower, necessary ones.

fuctions and

The higher functions are peculiar to man and

are seen as direct outgrowths of his capacities to reason, to speak
and to choose.
all

The lower functions are usually seen as necessary to

forms of life and not peculiar to man.

The primary distributive

function of any consti tution--and what makes the association which it
governs uniquely political and superior to all others--is
out those higher social

to

portion

activities and thereby to define the civic

body by stipulating the rights of citizenship and rule.^^

According

to Newman, this is the "only problem which the constitution has to

solve.

"^^

Broadly speaking, Aristotle classifies constitutions

in

two

ways, first, morally, i.e., according to whether the ruling person or

group acts to further its own self interests or
good.
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to

seek the common

The second manner of classification is formal.

function of the economic origin of the ruling group.

differ

in

It

is a

Constitutions

the ways they allot the right of ruling to different persons

or groups of persons.

Where power is held by those who act for the
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common good, Aristotle calls the
constitution "normal," or "healthy."
On the other hand, constitutions which
reflect or embody the political

dominance of men seeking only personal

gain are called "degenerate"

forms, and of this sort he makes strong
cri tici sms.^^

Aristotle's scheme for the moral
based upon the principle that political
fic nature,

is

sortition of constitutions is
rule, by virtue of its speci-

essentially for the benefit of the ruled.

But not

everyone who lives within the social order of the
polis counts, and
this is why

a

polis, qua political

koinonia must be understood as

something less than what we moderns would consider an
entire city:

strictly speaking, it incorporates the political or ruling
element,
but not those social
material

strata that contribute exclusively to its

functions--i .e.

,

those which are its "necessary conditions."

These parts of the city are regulated by the political part, but the

individuals who carry out such activities are not necessarily admitted
to share political

power.

Aristotle's attempt to formally classify pol i teia
(constitutions) is made
niety of city life.

in

terms of the social

and economic heteroge-

Here he says that "The real

ground of the dif-

ference between oligarchy (the rule of the few) and democracy (the
rule of the many) is poverty and riches.

fid

form of government he calls "democracy" is

By this he means
a

that the

government in which "the

freemen and the poor are invested with the power of the state.

By

an "oligarchy" he means a government dominated by the rich--whether
fifi

they be

a

majority or

a

minority.

It is not the

numerical

value of

.
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the ruling group that counts then,
but its role in the economy of
the
city.
Newman notes that here Aristotle
applies the rule that a defi-

nition of

a

thing must not be built on a
distinguishing feature which

is only an accident and not present in
every case:^^ power is econo-

mic, not numerical
But something more is involved in these
categories than econo-

mic position or status.

All

of the "poor" and "rich" in question
here

are also both "freemen" and "citizens" of the
polis
had both rich and poor citizens,

.

The Greek polis

who had been divided into four

classes more than once-in theory by Plato

in

the Laws, and in prac-

tice by both Solon and Cleisthenes .^^ Sometimes the
access

to

granted to these economic classes varied, but not always.

At other

times, equality counted for far more than wealth.^^

power

What is important

here, however, is that the polis was also the place of residence
for

vast numbers of non-citizens.

These were concerned with the necessary

functions of collective life and can be divided into three groups:
"metics"--i .e.

,

free foreigners and those natives who neither owned

land nor appeared on the registry of some tribe or deme; slaves; and
women.

Of these three, none had any political

rights or privileges in

Aristotle's sense of "political," though individual metics often

enjoyed great wealth and social

status and carried primary respon-

sibility for the commercial activities of city-states such as Athens.
The point, then, is that it
fers political

is

citizenship and not wealth which con-

privileges on individuals for Aristotle and--under the

best of condi tions- -arete not numbers, which confers moral
upon the policy directions which those citizens choose.

legitimacy
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The Mixed Constitution
The "polity" as we saw earlier,
stands as

a

mean between oli-

garchy and democracy and incorporates
elements of each.^^

The polity

of Aristotle serves as the prism through
which many of the major con-

cepts entailed by any participatory model
of politics are refracted.
The issues raised here are to reappear
again and again, whenever

assembled groups of men gather together
central

questions of political

life;

to

debate and decide the

these are also the problems and

concepts which seem to hold the center of attention
of any group
trying to decide, at the moment of founding,
just how to institutionalize

a

groups.

central
I

will

and permanent political
try to show that all

role for decisionmaking by

of the essential

elements of the

mixed government theory revolve around the central concept
of

a

public

space, that it is the sine qua non of this particular form of
government.

Most of Aristotle's theory of the polity appears in Books III

and IV of the Pol itics

.

Our primary interests here will be the citizen, the assembly,
the distinction between public and private, and indirectly, the con-

cepts of civic virtue and common good.

It

would be wonderful

(but

Utopian) could we discuss such notions far from the dust and din of
social

stratification and class struggles, but this would be

phenomena essential

to

to

omit

the plausibility of the entire discussion.

The practicality of Aristotle's approach to political

life has

long vexed those who are unhappy with the world that men have made for

themselves thus far.

Our discussion of the role that practical
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experience must play in the search
for solutions to the dilemmas
of
politics has shown that a real state,
a workable state, cannot
be
formed, willy-nilly, from the imagination
of the political

theorist.

Men and their cities are "already
there" and their manner of being,
as
we come upon them in history, constitutes
both the field and the horizon of any possible political

ditions and institutional

action.

Actual

cities are bound to tra-

practices that could only be wiped clean

were it possible to simultaneously found

a

city in

a

desert and people

it with individuals who had had no experience
of existing political
life.

But we can never have it this way and Aristotle
knows it.

So

he turns to the raw materials of history, and
his characterization of

Greek cities, while nowhere assembled
the Politics in

a

in

single place runs through

a

series of background themes that reminds the reader

of Thucydides: the city of man is ridden with class
antagonism, wars,

demagogues and often civil

strife; its population is diverse in

background, interests and moral attainments, education, wealth and
tastes; it may or may not be wel

1

=governed; its capacity to persist as

an independent, sovereign political

problem

is

centripetal

unit is often threatened.

The

to discover a constitution that could really mold such

forces into

a

koinonia held together through human affir-

mation rather than through force or fears--wi thout striving
abolish such forces entirely.

The diversity of social

to

simply

and class

distinctions can neither be legislated nor imposed nor wished away
the long run, and its presence results in

a

in

continuous clash of

interests that politics can contain but never absolutely resolve.

We
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Shall

see below that Aristotle does
not think that human attempts
to

abolish class distinctions can succeed;
that property can ever be
absolutely equalized. That the two are
tied together is a continuing
theme throughout the Politics but
there are limits to the realm of
;

things human over which man can exercise
choice or rational
For Aristotle, as

I

read him, social

control.

hierarchy is not a product of

human choice but appears everywhere that
men live together in can-

munities.

Thus it is a prepolitical

phenomenon given by nature.

Further, when either the rich or the poor gain
power in
city,

the consequences for its civic virtue and
political

disasterous.

a

system are

The rich tend to extract vast quantities of
wealth from

the poor and push them into military service and
other forms of ser-

vitude.

The poor, on the other hand, divest the rich of
their lands

and funds and turn these over to a state which cannot
really redistribute them, itself having been taken over by demagogues who
want

"rewards" and lavish public momunents to the memory of their
deeds.

Neither form of politics can attain even the practical
justice that Aristotle seeks

level

of

the one uses centralized power to

determine the affairs of the city exclusively from the standpoint of
its own self-interest, while the other takes an extreme of human political

and social

experience and attempts to remake the entire civic

culture over in its own image.

Each asserts its own interests

entirely at the expense of those of the other side--creating either an
oligarchy or

a

democracy as it will --and each is doomed

to

failure,

precisely because the wants and needs and interests of the other side
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are ineradicable and will assert
themselves anew whenever there
occurs
a

moment of weakness or hesitation among
those who dominate.
Accordingly, the "polity" is an attempt

to

institutionalize a

compromise; it expresses Aristotle's desire
to find

a

mean between the

extremes of domination by either the rich
or the poor, for otherwise
"the result is

state, not of freemen but only of
slaves and

a

masters."
The mean he seeks would institutionalize
and preserve

a

balance of social and economic forces so that all
of the citizens

could "share

in

a

common constitution. "''^ The compromise contains
two

essential elements: first, power is to be shared by
equal

a

large number of

citizens drawn from all economic classes; second, the
powers of

the various classes themselves must be balanced, with
none taking

dominant position over the others and none excluded.

This

"solution," then, attempts to preserve the positive and communal

ments implied by the notion of

a

political

ele-

koinona without sacrificing

awareness of and respect for the very real centrifugal

unleashed by social

a

forces

heterogeneity and economic inequality.

The

balance is delicate: the citizen holds power; the rich are permitted

neither to encroach nor to deceive; the power of the state itself

is

to be divided into three separate elements, each of which conducts its

business publicly; and

a

strong middle class will

act as a kind of

balance of power and mediate between the other two.
claimed, will be

existing pre-pol

a

i

The result,

it is

form of government that accurately reflects

tical

social

conditions and

,

through its constitu-
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tion, establishes

a

realm of political

freedom where the diversity of

citizens can act together under conditions
of political equality.
At one point, Aristotle sets up an
empirical

anyone can tell whether

a

test by which

mixed polis is "mixed" properly: the
various

parts of the city must support their constitution.

And he does not

mean tacit consent: he means that if offered
the opportunity to change
their constitution they would refuse:
A properly mixed "polity" should look as if
it contained both
democratic and oligarchical elements--and as if it

contained
neither.
It should owe its stability to its own
intrinsic
strength, and not to external support; and its intrinsic
strength should be derived from the fact, not that a
majority
are in favor of its continuance (that might well be
the case
with a poor constitution), but rather that there is no
single
section in all the state which would favor a change to a
different constitution. '3

Suppose we think of the mixed constitution as
intended to bring about two aims.
political koinonia

.

design

First is that of establishing

Second is that of establishing

among the various forces actually present there.
the individual

a

a

a

balance of power

The one emphasizes

or subject of politics as he appears in the political

arena, engages in political

action with his friends and acquaintances,

and exercises his liberties in the realm of freedom.

The second is

concerned with power and the brokerage role that politics must always
play as it seeks to mediate between conflicting social
interests.

If a

constitution alone can create

a

and economic

realm of freedom in

which men can truly act politically, the lesson here seems to be that

most men are nonetheless formed outside that realm: they bring with
them to the public space the concerns and interests that necessity
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imposes, and these concerns will

their lawmaking functions.

inevitably reappear as they
exercise

Conceived

in

tenns of the integrating

function that the public space
itself exerts upon its

hurnan elements,
each of these two aspects of the
"good" polity both defines and
is
defined in terms of it: the citizen
is whoever has access to
the

public space; the subject-matter of
the debates unfolded within
it

concerns necessity in

determine it to be.

a

In

necessity are separate.
appear together

in

number of guises-but always as
those citizens

Aristotle's "Ideal State" freedom and
Here,

in

the Practically best state,

the balance of social

they

forces present, and are

embodied in the agenda items with which they
will deal.
Theory of the Citizen
The citizens of the polity are equal

political

to one

another in the

realm, regardless of what they may be
outside it.^^

Aristotle does not use the notion of equality

modern sense.

in anything

But

like our

Equality does not exist in nature; it is only
possible

in human affairs where it is always discussed
with reference to

something specific.
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The primary characteristic with respect to

which men are equal or unequal

is,

of course, property.

Others

include birth, honors, freedom, intelligence, productivity and even
numbers.

No

individual

citizens.

such attribute, when present, justifies the elevation of

or group to

a

sovereign position above the other

81

This much should be simple and clear, but complexities follow
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as usual.

These are revealed to us as we
turn to consider the mixed

constitution as

a

structure or framework of institutions,
and the

problems raised by the division of
power in government.

constitution

is

not only mixed with respect to the
class origins of

the participants,

and authority.

The "mixed-

it is also mixed with respect to
divisions of power

Most important, some citizens are going
to hold office

while others do not:
It is a principle which has to be
observed among free and
citizens.
They cannot all rule simultaneously; they
must therefore each have office for a year.
.or by some
other order of succession for some other
priod.
In this way
It comes about that all are rulers.
.because justice
requires the participation of all in office
(whether office
be a good thing or a bad).
There is yet an imitation of it
or an approximation to it, if equals retire
from office in
turn and are all, apart from their period of
office, in the

equal

.

.

same position.

For Aristotle, there will

not necessarily be a contradiction

between equality and of ficehol ding if three conditions
are met.
First, officeholders must be drawn from the pool of citizens
at large.
No non-citizen may hold power and there is no social

distinction or

rank which might automatically confer high office upon

advance the interests of

a

subset of society.

a

few, or

Second, there must be

rapid turnover in office, for permanent rulers are dangerous.
the general

pool

Third,

of citizens is the body that usually selects the

officeholders and always reviews their performance at the end of their
tenure in office.
real
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For Aristotle, these conditions insure that the

sovereigns in the polity are the citizens at large, and not the

officeholders.
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Thus he prepares the ground for answering the
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question that would naturally occur
to any Greek well-educated
enough
to plow through a treatise on
politics:
can the

,nany

really decide

important matters as well as the expert
few?«^ After some discussion.

Aristotle confers judgment

counts-in terms

of

in

favor of the many, noting that
what

justice-is the collective participation

in

decisions: it is the institutionalized
powerholding group of citizens
in general

that ultimately holds and controls the
office:

.for the officer is not the judge or
the councillor or
the assemblyman but the court ekklesia
and the council
lbouj_e) and the demos; each of the
persons mentioned is a
part of these, I mean the councillor, the
assemblyman and the
judge.
Hence it is just for the people to control
greater
matters since the demos and the boule and the
ekklesia consist of many persons, the property qualifications
of whom,
taken all together, is greater than that of
those who fill
great offices individually or in small groups.
Let these
matters be determined in this way. 87
.

.

(

Sovereignty

is

)

thus firmly planted in collective assemblies

and by this arrangement the citizen-body distributes
office.^^
We may therefore draw the conclusion, which can be
defended
on many grounds, that all should share alike in a system
of
government under which they rule and are ruled by turns.
In
a society of peers equality means that all
should have the
same rights: and a constitution can hardly survive if it is
founded on injustice [i.e., if it gives different rights to
men who are of the same quality].^^

Now if all of the citizens have the same rights, and not all
of them have the same duties at the same time, how are the various

rights and duties and citizens to be divided?
nition of

a

We know from the defi-

"citizen proper" given earlier that citizens exercise both

"deliberative and judicial
legislators and judges.

In

functions"--i .e.

,

the duties of both

addition, some are to hold office or--as
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Barker translates, "magistracy."

The fullest treabnent of citi-

zenship, then, must incorporate all of
these elements.

In

Book IV,

Ch. 14, Aristotle takes up the problem:

We may lay it down that there are three
elements or powers in
each constitution. ... The first of the
three is the deliberative element concerned with common affairs
and its
proper constitution: the second it the element
of the
magistracies (and here it has to be settled what
these
magistracies are to be, what matters they are to
control
and
how their occupants are to be appointed).
The third is the
judicial element and the proper constitution of
that

element .^^

Properly speaking, the title "magistracy" should be
reserved
"for those which are charged with the duty of deliberating,
deciding
and giving orders. "^^ This power, different in but one
respect from

that of the citizen in general, is checked by the right of the
assembly to appoint and to review, and there follows

a technical

discourse on the various methods according to which magistrates might
be selected.
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These passages are important because they illustrate

the variety of formal

possibilities according

power may be allotted and checked.

to

which magisterial

The constant theme throughout it

is this: some kind of executive is necessary, but an unchecked execu-

tive is

a

threat to popular soveriegnty.

How are the people to bring

the executive into being yet not lose control

over it, once it begins

to command and they to obey?

For Aristotle, the political
or group but the citizen

history and political

(

pol

i

tikos )

agent proper is not the faction
.

He

is

life, and in the final

of citizens that counts.

the subject of both

analysis it is the unity

Though citizens may be "partisans" of either
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democratic or oligarchical parties,
it

is

individuals and not groups

who act within the public space, and
individuals and not groups who
finally experience the positive
affections and bonds of loyalty which
are essential

to

the political

occupies the central
his political

Marx.

koinonia

.

Thus the concept of citizen

place in his theory of political

action and is to

theory what knowledge was for Plato
and classes are for

There is no such thing as citizen qua
univeral

for Aristotle.

At the most abstract level, citizens are
the elements or parts of
which the political koinonia is formally
composed.
differ, so do definitions of

ci

tizenship .^^

As constitutions

What he is trying to

determine at the beginning of Book III, however,
is the concept of the
citizen

in

a

democracy, i.e., "a citizen proper. "^^ He
starts by

sharply distinguishing those who are not

to

included in the cate-

be

gory from those who are: naturalized citizens, metics,
those whose

only civic entitlement is suing and being sued
children, and also the old (whose presence as

assembly was sometimes proverbial).

in
a

the courts,

nuisance in the

Each of these carries burdens of

one sort or another which justifies barring them from unqualified con-

sideration for citizenship.

category "ci tizen"--i

.e.

,

a

Any of these might be included in the

child of Greek citizen parents would grow

up to exercise his privileges and duties as a citizen--but what counts
is that none of these is totally free of some personal

or legal

hin-

derance to the exercise of the citizenship function.

What we have to define is the citizen in the strict and
unqualified sense, who has no defect that has to be made good
before he can bear the name. ... The citizen in this strict
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criterian, "A man who shares
.
?n
in the administration
of justice and the holding of
o?fice "
we have no one word to denote
.
the factor common to the
judge and the member of the assembly,
or to describe
.

.

the

interest of a clear
analysis, call it indeterminate office."
On that basis we
^^'^ '^"'^'""^ are those who share in the
\) office as
hold
holding
of
so defined. 96

There are
passage.

a

number of important things to note about
this

First. Aristotle's notion of

a

citizen in the "unqualified"

sense has it roots in some of the more basic
categories of his logic.
An object can be a "universal" in the sense
that it is the co-nmon

characteristic of

a

number of instances, and it is well to take
note

of the "universal" possibilities inherent in
essentially complex con-

cepts such as Friendship. Soul, Shape, Being, or
Philosophy

...

"Citizen." What ARistotle is seeking here, then, is
to find

a

tion of citizenship consistent with the formal

"definitions" he has offered elsewhere.^^

or

defini-

requirements of

The concept he comes up

with is one that will, under most normal constitutions, indicate
that
part of the population which actively participates in the
political
life of the city.

The definition presented here, however, is that of

the primary form of citizenship only, and it would be

derstanding to think that Aristotle holds that this

constitution can define

a

a

is

misunthe only way a

citizen.

Second, the citizen in this strict sense--hereaf ter to be

called the "Aristotelian citizen"--is defined
empirical

in

terms for which

validation is possible: the student of any polis, wishing

know who actually plays the role of citizen, has merely

to

discover

to

34

who actually holds indeterminate
office at

a

given time.

The equation
of officeholding and citizenship
isolates that set of people who
wield

formally defined political

power in

a

given society at

a

particular

time and reveals much about the nature
of what power and of the kind
of individuals who hold it.

Applied to the contemporary United

States, for example, the notion could
quickly point out for us who the

"actual" citizen are.
Now,

for the student of politics, the question,
"Who actually

•does hold office?" may be sufficient to settle
the question of citi-

zenship.
gether.

But the legislator faces a different sort of
problem altoThe question, "Who should be admitted to office,
and why?"

involves him suddenly in the immense area of individual

capabilities.

"Should office be open to just anybody?"

attributes and
The question

is of utmost importance because the "good" of the entire
city and the

preservation of its health and way of life are at stake.

Obviously,

those who have not developed the moral and intellectual capabilities
to serve the common good should be excluded and those who have deve-

loped these capacities should be admitted.
forward very far:

But this does not move us

how are we to know and who is to decide?

What strikes the modern mind about the excluded categories of
individuals is that neither birth nor residence per se are said

admit an individual
turns out to be

a

to

to

the status of citizen, and that citizenship

privilege and not necessarily

a

birthright:

mem-

bership in the ongoing life of the society does not automatically

qualify the individual

for citizenship in the political

order.
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Aristotle wants to admit those with
"no defect that has
good

.

and

.

I

be made

suppose we could take the categories
of lunatics and

children as starting points from which
be in general.

to

to

see what such defects anight

The citizen, after all, takes
responsibility for the

affairs of the city, and clearly must
be able to assume responsibility
for himself before being empowered
to take responsibility for
others.

This means that he must be both economically
and psychologically
(i.e., morally) independent.

He should be neither a minor nor
a

pauper; neither weak and subject to bribes,
nor impressionable and

subject to influence.

Hence it appears that anyone who either
cannot

be held responsible for his own acts, or is
in a position of servitude

or retainership would be barred from the status
and privileges of
citizen.

But "responsibility" so used casts

net indeed.

potential?

a

very wide conceptual

What does taking care of oneself mean?

Aristotle doesn't tell us.

an individual

Is

this actual

or

What he does tell us is that

can make claims to exercise the mandates of citizenship

if and only if he fulfills the criteria stipulated by the
constitution

under which he lives. 98

matter of law

in

This ultimately makes the concept "citizen"

the sense that a constitution defines not only who

the citizen may be, but also the basic institutions of political

and its distribution.

adjudicata

.

a

power

Citizenship falls within the category of res

But the obvious political

consequence of this lies in the

possible responses that those omitted might make

to

such formal, and

necessarily exclusive definitions, either at the moment
is being adopted or later.

Formal

or legal

a

constitution

exclusivity of privilege
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entails considerable control over
the agenda of politics In any
city.
Indeed, one «ay to look at the
history of class conflict Is to
see It
as revolving around the admissions
criteria for Aristotelian citizenship.
At this point, Aristotle passes from
these questions of

defining the citizen to examine the nature
of his virtue.
put the question in the institutional

Suppose we

form first: "Who should be

admitted to the exercise of the privileges
of the citizen?" and
recognize that the "should" in this instance
refers
the moral

to

something about

quality of an individual's performance rather
than his

suitability to perform certain necessary functions.

In

making such

shift, Aristotle broadens and deepens his inquiry
considerably.

shows us that in human affairs functional

and empirical

are insufficient to determine whether something
appears to be.

is

a

He

definitions

really what it

The dimensions of citizenship implied in its having
an

^^^^^ are necessary because in politics the right performance
of

duties cannot be determined separate from considerations of
subjective

intention and personal

character, i.e., we have to know something

about the reasons and attitudes that underlie the apparent activities
of the individual.

We know who the citizens are in the normal

because we can point out the officeholders.
the attributes they need to fulfill
in office.

good life.

We know something about

their functions of participation

But there is a teleological

and to the life of the city.

state

dimension to political

action

The aim of both is not mere life but

Therefore, it is necessary to seriously raise questions

37

that surpass functional capabilities
because these presuppose
tain kind of moral

and intellectual

individual

background.

a

cer-

To sum up

the whole business, we can ask
one kind of question about the
external

appearances of power and those who have
access to it.
cal

.

This is empiri-

We can ask another kind of question
about the practical

duties

and difficulties that anyone exercising
citizenship privileges must

master.

This is functional

.

And we can ask yet another kind of

question about the motives for action, and
this is psychological
moral.

and

The question of motivation increases in
importance as emphasis

grows on the necessity of ruling for the common
good.
does the far more vexatious dilemma of personal

therefore,

So,

attributes.

Aristotle

does not try to take Plato's escape route here and
give power only to

those who are absolutely good.

much unity on the city.

This, as we have seen, imposes far too

Instead, he tries for a more open yet still

restrictive definition of the citizen.
Hence the citizen of the polity is not the spoudaios^ ^ -i.e.,
the man who is good without qual
his attributes.

In

i

f ication--though

he

does need some of

addition, however, he needs the attributes of the

phronimos and this means that he has to be practically effective

working with others to achieve jointly determined ends.

in

The latter

qualities are necessary if he is to embody practical wisdom, engage
political

action and work for the common

in

good.''"^^

Now the problem is that if the constitution is of

a

degenerate

fonn, constructed for the satisfaction of private rather than common

goods, there is no way that

a

person formally admissable

to

office can
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both exercise the arete of phronesis and
simul taneously be

citizen.

This is

a

celebrated dilemma in the politics and

result of Atistotle's refusal
action.

to lay down a priori

a

"good"

a

direct

principles of right

A free people chooses its own constitution
and in the process

decides which among them are fit for citizenship.
universal

In

the absence of a

(or metaphysical) principle of justice,
they are left with

whatever wisdom they may embody at the time they choose
order (i.e.,

a

a

political

principle derived from historical experience).

Thus

the relationship that Aristotle finds between existing
constitutions

and their sociological

background conditions.

The active citizen, then, must hold office; he must
not just

be eligible for it, he must be able to hold it and exercise
it.

Thus

we start with the definition of citizen as officeholder, move
to the

question of practical capacities and moral

can't know too much about them
least a general

level

in

attributes, decide that we

advance, and finally return to at

of understanding of those practical

things that

he must be able to accomplish and manage: this expands upon what we

can say positively about his individual capabilities;
.men hold in esteem the double capacity which consists in
knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and they regard the
excellence of a worthy citizen as consisting in a good exercise of this double capacity.
.

.

More discussion follows: there are different kinds of ruling
and being ruled.

The citizen need not learn how to be ruled insofar

as this means the kind of being ruled associated with the performance

of menial

duties or manual

labor or soldering.
103
^

^

4.u
4.u
u
a
On the other hand,
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there is rule of the sort which is
exercised over persons who are
similar in birth to the ruler-i.e.,
by a person over his political
equals.

This latter the citizen should know,
because "rule of this

sort is what we call

political

rule/'^^^

Finally Aristotle concludes

ruler and ruled have indeed different
excellences- but
tne fact remains that the good citizen
must possess the
knowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling
as well as
for being ruled, and the arete of a citizen
may be defined as
a knowledge of rule over Tri^men
from both points of
.

.

.

VI ew.

What is important here

is

the emphasis upon the kind of rule

In question: the adjective "political" is
specifically attached

to

this kind of rule, and it indicates something
important about

Aristotle's concept of the "political" life proper: it

is a life where

equals rule equals and are ruled in turn;^^^ where
power is shared;

where no-one who holds power has not first learned

to

sharing of power necessitates the taking of decisions

obey; where the
in

public.

exclusion of soldiers and manual laborers from citizenship here
done more with an eye to shedding light

of>

The
is

the kinds of individual

experience necessary to the personal development of political arete
than it is to permanently exclude

a

particular group or social

class. '^^

The point under consideration here is positive, not

negative:

the nature of the realm of freedom and political

such that it would be counterproductive for the individual

action is

citizen to

spend much time learning how to perform technical operations involving

objects and things.
thre is no

a

priori

108

Citizens work with equals and with ideas, and

standard available to evaluate the outcome of

90

their actions as there is

military operation.

in

the case of .anual

labor or technical

or

Hence, the fonnative experiences
of those who are

to live up to a citizen ar:ete
must take place in the midst
of political

activities and the realm of freedom;
and this is the kind of
rule
which the ruler ought to learn
while being ruled.
These considerations must not be
allowed to obscure the fact

that one of the fundamental attributes
of the Aristotelian citizen
is
power, and that the granting of
real power to large numbers
of the
lower classes is the cutting edge
of the "compromise" that is
the
polity.

Each side must give up something.

they will

There will be rulers, but

not be the sort that have sovereign
and ultimate authority.

This is reserved for the assembly to which
all the citizens have
access and

in

which each has the potential

to exercise a power far

excess of that implied by our contemporary
voting rights.

in

And note:

if this power is not shared equally among
the citizens, regardless of

their class background, the demos is excluded
and the polity is not

mixed.

Public Space
The single most important difference between the
social

economic realm on the one hand and the political

and

realm on the other,

is that the former is private for Aristotle, but the
latter is public

and shared.

Economic decisions are made by and between individuals as

they seek to promote their subjective ends.

Political

decisions

involve common things and are taken by citizens who gather together

in
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public.

What concerns individuals is
private; what concerns the
collective is public. The public

space of the asse,.bly, then,
is the

one institution that most requires
equality for its practical efficacy
as the forum in which the disparate
elements of the polity are mixed

and the public persona of the
individual
tured.
social

first given birth and nur-

Thus, it serves as both the point of
integration of diverse

forces and as the school

for the citizens where the arts
of

ruling and being ruled are first practiced.

equality possible by providing

a

regardless of what they may be

to

More important, it makes

common situation to all citizens,

one-another outside it in the pri-

vate sphere.

Despite the division of government into three
distinct elements, ekklesia, boule

,

and assembly,

it is important to note that the

citizens who assemble to deliberate and decide the
most important
issues for the polity^^^ exercise sovereign power
over the city.

Furthermore, in Greek politics, the ekklesia often had 5000
people

in

attendance and the executive power or boule numbered 400 citizens
during the 300 years of its greatest influence.
tant thing to note is pointed out by Barker.

But the most impor-

The assembly could

always override the other bodies:

The characteristic of ancient democracy was omnipotent
sovereignty of that assembly.
Primarily deliberative, it
turned itself into an executive, at the expense of the council and magistrates; and it acted as a court of justice in
great cases, while the Hel iaea (which was only the assembly
transformed) did the great bulk of judicial work.
There was
no supreme^judicature ... to check the action of the
assembly.
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Again recall

that Aristotle frequently praises
the advantages

in judgment and wisdom which
the many have over the few.^^^

Not only

is a body of persons more likely to
be free of corruption than a
small
112
group
but each member of the assembly
participates in the process

of deliberation and is equal
P^'^Q"^^^'^

^

to

any other member.

We saw earlier that

virtue peculiar to the ruler, and that
insofar as the

member of the assembly has access

to

power and office, he must be said

to embody it whenever he acts for the common
good.^^^ The equality

that holds among these individuals is an attribute
of their membership
in the political

koinonia

and specifically a consequence of their

,

admission to the status of citizen by the constitution of
the city.
They assemble together in
all

merchandise"

free place

a

and this will

(

eleutheria agora) "clear of

be a special

area of the city set

aside for this and for no other purpose.

Here is the public space which it is the central

dissertation to explore: it

is

the heart of the free realm;

manent embodiment of the commitment by the polis
assembled citizens.

It

is

a

aim of the

to

a

per-

government by

"free place," not the market place, and

thus set aside from other human activities either necessary or gainful.

It symbolizes

the freedom of the political

thing.

We have seen that the form of constitution known as "polity"
is Aristotle's attempt to outline the "practically best" scheme for

organizing the polis.

The assembly is the center of this scheme, and

the equality of the citizens within it indicates something about the

necessity for establishing equality among men

in

that area of collec-
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t1ve life Where

Us

absence would likely result
in an absolute breakdown of civic relations.
That, and to leave the rest
alone.
Aristotle generally thinks that
the sources of econ^ic
inequality lie
beyond our reach. They are
given by £husis and not by
no^. But
we

are able to exercise

a

measure of influence upon the
political

ine-

qualities that follow economic
inequalities; not only is it
possible
to redress the,., it is necessary
if the stability essential
to political

life is to endure.

This, then, is the only place
where the vivid inequalities of

human life are left behind, and

a

ticipation brought into being.

Such

rough and practical
a

equality of par-

notion of equality, of course,

fails to square with the more modern
conceptions of equality as some
kind of universal
natural

principle, discoverable by reason and
grounded in

law doctrine of fundamental

human rights.

Aristotle's

In

theory, equality emerges as a wholly
conventional

a

and somewhat fragile

construct, something not given to men by nature
at

al

1

,

yet something

nonetheless made possible through the concerted
actions and decisions
of men themselves.

In

a

sense, then, the de facto inequality of

history serves as the experiential
of the public space.

background for the de jure equality

This is not the place to attempt thorough and

complete studies of the difficulties involved
Suffice it to say that Aristotle proposes

a

in

these questions.

remedy for the question of

participation by the rich and the poor: both are required
participate.

to

cotne

and

The poor should be paid for attending the assembly and

the rich should be fined for non-attendance.

As for the other.

94

deeper problem of how we might
guarantee that individuals could
be
equal within the public space.
Aristotle offers no real solution.

When we finally push the question
of equality beyond equality
of
access to decisionmaking, we draw

a

blank.

Aristotle implies that to

the question. "Equal with respect to
what?" there can be but one

possible answer: "Equal with respect to
citizenship." Perhaps this
all

that a polis or

a

political

equality: the individual

is

theorist can offer in the way of

citizen is anyone who has legitimate
standing

to claim active membership in an association
entailing formally stipu-

lated privileges and duties.

Within that association, however, all of

the variety of human attitudes, interests and
abilities can be

expected

to

re-emerge.

What, exactly do citizen do in the public space and
over what

matters will they have jus jurisdiction?
vely little to go on here.

Aristotle gives us relati-

Twice he tells us that they will

"deliberate,"^^^ i.e.,
.the people in their gatherings have both a judicial and
deliberative capacity, and in both capacities they make
decisions which are all concerned with particular matters,
[i.e., the matters that cannot be decided, or properly
decided by law.]il/
.

.

a

The job of the people who assemble in the public space is

twofold:

first, they need to come to some agreement about ends, and

then they need a second kind of agreement about the means they will

undertake to realize those ends.
of deliberation.

But this does not exhaust the moment

Action is necessary as well.

conflated with action, and the phronimos is not

Phronesis is
a

a

virtue

phronimos at all

:
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unless he engages in political
the "truths" of practical

action.

justice-that

Therefore, his acts can beco.e
is,

the justice that is sought

and attainable in the polity, if
and only if they serve the
kinds of
ends in question and are concretized
qua acts.
G.E.M. Anscomb

explains the nature of the moral

syllogism that connects subjective

reason, intersubjective dialogue and
political

action:

what does Aristotle mean by "practical
truth?"
He calls
working, or the work, of practical
judgment;
and
n^..^.^?'"''
practical judgment is judgment of the kind
described terminating in action.
It is practical truth when the
judgments
involved in the formation of the "choice"
leading to the
action are all true; but the practical truth
is not the truth
of those judgments
For it is clearly that "truth in
agreement with right desire orexei )"[Ethics.
1139a30], which
IS spoken of as the good working or the work
of practical
intelligence. This is brought about--i.e., made
true--by
action (since the description of what [the citizen]
does is
made true by his doing it), provided that a man forms
and
executes a good "choice. "118
.

.

.

(

Alisdair Mclntyre argues the same point more succintly,
but in
the language of syllogisms:

The form of the deliberation involved Aristotle characterizes
as that of the practical syllogism.
The major premise of
such a syllogism is a principle of action to the effect that
a certain sort of thing is good form, befits, satisfies
a
certain class of person. The minor premise is a statement,
warranted by perception, that here is some of whatever it is;
and the conclusion is the action.

These analyses are helpful
tion on the level

of the subject.

for our understanding of delibera-

Newman takes it from the standpoint

of the assembly as a whole and the succession of issues with which it

must deal
All may be said to share in deliberative authority, (1) if
all do so successively (i.e., by relays) on almost all subjects, and the subjects on which all deliberate collectively
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^'"^

of^n'"^hI^^^'°

zne rest,

(3)

if all

°f

collective gatherina

deliberate collectively on

a

con

-gistratL^l1b:?ate

on

?he'';1%a\t^^°L"?r'^'i?;?
^^^'°'" ^^^^^
^11 cases in which the
nature ^f
of th!
the j^office does not make it essential
that it*:

sha 1 be filed by election (from
all?); (4) if a l deliberate
CO lectively about all subjects
and th^ magistrates nerely
make preliminary inquiries. But
if to
£en apanton is democratic (1298a9f fTT pan?as Boulesthaf kai
tliTFd modes really democratic?120

Wrle^l^l^d—

Such at least are the approaches
of philosophers and Greek

scholars to the problem of deliberation:
^^'^""^^^^^^

they delve into the Ethica

attempt to discover the connections
between right

reason, deliberation, and other-regarding
actions which Aristotle

discusses there.

While

I

think such approaches are useful, and
shed

great light upon what Aristotle would like

to

see happening in the

public space, the historian and the reader of
Thucydides cannot help
but note that rhetoric plays

a

considerable role in helping the

assembled multitude make up its mind.
Therefore, while most of our contemporarires
sophy or political

in

either philo-

theory would say that one should not study the

Po^^'^ics of Aristotle without taking the Nichomachaean
Ethics into

account,

I

am convinced that this approach overemphasizes the role of

reason and underplays that of the emotions in political

life.

I

can-

not take the time to develop this viewpoint in full, but consider the

following.

First, we know something about crowd psychology.

'''^^
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second. „e .now
so.ethin, about G.ee.
psychology In
we have a mt,e
han.boo. that A.stotle

panicuU.

M.seH .ote .

a,M

those «.o ^oun.
themselves havln, to
spea. In p„.„,.
^
a textboo. Of
devices, d.a.atlc.
psychological and linguist;^;:;"".

in the assembly,

then, rhetoric ,s
not

sLply

tante to study and
practice at his leisure:

an art for the
dilet-

it is the essential

tool

for gaining and wielding
effective power in the
assembly,
one cannot
use it Without a knowledge
of his audience,
that is, without a profound knowledge of his
fellow citizens.
Therefore, I submit that
rhetone and not syllogism comprises
the speech of the
phronij^

Further, given the absence
of
dards external
the assembly,

a

set of abstract principles
or stan-

to
I

politics which .ight serve
as universals to
guide
think it reasonable to
expect that the argument
which

carries the day will be. as
often as not. the most
persuasive rather
than the ,„ost true.
Here is Versenyi's summary
of the argument for
rhetoric that so shocked Plato:

w;^e^:

T^:^-^;^-:

(philosophic, "scientific," legal
or other) is
the force of eloquence rather
than

of

opmion,

result of
insight
' ''''' ^^'^^--^^ bet:^en'-dec;p:
loHn "?ruth'"LTt^'
distinguish between
su^cP.^fMi
unconvincing, persuasive and
fruitless
arguments 1^3^
a

of rational

^

Whether rhetoric makes integrative
political judgments
possible

is

open to doubt; whether it has had
demonstrable historical
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consequences Is certain.

The demagogue was an
archetypal

figure in
the Greek polis and the
consequences of his actions
for the welfare of
the society were widely
known.
Basically, the problem was
this:

assembled bodies of men are
often carried away by rhetoric,
passion,
and the beguilements of the
outstandingly brilliant, devious
or glamorous.
Though the assembly is the
center of debate and deliberation,
the institutional structure of
responsibility is threatened when
non-

officeholding citizens rise on the
assembly floor and recommend
or
urge policies that the assembly
adopts.
Any citizen could stand and
speak his mind; any citizen's
proposals could be enacted into
policy.
The difference was that such
citizens, unlike the magistrate
proper,

were not subject to the audit and
not formally accountable for
the
consequences which followed the enactment
of their proposals.
this could be

Alcibiades.

a

That

severe problem can be drawn from the
career of

That the Greeks recognized it as such
can be seen from

certain changes that they enacted into
law:

For if a decision which had been taken
turned out to have bad
consequences those who had voted for it could
always claim
that they had been misled or decieved by
the orators who had
spoken in favor of the measure, while the
orators could claim
that they had no responsibility because they
had no
authority.
They had merely expressed their opinion, and
nobody had been compelled to follow it. There
can be no
doubt that this government of irresponsible advisers
and
chance majorities contributed largely to the crushing
defeat
which Athens suffered at the end of the Pel oponnesian
War
although at the end of the first part of that war the
advantages had been all on the Athenian side in spite of the
terrible and unforseeable losses that Athens had suffered
through the plague of the years 439, 429, and 426.
In the
fourth century, the absolute sovereignty of the people
was
somewhat restricted through the introduction of a more elaborate law code and the prescription of a very strict and
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the creation

ornew'laws.fer'"''
Let me just add in closing here
that

against rhetoric

in

I

do not find a prejudice

the Aristotle scholorship so
much as

dency to ignore it completely.

This,

in

turn,

I

I

find

a

ten-

think reflects

something more about our current institutions
and mode of life than it
does either about Greek practices or

general.

a

public space politics in

Were we familiar with political

participation ourselves, it

seems, we would not so easily ignore the
role that rhetoric plays or

can play.

But we don't have this experience.

Instead, we read books,

diagram arguments and think about whether
statements and proposals are
"reasonable" or not.

We don't go out and participate; we don't
enter

the public space with our point of view firmly
grasped only to have it

swept away by someone's stupendously moving presentation
of the other

point of view; we don't ourselves abandon tightly reasoned
precepts
for the "good of the whole" in the moment that that good
sweeps over
us in a wave of collectively high spirited affirmation.

And since we

have so little experience of such things, and since we would most
like
to be able to protect ourselves by maintaining our ability to "think"

through the social and political

relations posited by Aristotle's

theories of government and of participation, we ignore the human element, the irrational, the emotional, the vainglorious and egotistical
sense of possession and power that can sweep over large gatherings and

make this sort of government erratic and dangerous.
words of Winston Churchill,

".

.

.

It is,

in

absolutely the worst form of

government imaginable--except for all the others."

the

i
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Machiavelli:

a

Republic of Divided Sovereignty

To attack and inflict lasting damage
on a central assumption
of an entire civilization is an
achievement of the first
'niu
order.

I

si ah

Berlin

But to return to the dangers you run if
affairs remain as
they are, I wish to make a prediction.
I
say that if an
emergency comes when the city is not at all
reorganized one
of two things will be done, or both of them
at once: either
in not and haste a head will be set
up who with arms and
violence will defend the government; or one party
will run to
open the Hall of the Council and plunder the
other party
And whichever of these two things comes about
(which God
forbid), Your Holiness can imagine how many
deaths, how many
exiles, how many acts of extortion will result,
enough to
make the cruel est man--much more Your Holiness, who
is most
merciful --die of sorrow.
There is no other way for escaping
these Ills than to give the city institutions that can
by
themselves stand firm.
And they will always stand firm when
everybody has a hand in them, and when everybody knows
what
he needs to do and in whom he can trust, and no class
of
citizen, either through fear for itself or through ambition,
will need to desire revolution.
Machiavel

1

A Discourse on Remodeling The
Government of Florence. 1520.

Conceptual Background: Ambition Plus Fortuna Plus
Equals Politics

~

H i s to ry
~

"The accidental," says Zeller, "arises when a free or unfree
activity directed to an end is brought by the influence of
external circumstances to produce a result other than that
end."
Spontaneity is predicated in the case of such a
disturbance generally, whether the activity disturbed and
impeded is that of a being exercising Moral Choice or not;
Fortune, only when the agent whose activity is thus modified,
is a being exercising Moral Choice.
.Chance plays round
the ordered process of Nature, careless whether it mars or
aids it or does neither.
Its essential characteristic is to
be without design and irregular; it is the negation of
Intelligence and Nature.
.

Of all

.

the human characteristics that might be noted by a
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political

theorist, the one that comes up most
often for Machiavelli

is that of ambition.

It drives men

forward;

it leads to

the destruc-

tion of both respublics and
principalities; it contributes to the
ani-

mosity that usually holds between the
nobles and the people; it makes
for outstanding careers and, as often,
destroys them.
We do not find
the well -modulated world of the virtuous
here, or the reasoned dialo-

gues of truth-seekers in the agora.

Instead, the life of men in

cities is chaotic, constantly changing,
colorful, violent, factionridden, frequently orchestrated by cabals
and conspiracies, and

peopled with skilled practitioners of intrigue.

message bourne

in

a

One reads the false

leather pouch by the faithful courier, hears
the

clanging of hooves on pavement, sees the quick flash
of sun on steel,
senses the tension and power in the body of the other
across the nego-

tiating table, fears the poison in the wine glass, ignores
the blood
on the walls of public buildings.

Men are dupl ici tious, venial,

hungry for power and riches, eager to curry favor with those who
would
advance them, and motivated by the desire for gain for themselves and
their families, and

a

sense of honor that tolerates no insult.

problem is to contain them; to channel
urges that will

The

their energies, to satisfy the

not be denied, and somehow to orchestrate the com-

peting interests of the various classes that they not destroy one

another--civic life along with them--in plotting

to

seize the city by

the throat and break her to serve their selfish ends.

Machiavelli

comes, picking his way among the corpses, seeking to found
In the political

a

republic.

thought of Machiavelli, the concept that
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embraces this mordant chaos

is

that of Fortuna.

I compare Fortune with
one of our destructive rivers
which
when
IS angry, turns the plains into
lakes, throws down
the trees and the buildings, takes
earth from one spot puts
It in anotner; everyone flees before
the flood; everyone
yields to Its fury and nowhere can repel
it.
Yet though such
It IS, we need not therefore conclude
tht when the weather is
quiet, men cannot take precautions with
both embankments and
dykes, so that when the waters rise, either
they go off by a
canal or their fury is neither so wild nor
so damaging.
The
same things happen about Fortune.
She shows her power where
strength and wisdom do not prepare to resist her,
and directs
her fury where she knows that no dykes or
embankments are
ready to hold her. •25

n

fQ*"^""^ is the accidental

men.

in

history and the unpredictable in

For Machiavelli, it controls but half our lives
while we control

the other half. 1 26

Always

a

force to be reckoned with, it thwarts

reason and planning and confounds those who would carefully
anticipate

either the structure of events or the timing of actions.

It suddenly

elevates the incompetent or utterly shatters the empire.

It may

strike the triumphant, like Alexander the Great, or the crafty, like

Alexander VI.

While we can prepare for it through awareness and

caution, our acceptance of it as

a

force beyond our control, but

likely to interfere with our claims means that we should always expect
that political

action will

have unintended consequences, and that

nothing planned or executed by men can ever turn out precisely as they

thought it would.
river.
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Machiavelli has here compared Fortuna with

At other places he speaks of "fortune's wheel"

upon the old medieval

which kings are seen
sceptres.

129

image and trope of the wheel
to

fall

1

a

?ft

and draws

of fortune from

with their crowns and their

Thus conceived, it is Fortuna which contributes to the
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rise and fall of individuals,
republics and principalities.

But, as

we have indicated, this force must
not be construed as that which

determines the course of
events.

career or the final

outcome of

chain of

a

Fortuna can be anticipated and dealt with,
for she is "a

woman and it
maul

a

her."

is

necessary, in order to keep her under,
to cuff and
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The political

actor confronts an interdetemiinate realm

in which Fortuna acts as a constraint
which he may nonetheless

understand and harness to his own purposes.

This means that men are

free to act and to choose, yet are constantly
confronted by

exigency that is utterly foreign

to

or Arendt has provided of political

sort of

a

the accounts that either Aristotle

life.

Mishap or opportunity

constantly lurk and the political actor must be poised like

cat--

a

ready to pounce or to run.

This concept, this notion of Fortuna
as something like a natural

,

which Machiavelli

force appears in his thought,

sees

think,

I

because of certain specific characteristics of the Italian city life
of his time--factors which set the Italian city-state apart from the
poll's

.

rooted

The violence which sweeps through the Italian city is not
in

a

simple opposition of democratic and oligarchical

classes

of citizens, as it was in Greece during the fifth century, but comes
from

a

different kind of struggle that took place between princes and

nobility, and the mass of people at the bottom.

This last included

workers and artisans who would never have been admitted

to

the

franchise at Athens, but who had long enjoyed intermittent access

power in the Ital ian communes

.

to

Under such conditions, the divergent
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claims to power and the self-assertion
of newly emergent commercial
interests during the quottrocento

,

and the theories of justice
with

which each of these rationalized its
claims to power, were far more

radically opposed to one another than had
been the case in Greece.
Hence,

I

think it is possible to say that if one
compares the ancient

pom

with the Italian Renaissance city, one
sees

moral

unity of the latter under the strain of

class conflict.
I

will

I

a

a

breakdown in the

highly intensified

not explore this material

difference here, but

think that it could be made out and demonstrated.

In

any case,

it

is the sudden eruption of strife and
violance which frequently

overwhelms

a city

and radically changes its constitution that
serves

as a frequently cited example of the power of Fortuna
In general, Machiavelli

tion, men will

.-^^^

holds that without an overall

direc-

find to their sorrow that Fortuna has pitched them and

their cities into chaos and squalor.

To found a republic

meant that first of all the men of his time needed

a model

in

Italy

of a well-

governed city which could serve as an example which they could emulate.

He finds such a model

or telos in the Roman republic.

ancient republic could somehow be made known
serve as

a

to

modern men, it could

source of examples of effective and noble political

for individuals, and provide

a

collective goal

that

If

action

for entire cities.

This, in turn, might make it possible for the cities of Italy to free

themselves from interminable civil
foreign occupation.

strife and, ultimately,

from

This is the central message of the Discorsi

In turning to Machiavel

1 i

'

s

.

conception of the well-ordered
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city,

then, it is necessary to turn
to ancient Rome-not as it

actually may have been, but as Machiavelli
presents it
Discorsi, based on the writings of Titus
Livy.
general

In

to

us in the

both Machiavel

li

'

s

orientation to politics and this particular
connection with

Livy, we find several

threads which lead back to Aristotle.

First,

men are moved to action through their
desires and intentions which can
be channeled like Fortuna and drawn forth
and elevated either through
personal

Hence
cal

a

example or by the desire to instantiate

a

collective aim.

teleological mode of explanation is appropriate
to the politi-

realm.

Second, Marchavel

i
1

'

s

method of presenting what he knows

about politics, while not based on the authority of
Aristotle, echoes

what we found

in

series of aporiae

the Politics.
,

There is no "system" here, only

which often explore

a

a

particular problem from ser-

veral

points of view.

Livy,

finds that this historian himself worked within the framework
of

a

Third, R.M. Ogilvie, in his introduction to

philosophy of history and

a

theory of unchanging human character

that were derived from Thucydides and Aristotle:
The difference between Livy and the others (i.e., Roman
historians) is that his philosophical detachment enabled him
to see history in terms of human characters and representative individuals rather than of partisan politics.
Livy
accepted a tradition going back to Aristotle (especially in
the Rhetoric: 1367b) and to Thucydides which explained
historical events by the characters of the persons involved.
As Aristotle said, "actions are signs of character."
Because
people are the sort of people they are, they do the sort of
things that they do, and the job of the historian is to
relate what happens to the appropriate character.
Equally,
however, it follows that if similar characters occur in 500
B.C. and 20 B.C.
their possessors will tend to act in a
similar way, so that one can infer from what a nan of a certain character did in 20 B.C. what a similar character must
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have done in 500 B.C. Human Nature, Thucydides
argued
is
constant and hence predictable. [1.22.4]. This
philosoohy
helps to account for the readiness with which
historians
transferred events from the recent to the remote
oast but
Livy usea it as the framework of his history. 133
'

What we may think of such

philosophy of history has nothing

a

to do with its influence upon Machiavelli and the
Renaissance.

He

tells us often enough that the world has always gone on in
the same
way, and that historical

selves.

134

situations have

tendency to repeat them-

a

The reader of Machiavelli must always beware that he writes

to the political

actor and not to the academic student of politics,

and that it is this audience with its immediate needs that he seeks to
serve.

Hence we find that all of his writings are concerned with the

particular and the concrete, rather than with the general and the
abstract.
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While not a philosopher then, and completely unconcerned

with the nicities of thought which have concerned philosophy since
Plato's time,

find that Machiavel

I

1 i

'

s

general

approach to politics

and his aporistic method are entirely consistent with Aristotle's con-

ceptions of what students of any practical
For both Machiavelli and Aristotle, then,

concerned first, with things said

to

be

in

science can hope to obtain.
a

"practical" science is
our power; second, with

things which come to pass by our agency but not always
uniformly--i

.e.

,

subject to the unanticipated consequence; third, with

seeking discoveries the exactness of which is defective when compared
to those of the physical

sciences; and fourth, with particulars and

not with generalities or universal s.

Within this constricted yet problematic realm of
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understanding,
the

I

think we can show that Machiavel

following general

'

writings rest

s

assumptions about what politics is.

that he holds that political
tive political

i
1

or

think

I

action is context-dependent; that
effec-

action therefore depends upon

a

clearheaded

understanding of one's context, including
the nature of the times and
the ambitions of those who surround
one and with or against whom one

must act.

Hence, if the present context can be
shown to be "like" a

past one, then the political
studying what was done

distinction?

in

actor can learn effective lessons by

the precedent case.

Can we make

sloppy

a

His philosophy of history could be used to
provide

explanations for why he proceeds with something like
the jus gentium
of English Common Law, rather than following the
more precisely laid

out and clipped pathways of the lex publicam of political
In other words,

he

philosophy.

stands with Aristotle, and not with Hobbes or John

Rawl s.
In

addition to the disproportionate weight of classical

influence--which includes Aristotle, Livy and Polybius--upon the
Discorsi and other works, there are

about Machiavel

li 's

a

number of other general

factors

thought that might be mentioned, though they will

not be explored here to any extent.

First, Machiavel

li

is not a

Christian, and, indeed, presents an ethics of civic life and political

action that are contrary to the tenets of Christianity

republican tradition in general
external

.

Since the

denies the possibility of discovering

or "transcendental" standards according to which politics

might be judged, this amounts

to

saying little more than that politics
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is a secular activity and that if political

actors are not guided by

Christian precepts, students of politics may
freely ignore them.
Second, and closely related to this fall from
Christian metaphysics,
is a factor that completely distinguished
Machiavelli

medieval

predecessors and scholarly contemporaries:

disregards any attempt to found

a

from both his
he entirely

philosophy of right, and no trace of

Natural Law theory is evident anywhere in his works.

With this

disappear both most of the traditional criteria for submitting
political

action to moral judgment, and some check on the rule of
pure expe-

diency in politics.

What criteria remain are

republicanism, to which we will
to note that Machiavel

i
1

'

to

turn shortly.

be

found in his

Third, it is important

republicanism lies square

s

an ongoing stream of Florentine political

hardly his own invention.

in

the midst of

thought and values.

It

is

This tradition surged during the crisis in

republican self-awareness that accompanied Florentine defiance of the

Milanese imperialism of 1390-1402, and afterwards went on
political

to

sweep the

thought of that city during the next generation--beginning

with the writings of Bruni and continuing throughout the general
val

of classicism during the early quattrocento

revi-

Fourth, The

.

Prince and the Discorsi are two completely separate works, written

different audiences and directed

to

diverse political

ends.

The

Discorsi, with which we are primarily concerned, are addressed to
those who would establish

a

republic, or who, finding themselves

living in one, would like to know what

to

do

to

keep it.

Like the Roman writers whose ideals were constantly before

to

109

^1^^

L^'^^'

Machiavelli

believed that
wi^t"'!"'^'
what men-at any rate superior
men-sought was the
fulfillment and the glory that come from
the creation and
maintenance by a common endeavor of a
strong and wellgoverned social whole. Only those will
accomplish this who
know the re evant facts.
If you make mistakes and live
in a
state of delusion, you will fail in
whatever you undertake
for reality mi sunders tood-or worse
still, ignored or
scorned-will always defeat you in the end.
We can achieve
understand firstly ourselves, and
thPn the
tL^n^i
then
nature of the material with which we
1^0
work.

We have already alluded to the nature
of such "material:"

violent, ambitious and

al

1

-but-ungovernable men who will pursue self-

interest at nearly any cost to others.
this human material

Machiavelli

seeks to work on

by imposing a new "form" upon it,^^^ and
he sets

about this task in two ways.

Knowing that he must establish goals for

both individuals and cities to aim at, he provides
the first

doctrine of virtu
cal
a

,

which is really

a

a

psychology of subjective politi-

action based on the ethics of pagan antiquity, and the
second with

theory of republican government--i .e.

Aristotle and Polybius. 142

,

the mixed constitution of

The fomi-matter relation, then, appears in

two important dimensions of his thought.

First, virtu

,

attributes which Machiavelli holds that the citizens of

must have if their city

is

to impose form upon fortuna

constitution

is

to

the mix of
a

republic

survive in liberty, has as its function

."*-^^

At the same time, the republican

the form which must be impressed upon the matter of

the men who live in the city.'^'^^

He thus suggests parallel

solutions

for the problem of politics, one for the particular and the other for
the general

aspect of the polity.

the political

It is

important to note here that

aspects of this theme appeared earlier in Aristotle's
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Politics: citizen and republic are mutually
dependent.

The man of

virtu upholds his city and it, in
turn, educates him and makes him

strong in the way of virtu

population cannot be.

if the

.

individual

is

A virtuous population will

not virtuous,

the

uphold good laws and

act to preserve its own liberty; the laws
they sustain will press them
into virtu

:

morals, if they are to be maintained, have
'a' i^lu ^?
need
of the laws, so the laws, if they are
to be observed
have need of good morals. 1^5
*

The antithesis of virtu for Machiafelli

corrupt populace

is one which

is corruption.

A

pursues selfish or short-term interests

at the expense of the framework of institutions which
preserves and
guards its liberties.

A people that allows itself to become corrupt

can easily be taken advantage of by the wily political
manipulator and

bent to serve his own ends.

Hence failure to exercise virtu will, in

the long run, lead first to corruption among the people or rulers
and

ultimately to the degeneration of the form of the polity.^^^
Machiavelli discusses specific attributes of virtu at several

places in the Discorsi
ness or power.

In

In

.

general, it does not mean wisdom or good-

cases it seems to connote efficiency in action

all

with respect to attaining the ends the actor has

in view.

all, for the citizen of

willingness to put

a

republic, it entails

aside self interest and work for the common

argument we first saw

in

damentally related

political

to

Hence, by the

good.'^'*^

the Aristotle section,

life:

a

First of

the concept is fun-

"politics" is

a

public thing in

the sense that it is concerned with those things that affect the

Ill

generality of the citizens, and the
goods with which they are
severally concerned.

Further, if virtu is predicated of
politics and

politics of public life
full

in

the double sense that it takes
place in

view of the populace and concerns common
goods, then the exercise

of virtu improves the general
tion.

quality of life and acts to check ambi-

Overweening ambition arouses animosity in the
people whenever

it appears:
in D.I. 30. 3, where Machiavelli is
discussing the same
subject, he writes: "In time of war Rome availed
itself of
everybody in the city, whether they were nobles or
not
and
in consequence there were always to be found
in Rome at any
given epoch so many virtuous men with victories
to their name
that the people had no cause to be dubious in regard
to them,
since there were so many that one looked after the
other."
Hence candidates for office were careful, he adds,
"to maintain their integrity and studious to avoid the least
sign of
ambition, lest it should cause the populace to attack them
as
ambitious persons." By " virtus " the Romans meant any characteristic that is appropriate and becoming in a man (vir).
The word connoted not only a man's personal characte'FTnd
his
ability, but also devotion to the state, and again efficiency
at his job, which was of special importance in the statesman
and the general.
But man, as the Romans conceived him, was
first and foremost a citizen with duties to the commonwealth
in which he lived, and unless he fulfilled these duties to
the best of his ability he was not, from the standpoint of
the Romans, or of Livy or Machiavelli, a virtuous man.
(Cp.D.111.8.3.)148
.

.

.

When Machiavelli moves from the "is" to the "ought" of things,
he nonetheless maintains that the latter be defined in terms of what
is practicable and not in terms of what is imaginary

.

'^'^^

This ultima-

tely means that it is not to principle to which the political

must appeal, but

to

actor

the characters and desires of those around him,

i.e., to the material

that he has to work with and the structure of

competing interests and passions

in

which he finds himself.
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Merleau-Ponty noted that
virtu ,s

.eans of living „Uh
others a way
Of affirming oneself by
acting In consultation
and exchange with
the.n^
and even the Prince
gives way to the opinions
of others In the
procesi
Of determining his course
of actlon.^^O
^^^^ ^.^^
^^^^^
that virtu and co«un1cat1on
with others are placed
at the service of
the needs of power, and
1n the final analysis
no one can be called
"virtuous" in Machiavel 11
s sense who lets hl.sel f
be daunted by
fortuna or otherwise acts imprudently.
Soderini, for example, was
a
virtuous man who transfon^ed
opportunity into failure by
not striking
down his enemies when they
were still disorganized and
he had the
a

„

opportunity to defeat them.
kindness.

Instead, he sought to win
them over by

Unreconciled, they successfully
plotted against him.

His

little exercise in Christian
virtue caused not only his own
ruin but
that of the Florentine Republic-in
other words, personal scruples
mrtally wounded the cmmn good.
gut at the same time-and here
we
see the utter futility of trying
to generalize about such
matters-

neither is it virtuous to successfully
acquire or retain power through
excessive or prolonged cruelty because
actions of this sort alienate
those against 'whom they are directed
and sow seeds of hot hatred

throughout the city.

The city.

i.e.. the common thing,

is

weakened

when so divided.

A Well -Ordered Republic

Machiavelli's republicanism, his impassioned advocacy
of
institutions open to participation by

a

broad range of citizens, and
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his reiteration of arguments in
favor of a

couched in anything like the moral

goN^

largo are not

terms which the twentieth
century

has seen fit to bring to bear on
such questions.

What is at stake has

nothing to do with justice or
fairness for its own sake, or with
the
notion that there is anything
reprehensible in formally or systemati-

cally excluding some group from power.

Yet, within the--to

us-

relatively limited diameter of his
spotlight of liberty, we
nonetheless find

a

range of social

and economic classes which were
not

to see power in other parts of Europe
for hundreds of years.

Machiavelli wants them

in

that spotlight, visible in the glare
of

liberty, because he knows that once
admitted to political
will

action they

both strengthen the city and check the
ambitions of the nobility

or signori who would otherwise corrupt it and
bring it down.
.in Rome the evil

of establishing
tyranny came from
the same causes as most tyrannies in cities,
namely, the too
great desire of the people to be free and the too
great
desire of the nobles to command. And when they do not
agree
to make a law in freedom's behalf, but one of the
parties
rushes to support a single person, then tyranny quickly
appears.
When a people thus brings itself to make this
mistake of giving one man authority in order that he may
attack those it hates, and that one is shrewd, he always
becomes tyrant of that city, because with the aid of the
people he undertakes to get rid of the nobility, and he never
turns to the oppression of the people until he has got rid of
the nobles.
By that time, when the people realizes it is in
slavery, it has no one with whom to take refuge.
This has
been the method used by all who have founded tyrannies in
republ ics ^^^
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

We have seen this kind of argument before in Aristotle: a

balance of power between the different classes in the city prevents
the rise of tyrants.

The one-sidedness of tyranny will

lead to
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further domestic strife in the
long run.

dimension that did not appear
from a moral

Aristotle.

adds a

He is not arguing here

basis so much as he is making
it clear that there are

efficient means by which
neighbors.

in

Further, Machiavelli

a

city may remain strong in
relation to its

A city divided by class conflict
is a weak city.

A united
city will maintain her strength-led
by the talented and virtuous
who
are sown at random by Fortuna
scattered like the seek of the
,

paleolithic farmer upon both the hills and
valleys of the social
order.
I
say, then, about that fault of which
writers accuse the
multitude, that all men individually can be
accused of it
and chiefly princes; for he who is not
regulated by the laws
will commit the same errors as the
ungoverned multitude.
And
It is easy to make sure of this, because
there are and have
been many princes, and the good and wise
ones have been few
.Hence it is necessary to consider each
man's nature
for Itself and to see if he is like the
multitude, because
the comparison ought to be made with a
multitude regulated by
the laws in the same way as those princes
are, and it will be
found to have the same goodness as we see in
them, and it
"^^itSier arrogantly to domineer nor humbly
to
.

.

serve^f^^^*^

The laws of which Machiavelli

republic.

speaks here are those of a

A republic is a mixed body of the sort Aristotle and

Polybius had described.

At the beginning of the Discorsi

,

he

notes

that states may be governed by the one, the few or the many, and
that
each has both

a

healthy and

a

degenerate

forni.-^^^

He then unfolds an

endless cycle of the emergence and decay of each of these, borrowing

shamelessly from Polybius, working from historical examples

in Livy,

and says that "a state might circle about for an infinite time in

these forms of government." Hence,
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bad 156
bad.

^ood and the viciousness
of the three

The solution to the dilemma
raised by this endless cycle
of
growth, decay and collapse is
to abandon all hope of
sustaining a
state organized along any of
these lines, and instead to
combine the
three into a single plan, because
"in that case one [part]
keeps watch
over the other." Thus, early
Rome at first combined the
powers of a

monarch in the Consuls, and oligarchical
power in the Senate.
It
remained for the popular element
to attempt to wrest power
fr™ the
nobles in the senate
people rose up against it; thence,
in order not
to lose the whole, the nobility was
obliged to grant the
people their share, and on the other
side the Senate and the
Consu s continued to hold so much power
that in such a
republic they were able to keep their
rank. 157

What is this but

a

balance of power in

the basis of such institutional

able to establish internal

a

mixed government?

On

arrangements, the Roman Republic was

stability, and ward off the encroachments

of corruption and the prediations of Fortuna.

Over the centuries she

then gradually wrote that history which Machiavelli

finds so redolent

with good examples.
But let us become more specific.

interested in the notion of
a

a

Since we are primarily

public space as it might be embodied in

popular assembly, what did Machiavelli propose when he turned
to

consider the institutional

structures of his own time?

What can we

infer about what he might have done had he actually been able

to

play

the role of innovator in an Italian city, and what arguments did he
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put forth to Justify his
views?

Is

the assembly that Machiavelli

pro-

poses "sovereign" in the way
that Aristotle's is?

Machiavelli's most specific
published statements on the
possible nature of a republican
government
in

his own city are to be

found in his "A Discorse on
Remodeling the Government of
Florence,"
which was written to Giovanni
de'Medici, then Pope Leo X
about
1520.
Note that the suggestions embodied
here are based upon
,

notions first advanced by Savonorola
and subsequently incorporated
the Florentine constitution of
1494.

in

That document, nullified by coup

d:etat in 1510, had established sovereignty
and legal

rights,

prescribed the composition of ruling
councils, detennined the qualifications for individual

service and outlined the duties of
the various

magistracies instituted

to

oversee public affairs.

the assembly proposed by Machiavelli

to Leo

We will

see that

is a body weaker and more

constrained than the ekklesia of Aristotle's
polity, and that it would
be inaccurate to characterise the Grand
Council

ment

in

a

the formal

mixed government.

definition of

tionalization of

a

a

as

the sovereign ele-

At the same time, what he proposes fits

republic and can be seen as the institu-

treaty of peace between conflicting class interests

in the Florence of his time.

Here is a sketch of what Machiavelli proposed

in

There are three sorts of men who exist

cities: the most

his letter to

Leo.

important, those in the middle, and the lowest.

three ranks in

a

republic and not more.

in

all

Hence there must be

At the top,

then, he sees a
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council Of sixty.flve
citizens of forty-five years
and ™ore, fiftythree for the major guilds
and twelve for the ,ninor
guilds.
These
Shall serve for life.
Fro. the. an executive or
Galfonier of Justice
Is Chosen.
The rewlning sixty-four
are divided into groups
of
thirty-two. Which rule with hi.
for alternating one-year
periods.
All

together are to be called the Signoria.^S^
The Signoria are the first
rank in the city.

The second rank is to be
arranged

in

this way.

A council

of

Two Hundred, composed of men at
least forty years old, forty of
them
chosen from the minor guilds, and
sixty from the major guilds.
None
of them would be permitted to
belong to the sixty-five.

They also

should hold office for life and be
called the Council of the Selected.
These two ranks, the Signoria and the
Council, would hold all executive and most administrative power in
the city and have primary

responsibilty for decisions of broad policy.
constitution, so far, lies first

The weakness of this

in Machiavel li

'

s

failure to stipulate

short office tenure and second that both of
these ranks shall be

appointed by Leo himself, rather than chosen by
the assembly from
among its own ranks as would be the case with
Aristotelian
citizens.

-^^^

Leaving these considerations aside momentarily,
we come

to the popular element itself:
It is now left to satisfy the third and final
class of men
which IS the whole general body of citizens, who will
never
be satisfied ... if their power is not restored or
if they
do not have a promise that will be restored. ... And
therefore I judge that you are under the necessity of reopening
the Hall of the Council of One Thousand, or at least of
the
Six Hundred Citizens, who would allot, just as they fonnerly
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This is clearly not a program
for an Aristotelian
polity.

Neither the English of the
seventeenth century nor the
taericans of
the eighteenth would have
stood for such a
thing.

But we need to look

first at the context, and second
at the arguments Machiavelli
puts
forth in defense of this scheme
before deciding whether its
tripartate
structure is sufficient ground for
calling it a republic or mixed
government.
The context is as follows: the
House of MedTcT had succeeded
in bringing about the collapse
of the Republic of Florence,
and for

ten years had held control

purposes, now in charge.

of the city.

Leo was,

for all

intents and

Machiavelli, who had held the position
of

Secretary to the deposed Galfonier Soderini,
therefore finds himself

writing to an opponent to propose institutional

arrangements which his

reader will suppose -correctly or not-to
be directly contrary
own interests.

a

republic to one who, we can be

sure, has never felt the sightest need of one.
a

his

Seeking preferment and favor, the writer
nonetheless

fervently and cleverly advocates

weaves

to

Machiavelli. no doubt,

tangled web which we cannot here take time to completely

unravel, but the thought does occur: should he gain
preferment and
official

position under the rule of this Pope by proposing

a

plan that

would defuse tensions in the city, how better could he contrive
along with his fellow citizens as well, than

to

to get

take some of the ere-
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dit for helping to have
established arrangements that
gave to the,«
some power and which, in that
century at any rate, canprised
grants of
a sort that Princes were
not wont to give?

Here are some of the propositions
with which Machiavelli seeks
to persude Giovanni de'Medici.
The first one is directly
concerned
with the public space:

Without satisfying the generality
of the citizens, to set up
a stab e government is always
impossible.
Never iill the
Florentine citizens be satisfied I
Hal?'?I\'^t°^

^^1-'

th^PPa lace
the
ace ofThp\1'
of the Signory].

Z

'''''

in

Vl'
Therefore,

if one is to set ud a
'
republic in Florence, this Hall must
be reopened and this
allotment made to the generality of the
citizens. 162

Following this, further measures are
proposed which will serve
to continue both the republican form and
to satisfy the generality of

the citizens once death shall

temporal

scene.

have forever removed this Pope from
the

These measures involve an elaborate system
of checks

and balances which are to hold among the
bodies previously proposed,
and in addition he now introduces the office
of Provost.

Four people

are to be appointed to this office, drawn from
among the people by the

Council, and these officers shall reside

in

the Signory,

in

an ordered

succession, and have veto power over the acts of the Signoria.

These

measures are put forth for two reasons:
One is that if the Signoria or one of the councils does not
decide a matter as the result of discord, or does things
opposed to the common good through wickedness, somebody may
be at hand to take from them that power and appeal their
decision to another body, because it is not good that one
kind of magistrate or council should be able to retard public
business without someone's being there who can arrange for
action.
It is also not good that officeholders should not
have somebody to observe them and make them abstain from

J

greater, .orlZslf
to
the earlier office. 163

he

r
"^epublic,
public'

iTA'''
and
more r^''''''^
honorable than

Machiavelli characterizes
these arrangements as

a monarchy
during the lifetime of his
Holiness because of the
appointive power
rested in that individual, but
as a republic thereafter.
He closes

with

a

plea that this plan of his
be instituted, giving
as final

grounds that the city is, at
present, internally divided among
simmering and confused factions,
and predicts the outbreak of
civil
strife in the event of an emergency.

The only way of escaping
the

ills of faction is to provide
the city with institutions
that
stand firm.
And they will always
'^f'.nA
stand firm^^T^^^^^
when everybody has a hand in them,
and when everybody knows what he needs to do and
in whom he can trust
and
no class of citizen, either
through fear for itself or
through ambition, will need to desire
revol ution .164

This final

prescription that,

sentence is
in

a

a

direct echo of the Aristotelian

properly mixed constitution, no class
or

segment of the citizens would desire

a

revolution-even

opportunity to change their constitution.

if given

the

As Sheldon Wolin has

pointed out, one reason for the superiority
of the republican system

consisted

in

its being maintained by force of the
populace,

than by force over the populace

.

rather

'^^^

At the same time, as we have said, the popular element
from sovereign here.

is

far

For Machiavelli, what is most important about

the people is not that they have "rights" (a modern
prejudice at best)
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but that they have
ambitions (which is

somewhat more ancient

a

teaching).

Furthermore, they not only serve
to check the countervailing ambitions of those
who look down in the city,
they also embody
Characteristics of political
judgment and wisdom which
must be incorporated into the political
process if matters of general
concern are
to be prudently arranged.
Hence Machiavel li says,
to improper
i-nfWnce^'^hp''
influence,
the people always make
fewer mistakes 'than Princes

In general,

the people judge well

ticulars, but do not judge well
of general

provide an all

of public officials and
par-

ties .^^^

i

Thus,

though they

important source of virtuous or
great men, without

whose leadership no city can long
maintain itself

strength or reach

in

for greatness, their judgment is
neither constant nor reliable enough
for them to be entrusted with
plenipotentiary power.
But they must
share, they must participate, for
even the gran signori cannot long

make adequate domestic or foreign policy
without both their cooperation and their wisdom.

Furthermore, and this factor is important
for

Machiavel li, their active participation

is

essential

to

any city that

would rise above the ordinary.
A City ... that does not make use
..
of her populace for
anything glorious can treat them as she likes
but if
she hopes to do what Rome did, she cannot make
a distinction
against the people. loo
.

.

.

It is ultimately the common good which is at
stake here, and

the common good which makes cities great.
the potential

greatness of

a

-^^^

Neither the health nor

city can be maintained at its expense.
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and the co™«n good cannot
energe without the active
participation and
assent of the common people.
The common good is most
likely to be

preserved and maintained through
republican institutions, and
especially through the institution
of the

G^and^ouncn.

Through its
agency, the cycle of decay
and corruption, which we saw
at the

beginning of the Discorsi.
the

"-ay

be circumvented by periodic
renewal

of

Form or constitution of
the city.

It is most certain that there
is a limit for the
''''''
thef en rally move
^h'^ouah^thP^'J^through the entire course ordained
for them by Heaven without

keeping the^irth^
wdy oraained, ... I am speaking
lly
of m xed bodies
such fl<;
republics and religions.
I
say 'that those cha ge^
re to
teir advantage that take them back toward

lZZY-

their beg nning.
^^'^ organized and have longest ^i e
Jh.t Jr'^T.J^^'"
often renew themselve or
^hat bv ?nL^
some accident outside their
organization come to such
rTnL.^
renewal.
And it is clearer than light that
if these bodies
'''''
t° renew them
s
I'''^^^""^
^^^"^ ^^^^ to their beginnings;
Lrl
because all the beginnings of religions
and of republics and
of kingdoms must possess some goodness
by means of which they
gain their first reputation and their
first growth.
Since in
the process of time that goodness is
corrupted, if something
does not happen that takes it back to
the right position
such corruption necessarily kills that body.
The doctors of
medicine say, speaking of the bodies of men,
that 'daily
something is added that now and then needs
cure. '170

Sheldon Wolin sums up not only Machi avel
historical

1 i

'

s

project, but its

context:

... To create a political theory for a world of random
movements, a task which had never been seriously undertaken
before, meant surrendering certain kinds of inquiry
because
they no longer presented meaningful problems.
In a world
pulsating with change, there seemed to be little point in
continuing the old quest for a motionless polity.
Likewise,
there was a marked shift away from questions of legitimate
authority, with their connotations of a stable political
world, to questions of power, or the ability to exert mastery

by controlling an
unstable complex of movinq
forr^.

^'

tt 1^ sc^l^-e^Iofe

trell^d^^;

were .ore often'^L^^L^rthan'?

g

^

were

c7:^::r^ne°c'ess1t;^^^^

To return to the problem
of the political
recall

that such

a

judgment, then, we

judgment, properly speaking,
concerns matters of

import to the general

order of society.

Such matters must be

addressed through public procedures
which themsleves serve
integrate the diversity of points
of view involved.

to

Machiavelli

and

Aristotle both posed this problem
squarely against the backdrop of
class conflict and civil strife

and-while failing

to cast the

net of

citizenship as widely as we might have
wished-held that both an
integration and

a

balance of opposing forces were needed
to animate

the procedure and prevent systematically
unequal
tical

power and goods.

Each proposes

his defense of human liberty on

a

a

mixed government.

a

school

in

Each rests

set of institutions which channels

the desires of the moment, outlives
individual

itself acts as

distribution of poli-

political

actors, and

the open-ended politics and mutual

and compromise necessary to sustain it.

Each presents

a

check

politics in

which conflict and compromise take place with
respect to concrete par-

ticular interests, rather than over abstract principles
or moral
systems.
In Machiavelli 's

design, qualitatively different points of
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View are separated and given
institutional

life in a republic which

prepares for their reintegration
by balancing the forces
they represent before requiring that
all concur in any forward
moves.
In other
words, the integration which
we have previously associated
with the
kinds of political judgment
that are rendered in the
public space
is

here not carried by the assembly
alone, nor by the assembly
acting in
concert with magistrates drawn
from its ranks.
Instead, sovereignty
is divided among separate
institutions of government, each
drawn from

and having the basis of its power
in
social

order.

In

a

particular segment of the

order to move forward, the various
parts of the

state must cooperate.

Compromise, then, is something that
takes place

between branches of the government, and

is

through assembly debate and deliberation.

assembly is not the forum

in

which all

a

The public space of the

forces come together to

struggle and contend, but rather that place

ment gets

not a synthesis attained

in which

the popular ele-

sense of its own desires and purposes, before
checking and

being checked by the opposed interests which
themselves control other
organs of the state.

What we see here, then, is the application of the
Aristotelian

philosophy

in

a

different context, and from this we draw the implica-

tion that the instantiation of

a

philosophically or formally stipu-

lated set of political

arrangements will always be subject

specific vagaries of

given historical

a

context.

to

the

At bottom, on both

views, lies the struggle for power between classes.

The self-

attitudes of such classes, their aims, their respective psychologies
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and the history of
their Interrelations
constitute the bounds of
the
theoretically plausible and
the politically
permissible.
Politics Is

after all,

a

practical

science, and the desire
for popular par-

ticipation in government Is
subject
interests.

to

constraints advanced by
opposed

Therefore, while the public
space (s an Integral

the process of forming
political

Machlavelli, it

is

judgments

in

part of

the polity of

not alone at the heart
of the affair.

The Wh1<i Science of Politics

^Englishmen are no more to be
Slaves

to

Parliaments, than to

Posterity will be ashamed to own,
The actions we their ancestors
have done
When they for ancient precedents
enquire'
And to the Journals of this age
retire
To see one tyrant banish' d
from his home
To set five hundred traitors in
him room.'
'

P^ss^9e of the Septennial Act of 1716

?!^?r
[Mcllwain. 50.]

Early English Background
At this point we make another leap
in time and geography, away

from the mediterranean basin to England,
where the theory of the mixed

constitution with its provision for public
space appears
next

.

The final

full

to

have gone

English version of this theory would not
be

drawn up and set forth until

the

founders of the American republic sat

in deliberation and wrote the
Constitution of 1787.

Hence we take the

view that this document was the culmination
of over one hundred fifty

years of intense intellectual argument and slow
theoretical development

in

two countrires.

This means that we have no central

thinker or
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text to Which we .1ght turn
to study either the
construction or application of republican Ideas
by the English.
There is no English
Machlavelli. For these reasons
it is necessary to
turn to the
synthetic compilations of Pocock,
Ballyn, Wood and others who
have studied

the vast quantity and range
of the primary sources
and summarized the
views they contain.

According to J.G.A. Pocock,
historians of seventeenth century

English political and intellectual
history have profoundly altered
their understanding of this
period-and of the American Revolution
that followed-since the
1970s.
Pocock indicates that there now
seems to be emerging

a

new way of looking at the
Puritan Revolution

the Glorious Revolution and the
American Revolution, one which
takes
them in chronological order and
sees them as successive stages
in the

decline of an old order and the emergence
of

a

new.

Prior to the emergence of this view,
it was the practice among
historians to see the Puritan Revolution
of 1641 as the climax or
final
In

catastrophe of the Tudor political religious
and social order.

1640 this world comes shatteringly to an end,
and then after

revolutionary hiatus, is restored in 1660.

a

This restored aristocratic

world, however, is so unlike the old one that
historians found themselves having to interpret it anew.

A 1976 conference of historians

made it obvious that such reinterpretations were
converging, and that
a

"new paradigm" was at hand:

The structure of the Folger conference obliged the participants to locate the Puritan Revolution at the beginning
rather than the end of a historical series, and this was in
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presen*?lna'"?J

CHS?:

°^

perspective they found themselves

'o'f

dnoLner, the Whig; we see
the Revolutinn nf

G:orgTn?!l7]"^"^^""

i^ftQ

^^-'"^^ that order 1n the'r^^gT
of

Our project here will be
to very quickly sketch
the outlines
of the Whig Science of
politics and the theory of the
mixed constitution upon which it was based,
through a series of writings by
various
parties in a long political struggle.
Their thoughts and polemics
were published in England and America
over a long period of time, and
have been synthesized and analyzed
by Pocock and Wood, both of
whom
base much of their efforts and nearly
all of their approach upon
the
work of Bernard Bailyn.
Over the course of these debates,
the attri-

butes of the basic concepts in the
protagonists, their practical

experiences and their expectations of
themselves and of the world came

under

a

variety of pressures.

By

the time we cover the theoretical

ground that lies between 1558 and 1786, we
will see that the ultimate
issue of this movement was an entirely novel

concept of representative

government.

The study is important first because this
long period of

intellectual

ferment in England provided both education and
justifica-

tion for the American revolutionaries.
of the 1640s provided intellectual

Second, English Whig politics

sustenance for the American attacks
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on the conservative
English Whiggery of the
1760s.
The Americans
having become Whigs of
the former sort, failed
to evolve in step

with
their counterparts in
England, whereupon the
English found the.nselves
attacked by others who held
to an antiquated form
of their own
views.

Such background information
is essential

for any student of the

American Congress who would
attempt to evaluate its
historical performance and present problems in
terms of the Constitutional

design.

One way of looking at the
revolution of 1641, then,

is

to

see

it as a dispute over the
correct form of the English
Constitution,

waged between advocates of the
mixed constitution, on the
one hand,
and the defenders of a
divinely-placed and sovereign monarch
on

other.

the

Attempts to untangle the welter
of theoretical and historical

sources which may have cast the mixed
government theory on English
soil, and nurtured it where it
fell, seem futile.
Weston sees the

writings of Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero,
and later continental
thfnkers

in

this tradition as crucial.

Early in Elizabeth's reign,

a

number of important men at Cambridge
University traveled to the continent and returned, bearing ancient
texts, to teach them at this crucial

center of inf 1 uence

so far,

in

.

In

the next generation, John Aylmer went

his disquisition on mixed government,
as to point

a

finger

at Parliament and say that here was the
mixture of monarchy,

aristocracy and democracy that the ancients had
described.

This

contravened the prevailing and less radical versions
of the doctrine,
held by the Monarch and the Peerage, that sovereignty
was divided between King, Lords and Commons, and that altogether,
sovereign agency
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rested with the
K1„g-l„.Pa.„-a.ent.

trouble at court.

Ayl.e.'s .evisionU™ got
h1.

Following this. Sir Tho.as
S.ith published

treatise on mixed government,
with explicit references
in 1584.

to

mto

a

Aristotle,

These were by no means the
only statements of the
theory."

Mixed government was "in the
air" and gaining influence.

Protestantism itself had become

a

Even

factor in the spread of the
new

doctrine by 1550. and the mixed
government theory was held tight
in
the grim embrace of the
Presbyterian Church throughout
the sixteenth
century as a representation of
its own scheme of organization,
only to
be applied to the English
government itself during the
seventeenth
century.
But the signal

event that moved the Aristotelian
conception

from the realm of academic and
theological disputation to the center
of political

action was brought about by the
monarchy, and the arena

in which this actually took
place was Parliament.

^^"'^'^
the

"^"^hs before war began,
theory of mixed government
with the English constitution
and thus gave the classical
^l^^t it could have acquired so
rapidly in no
rh;.i*.?"T^""!i^^n^'

^P"?l^^^^ associated

other^way''^^'^^

The remarks of Charles I on the mixed
^
nature of the
tnglish government were contained in his
Answer to the
Nineteen Pr opositions the cardinal document in
the history
of the classical theory of the English
constitution and a
pronouncement that proved to be one of the most
influential
ever made on the nature of the English government
The King based his rejection of the Nineteen
Propositions
on the ground that the two Houses, because of
the constitituional reforms that had been completed by August
1641,
possessed sufficient power to prevent the growth of royal
tyranny and that further concessions would upset the
balance
among king, lords, and commons and eventually encompass
the
destruction of the mixed and balanced government that he was
,

.
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con1::po?a'n•es^:Ta^•se^'^
effect upon
upo,
tary mixture of
^o^^^^'nent
as a saluthe simple forms of nn
been classified by
9°'^^"'I^ent as these had
Aris?o?le and ?I
'"^^^^o^'e
later political
phil
175 ^
philosophers
osophers .175

L

Not for the first
t1.e do „e see

a

theory of government
that

gives a Share of
sovereignty to the public
space c„e to light
and
gain strength In the
context of a public
space.
The crux of the
matter is sl.ply stated,
if the English
government «s. Indeed

"-xed" then

all

sovereignty did not reside
In the Monarch,
and'he
therefore shared power
with organs of the
state which derived
their legitimacy from
sources other than that
upon which his
own rested.
This concession, forced
upon Charles by necessity
amounted to a very large
hole placed squarely
at the waterline of
that
Old tub, the Divine Right
of Kings.
She would not remain
afloat in
troubled waters.
Thereafter, the struggle
between King and Parliament
would not be over whether
Parliament had a share of
sovereignty, but
would revolve. Instead,
about the question of its
dimensions.
The

Answer to the Nineteen
Propositions provided the point
of departure
for subsequent debates
between Royalists and
Parliamentarians alike,
and the theory of mixed
government took a firm hold on
the

'

national

imagination that was to last for
the next two centuries.!'^
But this is not the whole tale.

instantiate

a

If Charles'

Answers served

new conception of Enlish
government and diversify Its

sources of legitimacy, only half
the task has been completed.

What

has been thus far accomplished
for the English polity on the
general
level

remains to be set in motion for
the particular, i.e., for the

to
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individual

Citizen.

We have seen in the
doctrines of both Aristotle

and Machiavelli

that citizen and polity
are mutually dependent,
and
that if the polity is to
institutionalize a public space
for the pur-

pose of making truly synthetic
political judgments,

a

diversity of

independent and self-interested
citizens must arrive at the
central
point and participate in making
those decisions.
To borrow
r^achiavelli's language here,
Charles' Answers had the
historical

sequence of providing the form
needed for

a

republic.

somehow, to impress that form
upon the human material

Hence we raise the question how
the political
tical

It

con-

remained,

of England.

life, the forms of poli-

action assumed by this theory,
could come into being among

English freeholders long accustomed

to

being told that political

authority and power flowed from the
top down and were embodied by
agents of the Divine will.

Pocock put the question thus:

It is not surprising, then, that
for some time scholars have
sought to raise not only the question
of how the values and
concepts of civic humanism could become
established in a
territorial-jurisdictional monarchy such as England,
but the
larger question of how and when, in what
terms and under what
conditions, the Englishman could develop a civic
consciousness, an awareness of himself as a
political actor
in a public realm. l''

Pocock, therefore, emphasizes

a

strain of English political

thought which he sees as having been primarily
influenced by the
P^'^^Q'^si

tional

of Machiavelli.

His approach is a departure from the tradi-

textbook account of Augustan political

praeterea nihil

Harrington,

,

thought as Locke et

and proceeds to center instead on the figure of
James
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his time the descent of cprt^

ITJ

n

At issue here was something
like Machiavel

popolo armato.

^^^^^

'

^^^"^

i
1

'

s

doctrine of the

Since all cities have enemies
and live in the domain

of fortuna. there exists
some relationship between
military and political virtu.
In the Discorsi,
Machiavel li raised the question
whether

Republics lasted longer when military
power remained exclusively

in

the hands of the nobility or
whether the arming of the populace
could
be beneficial, despite the
internal threat that they might
then

constitute for those

in

power.

Rome resolved upon empire, upon
a daring attemot to
dominate the environment, and
consequently upon a vir^u which
wou d enable her to control the
disorder which
actions had helped to cause.
She had therefore
.

.

.

her^

to arm the

''''''
''^'^ demands for'^mo re
powe ''an'd
power,
and l^'lll
to make concessions to those
demands.
The arming
of the plebians contributed to
Rome's military greatness- the
struggle between the orders to the
consolidation of a
government; but some continuing disequilibrium,
yet to be
analyzed, to shortening the life of Roman
liberty. 179

mLd

Pocock finds

in

Machiavel

li

an intrinsic connection between

military expansion, the arming of the
plebians and the vivere popolare.

From this he inquires after the relation
between the capacities

of the solder and those of the citizen.

citizen first and
professional

a

Should the individual

be

a

soldier second, or should some citizens become

soldiers?

Under the Aristotelian theory of citizenship,

the man who devotes all of his energies to the
practice of any par-

ticular art and none to participation

in

public affairs is less than

a
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Citizen: he is
tes all

a

source of weakness to his
fellows.

his energies

outright danger.

to war

is

The banausic

worse than

a

The .an who devo-

weakness.

He is an

artisan is pursuing

a limited good to
the neglect of the co.n.on
good, but the solder is
even .ore likely to
do this because his art
is to exercise the
.eans of coercion and

destruction, rather than those
of dialogue and deliberation.

Hence it
is important to restrict
the art of war to the
commonwealth in general

rather than to

a

subset of its citizens.

A citizen called to arms
has

his own place in the body
politic and will

once the fighting has ceased,
he will
and his civic life.^^^

fight to preserve that, but

return to his private concerns

Hence,

Military virtu necessitates political
virtue because both can
be presenti^n

terms of the same end.
The republic is the
common good; the citizen, directing
all his ac? o
to that
good, may be said to dedicate his
life
to

'''''''''

nlTflrl"""":'''
Sniversal^Pnr'^iJ'^i;''

the republic- Jhe
the two'
alike in

^^^^^^icing particular goods to
'^'t"^'
t^^" the warrior displays
.1^
i?
ff.
1
'1^'"""'
"^^^
through military
^
dn<;r?nlinl\h%
discipline
that one learns to be a^ citizen and
to display
civic virtue.
In the anatomy of the early
Roman virtue given
in the Discorsi
Machiavelli seems to depict it as built
on
discipline
and civic religion, as if these were
^
the
twl
two socializing processes through
which men learned to be
political animals.

n

^'

In Pocock's

reconstruction of these matters, it was James

Harrington (1611-1677) who incorporated Machiavel

li

'

s

notion of the

armed citizen into his own mixed government
theory, and who emerges as
a

central

figure in seventeenth century English Whig
political

Following the collapse of Tudor power
Charles

I

in

1649,

English pol

i

in

tics--stil

theory.

1641 and the execution of
1

,

primarily, an upper class
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POlU,cs-.egan

to

.evolve around

a

clash of Interests
between count.,

gentry and court
arUtocrac. 1n London.

The country Interests
tended
to see themselves as
Independent their liberty
sustained by lan-

retainers who depended upon
the crown for authority
and position
Wh,le the executive branch
of English government
was centered at
court, it was Parliament
which represented-through
its electoral

syste.-the

rival

interests of the country
gentry.

Tempers flared and
debates grew heated as the
attention of these two groups
became fixed
upon the question of the
role that a standing army
might play on
English soil .^^^

:i^:ff'^l^ ^M^ir:ai^:n"d?rnotrem^?''^

armed

r^d'icali m.
saw
aw" in„' the
he":il?t?r?h°"
imlitia their ultimate guarantee
of the nowpr tn
'''^ ''^^ ^^^^ ^''' -''^ able to 5raw
^he conner^nn^K'/'"
nection between proprietorship
and the control of the swo^d
probably did more than anything
else to preserve
Harringtonian doctrine.
But the alternative to the militia
expressly 'S^cUr d L
be impossible: a professinal
bfiZss^ble'^"'
''V'
army maintained in time of oeace
''''''
'"'^'^ it u on thT"
land" ZtT"'.
land,
but found fiscal means of paying
it regularly.
The guarDs are mercenary, and
therefore dangerous'' was the
exclamation in the Commons of Giles
.183
Strangways

f'^'V

.

What
political

power

in

is clear

.

from Pocock's account is that this
clash of

interests quickly turned into
the English government.

which the crown could come

to

a

struggle over the balance of

The squires feared the influence

exercise upon Parliament

in

its search
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for funds to sustain
the

a™.

1t

controUed.

Individual .e*e.s could
be pressured or bribed
or otherwise curried
to vote for funds
To
such a development they
opposed all of their
political skills and
added the rhetoric of
.achlavelll and of Harrington
and the civic
humanist Ideology which
Insisted that the Individual's
political capaCity depended upon his
ability
"ity to
1:0 bpar
Dear, ;,nH
and to possess, the
arms to be
^^"^
exercised in the public
cause.

What

is

important for our purposes,
is to note that the
attacks upon court power were
first launched in terms of
protecting
Parliament from the corrupt
influences of the monarchy,
should responsibility for defense come to
rest in the executive branch.
As the

century wore on, the emphasis
shifted, the question of the
military
receded, and attention focused
on fear of Court corruption
of the

Parliament as

a

general

phenomenon.

At stake for the Whigs of
this

period, was their right to
representation in the English
government
and the strength of the
institution that embodied that
representation:
property in this vision comes not
oligarchy, nor from a revolutionary
army of
sa?nt^
'''''''''
which\e
d
^'^'^^
to
0 reduce the independent
and arms-bearing proprietors
to
dependence upon government.
What may now be termed
neo-Harnngtonian doctrine is directed not
against a
CO lapsing feudal order, but
against a bureaucratic and
^^ainst the past, but against modern?tf^"Ch^'"^u'^'''^'
^^°"9ht the traditional king and
oarlir!"^^°\^'^
parliament obsolete
in face of the revolution of
the
proprietors, his heirs and successors
sought to mobilize
Parliament against king and ministers by
invoking the independence of property against threats too
modern for him to
have considered. 185

JrL^^'K'^

tTV^
^ir

L

Jnt'L

For Pocock, the next phase of the
neo-Harrington revival

had

;
the count.,
.eactlon against
«^'-ch

fined

the .1,,,e and

-n

mics in th.
the .e„n

oMueen

---appears
tical
o

,

as

,

Wn,1a™ ,„ ^"^

ate. 1590S and .
foreshadowed later
pole-

Anne.

The

nse

o. a second

Count./

the

event in the
histo. o. Btintish
sh poV
polithought in
in
the age
^np h..
tne
y
between the Enali-^h
-oh
«
t^ngnsh and American
IOC

1""'°"

-

"
and commercial

H.

turn at Cnnrt
.nn an
uourt and
increasingly conserv,;,ti>,o
""3ervat,ve

on old-fashioned
virtue by the To

emphasis

.

P-^ -d

become staunch
advocates of
participation lin.ed
„i th ci tiWhile those at court
found themselves
standing for indivifreedom from central
government intrusion.

;--e.
dual

But this was

a

reversal.

If the

ten„s of the debates
had
^e9.n to shift away
from the questions
of the virtue of
the armed
cuizen and the corruptive
influence of court on
Parliament, the relative positions Of
the two parties
began to shift as
well.
The older
'deology of participation
was beginning to
give way
to

a

new one that

centered upon the notion
of individual liberty.
,n insti^tional
ten.s. Parliament
began to represent
not so much the ancient
demand
for participation as
it did, through
its laws and its
struggles

against the crown, the
propertied interests of an
individualistic mercantilism, empire and
^^S
bureaucracy.

By Defoe's

time^S' ,-„,eed

court apologists had
begun advocating parliamentary
supremacy
defense of this triangle
of new commercial

in

interests, while the

the
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count.. ,ent.. .a.
.eco.e t.^ou^h,.
To., an. now
1,entU,e. cUlzen
;

-

---—"---eact.n.
sta.e ,n the co.nt.y

TMs

was

was used 1„ t.e
elg.teent. centu.. to

defend the «,„opoly of
political power ,y the
landed an'stccac.

According to PococK and
Wood, these developments
are not yet clearl.
understood and there exists
nothing comparable to
the wor. done on
the
American politics of this
period for British
political thought and
history after 1688.
For students of American
history and Institutions,
however
let us see what has
been acomplished between
the publication of
Charles' Answers and the
Glorious Revolution of 1688.
First,
the

theory of mixed government,
traceable back to Aristotle
and Polyblus
has emerged on English
soil as the basic
paradlg. of politics and
government about which debates
over the legitimate
distribution of
political power come to center.
Second, the doctrine of
Divine Right
has been so modified that
political struggles, within
the new mixed
government context, themselves
revolve about the particular
question
of the extent and nature of
Parliamentary sovereignty. Third,

Harrington's Influence, with Its
emphasis upon virtue as opposed
to
corruption, and the powers of the
assembly as opposed to those of

the

monarchy, constitute an Injection
of Machiavellian republicanism
at a
time when Opposition politics
was able to embrace such views
in order
to further its own intersts.
Fourth, it was the emphasis upon
the in-

dependence of the individual citizen,
his freedom from retainership at
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t'ons Of the doctnne
of Parliamentary
supremacy and was later
«^ined to suit the needs of
Individual. I.e.,
co»erc1al liberties.

I^^^-^!!l£!l£irLixp^

to 1776

The reversal

Whig theories

of Court and Country
positions and the shift
of
fro,„ the Country
Opposition to the Court
Establishment

Which too. place at the
very end of the
seventeenth century need
not
concern us here.
,n ter. of British
history, they are
the place

to

start looking for reasons
why the Aristocracy
managed to regain its
position in British government
and society after the
revolution of
1641 appeared to have swept it
away forever.

From this it is possible

to see why a conservative
mixed government, with an
extremely powerful
House of Lords, was able to
persist in Britain Into the
nineteenth

century, and up to the passage
of the Reform Bill of
1830.

For our purposes, it

is

sufficient to stop

Whig Opposition, the Country
Opposition which owed
Machiavelli and Harrington.

As

by Anglo-American historians
has

the
it.

wUh
so

the

radical

much to

new emerging paradigm now
sketched
it was

the political

theory of

the radical Country Whigs
which had the greatest influence
upon the

Americans of later generations as
they moved into their own political
crisis of the 1760s, finally coming
to oppose Parliament in England
1n
order that they might elect a Parliament
of their own In America:

As that century went on its way.
Harringtonian and
neo-Harnngtonian ideas were absorbed into the
opposition
"'^2? political culture, a powerful current of
lhr..llr"^
thought whose effects can be traced in
Europe and America

as
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this
^:y''Se^L^:rtr4L11:n"^to jL^-J^*^t1ona„st te.s
of the for. of
government 5ep,cted ^
mVr''"".'" l°57-62

Tran'TTigt^H^SrNiVTm
^^ow convincingly
asslcal republic might
that a
be de Lne^
place of the balanced
"-^^
constitut on of h. ^'"'' ^
Neville and the other
^'"""^
neo-Harrina?onL„^^'
emphasizing the elements
"
of
of ?enubl?can Li
tionship and asserting
'"'!.
**'^t
relathem again t tJ» t
executive patronage and
^^'^^^"^"9 Power of
finance
.
tion of powers, insofar
°^
^P^^^as i? was Iver
rested on a Dunn1ng-1
ike assertion ^L. !!""^^ articulated,
legislature was in danger of hl-^
representative
reduced to dependence
^ ^e,
?,'
uDon th„
the independence Of
't was
parT amen?' Ill'""
"lore than the del
'
mattered, even
ineation of
doctrine became an
^'^'^
the
oppositional nn^tf'-.
nterpretation of the
parliamentary constit,i?inn
stressed the sovere
*°
"^^'^^
g t
kinn"""",'""
"^"' ""Parliament
of the executive
and the role
therein
precondition of the
American Revolution and
ihe ConsJff,!."''^
Constitution of the United
States. 192
c

L

"L

Gordon Wood begins his
review of the years
immediately proceeding the Americam
Revolution by asking why
the ;^erican colonists
revolted against such a
wonderfully constituted
government that all of
Europe in the Age of
Enlightenment praised it.
The English
constitution of 1688 had,
indeed, mixed within a
single government the
several categories of
politics that had been known
to the Western
world for centuries.'"
Pocock, as we have seen,
has already supplied
the clue.
The Whig Aristocratic
order attacked by the
American revolutionaries was not an ancien_reg1me,
but a recent outgrowth of
mercantile and patronage politics
Instituted in the search for
social

stability combined with
expanding empire.

The authority of

Parliament was overthrown
because its appropriateness
as
had been denied to be
satisfaction of Americans.

a

government

A new political
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-

"
fo™

0.

,,.3Move™e„t

own1nte.ests
aga.nst

a

.ut

Us

0.

seventeenth

content ,n

«tte.

as Bn-t,-s. subjects
«e.e conce.„ea.

parliamentary oligarch,
run by

oligarchy which put

Us

revolved around political

The, .a.

t.e.

..eUe.

new Whig aristocracy

a

Interests ahead of their
own.

The nature of this
rebellion, the

theories used to Justify

w.e.e

U

mivatlons

for It and

the

were "Ideological"
In the sense
that they

theories and values
concerning the organiza-

tion Of the political
co-unity, the distribution
of power and the
role that the Individual
ought to play In civic
life.
As Bernard
Bailyn has pointed out,

«i\-co!;:tu:;;s^a"/":i?j;:a"i"rtr^'T
struggle

controversy between \^r
in the or

-c^

^nUat

0

li

'

^^^^

'^-'"s'''i not
and
primarily a
'"^'^ ^^'"^es

o™1e'ty"o '^Se''"

"-^^^^^^^^^

befo^e^IndlJlln^cT

r^rI^snrJ^g^^::^t^fi^'^^^

?

«de^?r::V'o?ound,y

What were the values the
Americans held, how did they
come by
them, and how did they mold
them Into the foundations of
"lent, once the

Revolutionary ferment had ceased?

Here, If „e are not

brief to the point of being
Laconic, we risk being prolix
of tedium.

Bailyn

's

new govern-

a

to

study of the pamphlets of the
American

the point
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Ideology of the
substance of the
Revolution had L!^
years of the eighteenth
t^^e early
^entur^ ^f'"
" *° ^eein almost
instantaneous- and fn. ^!
early *erican
'"'^
^"^^

^

o?u cs TeTe%TeH
an importance, a
""'"''^
relevance in polU cs^^il'^^"
have-and never would
have
in Fnl,
Sharp break between
^^"^
a placid
re rivo? l'"'^^'
turmoil of the
""'"^
"'"^ ^"-^ the
1760s and n70s
^'"9""»"t, the claims and
counter-claims, the fears^„H 1
u
pamphlets, letiers
f
" t^e
ne^spapeJs ^^n.'^';'!""'
Revolutionary years had ?n
of
P^P^'"^
the
k
'J^*^^
fact been
heard throughout
century. 198 ^ ^
the
'

^

The energing American
political

thought fell sguarely
in the
republican tradition both
with respect to the
for,.l
institutions it

Of political

life.

starting with enormous
and nearly universal
respect for the
English constitution,
the Americans emerged
from the crucial
period

1760-1775 with the view that
it had been underlined
by bribery and
corruption and was rotten
to the core.^^^
Referring back to such
Classical republicans as
Harrington, Milton and Sidney^^O
they evolved
a

conception of political

life characterized by
a fundamental

unending struggle for power
between rulers and ruled.^Ol

and

The

intellectual atmosphere,
widespread throughout the
colonies and enc^passing individuals from
all classes to a truly
surprising
degree,202 combined with
radical Mhiggism and the
language of intense
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liberalism Into an
almost paranoic
mistrust of po„er.203
The

—

E„„1sh settlement

of 1689 .ad l„„lted
the powers of
the

commons

In

carr.ln. forward

^^-'-^^

^°
compromise acceptable onl.
as long as the rulers
promoted the public
interest.^"*
the

m

background, held
tive power:

in

reserve
eserve, lay the ultimate
sanction against executhe people's right
of resistance.

had wrirte'nl^-'nl'e^ss'th:
^^^emon Sidney
s'biect"' I''''"
hands as .a; obli fthe
''''''
pri ce to ?flV.\''''. '
Thus the people authorized
t°
^^reed."
their rule
"^^^
cute laws to govern
to exethem hiit^L.
right and power to choose
^-^ ^'^''^^^ they retain a
. lj\
"'"^'^'^
themselves, to be a reDrLpnt^I
^^^ng
... to have a voice n he'^a' l^,'^ ^
P°'p^^
°^
^"^^ ^^^s,
and in the management of ITi
state."
''''''''
the
"For depnJe us
I^IT^
"^'"''l'
'
and properties our own
liberties
.
^^Z'"'^''

^

^

.

.

.

LnL

secu?it.\gai^st°?;r::/a:d"^b'^o?ut^5:s7oti:::iaHere is the Institutional

™st

be Checked

crux of Whig theory:
executive power

lest It become overweelng.

it is not sufficient
that
the powerful exercise
their rule once that rule
has received the assent Of the people in
principle.
More than this Is necessary.
Active

consent by the people

is

necessary,

i.e.,

frequent, watchful par-

ticipation by the people with
their representatives
daily affa1rs.20'

in

the conduct of

The proper instrument of
such participation in

power, When not the people
themselves, 1s a representative
body chosen
by them whose members are
drawn from among them.

This was,

in

essence, the system of government
which both the

radical Whigs and the people
of England held to be
instituted in that
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90ve.n.ent. then the ,i.e.t.
of the people 1s
proportionate to the
Share the 50d. Of the
people have 1n the

,eg1sWe.

tlonalUed checks on executive
po«e..20«

,„

Second, one

words, represen-

tat,on oeans nothing If
the asse*,, can .e
overc«e
or the magistrates.

the

„„archs

For the Whigs, then,
popular liberty absolutely
depended upon
the strength of the
Colons, the ^*ers of which
"actually had to
represent the..
This sche.e «de sense
only Insofar as It could
be
Shown that there was, Indeed,
a popular Interest
generally opposed to
that Of the „narch.
In practice, however,
the Whig viewpoint was
coding under Increasing
pressure In England.
First, Parliament sat
for a long time, made
laws In a context free of
constituency
pressures, and as a result Its
,ae*ers had begun to resemble
magistrates themselves, independent
of the popular will
Instead of subject to
H. Second, and a related development,
the doctrine of "virtual"

representat1on-1.e., that the member
of Parliament act

In

his

constituency's best Interests, but
not as an agent of or attorney
for
those interests-was gaining
general acceptance ..^^ This
quiet evolution in English thought and
practice the Radical Whigs splutteringly
denounced:

14.

tenu;eJ°PaV'M:entf seeled
'"^^P-^-ce of longthe people's
While it might be
liberty,
necessary fo? Se'„.^
power in the State
^° Wo\nt a
to whirh
individually transfer
''ills, dress it up
their
in the i^„-„^f
with legislative
^^f^-^lsnty. ^nd an/u
auiKorU,
this "sovereign power
''™"
was "no more ?h«^ ?h
the people declaratory
of theirwin
.„h k ''T^^^"''^tUe of
subservience to their
in
interest " Ih^ m ^T'^ ^
tatives could do what
'
representhey lik^d wis %i
conceive." Can there
«nstrous to
be imaain»H
than that the trustees ^hnnf^ K
^ ™°'"^ striking absurdi tv
''""'^
independent of the frson reposing the
lust
'Wronger than the
creator?" Parliamentary
'.rii^.
'i'"^,"'"""
"lUes fro. the 'House I
°'
n"
'd ^ ^^'ms"^"^^'""
tion, only aggravated
--epeated electhis fear nftS
of the House Of Commons
independence
a fear tLl lJ^'^''rj
radical English mind sinrf II
through the
century? "«hen."
as Catharil Maca
aV ecal fed V;"'''"'^'
-"epresentatives had
affected an entire Ynaln^VAl.'
sovereignty ove*r?he??'?:n1«S;enEs.
^''^'""'^
"aS"''^'-

ZatZ'r
^

f

™

™

Adding to these fears
of

Parliament cut off from
the

a

people-a situation which
mooted

the question of
preserving

in order to preserve
its representative

its power

capacity-were new ones

prompted by the domestic
political tactics of George in.^U
Porced
to cooperate with
Parliament after 1689, His
Majesty set about the
commonplace task of working
with allies within the
body and trying

to

build

a

consensus for his policies.

Franklin Roosevel t-not

to

presidents-have struggled

mention
to do

Both Alexander Hamilton
and
a

score of lesser American

no less.

But His Highness quickly

ran afoul of His critics,
and to those on the American
side of the
Atlantic, the ancient English
Constitution appeared to be in
serious
trouble
It appeared to those who
clung to the original princiDle. of
''''''''' Sf sep r
powers
POwerrth'at''^;rr'"'
tnat the Crown, in its painful
efforts to build

^0
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:^T^^^^"^

and the

d.

stn.utlon of

upon this principle "
tyranny,
"u 1°
American. , "f^
Great Britain -s ab
""-^'^
^'"9 of
oluL fo %h„"f'''
the parliament, by
""'^
«' thout
peaces" pension."^ hl'^
he obtains the
aid pro,n1ses,
sanction of f h» 1^ ,
pleases.
The ancleni fom ,s
He
""'"S
'T"*
constitution Is evaporate™. '212'"""''''
''"^ ^P'n't of the
•'

«

i

«as t.ere, .l,ht
there be a

corruption" began now
to play

a

ere,

The Machiavellian
notion of

major part

In

Whig

government but to the
people of .nglan.
themselves who theoretically
had the power to act
as a corrective.
Once again,
then, we see the

a society and Its
constitution which appeared
earlier in Aristotle's
Pol Itlcs and Machlavelll '« m^n^-^i
s Discorsi^, and
11
seems to have been
derived

the English from the
latter source.^^^

by

Therefore, the Whig radicals
advocated returning English
government to Us first
principles
by

securing Parliamentary
representation for themselves
and resisting the
encroachments of executive
power.
This was the context In
which
Americans viewed English
attempts to shore up their
empire after 1763
While the mother country
grew old and haggard under
the Increasing
strain of corruption, and
made a conspiratorial drive
for the entire
subjection of the colonles.^l^
the Americans revolted to
secure a
theory of popular government
and political
liberty which their contem-

poraries

in

England supposed them to have
enjoyed for over

a

hundred

years
Such was the Ideology In play
at the time the Americans
began
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to move toward revolution
revolution,

actu.n. .ounae.

u

the

to

a

,ene., .e.efs. „e
.n. that

^"'"^

national

t1ons «e.e drafted.

^hen «e turn to the
Institutions they

the na.e o. those

:rTr""
constuuted

wu

,ove™,„ent, and

These Institutional

variety of fo^ulas.

--as
a

nu™.e. of state
constl^-

Ued

Whi, doctrines
according

The second phase is
that of Federal is.

This was su™ed up in
the United states
Constitution of 1787,
,ased
upon Whi, doctrines
hut with a powerful
dose of institutional
conservatis,n added to ,uel
the new social
instability that followed
the
«1despread establishment of
political liberty during
the revolutionary
period/-^"

Arneri

can Constutio naVUm

on 15 May 1776. the
Continental Congress passed
a resolution
calling for the exertion
of "all the powers of
government
under
the authority of the
people of the colonies,"
in effect abolishing
the
Older colonial governments
which had been established
with the sanction of British authority.
Wood considers this resolution
to have
been the real American
Declaration of Independence .2''
The effect of
this act was to electrify
the Americans who rushed
to their respective
.

.

.

state capitals and energetically
took up the problems of
drafting new
state constitutions.
Indeed, such was the general
animus against the
power of a central government
at this time, that the design
of government at the state level was
held to be the primary focus of
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anse

to

set up a strong
central

government.

independence ended ne.ther
the American
ha.it of thinking

-

-

the. had long conceived

were no

U:

«re

0.

U

gover^ent

as

for the ..encans,
republican magistrates

"representative" of the
people than .onarchs.^"
was still assumed to
exist autonomously,

Po«er

and the tas. of
the ,.ment

was to institutionalize
means of checking

Us

excesses.

™^^"

c°Sr:::n\,T?:ihTr:;?af\lnlrS'1"'^'liTri-rt^^^

For Wood

-ei:rhif!r^rtS:irtre?:?t:r^ -

At stake was the problem
of representation.
people in the legislature
was not

al

1

Representing the

that simple.

The English, as we
have seen, held that
every British subject,
whether he had had a role

*°

Parliament or not. was
'virtually

represented there.

g?bfe"what"'gIve'°?t'?Ji°;

°'

^^P-'esentatlon Intel 11-

homogeneous order with a fundamental
depended on the conception of
Engl 1 shmen as
people with one definable
interest.221

^'{eet

All

a

'
'

sf n„i'»
"^'^

This conception of a unified
people with a single Interest
In
turn made It possible to hold
quite specific views about the
nature of
representation itself. As Burke told
his constitutency in 1774.

Parliament was not

...

a

congress of ambassadors from
different and hostile
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J

Parliament is a deliberanL ,f
jnterest. that of'lhe':
o
loca
prejudices ought to
guide but
resulting fro,„ the
general 'r^alon'of

advocates; but

lllTlt CV'^'^"
"^ Purposes,

--r

°

'

?L

not

Z Zre^'-zTz"''

Hence, for the English,
it was not election
that gave the
his representative
po«er, but his
mutuality of interests
with

representation uUimatel,
justified the binding of
the whole people
Whether the. voted or
not. or whether their
particular representati.s
fonned part of the
majority or the minority
within the cha«,ber.223
If the Americans were
to reject this
conception, as we have

that the colonists never
decisively repudiated the
concept of virtual
representation.224
^^^^^^^^ ^^.^^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
virtually represented in
Parliament because they saw
a profound
disparity of interests
separating themselves and
the English.
With
respect to their own domestic
arrangements, however, the
tune was subject to change. Having
conceived themselves as a
"whole people
distinct from England-^^^
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^.^
^^^.^^ ^^^^
they were a "whole people"
when it came to justify a
system of representation based on an exclusionary
concept of citizenship and a

^

franchise limited to white males
who held property

in

land.

Republicanism, with its emphasis
on devotion to the transc-n
dent public good logically
presumed a legislature in wh?c"
the various groups in the
society could realize

"the
^^ch had with the
otners.
rhers''''"Ours??:.'?
Our situation requires their being
firmlv united in
the same common cause" with
"no schism in the bSdy pob t?c ."

'"'

"""^"<°h"
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-pres':^t^i?o^°!..li:,^^f ",-,P---^
employ the1. .hole

a

particular sort of

ti:rf:^ Jhl'Sb^^rtd'^eee"""

What was

th,-s

.ut virtual

representation.

An, other vie.
of

-f,el.«heren™ero.s

partial views wo.l.
str.,,le for preference
and destroy the
ho.ogeniety and har.ony
upon which repuhlicanis.
rested.
At least, this was
how ^^ericans
approached the proMe.
in
1776.
AS frequently happens,
however, political

wUh
a.nong

an external

themselves.

theories begin to

ene.y to one of arranging
a distribution
of power
Internal

very soon of interest,
all

differences, first of ™ere
opinion but

insignificant during the
revolutionary

period, suddenly emerge-often
with unanticipated force.
Drawing upon
their own disenfranchisement
in Parliament, many
/taericans began to
Challenge the concept of
virtual representation
itself once it dawned
on the. that they might
be on the losing end
of divisions of power
at
home:

"y, ana not just the colonists
v^>i2al^y^°r^onrhl^^

but people anywhere. 227

According to this view, the
popular consent that was so
important to the workings of the
British constitution seemed
justifiable
only if the people actually
choose their own representatives.
For it
was becoming clear to many
that "the elected are not
representative in
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th>e. own n-,.t

....^

of the,> election."

,e„ce t.e ^eHcans
found themselves
emphasizing the sufferage
Itself as a necessa.,
condU,o„ Of legitimate
representation. On this vie.,
the Interests of
the various Individuals
In the community
were so pecular, so
personal
that "the only ground and
reason why any man should
be bound by the
actions Of another who
meddles with his concerns
1s. that he himself
Choose that other to offlce.-^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^
carried? It was difficult
for some of the ^re
radical to resist
holding that the doctrine
of actual representation
meant that every
individual in the community
™st expressly consent to every act of
legislation.
As has recently been
pointed out, at the very time in tho

theoretical

foundations for parliamentary
sovereiqntv
thp
representation we^e movinT ^'^^ difTerlT",ferent direction, regressing
in fact to an older
medieva
'"'^''^ constituents and
senp
at
While the American experience
was recreating Jhe
fnnutl
Eng
ish medieval practice of
attorneys or delegaLs soecifi
ca ly empowered by counties
or towns to vote suddHp. to Ihl
rulers and present grievances
from their ?ons?tJeces
t e
Eng ish from sometime in the
late fifteentTce turv
h^d ara
dually but increasingly regarded
their members in the Ho. se
''''''''' '''''''' '^'^ particular
distrT^s^ rL'^
spokesmen for the entire estate
of the
peop^e!230'"^
Thus, by 1759, the Reverend John
Joachim Zubly had been able
to confront the official

English concep.tion of virtual

representation

by arguing that "every
representative in Parliament is not a represen-

tative for the whole nation but only
for the particular place for

which he hath been chosen

.

."231
.

y^is doctrine was eventually to
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enshn-ned

Constitution o. the United
States

In the division
Of leg,s,at1ve power
a.nong representatives
elected
loca, districts
Of the several states.
But It should .e dear
that within the ,
oca,
strict itself, "actual 1/.
represented in the American
Congress
something
the doctrine of virtual
representation «st appl,.'

me

The controversy over
representation can never be
settled
once so.e body is Instituted
to stand before the
people and legislate
the,r na«. so.e
»,1salign.ent between the
Intentions of the one and
the deeds of the other
will always occur-unless
it can be shown that
"the people" are one and
have but a single Interest.
With respect to
external forces or threats,
such as those of a tyrant
or an ene.y
beyond the borders of the
state, the unity of popular
interest is
relatively easy to pronounce
in theory and attain
in practice.
The
difficulties cone with respect
to the formation of a
political consensus about matters of the
internal distribution of
goods, and the

-

simple fact that as soon as
discriminations appear in the determinations or applications of
law, divisions arise among
those to be
affected.
These must be overcome somehow
If the political process
is
to embrace al, of the body
politic, without losing the
allegiance of
its several

parts.

We will

see this formal

dilemma recurr again and

again in what follows: not only
does the fundamental disparity
between
the general and the particular
appear in local district politics,
it
has been

a

perennial

difficulty for the Congress itself as
it has

struggled to muster Internal consensus
while exercising the representative function in the governance of

a

heterogeneous population.

Wood
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-^es

it

,une evident

that revCutfona.y

Men'ca ca.e perilous,,

close to absolutely
breaking apart over
these political
.^^^
contradictions

«st-dem:dlJ''r;pJS??ca:'°„rrr Tl'.
to the'chl^acJ:"
iicf f 1,:'conc::t*
concept jacT^S
of actual
representation--equal

ni tted

elertnr;,! Hnc!
of consent through
particularity
a^J^^
for both the elected
J^^f/^^^^q^i^^^'^ents
and ?he electors'
tability of representatives

boaeedf
to

UcuU?"L%^°r^'^^^

the

Be these things as they
may,

tation persisted.

foc.l

ties'bet'See^^;;^

Piir'^''"'"-

str?h" ^p^r^''

the controversy over
represen-

Despite the fact that small
towns throughout the

united States pushed for their
right

to

be

free of regulation by state

governments during the 1780s, the
ideal of an independent and
deliberative legislature, attending
to the common interests of
the state,

would not die.
the centeral

"Submerge all particular and partial

good" was still

When we turn to

a

the common cry.^^"^

review of the actions the Americans
took as

drafters of constitutions, it

is

clear that the mixed government

theory-as it had been interpreted
of the status of

a

axiomatic, so much

basic postulate.
a

interests into

by the
In

radical

Whigs-had something

most of the states, it was

part of the Whig science of politics,
that it

so
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went largely
unquestioned ^35

.

^

''''' then, was to
refine
the conception and
purge it of
P
th» .
°f
errors and corruption
3«
which had led
,
t„ Us undoing
to
in England.
The central
"^"'''^^ PO^ed by
^
,„hn '^"-^
.H
.

•

I^OHShUo^Joven^o^

236
p„,,,3,,,
^ad to .e determined
was the ..i.ture"
of the government
or, in our

Adanis had proposed
a balance between
contending powers

i

e

between executive,
Aristocratic and popular
interests.
Throug^ou^
colonies, however, scores
of alternative
proposals poured forth,
each
wUh its particular scheme for
arranging the balance,
and each
possessed of a degree
yree or
of radicalism
r^Hir;,iicm that
^
could be measured by
the
extent of its author's
confidence in the people.
"That

a

mixed government is
the best

the respective Colonies"
was

th^it r;,n

accepted in
J^^/^^t^'nient of
constitution-makers in 1776
be inclined to that
^^^^ naturally
which is mn.;
been used to," that is
^^'^ ^^"^ ^''^ ^^^^^s
^^
a mao?cL
"two orders in Se b d;
f
e
s ai? n'"1^t'°r'''^^^^'
°5^^^"sly since
the orders of their
new reouM r. "nn
^^"^^'^^ their
authority from the 0^001! ^ni
^"^^
^^^fereut
manner
from what has been Ssua
'
it'tL'T,
requires
the
utmost
wisdom
to cLtit ;J^h
^^^^'^
as effectuaily to ec re thP ?-K
P^^ers
'°
niost

.

thurtL

.

their mxed polities that
would have enormous
"'"""^ repercussions
repercus ions
on their understanding of
politics. 237

Among the changes they actually
instituted, the most evident
«as the near universal elimination
of the governor's role in
state
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;;-Ut,on.

,n

Anstoctlc"
9enera,

favo.

UU.

sout. Ca.o,..

ele,.e„t,

so

„„ponant

The A^en'oans,

-g

«n

to

exception.

to

In a "natural

i„

.0 with heredlta..

aristocracy" consist

Of outstanding .erit.
wisdo™, or ability.

seated In the upper
houses of bicameral

Vet t.e

en,,u., continue.

the

anting nothing

anstocracy, nonetheless
believed
Of

«s

These were to

legislatures, and to be

t.c element Into the
state portended was
little understood at
the
t-™e,
but 1t was clear enough
by 1780 that the
concept of a Senate
was in for trouble.
Either a distinct social
order of ,nen was to
be
brought into belng-which
all the revolutionaries
had opposed-or the

body Of citizens.
Senate?

In

that case, what sense did
It

Two homogeneous branches
would not make

a

«ke

to

have a

mixed

government.
^^^^ ^^"^ confronted the royal
officials wa.
JUl-"^'^!™?
coming
back to haunt the
Revolutionaries.
The DeoDie ?n th.
^^'^^ or;:r^o"ns^io
b^^th^^o^^irt^e^gis^^tu^:"^

tT

Of interest JtwTen^^^rlr^^lnch^^ra^^^^^^^^
pose for instituting a mixed
polity.
One but not thp nni
th

r/nost'of'SheT'^^^ 'i'/' ^^^^P-^'^'
The essence of "special

perty.

qualifications" turned out

0 s"^^'

to

be pro-

Although wisdom and integrity were
difficult to measure, pro-

perty was not.
"Senatorial

obvious:

-I'fca'

In

property Americans found

a

means by which their

part" could be clearly distinguished.

Wood notes the

"The meaning that many had intended
to give to the mixed
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While

Jeffe.son an. Madison
had .een .afHea
the people to perceive
the truly talented.
.

Americans toward

as

apparent

Ina.nu.

of

This
'"^5 shift
Shift, then, pushed

change
ge in their hac<.
basic assumptions
about the nature
their
society,
a change that
0
was to have serious
repercussions for
their ideology of
repuhlicanis..^^ Property
was now becoming
an
-terest in Its own right,
to be specially
represented in the legislature.
Wood draws the
implications:
a

the "d^^fe^^nl'a'",'
y'^t-oraant interests
ZZZtT.lT.'f^'''"'
existina "in
sociptipc " i-hr.

'«'^e
i

P™f«sional s-who
could "for convenience"
al l
?"l>sumed under "names,
invented lona ann Jh!
or beUer!°;gosT:ho''
ost^rri"gh?r of*"""'^ r^«'°->"
those Who possess "the'

/

rights 0? pr^'er'ly^-zi!'-^""^

The tarn toward property
had nurterless consequences,
not the
least of Which was that
it was now possible
to pollute the
theoretical
notion that the people were
a unity with the
acrid assertion that
they
actually embodied separate
and rival interests.
In 1784. Benjamin
Lincoln, the Revolutionary
General, set out a
justification for bica-

meralism

in

the 1780 Massachusetts
Constitution that opposed the

Revolutionary assumptions of 1776.

Turning his back on the ancient

distinction between the few and
the many, he substituted
instead the
notion that society consisted
of a vast difference of
Interests,
interests which contain the
seeds of its destruction if
their
influence is unchecked.
In republics, such
interests .nay be traced

to
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in danger" from
"a maioritv
Mjonty

pass1on."^«

.

^^.^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^

.

.

^

...by
unued

a

common interest or

^^^^^^^^

most Americans in 1776
P'"?P\^ti'.
nghts that
had lltlL
dentified." and by
^"d more
assigninq
,^°"J<^.^,^<«'-^
legislature, the Americans
'^"^^
t*'^
?n a ftlt
V"J^'
""^ ^"^"^"^
nagging problem of cons?.i tnt^J !

S

''

i-n so 3oing
but
they ad pir erted'th^'cT!?^government, which had nlTlH h„
'"^^"'"S of """d
^
property, in the m die
^"^
"^^^
br ch "rt^ir ''?™;
explicitly violated the
""^ ^^"^
homogen°L
of tSJf
interests on which
republicanism was based. 2™6^
^

"

But property and a
diversity of interests
did not c«prise
the
sum Of corrosive issues.
Wood reviews the history
of revolutionary
Pennsylvania.
,„ 1776, radical Whigs prevailed
at the Pennsylvania
convention, and explicitly
disavowing the mixed government
fo™,
ratified a constitution
with but a single House.
The educated, the
upper classes, did everything
in their power to
undermine the new
government, and in the process
of attempting to rally
popular opinion
to their viewpoint, were
compelled to lay out the social
basis for a
balanced constitution with
unusual starkness and
c«prehensiveness
and

thus were even driven to
call

American society.

into question the egalitarian
nature of

A simple republic, the
opponents of the 1776

Constitution argued, was impossible

in America because of
"the great
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--notion

0,

pe.o„,

„,,e.ences

In

property/^'

t.e,V estates o.

Han. ;^en-cans no«
.e.an to as.
,.est,ons: was t.e
.eceWe.
,o.e.«ent t.o. co,.at,-Me
.t.
.p.^-canU. o. not,

;

-

7

^-eate

thought they had
settled in 1776'

egalitarian?

nous

-ted

Could it "e,
be
if
,f

political

and social

us

order,

t.e

Was th.

,
American
society to be

•

instuutions reflected

a

heteroge-

Pinally, if Whig
republicanism

on the assumption
that the people
have but

-terest, Why need

p.o.e.s t.e.

a

single

wi„

or

the legislature
have two houses,

Upon reflection
agreed with Condorcefs
observation
vanon that »th»
the representatives
of
a single nation
naturally form a iingie
single bodv
r.
body
[hence]n there was
no place for a Senate
in an egalitarian
republic. "^-^

wny

.

.

.

^el1bera"?^]rr;iec"?:d'Jhe°:!Lf'1-r'''=*'
possessed a s zab,e and
tic'u It^
defend comprehensi velT
"™Pelled to
ll ltll T"^]^'""
do. the merits of a
^
mi^ed repubhc ^^^""'"i
engthy and expanded
arglenro er'the nature Jf"?^
of the upper
house in American hi^tn^w
^^9^" "^t^- '»^^
traditional Sefense of Se llf/r:'
constitution and
ended witb.an entirely
entlrelv new and revolutionary
t^l^''
conception of
politics/"^

"

Z

The Whig parties generally
assumed that there was
but one rank
of men in America, and
therefore there should be
but one representation of them in government.
In 1777 one Benjamin
Rush, in a comprehensive criticism of the
Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776, advanced a
host Of arguments in favor
of bicameralism of which
one was to become
crucial.
A single legislature,
said Rush, was dangerous
to liberty
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P-1sel.

because n«asun.est.a,-ned.

-checed asse*,. .o.U

.eco.e

a

Pred.cUn, t.at

a s,-„,l»

.l,«en1„, a.Mtra..

po«e.,
«as .au.n, a .oge.
u,at cou,d st.Ue te..o.
.„to the .ea.t of
a .a.cal Whig."
since the Whigs
wrngs took
tank if
fh.^it that power
anywhere was
dangerous to the people
and the,V „-.e.t..
the Penns.lvanU
.ad,ca,s

Rush pointed,, as.ed why
such devices were
necessary,

MMsh

need fo. an uppe.
house-1.e.. for

a

the people so that one
could chec. the other.

was not there a

double representation
of
On this argument,
which

abondoned the rhetoric of
property and ™erit, the
upper house .as
be only a Whigglsh rein
on unchecked power.^^l
«as

to

^

complete disavowal of the
traditional defense of ,„1xed
government
as a structure that
reflected a diverse social
order.
Here was a
reversal as profound as
that which had reordered
the positions of
Court and Country parties in
England a hundred years
earlier.
When
a

the Pennsylvania Republicans
held that there was now
to be

a homogeneity Of interests between
the two houses, they expressly
defendeed
what other Americans had seen
as the principal fault
in the bicameral

system.

At stake

in

all

of this was the

issue of sovereignty.

With the

conclusion of peace with England,
the Americans found themselves
living under the loosely
structured Articles of Confederation,
and
became more eager than ever before
central

to

affirm local

politics over

government and "to oppose all
encroachments of the American

Congress upon the sovereignty and
jurisdiction of the separate
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-----3 „

—
people

^^^^

so.e.e,>t.

s

AS

•

as

^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^

t.e. .a. neve, .een
wU;,

aspect

to .e
t. posWe.ol.t1on pen.,
con.n.e.. ,e„e., „,
ambi va-

lence about the entire
dilemma of represent.t
inn increased
representation
to the
point w.e.e even Wh1,
.ep.esentatWe ,e,,s,atu.es
we. ..ou,.t into
•

representatives/^^
This proble™ ca™e to
a head 1n a series
of debates over
the
power Of the senate to
pass
Which arose in the
.ar.iand
House of Delegates in
the «i„ter of 1786-1787.
One side held that
the

™„e.Mns

tions fro. the people
before acting.

The other side disagreed.

Out

Of the ensuing debate
over instructions a new
doctrine of representation began to emerge.

question

borough

being debated here in Maryland

or the majority of the

nati^

^;iih

d:>^o

Thus Paca
thi^^broadTn^d use of
questions of public interest

positive
s^i :^^ns^^c^!?S^-l^^^^
instructions on general^-^^
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t'c,pate 1n the exe?cise
of leaioJ"'^^
The ,.eat t.eo.et.ca,
weakness 1„

- -o.Ue

l-

.a. ...

peop...

'

^°"^^y-

Par-

w., ,ep..can t.o.

a.

.

...eneo.,

eco„o.c. cuss, an.
,eo,.p.-ca, a,s.nct,o„s.

"

^

T..

o„e.

.e.e., an..ena,-ssance.„,..
soce.,

-c.a,

o.e.

-td,-v,sion

«.1c. ecu,, .e

easn. .eflecte.

Of .onarch. peerage
and

,nto t.e

c««ns.

..a

,ove.n-

Transferred,,

unprecedented pressures,
as we have seen.
F'>st. English

renamed

a

poIUks,

clear Into the
nineteenth centur,

restricted real., separated
fro. trul. .road-hased
par-'

however, not onl. was
the franchise w1de„
extended, hut popular'part'cpatlon 1„ a host of formally
constituted legislatures
and ad hoc
political gatherings
constitutional conventions
was the no™

me

for

the overwhelming

.ajont.

animus against monarchical
from the monarch,

Of White .ales Who
lived there.

Second

the

tyranny did not die away
with emancipation

instead It was translated
Into

a

deep and growing

suspicion first of executive
power, but later of all
central or
governmental power 1„ genera,,

u

continual

was this fear that lay
behind the

conflicts over representation
and the constant
theoretical
tension that held between
those who advocated popular
sovereignty and

«

^"'-^
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Of t.e peop,e
,„ eve..

-

^e.UUt.ve .ecUion

-e .eo.

-

-

-c,s1o„s Of ,ove.n,nent.

.

-e

Of

peop,e

,,e.U.

of

.e c.o.

.

,„.e

together in centra,

p.„ic spaces sue.

as

.e

,eo,.p.-ca,

snuat,ons an. pom.cal
traditions e*.e. the
van'ous pans
A-.-can populace .t.
concrete,, .st,-n,.s.a.e
interests

--ere.

as

of t.e

s.c. t.at

t.e Continental

congress or t.e various
state legislatures,
the centrifugal
forces of
the emerging societ.
i.pinged upon its
politics with the effect
that
the

co«on interest-ta.en

for granted h.
everyone in the revolu-

t-o„ar. period itsel
f-5eca.e increasingly elusive.
Wood shows that
these tensions increased
in influence
throughout the 1780s and
f nally resulted in a
radical

transforation of the ideas
that

Americans held about
popular sovereignty, the
nature of legislative
power, and their theories
of politics in general.
One vexing question
arose again and again:
if sovereignty was
essential to a republic,
how could it be derived
fro. the people
and

constituted such that its
exercise would not degenerate
into abuse and
license? The search for
a re.edy-i.e., a
way to control

and restrict
the power of elected
representatives-dominated the politics
and

constitutionalism of the Confederation
period.
instruction continued to hang
like
general

issue,

a

Hence the question of

brooding presence over the

for here it seemed lay
the only means of checking

legislative power.

As usual,

however, absolute adhesion to
this view

prompted sympathizers and
opponents alike

to

'

draw the consequences:

if

•
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the legislature
did not oos5P5<
i,
possess th^
the e
full

power of the people
to do

anythin, it .shed for
the ,ood of the
state,

-

fact reside there,
then there could

^

if

sovereignty did not

no lo.ica,

wa. to prevent

legislative authority fro.
passing c.pletel,
to the people
at
°

1

arge.

practice and the triu.ph
of the particular
over the general.
Writing
h.s own American
Magazine 1787-1788. Noah
Webster „unted a
cogent
attack on the notion of
instructions that clarified
the issues:

'l"sZ'rirVr'

JatireT'Iaid^Web'sllr'
tuents. on a vilw oTihei
""^ti^'^^^
local
none, or very imoerfert
l-'"'^'""'^' and either with
propn-ety of^ Ta^^ Tnd o? ?hT"°"*
"""^'^ j^^S" "f he
Judiciou^ ™en arrifo^'su^cV
n

aTl^ar^elhe''"
the^ejrofficiai ^n^o-

r^r

::?^:r?r^'*::liy^\^^e^«^"
subject in an !sfe*?y where
clashlnn'-'i"'
detect error and su

ticuiar part,
0

^sf il

r

""1n1r*uth°"sa'!-d'

they "must be founded on
the best aenerli
themselves have no r?g t

f^ent

aTL

i"LS:d\£-1 V e^H
:fVc

<'^=""'<>'> of the

:

;

-™K"^co,r:^ar

"

irass^ifi^MiTthe-

people or of their Representatives
of instnjc^^

1^^^^^
ODjections,

^

where is the richt
The local sense of the^
.

.

^

genrral^n'o^ledge

^i^^-^
and reasonings of
the whole statp " r;,n
never produce the general good;
each district is but "pa?t of
ui

tne
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l'\ll'ltol%r

^o^P^^-t

to judge full,
of the

^"^^-^--''^

Annapo.r"'

Interest

~ce a.

uiterally hundreds of
mict^<
voices H^if*
dnft ,„ and out of his
account, alternately defending and
attaching "actual
representation" or central
3tate power respectively,

u

see^s that the Whig
radicals had gained

t^e upper hand in
™ost of the state
legislatures of the ti^e.
written
-ate constitutions that
gave those legislatures
sweeping grants of
power, and then
proceeded to "instruct"
instruct them
thpm th
throughu a complex
political process that
reflected the will of
the popular majority
on a host
Of particular issues.
The result was an
experiment in Whig republicanism Which, in the
eyes of most Americans,
ultimately failed to

function as effective
government.

Alternately, paralyzed Py
faction
and Charging gamely
into the thickets of
heated issues, these
legislatures enjoyed a tenure
that proved to be short
lived, but which provided Americans with an
historical experience that
profoundly altered
their views about politics,
government and the art of
the possible in
collective life. The debate,
then, focused increasingly
on the nature
and extent of legislative
power, and its ultimate,
practical result
was the Constitution of
1787.

HOW were the representatives
to be drawn from, the
people?

Who

Should sit in the chambers of
the public space, and
what ought they
do once so seated? Wood
characterizes the fundamental
debate as
having taken place between
Whigs, for whom the right to
rule existed

to
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''ete™..,

——
;

-

„Ho Should .0,.
pos,t1ons of ,„a,Ut.ac.

..o,.,-o„

;

to

those

.o.,„e .o...n,on.
e,Ue .c..o..s,

chan.es 1„

......

.eha.o. a„. ,e,.,,,e

that set the
.epub^cans' teeth on ed.e.

u

was th.s e«..ln.

.3.
.

conflict over socU,
position and p.^.n^.e
that demonstrated
wUh
-solute cant, that Hhe
people" «e.e rapid,,
p.o.ln, the.selves
e a

.unip.cu.

to

Of particular
interests,

.or the repu.lcans,
.0
had anticipated no
such thina
^ning, an air of
of corruption hung
over the
young republic:

™T^e„??::n?^;

^i^T^-i^-^"
w

the pre.

^^"^"t times, they
seem only relative to
oartir,
of interest," 'to
occupations, credi t de'bt 0"
,el i-aJo"n^''r
the people, it was
.^^"'s^'ons among
argued were obv om^
selfishness and InfirmUy
in the soc?e?v
"pf^""'
dangerous diseases of civil
the
freedom fh^
stage of anarchy,
"^^^
clothed'ln'^tid^anju^^e'lef"'^
Political conflict centered
on the issue of state
legislative
behavior, where Whig radicals
had cane to dominate in
case after case
Not only did these bodies
begin to pass laws affecting
such crucial

relationships of property as
those involving creditors
and debtors,
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P-eeae.
tne

Uw

to

aue. «u.o.t ..cease.

T.s p.c.ce pU.e.

an. .o.Hfled the
bette. educate.:
persons

m

civl,

.avoc

„U.

a*1-

nistration scarcely .„e„
„hat the law was. and
such lu.tnaries as
Madison began to aecry
decrv a Uri^
^
lack of wisdom
and steadiness"
•

in

'e9is,ation.^^^

to

pro»te

e*od1ed

the states,

U

seeded, were being
s«thered

a

the rights of .en
over the rights of
property.

,a„s which
the composition of
the legislative majority
on a given day

only to be changed

to

reflect the composition
of a different legislative majority the following
wee..
Soon the law Uself began
to become
a contemptible thing
In the eyes of those
fro. whom
traditionally
should have commanded
respect, and a healthy
disregard for It began
to
spread throughout the former
colonies.

U

Nor was this all.

For Madison, the
representative assembly in

the several

states was not only corrupting
the law; it was "drawing
all power Into its
Impetuous vortex. "2" All
the functions of government, it seemed were ending
up In the legislative
body.
The student
of Aristotle will not be
surprised by the reaction to
such

developments:

the American suspicion and
jealousy of political

power
that had once been directed
against the Crown now emerged with
reference to the various state
legislatures.^" and the educated
classes began a tightly orchestrated
public campaign to channel the

growing popular animus against
power into

privilege

to

a

force that would return

Influence and reason to government.

From the standpoint
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Of classical

political

theory,
"the
trie citizens,
J',
citizens

"

in
in

•

their various public

spaces, had begun to
administer an un.ixed
polity. i„ „Mch the
-terests of important groups
or classes were he1ng
systematically
ignored.
Those who were excluded
set about agitating
for change
The upper classes began
to dispute the
principle of unchecked
popular sovereignty, and
noted that it might not
always be the case
that the majority who
rule in republican
governments are the safest
guardians of both public
good and private rights.
"The people " it
seeded, were as capable
of despotism as any
prince; and public liberty
was no guarantee after
all of private liberty.265
^...^^^^ ^^^^
learning was that the equality
of social and econcic
conditions which
they had supposed themselves
to enjoy in 1776 did
not exist after all,
and that the excess of
power wielded by majorities
in the state
legislatures had led to abuses
of authority that violated
centuries of
property law and legal tradition.
What Shay's rebellion pointed
out
was that the dispute involved
no simple class conflict
between popular
representatives of the poor in state
legislatures on the one hand, and

elitist American gentry on the
other, for this was an outbreak
by New
England farmers who lived far
fron> the centers of power
and wished to
remain unhindered by them.

Confronted by such an uppity challenge,

the Whigs in Boston made it
clear that when all was said and
done, the
doctrine of virtual representation
would prevail:
The rebels, announced the town
of Boston, must obey the
majority.
Let the majority be ever so much in
"
the wrong
It was the only remedy for grievances
"compatible with the
Ideas of society and government" The
insurgents, argued a
publicist, must rely on their elected
representatives for the
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demonstrate the absurdUy'^af
X:bncrS?sr2r
As the young country
moved Into the 17SOs
the crisis
atmosphere Increased.
Ooubts about the success
of the republican
experiment began to spread.
Republican state legislatures
continued
to sow seeds of
resistance. The writings
of ^ericans in the
eighties
became a series of
self-diagnoses, an intensive
examination of the
sources of political decay
characteristic of the age of
Gibbon.^" o„
the critical accounts,
what seemed to be amiss
was that private
interest had succeeded in
capturing the legislatures,
and "thus the
whole of that care and
attention which was given
to the public weal
is

turned to private gain or
self preservation.-^^S
and intellectual

discussions

dialogue became concerned
with the problem of citizen

virtue, and the rise of
in press after press.

tigiousness among

the populace was decried

Behind these maneuvers,
however, as we have

indicated, something of
and economic degree.

11

a

class conflict simmered over
ranks of social

This, as

I

have Indicated, was not

a

simple

conflict, and it would take
considerable research to explore
its contours and assign the contending
parties their respective places.

Nonetheless, it seems that there
was
government,

a

a general

popular animus against

popular majority which was, at times,
willing

to

use

the

instruments of government to despoil
the privileged of some of their
property, and the privileged themselves
who for

held

a

a

variety of reasons

more positive view of the possibilities
of govern.nent than did
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If a thorouijh
exploration of the socal
social

vera

to

;.nH
and
political

forces involved

yield any such simple
conclusions.

acts of the various
state legislatures,
the combined
strengths of
those «ho favored no
government and those who
were disfavored by
such
government, and the writings
of the inte, ligentia
all coalesced
throughout the colonies
to strengthen a
wave of refo™ which
swept the
states in the early
nsOs. Wood offers the
Massachusetts Constitution
of 1780 as an example
of the changes that
went into effect. On
balance these consisted
of trimming the
powers of the legislature,
and
strengthening the hand of
the executive branch.
It now seemed
unquestionable, for example,
that the governor should
participate in
legislation through some sort
of revisionary power.2"
,,,,
starting to e,nerge. then,
is a doctrine of
checks and balances:

aution> :?nh:';lg'isfa?:;er'

Jefferson exol

^^

invigorated, the

Constitution

rit^fl

any person on account of
his reliaiou<; HpI pfc

"

1

?l

'-^"S?:^^i?;^s1}^I^?;in

^n'S 'eT
r.'^The constitutions themselves
refomerT
argued. must be made more
fundamental, drawn directly by
the
tacto laws.
p:s?;actSt:r^

•

fegfslattes'^fo^^"^^-^

-^^^-^^^^

by ordina^y"^'^'

Once put into practice, such
proposals abruptly curbed the
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power Of popular sovereignty
as
lower houses

in

U

was then being exercised
by tbe

the state legislatures.

As such, the. were
bUterl,

resented and resisted h.
those who saw In the.
a complete betrayal
Of the principles of
1776; the reforms appeared
to ™a„. as

Insidious

devKes

to

return to the aristocratic
and anarchical

former colonial governments.

-for. proposals denotes

tones of the

Wood notes that the
raising of such

the onset of fundamental

change In American

conceptions of constitutionalism
Itself.

mtu'^as^o'^ong^r iTf l^lZr""''"

°' ""^'^^^^

''^-^

«uld have been a
decade earlier th^t fh!
Constitution
of 1780
was fesrpopular Uss llhertf.'"'"'?'
Pennsylvan'?rJo^st!tut1o: :f*l7;r^7l"= democratic, than the

^

This was a crucial

development.

What is emerging Is

a conception of "constitution"
closer to that of Aristotle
than to the notion
embodied in the English tradition.
The Aristotelian constitution
is a
set Of fundamental rules
according to which political
activities are
carried out. These rules are,
in a sense, the fonn
of political

life,

and specific political

decisions and the daily round of
political

activities are its content.

While constitutions are, and
must be sub-

ject to change, such changes and
the processes through which
they
occur, are extraordinary.
The English constitution, on
the other
hand, while also not something
which has undergone effortless or
easy

change, can nonetheless be altered
either by acts of legislation or

through the slow accumulation of
precedent or even by royal proclamation or mis-statement as we saw in
the case of Charles'

Answers.

Americans of this period, having begun
with the English notion of

The

a
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consmution.

w-n s..

-

acts

™a.e sue.

we. ca.ne.

.se. to ..St..

'twas

the

st™c..es alte.a.e

was

..e.

us.n.

special

..-.atWe

p.oce..es.

T.e

act

a,.

. te.s o. t. notion t.at
asse*,. o. 1eg1s,at..e
wMc. e*oa,e. the popuW

tne sovereign people.

Asse*„.s

™a.e

w,n

of

Havin, once put forth
the notion that
the

power was not the
extension .ut the
antithesis of popuUr
I'^erty. opponents of
the 1776 Constitutions
attempted to alter
those
documents hy removing
the,n fro. legislative
purview.
,f there was
even the slightest
possibility that asse*,y
power .ight lead to a
despotls. by popular
majorities, and It could
be shown that a
constitution was a set of
fundamental rules for
structuring the political
order, then the powers
of the legislatures
could be legitimately
restricted to spheres that
had been constitutionally
defined In
advance.
Hence In Pennsylvania,
opponents of the assembly
held that
could not Change the
constitution, saying that
"Whenever the
Assembly assume the exercise
of powers not granted
the,„. they act

U

arbitrarily and without
authori ty. ""3
profound Change

In

^^^^^

^^^^

^

the structure of linked
concepts that bound

together their views of
political

life.

"Sovereignty."

"constitutionalism," "reore'ientstinn
representation, " and -u
the proper role and
extent
Of government were shifting
their meanings simultaneously:
,

"''"3 """^ t° the concept of representhe mutual Uy o?
fnte^esi
interest between
bef^eL^^H'''"'^?
the people and their
delegates and thp rr^r.
^""^^3^^= the main c'rUerion of'''
pr sentl lon"i?"
"'"'"'"9
"'"Prehensible to
reSard ?he
the foundation and
\
f"'"'
measure n?
of representation.
Therefore all elected officials

tf^iof ^n^h'''*

"

^
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not just the houses
of representati>,»=
"^""^
"me way
representatives of the olonlp
devolved sovereig ty Of
the peoD?e
fr"'''*'"'"
no essential distinction
seoarat nn t
'T'"'
legislature from the other
^"^"^ °f
allrtpH^
!
elected
parts
of the
government. 274

J

'"f

The Assemblies were
losing their special
mandates.
Political
power was heing homogenized
In terms of its
representing consti^tien-

cies that were subsets
of the whole.

Hence, on the basis
of the

emerging gulf between
populace and government,
the powers of the
latter would be restricted
first and later divided
up to make the

application of those powers
more difficult.

All governmental
officials, whether executive,
judicial or even legislative
were ultimately
held to be magistracy.
Upon this development
hinged the concept of
divided sovereignty that would
be institutionalized
In the Federal

constitution of 1787.
if some of them,

in

the

,f all

elected officials were
magistrates, and

form of the legislatures,
had evinced a ten-

dency to exceed the limits
of justice

in

the laws that they
passed,

then It was reasonable to
divide the sovereign power
and limit the
reach of any particular part
of the government.
It was

in

fact only in the years after
1776

ueen
expected, that the idea
b^'^—eS'^^iJarth^^r

"'1

when the

^'-"-enttom^'hat

had
of separation of oower*: ;ic:c„maH

in.these'years

.^s^C^UrlvTn'
as stated in 'tr:;
Is'st'a^Id'"
the early consti tutions--"that
the leaislativp
departments, ought S'be'for e^^'
epar ;:';ndl^K^"'r7
separate
and distinct from each
other"-made truly reciorocal
by those seeking new
justifications for strengthening the
government at the expense of the
TJaiT.?"'
legislature
Seizing upon this relatively minor
eighteenthconstitutional reformers in the years
^ffl'i'lT''''.^^'
exploited it with a sweeping intensity
and eventll^,"^
tual y magnified it into the
dominant principle
^
of
the
^
American political system. 275
^

^

172

What „e n„d .e.e.
then, 1s

a

c.p,e.

the actions of
popular representatives.

-tncte.

so

t.at the political

set of constraints
upon

The public space
Is

or.er can .e .el .
to

a

1 1

.1 to. ran.e

undertaking actions that
Interfere with the
private or the soda,
effect, this amounts
to a return to the
.Ixed government fon.
after
brief experiment with
unchecked asse*l, po„er-5ut
now,

seen, the status of the
underlying

Changed,

"hlle the detail
s

specfic. It

is

r.Us

of the

,n
a

as we hav.

constl^tlon has

of the new arrang.ents
are historical ly

Clear that the actually
existing differences

In

social

and economic standing
of the various parts
of ^erlcan society
were
now to be instituted In
the mixed government fo™
adopted by the
Americans at Annapolis.
This Is consistent with
the rec«endat1o„s
of Aristotle and Machiavelli.

Yet the differences between
the earlier institutional
tices and the new ones of
the Americans were
drastic.

American government were

to

be elected,

Al,

prac-

branches of

and no matter how many
steps

were Interposed between the
people and the higher orders
of government, all were given roots in
popular sovereignty.
Authority and
sovereignty were held to reside
in a populace which made
temporary
grants of power to selected
individuals and groups who were
empowered
to act in its name.
The powers of the representative
agents were to
be restricted, and their courses
of action so arranged that
concerted
movement among them became nearly
impossible unless proceeded by

compromise.

This not only assured that the
various social

orders
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have

mnuence

on t.e acts

author.,

u

™a.e tt

a

vinua,

alone against the others.

convention wh.ch
Show that the.e 1s

to

«.e

Cose

the pen'o. we have
Just reviewed.

than one „a. to

-teg^ation and co.p.o.1se
necessary
politics when that kind
of pontics
or
politico

What we have seen emerge
here
a

.n„,

to

the

a.out the processes
of

function of a public
space

n,.*
t
part of
a mixed government.

i«
IS

Is a radical
r;.rtir,i
IS

that the common interest
can be held

The.

»

transition from the notion

exist because there is
no
"schism" in the body
politic, to an acceptance
of the practical difficulties of finding
political c»prom1ses which
will allow a heterogenlety of political Interests
to move forward
together.
In a sense,

to

the U.S. Constitution
would reflect the notion

that conflicting Interests
are present

in

the

polity and that c^pro-

".ises between

political

that power

them are possible first If
the sphere of application
of
power Is limited and second,
if the potential exercise
of
is

fonnally divided among those
interests.

Therefore, the
public space of the Congress
was not to be the repository
of an undivided sovereignty, any more
than the Consiglio Grande of
Machlavelli
«as to reign unchecked.
Unchecked popular assemblies,
taerlcans had
seen, led to abuses of
legislative power. To this they
responded with
what we can see was an
Aristotelian" compromise between competing
class interests and a return to
the mixed government form-with
the

crucial

distinction that all now depended upon
the frandse and the
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fact that those
,„ p„„er were to be
selected

U

those subject to
The constitution of
1787 would carry forward
the Whig antipathy to governmental
power by Instituting a
set of ll.lts upon
what
could be defined as Its
legitimate sphere of
activity, and then provide an institutional
structure designed to ensure
that it would not
overstep those limits.
While this protected
privilege, and ensured
the social positions
of what passed for
aristocracy In the America
of
the t1,„e, It also served
to prevent the
reapperarance of the civil

strife that had threatened
the states in the years
1,„,„ed1ately
following the revolution.
,n

this sense then,

political compromise in the
Aristotelian sense.

it can be

seen as

a

•

think therefore,
that the period of /^erlcan
history between the attainment
of
independence in 1776 and its
closure at Annapolis in 1787
could serve
as a clear exa»,ple of the
kinds of unmixed politics
which Aristotle
enumerated in Book III of the
Pomics, and the Constitution of 1787
as the kind of compromise
between all

I

parties that he rec(,n,nended.

If

we apply Aristotle's test of
a properly mixed government,
i.e., that
no party to the agreement would
change the constitution even if
given
the opportunity to do so, we
find that the founders of the
American

republic forged

a

compromise which was

to

last until

1860.

.

'
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Plumb's thesis.

A Tudor Aristocracy was reolaced
°f
^''<ed governinent
con.ti?,?,-l was preserved,
constitution
but the distribution of power among
its
branches was altered at the expense
of the king.
At the sane time
it
should be clear why a doctrine of
Parliamentary sovereignty too so
^

uh,-i^!^'^^!

™"

necessarily'o'^re'cons r
to the Athenian

vative
a??ve than'?h:
than the undivided sovereignty that
applied

189

power, or the place where

PolitK^'l^LNhtu/on-^inlSld^^"'

°'

l^^ibid., pp. 143-144.
193

American debases
the
and'i^rns'orthouah? 'Mir'"
natives available among
"""^^^^
terhistorians of thJ
t
important to sketch the
'^"^ ^^'^
niore
-najor lurns In tL''t['°^:
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CHAPTER

III

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE U.S. CONGRESS
The matter that detains
us now may seem
To many, neither
dignified enough
^^"^^
be scorned by them
Uhn 'i
have observed the ties
Tu.l bind the
That
perishable hours of life
Each to the other, and
the curious proos
"^^^^^^
thoug'
Exift^'
nn'"'is sustained.
txists and
'

Wordsworth
Prel ude

Introduction

Congress is not

a

Parsonian object of knowledge.

cannot be displayed before one's
view at

a

given time.

^

The whole

Indeed, as one

focuses one's attention from
one aspect or process to
another, the
whole thing seems to change.
It shifts in turn from
something where
moral activity takes place,
to a repository of power;
it shifts from

being

a

public space to

relationships.

a

system of political

Sometimes it appears to be

a

networks and personal

bureaucratized hierarchy.

Seeking the whole, the student of
Congress approaches his subject-

matter by grasping its parts, each of
which

is examined

as containing

its peculiar strengths and weaknesses,
each of which contributes to

and takes away from the strength of
the whole.

At the same time, the

various parts, even if added together, do not
reveal
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the entirety of

.
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the institution

explains
UP

an

,„ost

atte.pts

c-Ksts

as1tVea,„ls"

in

professional

.rrUe at

to

and pe.haps It Is

tMs

«.1c.

students of the .od.

see,„

to

an o.e.a.ching
synthesis and

the analysis and stud,
of so.e

pan

,..e ,1ven

.ec«

spe-

or aspect of the

whole
very often, however,
one can sense

"felf synthesis behind

the technical

a

kind of incohate or

analysis of the expert
pro-

fessional

n

student, hased upon so.e
l.a^e of „hat the .ody
1s and how
functions 1n essence.
The beginning student,
seeing his own

synthesis, tries to overlay

a

welter of received
l.ages one upon the

other, to see what fom,s
anerge.

complex 1.age, but
fused with far ,„ore

a

What results

Is

not

a

collage, or

a

multiple exposure, blurred,
Ind,st1nct and suflight than necessary to
.nake fon„ or surface
evi-

dent.

At the heart of the

proble,,,

Is

a

set of

Lplidtly contested

assertions about the flow of
power itself: where It "begins"
or first
impinges upon a complex structure
and who is primarily
responsible-or
subject to pressure on behalf
of--whom.
While many students try

to

confine their researches

pertaining to the internal affairs
of the body,

a

of important studies have found
It necessary

go

order to explain it-to the
electorate;

to

to

to

significant number
beyond Congress in

the bureaucracy;

to

corporate structure; to the activities
of lobbies and special
groups.

What studies of the latter sort
reveal

it a concept or an institution,

is

is

.natters

-1

the

nterest

that "Congress," be

context-dependent, and that

3
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possible solutions to
particular questions
Involving Its nature
or
operations .epen. upon
clarification of t.e
surroun.n, circumstances
Finally, the elucidation
of an, such context
itself depends
upon how a given student
evaluates Congressional
perfo«nce
of Its

evaluation of what those
duties comprise.

Roger Davidson and
Walter

Oleszek have noticed this:

-^'^
respect'^toTongr^ss' 701^1^^^!"^^
""f^'''"'^
notion of Congress' oUce n It f
^ ='ear
^
is difficult ?o
^^"^ t''''"now'ihe?h
^^e '^S^slative
eaisl'ff
branch 1s functloning as It should nr
.
,
^
^1ght
] eg°d d% c? n?i>s'"''sZ^^°^°=f

Ud;'ns

A

second difficulty which
arises with respect to

a

student's

fundamental evaluation of the
basic relationship which
Congress has to
the polity in general can
be seen In terms of focus:
does one look for
the effectiveness with which
the Congress operates In
relation to the
general

order, or does one emphasize
the more concrete and discrete

relationship which the Individual
member has

to

the district which

elected him?
"^^^^
institution may be woefully unresponsive
tho
the ^o^K*
members can act very responsively in
their casework and
on specific district-related
policy problems; the evaluation
^^sPonsiveness depends upon'whether the bod,
a
as a whole or the individual
member is considered.
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Such evaluations, of
course, depend upon the
"politics" of the
student.
Most start with an i,„a,e
or representation
of the flow-chart
Of power Which animates
the rest; the analyses
which follow the selection Of the i,„age can be
quite complex and
sophisticated.
But. again
when any such image is
held up before the full
range of possible
interpretations, each see^s
condemned to partiality.
I„ .y view, this
IS a necessary consequence
of the emphasis essential
to the fonnation
Of any perspective.
Aristotle would probably note
here that systematic or comprehensive
explanations of Congress are
impossible to
attain, even in theory,
because Congress is not among
those things
which can be so explained.
Long ago, Woodrow Wilson
expressed very
similar sentiments about the
confusing nature of Congress,
and while I
am unable to find his "system
which underlies its composition."
I find
his general

statement true enough:

Like a vast picture thronged
with fiqures of emiai
prominence and crowded with elaborate
and obtrisve details
Congress is hard to see satisfactorily
and appreciatively at
a single view and from a single
standpoint.
Its clpHcIted
forms and diversified structure
confuse the visio
and
onceal the system which underlies
its composition.
t is too
complex to be understood without an
effort, without a careful
and systematic process of analysis.
Consequently, very few
•

;

are

practi a l^shut
a^aa?^t
against ^h""'''''^"''
the comprehension of the public
at large
If
Congress had a few authoritative leaders
whose figures were
very distinct and very conspicuous
to the eye of the world
and who could represent and stand for
the national legislature in the thoughts of that very numerous
and withal very
respectable, class of persons who must think
specifically and
in concrete forms when they think at
all, those persons who
can make something out of men but very little
out of
intangible generalizations, it would be quite within
the
region of possibilities for the majority of
the nation to
follow the course of legislation without any very
serious
confusion of thought.*
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one crucial difference
between Wilson's generation
and Its
successors Is that he has
sought his controlling
1,„age In the

hu.an
figure. While we have
proceeded to analyze
structural relationships
power flows or Interest
networks.
For example, over the
.ears. NeUon
Polsby has consistently
emphasized the "representative
function" of

congress;

David Mayhew. the consequences
of which the never-ending
pressure of Impending elections
has upon the behavior
of Its

.e.bersh1p;6 Davidson and
Oleszek describe

a

body riven by Internal

conflicts and at war against
Itself;^ and Dodd and Schott
are primarily concerned with the
place that the legislative
body has cc»e to
occupy within the distended
structure
of the adoilnlstrative

state.8 Michael Malbin and J.

Mclver Weatherford are struck
by the

problem of rising staff
power-something unheard of twenty
years agoand approach It from the standpoints
of political scientist' and

anthropologlst.lO

The collections of articles
edited by Dodd and

Oppenhelmer^l and Mann and Ornsteinl^
inadvertently bear out the

Aristotelian doctrine that politics be
studied through aporiae or
selected problems, for each of the
articles presented
tions takes as Its subject some crucial

none attempts to grasp it as

a

whole.

multiplicity of perspectives adds up to

In these collec-

attribute of the Congress and
Taken together, however, this
a

body of information about

the variety of problems and circumstances
which now beset our national

legislature.

Congress "as

Though they cannot be said to reveal
a

the true nature of

whole," they provide a rich context for raising
the

questions pertinent to our own inquiry, and together,
they add up

to

a
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consensus t.at

,s

cmical

one crucial

of .an. of

question that «11

Us
,

"

:7

-n-ere. theaMllt.of

c™

practices

,e constant!,
before us 1s

the

l^e..ers has a.e. or
the ,enera,

.0.. to carr. out
Its proper functions within the .ixed
constitution of the United
States.
Evidence

th,s proble. without
recalling Polsby's
observation:

7;^^,?^ ^olIcMsls^f f ^"^^
Hou^sr?r?:ti?ri-i°:;>
.une exceptional fTr^r^^O^h^
enti;e'spec^\':

V-

'^^^

''^

Specialization presents
difficulties for the theorist
of
public space because through
It, the legislature
finds Itself
intellectually and politically
divided before it can
assemble to deliberate and decide.
,n what follows,
we shall explore both
the origins
and the political
consequences of this division
of Congress, and
try
to determine whether or
not Its powers have Indeed
been upheld by such

specialization.

That Congress in its present
form Is the product of

evolution and rich history often
fails to take
even serve a cursory role,

in

a

a

lengthy

pr™inent place, or

the researches and discoveries
of ™any

of the best students of that
body-despite the fact that the need
for
such research has been widely
evident among political scientists
for

some tirae.l"

This general omission of the
historical dimension Is

unfortunate.

It seems obvious to

this student, at any rate,

that any

adequate explanation of what the
Congress "is" entails some apprehen-
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cesses Which are rooted
first of

Federalist period, hut
e.ual,,
took

puce

in

an

i„

in

the practices of
the

the explosion in

c„p,exit. which

stages beginning early
in the present
century.

wUh

Coeval

these developments are
the processes which
Congress has instituted in response to the
vast changes in the
nature of the national
government which it initiated
during the New Deal
period.^^ decent
developments within the
professional literature
indicate that others

are beginning to recognize
the advantages which
can accrue fro. taking
Polsby's advice and heeding
the vital importance
which the history
of

congress has for our
understanding of it.

With luck the number of

studies Of congress which
incorporate the history of
its development
will increase.
The "historical" approach
primarily involves explanation
as a
matter of the unfolding of a
simple chronology of events
and develop-

ments in the history of the
Congress itself.

This approach will be

useful for our purposes, first
because it will permit us to
move
directly from the arguments of
the founders about the powers
and purposes of the national legislature
to the actual practices they
carried
out upon finding themselves
seated members of the first
Congresses.
In other words,

additional

evidence for the founders' notions
about

the nature of a possible national

public space can be gleaned from

their actual constitution of that
space as they struggled with the day
to day problems of legislating.

We will

find,

I

think,

that practical
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tr,ed to co.e to grips
with the concrete
problem which arose in
the
course of governing a
large and heterogeneous
polity.
Second
the
historical approach facilitates
analysis of the functions
of current

-stitutions and practices within
the Congress

by providing the
opportunity to review the forces
which preceded their
emergence as practices within the life of
the legislature as a
whole.
Here we will
find Congress struggling
to maintain a balancing
act between its
internal requirements of
democracy and consensus;
between ™e*er autonomy and party leadership;
between its own powers and
those of the

executive. 18

The history of the Congress
is one of

a

series of

oscillations in each of these
areas, between personal and
individual
power and powerlessness, and
a constant struggle-.anifest
in periodic

rearrangements of the formalities
which govern its internal

organizat1on-to co-exist with
political environment. 13

lost in all
a

real

a

continually changing governmental

and

Has the member of Congress
qua citizen been

this? This is what we will

have to determine, for without

citizen, there can be no public
space; and if the public space

be rendered powerless, ignoble, largely
ceremonial

or in some other

ways Impotent, there can be no real
citizenry.

Congress in the Federalist Period:
Failures of the Democratic Form

For purposes of analytic simplicity, the
ideal approach
the sketchiest review of the history
of Congress would be

to
to

.
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separate Its development
of interna,

ccplexU,

fro,„

its externa,

ba,ance of po«er with the
Presidency.

Unfortunate,,, in this
as in so
™any other cases invoiving
institutions, analytic
elegance and strict
Chronology do not .ix-yet.
the requirements of
chronology are such
that they cannot be
separated.
After some ruminations
and a few false
starts, the student of
Congress finds that the
opening pages of any

such history .ust include
three crucial

factors which impinged
uoon

the membership fro. the
very outset, and quite
firmly steered the
organization away from the mass
meeting form of conduct
which it

received at birth.

These factors, which we shall
explore in some

depth, are first, the problem
of legislative detail;
second, the

problem of attaining political
consensus among
and third, the partial

a

heterogeneous group;

Imposition of order upon an
unruly and disorga-

nized Congress by agents of the
executive branch.

Once history has

begun to Intrude the executive
Into the internal processes
of
Congress, however, it is very
difficult to extrude it later for
purposes of analysis.
And yet it seems that the two
must be kept

separate if theoretical questions
about the nature of representative

government

in

the U. S.

are going to be raised at

al

1

The founders of the American Republic
were not citizens of

city-state.

a

Indeed, the America of 1787 more
resembled the entirety

of Greece as It was

in 338 B.C.

than it did any single city-state of

Aristotle's era-and the student of history
notes that It took no less
than Alexander the Great to unify the former.

relative simplicity of the polls as

a

Hence, if we take the

benchmark, we see the
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Constitutional convention
ent.on nf
+,i
of i7»7
17<37 taking
place w1th1n the
context of '<
heterogeneous confederation
or league of allies,
fo™e. pr1,„anl, ,n
opposition to a foreign
power, onl. to .e beset
centrifugal forces
once the period of armed
conflict was over. The
task the Convention
faced then was to subdue
these forces without
subjugating the., b,
seducing the. Into jointly
cooperating In the creation
of a central
authority.
All of this material
has been reviewed
1n an earlier
Chapter.
•

Drawing upon

a

complex fusion of Enlightenment
political

phi-

losophy, Roman history and
law, English precedent
and radical Whig
doctrines, not to mention
their own experiences in
colonial government, the founders constructed
an artifice which, in
their own view,
was to revolve around the
open space at the center
of the Legislative
branch of the new republic.
Accordingly, most of the
substantive
powers of government having to
do with domestic policy
were explicitly
placed under the purview of that
body which was to lie closest
to
those upon whom its decisions
would have immediate effects.

Unfortunately, despite the Constitutional
attention lavished upon the
powers and duties of Congress,
and upon the qualifications for
serving
there, little mention was made
about the nature of the Congress
per
se.

Indeed, the members of that body
itself were to "chuse their

speaker and other officers

.

.

and, by implication,

to

regulate

their internal affairs themselves.
Once assembled, the new Congress set
about readying Itself

for joint political

action.

The record shows that the individual mem-
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^ers had had considerable
pn'o. expen-ence.

n-ne representatives who
had been

«bers

convention and thirty-six
who had sat

in

Thirty-nlne representatives
had served
fifty-two had been .e™bers
of either

a

In

Seated tn the House
.„e.e

of the Constitutional
the Continental

state legislatures,
and

state legislature, the

Continental Congress or the
Federal Convention.

.embers In all.^O
A.

C.

Congress

, House quorum straggled In on

There were sixty-five
1

Muhlenberg as speaker, and
he promptly named

draw up the first rules of
procedures.^!

April. 1789. chose
a

committee

to

our first Important clue
to

the riddle of Congress
therefore lies in the discovery
that a committee was prior to everything
else-even to rules of procedure.
That

Muhlenberg's committee duly met
and performed its functions
we can
infer from the historical

record: by 18 April, the
House was already

debating the first tariff bill.

Here is how they proceeded
in those

early days:
In

the early years of the House,

it was the practice to beain
CoLittee of

"^'J^' legislative proposals ?n
fl^'ul'Tu'^
the Whole House on the State
of the Union.

After broad
agreement had been reached on the
principles nvolved a
select committee was named to draft
a bill.
When thi^ Committee reported back to the House,
the bill itself was
referred to a Committee of the Whole
for section-by-section
debate and approval or amendment.
Its work completed
t e
committee rose the Speaker resumed
the chair, and the House
either accepted or rejected the amendments
agreed to in
uommittee of the Whole. This was followed
by a third and

engrossed or complete bill and passage

by^the'^HoSse^
Since there were no time limits as yet
on the right of
members to speak, even the small membership
of the First and
Second Congresses found this procedure
cumbersome.
Rep.
James Madison blamed the "delays and
perplexities" of the
House on the want of precedents. " But
Rep.
Fisher Ames of
Massachusetts saw the problem as an excessive concern
with
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George Galloway goes on
to report Fisher
Amos' remarks at
greater length, and they are
interesting because they
indicate
something about the value
of the contributions
which the

c«ittee

system made to the legislative
process at this early stage,
^es was
quite strongly in favor of
committees, and had little
apparent use for
the committee of the
Whole-in part, no doubt, because
of the rather
poor quality of the debates
he observed there.

Contrary to received

wisdom and mythological assumptions
about those good old early
days,
Ames' account makes clear that
there were times when the
Congress

did

not so much debate matters of
high principle as it indulged
itself by

wallowing

in

trivialities.

Writing to

friend in July, 1789,

a

^es

described the procedure as follows:

•

The bill was at first very
imperfect.
We laboured upon it
for some time, settled some
principles, and referred it to a
large and very good committee. They
met, agreed upon princip es, and the clerk drew the bill
which they reported
We
^'
committee of the whole, and we indulge
a very
ITn
l
minute criticism upon its style. We
correct spelling or
erase may and insert shall, and
quiddle in a manner which
provokes me. A select committee would
soon correct little
improprieties.
Our great committee is too unwieldy
^ for this
operation.
A great, clumsy machine.
.23
.

While Ames was objecting

to

.

Congressional

preoccupation with

the details of rhetoric, details of an
entirely different sort quickly

presented the earliest Congresses with

a

challenge that could not be

adequately met by the committee of the whole; challenges
which concerned

a

problem that has plagued Congress throughout its history:

205

how is it possible
for an assembly
^ to keeo
''^^P un with an increasingly
^
heavy and detailed
^
•

.

_

work

.

•

-"Haneousl,

.ebate the substantive
sues and .bas,c
1ss.es
pnnclples Involved 1n
eve., .atte. of
pCic.,
C'ea.,.. the Intention
of the Pounde.s,
and those of thel.
conte.Poran-es «ho found
themselves seated
the easiest
Congresses .as
•

—

""V^^ and

P-c,p,es

m

-e*,e

and debate to.ethe.
fl.st the

.oad

then the substantive
detail

s comprised h.
each bH,
Th.s procedure
guaranteed that each of
the .an. Interests
actual,/
present In the emerging
American society would
have an effective

-

the legislative body,

assembly and

to

voice
indeed. Galloway holds
that In those first

stage great debates on
national

questions.
But
apparently, the organizational
difficulties which followed
fro. this
arrangement proved to be
Insuperable, and 1t gulc.ly
turned out that
it was impossible for
each and every Interest
to participate on
an
equal footing with all
of the others on every
legislative tas. which
the congress then confronted.
The paralysis of the body
by a mass of
detail, then, provided a
ready historical answer
to the question posed
earl,er: It Is not possible
for an assembly to keep
up with an
increasingly heavy and detailed
work load and simultaneously
assemble
to debate the substantive
issues and basic principles
Involved In
every matter of policy.
The fo^al and politically
necessary solution
to the problem, of course,
was the institution of the
standing
committee: in order to conquer
a burgeoning and detailed
workload, and
manage its own growing numbers,
the assembled body itself would
have
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to divide:

of 1800), tte House began
^''^^ t^^t
to del »a.?!
slbiHty for initiating
--"pon?«g1sill?o^f!„^""^^""9
commlttees. Four were «;^M
Permanent
w^,
1"5; between 1802 and
1809, six were added'25"^"'^'"^"''
So goes the conventional
wisdom of the standard
account;
Fr™
one could draw a variety
of implications and
raise important
questions.
First, on the negative
side, a subdivided
legislature forces its individual member
to specialize and.
perforce neglect his
general responsibilities
to both his constituency
and to himself as a
citizen,
second, a subdivided
legislature comprised of
specialists is

n

structurally impeded from bringing
its collective wisdom
matters that concern the common
interest.

to bear on

Third, a subdivided

legislature cannot Vepresenf
the generality of society
or speak

in

its name, but delegates its
responsibilities to its parts which
then

presume to speak in the name of
the whole.

To claim that the

adequately represent the whole is.
in effect,

to

part can

commit the logical

fallacy of composition and to subvert
the founders' notions of the
true relationship which a
representative body should have to those
who

have elected it to act for them.
Such arguments, however, tend to leave
out the element of

politics.
detail

If the

Congress had to subdivide because of the
wealth of

involved in drawing up legislation, then
the act of legislating

can ultimately be reduced to

a

problem of perception and this thesis

would be written on the subject of selected
problems

in

collective
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episte.ology.

,„

that case, the fundamental

question would be

"

How
does a group intersubjectlvel,
establish consensus about
the nature of
reality with reference to
a given question?"
Unfortunately, politics
1s not always so easily
reduced to problems of
perception.

On the

positive Side, the delegation
of responsibility for
specific legislation to certain individuals
is a division of labor
that makes it

easier for an unwieldy body
to approach consensus
on a variety of
detailed matters, and to move
a vast workload
through its legislative
calendar.

Such a task would have been
simply Impossible had the

entirety of the assembly attempted
to pore over the minutiae
necessary
to the drafting of effective
legislation.
Second, insofar as it might
be said that it is in the general
interest to maintain legislative
control over those areas where
Constitutional

responsibilities are

clear, then in those cases where
legislation is necessarily detailed,

specialization,

in

fact,

there can be no "final

serves that general

Interest.

solution" to this dilemma.

It seems that

While the standard

account emphasizes the problems which
detailed legislation presents
an assembled body,

further detail.

26

it remains to explore its political

to

dimensions in

We can put the problem this way: suppose
that all

members of an imaginary assembly can agree
about the nature of

problem wanting solution.

This in no way guarantees that they will
be

able to agree on what should be done about
it.

problem of formulating

a

a

We will

call

this the

consensus for political action--wi thout which

any legislature is impotent.

James Sterling Young has shown, for example, that the early
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congress was not paralyzed
by

Us

Inability to sit en
banc and debate

an infinity of details,
but rather by Its nature
as a representative
body.
For Young, the Intersubjecti
ve and psychological
attitudes of

much Of Its early membership
prevent It from agreeing
about very much
at all.
The characterol oglcal
structure of the Individual
members led
them to hold certain
attitudes about political
power and authority
Which, in turn, led them to
value particular forms of
Institutional

organization over others-and
this led
for collective action.

to

breakdown In the potential

a

Young points out the problem:

'"The

Americans,' observed an astonished
Britisher, have taken "the principle of democracy
[and] applied [it] to a
legislative
.

.

.

body.'"^^
Given Gordon Wood's analysis of
the social attitudes which
swept the country

in

the years

immediately following the revolutionary

period, this is precisely what we
might have expected the newly-

liberated colonists to do as they
assembled together

to

make laws.^^

Yet, once having moved to form and
operate a government,

these indivi-

duals perhaps continued to adhere to
principles more appropriate

revolutionaries than statesmen.

In

any case,

to

their continuing to base

their actions on an unallayed principle
of democracy gave rise to what
the modern student of Congress--not
to mention of ancient

democracies-can only define

as bizarre activity:

spirit of cooperation, conciliation or deference

there was here
to

'no

the opinions of

others; individuation of behavior and opinion
was valued, and

following the lead of others was scorned.

These psychological

atti-
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tudes 1„ tun, fostered

^-crac.

a

dogged persistence 1„
the practice of

and a delicate concern

.t.

the e..a,1t. of
each person such

that the concerted
action which res.Us
In the passage of
blHs-and
Which, after all. ™ust
be directed by
so,„eone-beca™e nearly
Impossible to ach1eve.30
These outwardly appearant
difficulties were
underscored by fundamental
differences of outloo. and
culture which
separated the .en who gathered
In the well of
Congress fran' one
another, for In the Jeffersonlan
era. .en fro. different
regions were
».en fro. different cultures.^l
The result was a highly
contentious
lower house. lacking party
discipline and organization^^
and

recognizing no leadership of
Its own.33
to aggravate such sectional

speaker Henry Clay proceeded

differences by distributing
c^mittee

Chairmanships equally a.ong the
sectionally-oriented fraternal
groups
that attained social and political
cohesion in com.unity boarding
houses, and which constituted
the actual power blocs and
Interest
groups of the Congress at that
time.
By multiplying the number
of

groups involved

in

policy-making, "the committee system"
under Clay,

"multiplied also the opportunities for
obstructionism and

.

.

.

intro-

duced a whole new set of disparate
organized interests Into the
congressional

establishment. "3"

system-which we are exa.ining

For Young, then, the com.ittee
as the logical

response to the

complexity of legislation-did not enable
Congress

to

function effec-

tively, nor can its emergence be laid
to the complexity of the

Congressional

...

tasks at hand.

Instead.

the standard Interpretation which sees the
committee
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applicable to the JeffeSnian
e?^
"ilnority formations
thaJ were thl ^.n^
nay well have been
In narr . Jnn^. ^
*^"""iO"al
early Congress' incaDar,-?v
policy-Jing by

™*

'^'"^

comraittees

adaptation to the

^"^"''^^

SrU?es%

undaunted by preceding
historians and political
scientists
Young took the view that
early Congressional
paralysis resulted fr«
US failure as a body to develop
institutionalized .eans of
attaining

consensus-i„ short, that the
proble. lay

in the

internal

structure of

congress as that structure
reflected the psychological
attitudes of
its .e,nbership.
Congress lacked leadership;
it had no coherent party
structure; its committees held
themselves responsible to
nothing
beyond the informal and regional
affiliations of their constituent
n-embers; and the body as
a whole could neither bring
itself nor force
itself to act. And what did we
have then? Government by
separate and
rival

interests; government without the
possibility of compromise;

government in which subjective
independence was valued more highly
than government itself.
Young's description of the inability
of
Congress to respond

to

the deepening crisis brought on
by the Mar of

1812 stands as a graphic illustration
of the consequences which can

follow from a kind of naive self-indulgence

in

internal

democracy;

a

week after the British had sacked
the Alexandria waterfront. Congress,
unable to agree about even the most
fundamental policies for the

defense of Washington, decided to go home.^^

How does Young explain the problem of
Congressional

inactivity

then? How does he evaluate the consequences of
the struggles of the
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early membership to maintain

tioned.

a

government of separate and
rival

First, the members of the
early Congresses placed

a

much

higher value on their notions
of "equality" than they
did upon
leadership, guidance or discipline.

Individually, they abhorred
and

distrusted power; collectively,
they acted
their membership to raise
himself to

a

to

check any move by any of

superordinate position.

Second, instead of identifying
with the institution of
Congress and
with its responsibilities as an
organ of government, the members

stayed attuned to their constituencies,
embodying

in

microcosm the

disparate forces of the larger society
which had sent them
Washington.

to

Instead of seeing themselves as
"governors" or agents of

government, they persisted

in

seeing themselves as "outsiders,"
even

while occupying seats of power.

Young sums up:

It can scarcely be accident that
a community whose members
Immorality in power was also a community
deJfrnpnr^n^?' behaviors and the
informal institutions by
^hl^h
"-^^f power
which f(majority)
is acquired.
What, indeed, was the
to develop any system for getting
majority agreement
iVlZ^
It not another expression of the
governmental community's
aversion to the sorts of behavior that mark
a man for a poli•

tician and^a seeker after power? What, after
all, but the
legislator s antipower values created in them
that compulsion
to play the constituency advocate--the
outsider in power--and
to avoid the behavior of rulers? The
psychology of the governors themselves would seem to explain better
than any other
single factor their deficiencies in the statecraft
that is
necessary to make a truly representative institution
into an
effective governing institution. 3/

To the extent that this aversion to power is an
expression of
the desire for and belief in "equality," note that
this not the notion

of equality which one finds in Aristotle (i. e.

,

that equals rule
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equals and are ruled

1„

turn), and that it
«ould probably have
.ade

very lUtle sense to
the andents.
not in the social

Note also that it did
not last-

order, and not in the
political order.

sequent history Of congress
can be read as

a

succession of attempts

institutionalize inequality within
the cha.nber
act and carry out its
public business.

The sub-

in

t<

order that it ,„ight

What characterized citizen

equality for the ancients,
as we have seen, was
participation in the
dally affairs of the state
or the plausible expectation
that one not
so engaged at the present
«n,ent might yet be at a
future time.

This

-ade the affairs of the
polls co^on and shared, and
political action
a necessary dimension of
a fully
human life.

ception of citizen equality

in

a

they have yet to remove.

It

grounding their con-

individualism rather than in par-

ticipation, the Americans succeeded
not only
name, but also in driving

By

in

giving power

a

bad

wedge between the state and
society which
is

important to contrast this ethos
of

frontier anarchy with the freedoms
enjoyed by individual citizens
the classical

in

tradition, for the Americans distrusted
government and

often cared little for its success or
well-being.
early members saw their primary
responsibilities

All
in

too often the

terms of pro-

tecting themselves and their constituencies
from the predations of

government and their own terms of service
there as an unwelcome chore
to be got over as soon as possible.

Enjoying power in one sense, they

literally did not share it among themselves,
and therefore rendered it
impossible to use for either good or ill.
Young's distinction between representing and governing

is
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'^npo^tant and fundamental

to

u

ou. analysis,

i-nponant consequences for
an. theory of
h-story Of that concept
as it has evolved

Americans did not value
participation as

a

„n, necessan..

puMic space,
in

the y.

s

and

.ave

for the

,f the

«h

as they did equality
and desired to see
themselves living in isolation,
free of government
and away fro. government,
then the primary duty
of any self-respecting
representative must have been
at that time to diminish
the prerogatives of government and
hold it at bay while a
suspicious citizenry

1-ked

in

the distance.

And this more or less
accurately charac-

terizes Young's account of
the attitudes most
^nericans had toward the
unsung little group in
Washington until the time of the
election of
Jackson in 1828.
As Gordon Wood has pointed
out at length,

this represented

radical

departure from the Whig theories
which had sparked debates
throughout the colonies a mere
twenty-five years before the first

Congress gathered.

For the government to protect
its citizenry from

tyrants is one thing; for it

to

express their views and interests
in

the construction of positive
policies is another;

expected

for it to be

draw away into itself and leave
them alone is something

to

else entirely, and while it is my
contention that this deep-seated

attitude has gone unsung for too long by
political

scientists and

historians alike, it can hardly serve as
the basis for evaluating the
historical

failures and accomplishments of the Congress.

Suppose, then, that the representatives served
their consti-

tuencies well

by refusing

to

cooperate with one another? There was,

a
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nonetheless pressing business
to attend to. bills

to

draft, an

econ.,

to strengthen, taxes
to gather and war
debts to pay.

At what point 1s
necessary for the representative
to abandon specialized
constituency interests and devise
compromises with his colleagues
so that
the co«on or general
interest .night emerge with
respect to the actual
products of legislative action?
At what point is It necessary
for particular interests to maintain
a strong presence in
the representative
body so that no important
part of the represented
constituency is
Ignored when decisions are taken
which affect the whole? The
first

n

question

is

posed from the standpoint of
one who looks down on the

body politic and realizes that
the requisites of governing
are not
always identical with those of
"actually" representing.

view that Young takes.

This is the

The second question is posed
from the stand-

point of one who looks u£. distrustingly
perhaps, and seeks to limit
the power of government and of
individual governors alike.
This is
the view apparently taken by many
of the members of the early

Congress.

The first view is that held by
those who believe in

theories of virtual representation; the
second accords with the theory
of actual

representation.

The first view is that taken by those
who

hold that the common Interest will be best
served by

which is able

to

act;

to

be an instrument of the popular will,

and who tend to favor discouraging government
action.
a

government

the second view is taken by those who stress

that government is or ought

two views stand in

a

relation of parataxis.

In

In

theory,

the

practice, such dilem-

mas are always resolved, and were in this case when
the second view
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emerged as dominant and the
Congress al.ost lUera,
door Of the Capitol building
while the British ca™e

.an out the bacK
In

the

front.

The practical d11e™a
which Congress always
faces as it orga
mzes Itself to do business can
be expressed as the
need to maintain
balance between the requirements
of actual representation,
and the

proble. Of resolving its
internal differences and
establishing mechanisms for attaining consensus
in order
to

use its powers.
We shall
see that whenever sectional
or class differences have
prevented

«jor1t1es from forcing about or
acting upon general questions,

or

whenever the formal mechanisms
for achieving consensus
have broken
down. Congress has been unable
to maintain
its power as an

institution-even

in

those areas where its
Constitutional

respon-

Sibil ities are clear.
It follows from these
considerations that the problem of

representation

is

now cast in a very ambiguous
light indeed: clearly,

this concept is central

both to theories of republican
government and

to the particular array of powers
which the Constitution has conferred

upon the Congress,

If the Congress does

articulation and clash of

a

not provide a forum for the

diversity of interests in

a

public space,

what reason could we as citizens possibly
have for valuing such
institution? At the same time, we have tried
both logical

and political

Constitution was deficient

show that there are

limits to what can be demanded or expected

of the representative function:

route of legislative detail

to

an

such limits are reached via either the

or that of the consensus problem.
in

If the

having failed to stipulate an internal

a
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structure for the Conarp<;<;
th^f k^^
i^ongress, that
body nonetheless
found itself having
to invent such a
structure
on an

US

hoc hasis

a.d

if

it was

mandated duties as an organ
of the new government.

that the

,ne„,ber of

Congress has

a dual

represent his constituency;
second,
He is

a ,ne.ber.

to c.rry out

Thus we find

responsibility: first

to

to

uphold the institution
of which

His ability to carry
out the first absolutely
depends

upon his willingness

to

carry out the second.

upon the ,„e™ber by virtue
of the practical

This duality ,s forced

necessities of government,

but it can be seen to
undercut the radical Whig
doctrines and the
American ideals of "actual"
representation which we saw so
animated
the revolutionary impulses
reviewed in the last chapter.

We thus find ourselves forced

fr«

turn away

to

the problem of

actual

representation and take up the series
of Congressional efforts
to institutionalize procedures
for the regular attainment
of consensus
which have preoccupied it
intermittently right up to the
present day.
But this shift from representing
to governing will not free
us fro,n
paradox:

if „e are to

text of Congressional
usual

take the problem of positive
action as the con-

self-government, we run smack up against
the

gamut of problems that attend the
conduct of groups which

decisions on other than strictly democratic
lines.

,„ake

Not only shall

we

find Congressional majorities and
minorities, we will encounter big

men and little men, reform movements
which are restrained and reform

movements which are successful; leadership
coalitions that manage the
chamber with an iron hand and others which

discipline necessary

to

enact programs.

fail

to

muster the

We may even

find
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congressional

ana.c...

Beh.n. al,

sue. poss15,e an.
actua,

™anou..s

and discussions .ay
be found the
Individual .e™be. of
the Congr.s
now seen In the guise
of participating
citizen rathe, than
representative,
instead of the d11e™a
of governing vs.
representing «e
face that of the one and
the .any: can Congress
solve the proble. of
positive action only at the Pxnpnca
^
tne expense of internal
'y
democracy? To state
the sa.e difficult. In
different te^s. Is
consensus something that
Is
possible only through the
efforts of strong leaders,
or can It folio,
the .ore or less smooth
workings of a properly
constructed
•

organization? A theorist like
John Rawls .Ight ask
whether, in the
absence of personal authority,
rules could be conceived
according to
which such a syste. might
be

reach toward

a

historical

Induced to work.

We will

here try to

rather than theoretical
answer to such

questions, as we have fro. the
outset.

What have men actually done
In

real

situations when they came upon
one another to decide
c«plex matters, found that they disagreed,
and that they st1l, had to
decide?
How has Congress organized itself
in order to c«e up with
positive
proposals and actually carried them
out?

Institutio nalization in the Federalist
Period-'
A House Divided

Nelson Polsby drew attention

to

the

"institutionalization" of

Congress, as an analytic category, nearly
fifteen years ago.^'
Polsby,

the House

is

For

not and never really was the mass
meeting which

the founders probably imagined that
it would be.''°

Instead, his
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account draws upon that
of Young, Galloway,
Harlow and others to

upon Its inceptlon.^1

Por Polshy. the division
was entailed by the

rap,dly expanding real,
of responsibilities
of the national government.
Starting with a government
without duties and a
Congress
Without established practices.
Internal institutions or
foUways he
posits something very lUe
Hume's causal connexion
in the following
hypothesis:

no;"™:"

f

c'tediy^ ?[ff;„rs:^'°a;

c1es Of the national

Shifting from the general

gov^r^ ntln^mu'tfo'naffzel:^^''^^
to

the specific, he continues:
"^'^

dn*''lhf

5°'"^

amount of work to

^i.^^"n!;^:lg^v::^p-L^;^^o^^d^^i?o^rLlnsT^r

Institutionalization seems to be

a

complex process ultimately

linked to the work load, in which
the mechanisms through which

organizes itself for the conduct of
affairs proliferate
increase in refinement.

For Polsby.

in

a

group

number and

it follows growth in the number

of people involved, or greater
complexity-he says "density"-in their

common affairs.
nal

As a response to responsibilities
entailed by exter-

events, we note that institutionalization
is

a

way of making

it

easier for Congress to reach consensus by
formalizing and subdividing
the processes through which it is reached.

ween the approaches of Young and Polsby

is

A crucial

difference bet-

that Young focuses on poli-
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tical

dynamics, and Polsbv
soy sees the
tne o„n
entire phenomenon with
reference
to problems of
organization.''*

According to PCs.y,
institutionalization has
several deter".mate Characteristics.
Pirst. an institutionalized
organization is
relatively differentiated
fro. its environment,
its members are easily
identifiable, it is difficult
to become a member
and the leadership
is

recruited from within the
organization.

zation

is

c«plex,

i.

e.

.

Second, the internal

organi-

the functions of the
whole are separated
on

some regular and explicit
basis and its parts are
not wholly
interchangeable. There is a
division of labor, roles
are specified
patterns of recruitnent to
roles are regularized,
and expectations
about the performance of roles
are widely shared.
Third, the organization tends to use automatic
rather than discretionary
methods for
conducting its internal business."
The balance of his article
is an
effort to support these
generalizations with reference to
the history
of the House.
On the level

complexity

in

of this history,

he

indicates that the growth of

the House can be shown in
three ways:

in the growth in the autonomy
and importance of committees
in the growth of specialized
agencies of party
and in the general increase in
the provision of various
emouluments and auxiliary aids to
members in the fom of
salaries, allowances, staff aid and
committee

leadS

sLfM6^'"'

But what "set off" the process of
institutionalization in

Congress in the first place? Was there

a

prompting impulse or spark to

this development, or can all be laid
at the feet of legislative

7
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co.np1exn. and Increasing
„.*e.s as we have
«1„ta1ned
P0U.ys account U Cea. enough,
though the process
he

not s1.p,e.

so

Ur^

.esC.es

the

U

Institution of the standing
c.n.lttee .egan to
ta^e ho,d-..the
c^^ttee syste^'.-othe.
developments exerted
sl.lUr
pressure on Congress to
coalesce via the -part,
s.ste.
Alexander
Hamilton too. control of
the administration
of George Washington
and
extended his Influence
toward .en of 11,e mind
In Congress.
,n the
f.rst two congresses.
Hamilton Is said to have
used the Federalist
caucus to guide debate In
the Committee of the
Whole.« Thus we see
emerging 1„ nascent form,
as early as 1790.
one of the ™st fundamental problems to plague
Congress throughout Its
history: Its tendency
to seek cohesion of
both conduct and policy
by abrogating Its
prerogatives to agents and agencies
of the executive branch.
Here we see
that the gap between the
legislature and the executive,
created by the
constitutional system of separated
powers

Mzatt^L^^rth^^^?^s?^?::;-:rei:"^^?::i\ro^"^^-

J^

'''7
wL'fpeTrl^d n
e
whe?I
grI:t'"ori:rrf^' of government
were evolved through the g^ve
.V''
discussion. Congress as such
ad
become
oecome In
in effect
ffeTff'''''
a mere ratifying body.
The real work
"

InTfZ

isulur 'b
in
secret
el^e 1::s1o"r„?"V'"
session of the majority party.
In this oraanlT^^n^n
unknown to the Constitution a^d
beyond the
ch o
he
2 les
of either chamber, the executive
could work wUh ?he party
following in Congress, and secure
the adoption of
prearranged program. " [Harlow,
1917:145.] Thus oartv tar
tics, already familiar in state
legislatures made an eartv
appearance in Congress.
They attained thefr'peak o
le

oe flc-

Re°ed

:nd"c"rnnL%'^'"

'^'^'^

°f

^P-^'-

Party tactics, of course, are
interbranch tactics and cut
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across the l.nes of
Institutional distinction
drawn by the
constitution,
„e ta.e the view
that a diversity
of Interests

u

e-ts1n

the U.S.. „e can
^ard,y .e surprised
by the appearance
of

different parties to
espouse such different
Interests.
time, however, the
Constitutional

At the sa.e

deslqn for
aesign
^
.
.
tor th.
the conduct
of govern,nent

's predicated on the
division of auvernmental
governmental

or assignment

to

different branches.

an»„. and.
agency

Us

sortition

Party
ty necessitv
necessity „„h
undennines this
i-ar

design precisely to the
MS extent th^t
that ftit requires interbranch
coordination for the enactment
of policy.
The

danger, of course, is
that

insofar as Congress may be
bumptious and unruly, it
could be easier .0
control events from the
White House and impose
Congressional
discipline from without.
Under such conditions.
Congress becnes the
cart, and the executive branch
the horse.
The reins of power will
be
held by the President and
the party leadership-a
preferable alternative, for some, to seeing
them fall Into the well of
the chambers of
the assembled, to be trampled
in a legislative melee,
or simply
shunned.

According to Polsby, Hamilton's
use of the Federalist party
caucus to guide debate

in

the Committee of the Whole
led to sharp

clashes between his followers and
those of Jefferson who Pelt
that the
House was being stripped of its
constitutional authority over finance.
When Jefferson's Republicans finally
gained the upper hand

Third Congress

in

1792,

in

the

they restored detailed power over
finances to

the Committee of the whole.

satisfactorily," however, and

"This," Polsby tells us, "did not work
in

the Fourth Congress,

a

Committee on

222

-ys

an. Means

Co«Utee

.o^e.^l

Of t.eH.ole

..,e

one

not „o..,.

.o.U .ve

.

PUc.e. .es' observations

vide evidence sufficient
fo. .Lectin,
suspicions.
infer that the formation
of a standing
c^.lttee on
a

co,„.1t.ent to

agreement

wUhln

In

the

the

,,^0..

,

to

pro-

thin. «e can

finance reflected

Idea of at least
starting with procedural

face of regional

and political

the bod. coupled
«1th external

pressures

diversity and conflict

fr»

the other branch
indeed. It see^s that
the appointment of
this and other
c»«1ttees can
be seen as partially
successful strategies
Congress to defend Its

territory

fro,n

executive encroachment and

to

maintain the institu-

tional

integrity which was threatened
by the derivative
sort of power
provided through interbranch
party organizations.
Polsby Includes a
quotation from Harlow which
bears directly upon
Republican theories of
the proper role of the
Congress which I here reproduce
in full:
'''"'^"^ committees, particularly
''Says'and'MeIn;
^
^ manifestation of the
Reoublir^n
Republican fhi^
theory of government.
From their point of view
'''''' repres'enJattr:?'
t
yie
e'
voters, ought to be the mainsprinq
Ztel?
of the wholP cvctom
Hitherto the Federalists had sold
the'ir bfrthr g t brper:
muting the executive to take a more
active part In the
government than was warranted by
the Constitution
The
Republicans now planned to bring
about the proper'balance
^--Mlening at on e he
scooe ofM':"""^'
""^ --estricting the
exeTnfle
it'^""'*!r\°*^
executive.
It was the better to enable
the House to take its
'''' °' o--9anizat1on was worked
out""t
"^^^"^
departments were looked upon as
Zh,.
agents off\t
the executive, so the committees
would be considered as the agents of the House. 52
'

'

^

:L^%Tr:.''

'

Note that each party,

in

its own way,

had turned to the execu-
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tlve branch for guidance:
the Federalists by
wording «1th Hamiltonthe Republicans by at
first attempting to
,ni™ic. so.ne of the
characteristics Of executive branch
organization, and ultimately
by allowing
President Jefferson to exert
al.ost total Influence
over the appointments of committee chairmen."
^^^^
^^^^.^^^
stages of the development of
Congress, "coordination"
between the
legislature and the executive
was obtained at the behest
of the

executive; that the earliest
precedents show Congress beginning
to
occupy the role of "patient"
with respect to executive
agency; that

a

semblance of Congressional control
over policy was obtained by
subdividing the tasks of the chamber;
and. finally, that the
allocation
of positions of authority was
subject
to both party and

to mention executive-influence.

factional

-not

These factors add up to

"institutionalization." that is, the primitive
mass meeting proved
unequal to its legislative and
political

tasks and the internal

nization of Congress became increasingly
complex as

a

result.

orga-

For the

somewhat Innocent republican, the political
consequences were
enormous

... the effective decisions on legislative issues were
reached behind the scenes in closed caucuses
of the majority
party.
As Federal i st Josiah Quincy lamented
in 1809, the
House acts and reasons and votes, and
perforns all the
operations of an animated being, and yet, judging
from my own
perceptions, I cannot refrain from concluding that
all' great
political questions are settled somewhere else
than on this
f 1 oor
It seems that the gradual

emergence of such House institutions

as floor leader, committee system and party
caucus constituted

a
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variety of responses
to

a

apparent,, were essenttal

the

cha*e. with respect

vanet.
to

of p.oble.s.

consonsus-.un

The

cn.utees

and the p.o.le.
of
in

to

legisUtlon;^^ the caucus
and floor ,eade r

seen to have risen pr1,„ar11y
1„ response to
requirements of the e.er
C'se of institutional
power and as a direct
resuU of executive branch
willingness to Impose Its
programs and views on a
d,sorgan1zed and
unwilling assembly.
At this point, the ta,e
begins

grow murky.
Quoting fr«
Henry Adams. Young notes
that "The whole structure
of Mr.
Jefferson's
administration toppled over and
broke to pieces in its last
days.»
Mddison, in his turn, inherited
a wreckage comprised
of

...

to

as Secretary Gallatin
advised

the

new Presi^dent'57

Under these circumstances, the
President could acconplish

IHtle, and

the entire government sank

into lassitude and

inactivity

as the pendulum of power swung
rapidly from the President to
the

Congress.

Beginning in 1811,

this shift was strengthened
and con-

firmed as another House institution
emerged which was sufficiently
powerful

in

its own right not only to
command

the

that body, but to eclipse the
Presidency itself.

Institution was the speakership.

internal

This newly-emerging

With the aid of the War Hawks,

Speaker Henry Clay expanded his powers
from those of
officer

to

affairs of

a

mere presiding

become an active party leader.

Clay for the first time used the speaker's
prerogative of
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doubt that Clarwo 'for'the
Speakershira'n
independence as a power

"° ''''''

^

^.s^^Zr^^ ^^^^.^^

Clays election

to

this post, and repeated
re-election to it, ".arked

profound change in its character
and in the effective
leadership of
govern.ent,5^ With this, the
nation embarked on a period
of
Congressional supremacy over the
executive, which lasted until
the
a

elevation of Jackson
was

crucial

a

in

1829.

While the emergence of the
speakership

part of this shift in the
balance of power, we have

already seen that an impotent
Presidency did not entail

institutionally viable Congress.
deal

a

Indeed, Congressional

strong and

failure

to

adequately with the crisis of 1812
was perhaps the outstanding

incident in what can be seen as
on the part of Congress.

a

long period of dilatory inactivity

Since Clay's power depended upon
his making

every committee representative of the
general
general

and since the

body was riven and paralyzed by
faction, the consequences of

Congressional
image.

body,

supremacy in government did not equal

the Constitutional

A government dominated by the Congress
was also rudderless,

for the faction-dominated Congress excelled
at opposition, but failed

utterly at construction.
historical

With this, the other side of

a

great

pattern seems to have been set: when the Presidency
is

strong. Congress is Jed; when Congress predominates,
government

accomplishes little that

is

positive.

Is

this,

philosophically

speaking, necessary?
Here, analytical

distinctions and chronological accounts begin
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to

.ec«e ,une

and that

o™

Us

H U

t.e .at

Ued

e,ne.,1ng institutions
too. on lives and
powe.s of

.efo.e the, .a. .een
,on, in Place.

--nutions.

Congress institutional

i.e.,

U

is also

the .,00. leade.
an. the caucus,

t.e

t.at part,

see™ to h:;:;een

bound up With the executive
..anch and its needs
at the «ent of
their inception.
The co«ittees,
however, and the
Speakership itself
ca.e into being as ™,uch
to oppose the Presidency
as to assert
seething positive with reference
to the electorate.
Indeed, even

the

institutions of the party
syste™ changed roles

in

relation to the executive once the balance
between the two branches
had shifted.
Galloway sums up:

The great question which one
would like to have answered,
and
for which there appears to be
no clear answer, is whether
the institu-

tionalization of the Congress both
enhanced its independence and
enabled it to function niore effectively.
Even the briefest glance at
the rest of the nineteenth century
affords us no help.

Mr. Jackson

(1829-1837) was effectively able to
dominate the Congress through his
use of the appointment power and the
veto--despi te the lessons
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congress had learned

1n

standing up for Uself
tn the t.ent.
.ears
previous to his election.^!
The period 1837-18S0
showed freguent
fluctuations In power as the
relative strength and
weakness of the
various Presidents changed,
and as the assembled
representatives were
or were not able to
co.pro.1se on the overriding
Issue of slavery
During the Civil War period
Itself. Lincoln, of
course. do,.1nated
everything Including a Congress
effectively comprised of a
single
.

party of Republicans radically
opposed to hi..

The Reconstruction

period, in its turn, is as
famous for the domination
of the government
by congress as it Is for
any of the specific
policies then undertaken.

At this point, the Radical
Republicans used the institutional
forces
Of the assembly to assert
their doctrine of legislative
supremacy
in

the Wade-Davis Manifesto:
°! Congress is paramount and must be respectedt^l;.%'th^'i^^
that
the whole body of Union men
in Congress will not submit'
''''
President] ^f rash and
c nstut on^r^f'
tutional
legislation; and if he wishes our
support he must
confine himself to his executive
duties-to obey and t^ exe

1

rTeuL'\T^

''1'"''
rebellion, and leave political

arms armed
reorganization to Congress. 62

This manifesto rapidly changed from

a

statement of intention to

a

sta-

tement of fact when Andrew Johnson
succeeded Lincoln and shortly

thereafter was impeached for failing
Congressional

to

heed the Tenure of Office Act.

power during this period, however, was
not asserted

so

much by the institution as it was by the
Republican Party within it,
and was focused in particular by

... the shrewd management of Thaddeus Stevens of
Pennsylvania, leader of the Republicans in the House
of
Representatives and for two years the virtual ruler of
the
United States. 63
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According

without

to

Galloway, Congressional

break through

a

either unable

to

s.pre.nacy was to continue

succession of weak Presidents
who were

a

assert the.nselves, or
perfectly contented

to

follow

the lead of Congress.^^ The
period was characterized by
strong

Republican leadership

in

the Congress and

a

gradual

but continuous

strengthening of control over
legislation by the various
standing canmittees.
Although it is difficult to
determine precisely from the
record,

I

think it not unreasonable

the development of internal

simultaneous external

to

infer that this next stage
in

House institutions was related

dominance over the executive branch:

to
a

its

superor-

dinate Congress presented vastly
enriched opportunities for public

notoreity compared with

a

subordinate one, and as the nineteenth
cen-

tury wore on, the individual members
gradually began to lengthen their
stays, and House career patterns began
to change.
By 1899

...

the proportion of newcomers among
the 357 members entering the House had fallen
to 30 per cent
while the
mean period of service had increased to
more than'three
terms.
As more members sought to stay in
the House for
longer periods, it became of increasing
importance to them
that they have the opportunity to gain
political recognition
through specialization and rising influence
within the co<nmittee structure.
There was thus a growing demand among members of both parties for assurance that their
seniority would
be respected in assigning them rank on
committees of their
choice.
The resulting new expectations contributed
to the
reaction against centralization that began under Speaker
Cannon. 03

From the days of Thaddeus Stevens

Speaker Cannon

in

to

the

revolt against

1910--of which we will hear more below--the power of

the speaker to appoint committee chairs had been gradually
subjected
to

increasing pressure by the chairiien on behalf of the seniority
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system.
As more and more meinbers
made careers nnt
service, their committee
'''^"^"^^
membershiD. .nH i /'"f
opened routes of advancement
Posts
^^^^^^^^^P
with nrnn
regularize these intern
to
,'
,^^
l^^Ve
rule" became virtually
^^"^^rity
inviolable!66
'

This development, which
consumed

a

period of decades,

finally

brought into being one of
the major characteristics
of the contemporary House Of Representatives,
and institutionalized
forces for
decentralization of power within
the chamber which cut
across the previously existing lines of
political conflict and
tension.
We
have

seen that geographical

and social

factions within the Congress
were

capable of paralyzing it; we
have seen that party
discipline and the
Speakership were capable of uniting
it to successfully
oppose, and
sometimes even to dominate, the
executive branch; we have seen
that
this same party apparatus could
be effectively turned to
suit executive branch purposes at some
times but not at others.

entirely new basis for centrifugal

Now we find an

forces within the chamber: the

self-interest of the individual member
and his pursuit of his own
career.
This element was to grow in
power and influence until

successfully able

to

office of the Speaker

it was

assert its decentralizing claims
against the
in

1910.

It was

to

provide precedents for later

House revolts against centralized power
and authority as the twentieth

century wore on.

Occasionally, it was to provide arenas for
the legi-

timate airing of public grievances which
otherwise would have gone

unnoticed, and as such, contributed
tutional

to

strength of the legislature.

the preservation of the

insti-

But these developments, as well
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as the forces they
unleashed and expressed,
were highly uneven 1n
their influences and
subject to seasonal changes
and cycles of

influence and power.

before doing so,

We will

take up those cycles in
their turn

but

think it important to turn
to the work of Woodrow
Wilson, who observed Congress
during the late-nineteenth
century
period of its dominance over
the Presidency and in
the midst of the
rise to power of the committee
chairmen.

In

I

turning to Wilson, we leap

a

considerable historical

distance from the practices of the
Federalist period, to the beginnings of contemporary American
political science.
Wilson is important
because he
ture of

a

is

the first "modern" political

fully institutionalized House.

scientist to give us

a

pic-

At the same time, however,

he carries forward into the twentieth
century some of the political

values of the eighteenth.

The generation of Wilson

-which can

be

seen to have included Neitzsche, Weber
and Henry Adams--faced life at
a

crucial

historical moment when the foundations of
our modern

parliamentary democracy were being laid

in

an age of high capitalism.

This generation of scholars and intellectuals
held

a

unavailable to its successors: raised by citizens
of

vantage point
a

relatively

simple society, they stood witness to the
sudden overturning of an old
world, conceived and built on

a

human scale, by a new one as tech-

nically and powerfully superior to it as the dynamo
was

to

the horse
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and stea.-engi„e

U

replaced.

«as also a shadow here:

But.

as Henry Ada™s pointed
cut.

the power was all

there

on the technical

side
in
the instrumentalities of
hu.an creation and not in
the .en themselves.
Hence the emerging world,
infinitely more complex than
what it surpassed, presented the humanist
sensibility of this generation
with a
dilemma: to put the problem
in American terms, was
it possible to pre-

serve the spirit of the old
Republic

in

the new containers of
tech-

nical

proficiency and institutional
complexity that were entailed
by
the emerging new order? Could
the values of public
participation and

self-government be preserved

in

an environment of high
technology,

world empire and corporate power?
Could men retain control over
their
collective destinies and remain men,
as history-going clear back
to
the time of Pericles-told them
they had to be? Or would we strike
the

usual Faustian bargain with our
organizational machinery, and exchange

our political

liberties for the technical mastery of
human events made

possible by the technical mastery of nature?
Wilson's generation bore

witness to the initial phases of the
reconstruction of our institutions of self-government on technical

lines.

None of these factors, of course, can be found
anywhere

manifest content of Wilson's Congressional Government
to be among the set of general

a

but

I

the

take them

background conditions that made up the

historical moment in which the book was written.
of this or

,

in

Without the benefit

similar set of assumptions, how can we account for
what

we find in 'Wilson: the richness of the language, the
concern with mat-

ters of debate and civility; his analysis of the structural

deficien-
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cies and lapses from Constitutional

prescription evident

in

the

Congressional
sal

practices of his day; his careful
and passionate rehearof republican values.
The brevity of the book enables
it to stand

as a pithy presentation of
the fundamental

problems which confronted

the modern Congress at the
beginning of the twentieth
century.

Nearly

every student of that body begins
here.^^
However, for the serious student
of modern government,

Wilson's book has many of the characteristics
of
an overall

a

primer: it presents

description of the customs, mores and
institutional

tialities and liabilities of the Congress.

It

is

poten-

neither painsta-

kingly researched nor copiously annotated;
the narrative voice

constantly assumes the tones of instruction
rather than of discussion,
and it is clearly written to the general,
rather than to the academic

or specialized audience.

In

it,

the serious student will

find

expressed the values, but not the theory of
representative government.
The value of Wilson's arguments for us is that
they

demonstrate that what many commentators have taken

to

be

fundamental

changes within the institution of Congress are really
fluctuations
endemic

to

its institutional

being--i.e., necessary consequences of

imbalances in power which are entailed by the design of the

Constitution.
to the basic

On

this reading,

nature of Congress.

flows in Congressional

then,

such fluctuations are essential

For us this means that the ebbs and

fortunes, first with respect to the distribu-

tion of power among the various institutions within the body, and

second in the balance of power between Congress and the rest of the
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government Itself, are perhaps
better measured

the generation or
even by the half-century
than they are by the
recurring "realignments"
and reforms which .ore
frequently disturb both the
institution and its
stu dents.

For Wilson, the primary
fact about the U.S.

government of

his day was to be found in
the depotism of the
Congress over the rest:
.

.

.

to adopt Mr.

iHif

'
or*i;..
or
ess Idle people.

Bagehot's description of
Parliament
' b^'g "leeting
In

orLre

proportion as you give it power

""^-^ -^ryt^in ,^m'edX

e
everytmng.
y h?nr' In'^anTrd'f
In an ordinary
^'^hdespotism

U'

i

the powers of the
despot are limited by his bodily
capaci ty ^nd by the cal
of pleasure; he is but one man;
there
,

1

s

are but twelve hour
in
"
^'^
'^^'^y more ^h n
m
part
oln in dull
du I'h
business: 'I''''''
he keeps the rest for the
court or
the harem, or for society. "
But Congress "is a despo^who
has unlimited time-who has
unlimited vanity-who has or
believes he has, unlimited
comprehension-whose [j't^a^ure
plea ure is
in action, whose life is work. "69

^

Z

This despotism is
central

a

consequence of the ascendency which
the

government established over the states
as

civil war;

a

consequence of the

an ascendency now compounded by
a distinct movement in

favor of national control of all policy
requiring uniformity of treat-

ment and power of administration.^^
liberal

Given these developments, and

interpretation of the implied powers clause,

become capable of confering on the federal
any extent.

a

Congress has

government powers of almost

The next move in his analysis is crucial:
Congress early

divided itself into standing committees and conferred
upon them

comprehensive and thorough-going privileges of legislative
initiative
and control.

73

As a result of this, we now have government by

standing committees of Congress.''^

The leaders of the House, there-
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fore, are the chairmen
of its principle
standing co„,„ittees.»

curately
t1ons.

be calirt ,„

'"^i^-

Time would fa?f

't

fi3"'-atively,

to

but not inac-

"scusslrlPnTT^^
^
"^r^

H

ioubt^^ w\i^h:r^LeTn°;i
Of debate anTa^end^ n
'wo'
•to'li^^'ir'^^jr?""
<^*'^ff fi'O"'
'
the wheat in the busheU
Miil 1
clerk's desk.
Accord gly°' no
t
""/'^'"e
l^at^efnt'l'^'
attempt is made to do
anything of the Unrt
t^;
,

T"

Thus Wilson finally sets the
stage for

criticisms of Congress.

a

number of substantive

Wilson does not say that the
organization of

Congress into committees was

a

majorities within the general

consequence of its inability to
create
body.

He simply lets it go

that this

form of organization was adopted
for purposes of ef ficiency
he does say,

.

What

however, is that this fon. of
organization constitutes

structure of power which prevents
cooperation^^ and places the great
power to formulate legislation in
the

has the crucial

hands of small

consequence of making general

groups.

This

debate before the

assembled body impossible.
The practices of debate which prevail
in its legislative
assembly are manifestly of the utmost
importance to a selfgoverning people; for that legislation
which is not
thoroughly discussed by the legislating body
is practically
done in a corner. °^

At this point, of course, it

complaints Josiah Quincy penned

in

is

1809.

difficult not

to

recall

the

For Wilson, once under the

sway of the committees, freedom of debate finds
"no place of

allowance," for the House must consider the reports
of 47 committees.

a

235

The order of business 1s fixed;
each member must content
h1,„self with
"such cru*s of time as fall
fro,,,

the

tables of the four c^nlttees
of

highest prerogative. "^^
What emerges as one of Wilson's
central

themes is an

overwhelming preoccupation with the
problem of what constitutes
public debate, and with the
consequences that such

peculiar fon. of

a

discourse has or can have for the
political order.^^

could sum up Wilson's study without
doing violence

terization of Congress as
Wilson, the essential

a

^

^^.^^ ^^^^

either his posi-

to

tions or his intentions by saying
that he affords us

true

a

a

charac-

public body without a public space.^^

purpose of an assembly is to enable

a

For

"mass

meeting" of representatives to superintend
administration and get good
laws made.

84

Such

a

meeting, of course, must be conducted

in

full

public view, and the quality of the debates
among the membership will

determine the quality of the decisions they make.

Since, however,

"the committees meet in private, "^^ the kind
of debate essential

to

the making of good laws does not exist, and
Congress, despite its

domination of the rest of government,

is

incapable of carrying out the

purposes for which it was instituted.

Wilson's critique

is

interesting because we can use it to show

that the term "public" is commonly used

in

two senses.

First,

in

relation to the nature of the debates inside the Congress, he indicates that "public" applies to those discussions conducted in the
pre-

sence of the general

body.

This is contrasted with what goes on in

the dark corners of committee rooms.

Second, and equally important,
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Wilson's notion of "public"
concerns that bod, of
educated .ass opinion in the na™e of which
Congress conducts Us
business, and
in

the

eyes of which its .ove.ents
and deliberations
.ust be visible
For
purposes of expedience of
expression, „e will call
the first sense of
"public" "Publlci" and the
second sense, "Public^."
"Public," speech
here is something that
takes place in Publici
spaces in order to
determine the courses of action
that the body in question
will undertake or rec.n.end.
"Public^" law or policy
1s what Issues fr«
the

deliberations of "Publici" bodies:

it Involves the general

order and
indicates both the alert constituency
which follows the debates
of the
legislature fro. a distance, and
all of those citizens
upon who. such
legislative prescriptions will
fall with equal weight.
In the
first

place, then, Publici speech

«st

take place before the entire
body

assembled; further, it must reach
the ears of the general Public2.
Publici ultimately arises out of
the deliberative function of

a

more-or-less-democratlcally-constituted-assembly; Publicj
concerns
those in whose name that body acts,
and could not exist without

"representative" form of government.
Public2 be severely circumscribed

in

a

Should either Publici
Its political

consequences shall eventually appear first
tion and later throughout the country.

in

functions, dire

the content of legisla-

Though falling to explicitly

distinguish between the two senses of "public,"
Wilson nonetheless
finds that the partition of Congressional
act1v1t1es--the loss of

Publici-serlously undermines Its responsibility

to make

ceedings and conclusions clear to its constituency,
that

its prois,

Publicj.
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account worth
publishing.
They are
,
,
?u
pleaders, the argun,e t
o? a
none of the searching crit?rl?ocates'
^^"""^ them
ni'
^l^^''"""""'"9
character of
the higher order of l;,rulll l
-

'

between antagonistic interest?

not

;

?

Represent

a

joust

Responsible for the fonnation
of national policy,
Wilson's
congress not only fails to fulfill
its didactic purpose
(about which
the Constitution is silent,
however) but has also so
structured itself

that low interests are served
at the expense of high
principles.
One
alleged consequence of this sheds
light on Wilson's conceptions
of

what constitutes

a

truly "national" policy, and
concerns the gen, of

theory of what he considers the
proper extent of the legitimate
range
Of governmental activity. Wilson
excoriates our representatives for
establishinent of the very questionable
•
•
precedent of
expending in favored localities monies
raised by ?axation
which bears with equal incidence upon
the people of al
ections of the country. 87
•

Wilson's objection to such practices may
strike the liberal

student of contemporary government as
somewhat bizarre, for it contains

a

theory of the common interest which is
not linked to notions

of distributive justice.

Whats at stake here is whether, and under

what conditions, benefits locally disbursed
can be said
"common" or national

interest at all.

If

to

be

in

the

grants of this character can

fairly be considered as made for the common benefit
of all the states,

a
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1t can only .e because all

the states are interested

in

the welfare of

each; or it must be the
case that certain local

expenditures will
redound to the benefit of
everyone, as was widely
assumed with the
canal building projects of
the early nineteenth
century, and has

been

recently assumed with respect

to

the dredging of the harbor
at Hampton

Roads. Virginia, which will
enhance the nation's coal
-exporting capacity and improve its balance
of payments.
The problem, however, is
that carried to political extremes,
such practices may destroy
all

distinction between local and national
matters of concern.
time of writing Congressional
Government

,

At the

it seems that Wilson cared

less for the increasing economic
interdependence of the various states, and the need that this entailed
for federal

projects beyond the

means of any particular state, than he
did for notions of

government limited

in

scope, and

a

a

national

polity not dominated by any par-

ticular set of interests which could control
any single branch of the
government.
Thus, the redistribution of goods from the
whole to selected

localities did not comprise national

policy for Wilson.

National

policy, we must infer, included only those things
which concerned the

nation as

a

whole; tax monies unequally disbursed may have
struck him

as a form of corruption which the entire body of
legislators in

Congress assembled ought to have been able

to

resist.

notions no longer comprise the prevailing liberal

Of course,

such

theory of government

according to which such payments and projects are not only desirable
but necessary.

However he could have spelled it out, Wilson's body of
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assumptions about the proper
relation between the state
and society
between the whole and Its
constituent parts. Is
profoundly different
fro,n

that which characterizes

and congressional

™st

of professional

political

science

liberals and conservatives
alike.

What we hav e coffle
to take for granted-and
earlier generations did
not-is the assumption that one of the primary
duties of government is to
distribute
goods and services, and this
is coupled with the
wry, if not eager,
congressional acceptance of the
obvious necessity that such
goods will
be dispensed unevenly and
local ly.^^

^^^^

problem

is

"the struggle to maintain
representative incumbency."

What makes the raising of this
issue particularly difficult
is
that regardless of what their
respective evaluations of
Congressional
performance may be, contemporary
students almost without exception
indicate that the one thing Congress

rarely botches up is getting
the

goods to the special
tal

Interests.

But nonetheless,

this is a fundamen-

question, and for students of U.S.
government in the latter part

of the twentieth century, it may
well be the central question.

It

contains an issue not often confronted
within the republican political

tradition Itself, and that issue

is

hidden in the faith that

a

"common" Interest will somehow emerge once
the diversity of particular

interests has been transsubstantiated by their
clash in the public
space.

Wilson would have the representatives somehow
leave their par-

ticular Interests behind and argue from principle
the national

Interest.

Aside from being

a

to

the defense of

doctrine of virtual

sentation, this approach begs two political questions.

First,

repre-

.
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according to the Constitution,
individuals are not that
which
represented In the Congress,
nor Is that .ystlcal

American people.

"

Local

question going begging

Is

Is

entlt. .no«„ as the

districts are represented
there.

The second

the consensus question
which .ust be settled

for both the Publlci of
the Congress and the
Public^ of the nationhow is It possible to build
majorities among heterogeneous
unlike

representatives and build

a

sense of national

union sufficient to

sustain the government in
power without the chicaneries
of bargaining
compromise and tradeoffs among
local and special Interests?
To follow'

Wilson's prescription, the individual
member of Congress not only
would have to abandon the articulated
needs of his district-upon
which he depends for reel ection-but
the Congress as a whole would
have to completely reassess what
it could consider "justiciable"
issues, and perhaps restrict the
scope of its activities to all
and
only those areas of policy, such
as defense or the post office,
which

tangibly affect all citizens in Publicj
in approximately the same
ways

Despite these reservations about Wilson,
the thrust of my own

critique of Congress

is

that it has so evolved by now that it
is vir-

tually incapable of addressing the broadest
and most general

kind of

questions, having been driven by headlong
institutionalization to virtuoso performances on matters of special
on the larger questions.

interest; virtual

paralysis

Between Wilson's principled critique and

contemporary practice, of course, lies the abyss into
which we shall
poke about for

a

bit,

however cautiously,

in an effort

to

find some
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Middle ground.

The student of Congress
notes, however, that
Wilson

i-ust be given credit
for having pointed the

cumstance underlying the growing
crisis

in

finger at the primary
cir-

toerican political

institutions: if we use the
Congress as a battleground
in a war of
each against all, and its
decisions to reflect the
distribution of
modicum of goods by all to each,
the devil will

take the

a

"c^on

interest."

There will be more about this
when we reach our discussion
Of the spending and budget
processes.

Twentieth Century Contests for Power
As the Congress crept forward
into the twentieth century,

power relations among its internal

the

institutions began shifting.

First, the speakership took an immense
leap in its ability to control
the chamber; then, buttressed by the
seniority system, the committee

chairmen began to move against that officer;
finally the hoi polloi

attempted intermittently to break ranks from
either the hierarchy
imposed by the committees or that settled
upon them by the parties or
both.

Such efforts were episodic and met with
mixed success.

see occurring in general

during this period is

a

What we

contest between local

district need and the discipline imposed on the
membership by the
national

parties.

According to Morris Fiorina,

curbs on the arbitrary powers of the national party
leadership at the beginning of this century were a natural
outgrowth of the increasing professional ization of
congressmen.
With more and more congressmen wishing to
retain their seats for long periods, iron party discipline
became intolerable.
The individual congressman desired the
.

.

.
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tunny to take actlo'ns't'e^h
ft
L?ec'uo„'%%?!:^refforts.
The semonty system wa<; thp n;>+,,.,.V et^ i^^eiecnon
budding c^relVolTr^llleT
ow^^e".

ard?";^^,^?^ f"""

We are at this point somewhere
around the middle of that

period of Congressional
from 1865 to 1898,

a

dominance of the executive
branch which lasted

period characterized by widespread
acceptance in

Washington of the doctrine of
congressional

supremacy.

Again,

however, as we saw during the
period which lasted from the end
of

Jefferson's tenure
Congressional
In

the

in

office to the beginning of Jackson's,

power did not translate into
Congressional

leadership.

first case, the paralysis has been
traced to the obstructionist

tactics of the various House factions, and

efforts to appease them.

In

to

Clay's successful

this case. Congressional

paralysis was

due to the obstructionist tactics of
the chairmen of the various com-

mittees who, thanks to the effects of
institutionalization, were able
to exercise pluralistic dominance.

Galloway quotes Binkley's picture

of the situation:
The culmination of this vast assumption of power
by Congress
in the 1880s coincided almost exactly with
the decline of the
lower house to almost the nadir of incompetence.
Despite its
assumption of sovereign power in the government, it lay
floundering in a confusion of warring committees.
Spurning
all suggestion of external leadership, it yet
found no trace
of leadership within.
The cause of the confusion lay in

...
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'''''''

b^^I'foV^'Sn^^de'tlorLThX'"'
tens of thousands of measure.
something like sheer caorirP h^H '
should reach the
for ron??H«
Situation drew frllTpres^n
a"

fLr

--"mg
«ong
^"^ion

^'°

'

r?h'o™as"'

the

appears to be to prevent the
transaction o^'businLs

When Reed

hi.nsel f

the

^"'^"3
""'^^^''^ which

"91'

ascended to the speakership,
he moved

rapidly to change everything
and made the Co^ittee
on Rules his chosen instrument.
The two major tactics in
current use by those who

would block House action were
the disappearing quorum,
created by members physically present and
refusing
to

vote, and who thereby denied

the body a quorum; and dilatory
motions, which included quorum
calls

and other parliamentary manouvers
designed
tion of business.

to

delay the speedy execu-

Moving to overturn these practices.
Reed was

challenged by the minority Democrats.

The ensuing dialogue encap-

sulates the dilemmas faced by the
House as it confronts the problem of

positive action:
^'''^
ex-speaker Carlisle, defended
It
the Sf^'^''/u^
traditional House practices, stressing
the minority's
need for protection from arbitrary
majority rule. The chief
Repub lean spokesmen, Joseph Cannon of
Illinois and William
McKinley of Ohio, argued that the majority
must be given the
power to govern.
Reed's ruling was finally upheld by a
^
party-line vote. 92
*^

Reed ruled with an iron hand for six years,
and the precedents
he established were generally followed by
his successors Crisp and

Cannon.

He

thus filled the vacuum of leadership

Washington and established Congressional
Executives Harrison and Cleveland.

in

the government at

dominance over Chief

Galloway's brief account of the
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period of Congressional
Government (1865-1898) indicates
that, in
general, a contest for power
between Congress and the
President
occupied .nuch ti.ne and attention,
and a legislative history
of these

years would show little accomplished
of outstanding

,nerit.

Weak domi-

nated Presidents, or those who
harbored the old Whig doctrines
within
their breasts did not, again,
create an atmosphere in which
the
Congress could use its overwhelming
powers for productive work.^^

Matters shifted to

a

new footing with the assession
of

McKinley, who had served six terms
in Congress prior

to

his elevation,

and who was interested in cultivating
the assembly and knew how to

work with it.

He

quickly fell

became Speaker

in

1903,

into step with Joseph Cannon,
who

and who exercised uniquely enonnous
and legen-

dary power over the House.
Danville, Illinois, was a hardch!??\^"''i?^
^^"T'
shell Republican
who adhered to the principles that
underlay
the founding of the Grand Old Party-the
Union cause lowcost western lands, high tariffs, and minimal
governmental
involvement in social programs.
His failure to bend these
principles to the winds of changing times, in fact
was one
reason he failed to preserve the powers he had
inherited.94
As beneficiary of the Reed rules. Cannon enjoyed
such powers
as appointing committees, designating chairmen,
referring bills to

committees, sitting as Chairman of Rules, and determining
who would
speak on the floor.

As the years went by,

Cannon's use of his powers

began to verge on the dictatorial, and he was forced

with increasing urgency in his attempts

to

to

call

on them

block the refonn movements

that gathered force during Theodore Roosevelt's presidency.

Standing

with the orthodox Republican "stand-patters" the speaker successfully

:
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blocked the strenuous efforts
of reform .ninded
representatives to
extend the sphere of Federal
action to such arcane areas
as food and
drug laws, income and
inheritance taxes, federal

investigation of

labor disputes, liscensing of
corporations and child labor
laws.'^
But this impasse couldn't last:
the insurgent ho^
1" the House

HlM

were responding to constituency
pressures, and by the time that
Taft
had succeeded Roosevelt, the new
movement
had begun to break out

certain Midwest Republicans as well,
and the fat was

in

the

a»ng

fire.

Cannon's opponents now consisted
not only of members from the
majority
party per se, but ccnprised a new
majority of House members of both
parties.

96

As the resentment of Cannon and
his control

finally boiled over

in

of the chamber

the form of an important refonn
resolution,

representative John Nelson of Wisconsin summed
up the feelings of the
i

nsurgents
Have we not been punished by every means
at the disposal of
the powerful House organization? Members
long chairmen of
important committees, others holding high rank--all
with
records of faithful and efficient party service
to their
credn--have been ruthlessly removed, deposed and
humiliated
before their constituencies and the country because,
forsooth, they would not cringe or crawl before the
arbitrary
power of the Speaker and his House machine. ... We
are
fighting with our Democratic brethren for the common
right of
equal representation in this House, and for the right
of way
of progressive legislation in Congress.

The upshot was the famous "Revolt of 1910" which issued

in

the

revocation of many of the prerogatives of the Speaker, including his
seat on the Rules Committee, and his powers to make committee assign-

ments and

to

schedule floor debates.

decentralization of power

in

With these reforms, the

the House and

the professional ization of
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the .e..e.s had ta.en
a huge step:

careens, became pervasive,
and

co™utee a.to„»,

the

and sento.t.

senlorUy pn^nclple

as

the

«Jor

criterion for the selection
of co™„1ttee chairmen
.eca.e vl.tua,,.
inviolable.
AUhough this .eant f.nher
Institutionalization In the
formal

sense-1.

e.

.

the "personal" power
of the speaker had
no« .een

supplanted b, the "^personal

Change did little

to

"

«chan1s,„ of the seniority
rule-thls

alter the dally

«dus

Vivendi of leadership
that

continued to be characterized
by contemporary
observers as "Invisible
or in co™iss1on."59 As
things stood at this point,
then, the

increased professionalise of
individual ™e*ers ™ade the.
,„ore sensitive to constituency
pressure, and more likely to
respond to the
reform movements which were
then agitating for changes
role Of government.

As a result,

In

the social

the concentration of power
In the

Speakership now for the first
time had become
House actlon-that Is, Its
manifest ability
twenty years earlier had been
negated.

a

to

real

Impediment to

enhance House power of

That the refo™ ,„ovement

itself was bipartisan yielded
little comfort to the party
caucuses,
and one might have expected to
see a general erosion of House
Institu-

tionalization had not the Rules Committee
emerged at this point

to

tak

eup again In dally practice what
the other organs of the chamber
had
so recently lain down.

As House business burgeoned and
the calendars bulged with

bills awaiting action. Rules became more
crucial

lating the flow of business to the floor.

more power than

in

than ever In regu-

Its chairiien wielded even

the days of Reed and Cannon,

including the power to
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"pocket veto" bills approved
by their o«n co,»1ttee.
or to defy the
caucus for whom they were nominal
agents.

Davidson and Oleszek point out
that the enhanced power of
the
Rules Committee «de It guilty
of greater abuses after
the 1910 revolt
than the Speaker had committed
beforelO^-and we should
therefore take
note that the unintended consequences
of reform movements always
may

Include factors which make the cure
worse than the disease.

The

zenith of Rules Committee Independence
occurred during the 1937-1961
period, when it became dominated by
a bipartisan conservative
coalition and acted as

a

semi-institutionalized constraint upon both

Democratic Party leadership and the
succession of Speakers who served
during this period.
the House explicitly rejected
[institutionalized
leadership] in 1910 and by 1919 had abandoned
the alternative
of caucus control as well.
Although partisan leadership was
not impossible, the most successful leaders
were those who
like House Speaker Sam Rayburn (1940-1946,
1949-1952
1955-1961) and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon
Johnson'
(1954-1961), bargained skillfully with committee
leaders and
represented their interests. 102
.

.

.

With the institutionalization of seniority and the
automatic

promotion came

a

formal

decentralization of power quite unlike

anything which had existed previously

outcome of the Cannon revolt was

to

in

the House.

"^^^

The ultimate

strengthen committee autonomy and

independence and weaken House leadership and the party system.

In

the

very earliest period of House history, before the assesion of
Monroe,
House power had been decentralized, and the capacity of the body

to

take the initiative with respect to important policy questions had
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been wea. to the point
Of

congressional

see. to

,nake

COS.

Now we see a .etu.n
to fonna,

dominance In government,
and again centrifugal

forces

positive legislative
.ove.nent next to Impossible

Although the reformist or
progressive Impulses which
swept the country
and us legislators
succeeded In passing much
extremely Important
legislation during this
period. I think It crucial
to distinguish
between ordinary and
extraordinary times: in moments
of national crisis, congress occasionally
has shown Itself capable
of throwing

caution to the winds and acting.

The deeper and more
difficult

dilemma rises with respect
to the proble. of
positive action in ordinary times: even when aided
and abetted by willing
Chief Executives,
the Congress has,

for much of its history,
been unable to conduct

Itself along lines of equal

representation and participation
for its

.nembership and simultaneously
take active responsibility for
domestic
policy.

The decline of the Speaker
and the rise of the committee

system moved the House not one whit
closer

to

becoming the kind of

publici body which Wilson had maintained
was essential
ment.

to

good govern-

The difference lay in the fact
that the earliest absence of

centralization reflected the general will
of the membership, which
stubbornly refused to be guided or coerced
by authority.

The revolt

of 1910, on the other hand, had the
consequence of weakening the

Speaker, and therefore the grip of the
national

legislature, yet it did not succeed

in

parties over the

doing away with the often
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hierarchical arrangements
against which many of the
representati ves
had allied themselves.
That the Rules Committee
and the various

com-

.ntee Chairmen

were able to continue
to assert

a dependable
dominion
over their fellows indicates
that the struggle over
the Speakership
was ultimately about
whether power would be
centralized or decentralized within the Chamber:
it was not about democracy
for the represen-

tatives.

What continued to matter
was control: policy
would not be

coalesced by

a

heterogeneous body of individual
members of Congress;
it would be enacted by
relatively well-drilled minions
at the behest
of senior men, whose public
careers depended in part on
the status

conferred through the exercise
of power.

organization can be seen

in

The efficacy of this House

the disciplining of the
Progessives by the

Republicans, 1924-1925; in the blocking
of the Norris amendment by
the
same party during the 1920s; in
the struggle over reapportionment

which lasted from 1920 to 1929,
and finally in the imposition
of Gag
rules on the hoi polloi by the
Democrats in 1933.^^^
As happens with so many "reforms,"
however, the 1910-1911
revolution produced problems of its
own-or rather, placed
the dilemma of House organization
in a different light.
The
most important single result was, of
course, to reinforce the
particularistic tendencies of the body.
True, neither Reed
nor Cannon had ruled alone, preferring
rather to rely upon a
small coterie of lieutenants; nor, for
that matter were
post-Cannon Speakers barred from exerting a
leadership role
Nonetheless the circle of leadership was
perceptibly widened
to include such people as the floor
leader, the chaimen of
<ey committees like Rules, Ways and Means,
and
Appropriations, and, during the 1920s, members of
the
Republican Steering Committee. To the extent
that influence
shifted to seniority leaders rather than elective
ones, power
was not only dispersed but autonomous as well.
"
"Nowadays
wrote Robert Luce in 1926, "the leadership of the
House is in
commission, with the members hip^pf the commission more
or
less fluctuating and shadowy."

^
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Davidson and Oleszek go
on

to

sequence Of the new
arrangements was
bility of pushing "national

Speakership-an ar™ of

the

point out that an
important cona

ver, rea,

decline in the possi-

programs" through Congress.

party-had been vitiated.

First the

Then the Party

caucus was tried, only to
founder on the factionalism
which reigned
throughout this period.
Since stable partisan
majorities no longer
confronted one another on
«,st issues, the caucuses were
unable to
achieve party cohesion within
their ranks.
These developments led to
the heightened independence
of individual members and
diminished party

loyalty.

What must be stressed 1s that
this member independence

existed with respect

to

programs of a national

interest.

I.e..

that

despite the organizational changes
and fluctuations of
Congressional
power which had taken place since
the writing of Congressional
Goyerrarjent,

Wilson's primary objections to
Congressional

were still applicable.

As one early student put it,

practices

"freedom

party control meant freedom from
assuming responsibility for
national

program."10'

fro>ii

a

The specialized tasks of the
committees and the

often self-interested perspectives of
the committee chalrren continued
to be well

served.

of legislation

in

These individuals not only controlled
the outcome
their respective areas,

they were generally able to

categorically assert their powers in the face
of united opposition
from below-whether that opposition be
based in the committee, or

throughout the chamber.

While the following quotation does not

describe the attitude of every chairman during
these years, it does
illustrate both widespread attitudes and the real
distribution of
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di3a3.ee,n.„t.

He.e 1s House Rules
Chairman

Kansas refusing to report

majority of his

c«1ttee.

a

„u*er
to

P.n

,p p.

of resolutions,

ca^p.ellof

approved

a

authorize certain
Investigations-

be done.
I am the clml
Uee
':™'"i"ee.
tive powers. 108

^
me

In

disapproval. It shall not
repose absolute obstruc-

So much for the view from
above.

Fr«n below, of course,

perspectives were reversed,
even while the hostility
was no less
healthy.
Since hierarchical power
arrangements have been equally

tan-

talizing to both Republicans
and Democrats, we may
safely assume that
the following vainly-expressed
sentiments against the Republican
party
hierarchy were felt at least
as often as they were
expressed by

Democrats as well.

Here are the members of the
Progressive Wisconsin

delegation upon finding themselves
subject

to

stringent discipline In

1925
='"'9'""= ^°<^^y

" "ds

itself
chanenrl
challenged Kby those assuming to be
in control of the
Republican party by threats and
intimidation on the one hand^
and by the offer of party
recognition with its favors !nd
patronage on the other. We refuse
to compromise
or t^
bargain with Mr.
Longworth or with any other Member
of the
House on an issue affecting our
rights as Representatives in
Congress to vote our convictions.
Neither flatter^ no?
suggestions concerning committee assignments
nor threats will
cause the Wisconsin delegation in the
House to deviate.109
.

.

.

The foregoing quotations should provide
some indication of the
rich qualities of mutual

animosity which often erupted between those

who looked down and those who looked
up at one another within the
House.

It

is

clear from both this and other evidence that
when debate
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concerned matters of
import for the leadershin
'^^^^^s^iP> Vn
consensus" throughout
th,s pen-od «as not
evo.ed .ut created th.ou,.
the suppression of
A
^ ^
di ssent
-i

j_

In

genera,, then, the new
arrangements Inaugurated
what Roger
Davidson has called the
"era of the

Co«1ttee chair.an"-that

period 1937-1971 which
,nar.ed the zenith
of

period during which those
strong enough

exercise the prerogatives
of power
tative Campbell above.

so

to

c^ittee
seize

the,,,

is

the

government;' that

were wont

to

clearly articulated by
represen-

We have now seen the
locus of power ,,ove away

fro. the floor, away fro.
the speaker and finally
even away fro,n the
party caucus; away fro,™ the
practical possibility that
the general
.ne,nbership of the House
,„ight assert control
-nents of legislating.

Committee, itself controlled by
From

arrange-

Instead, power is now ledged
either in the

hands of the chairmen of the
various

and Republicans.

over the fo™al

ti,ne

to

a

co.n,nj

ttees

,

or in the Rules

conservative coalition of Democrats

ti,ne,

of course, we hear cries of
rage

or anguish rising from those
quarters which usually found
themselves
flagellated into obedience, and such
cries indicate that al 1-too-often
the House had circumvented anarchy
only to divest individual members
of a considerable degree of
freedom.
At the same

peculiar

in

ti.ne,

this syte,«, historical

in

its origins and

its attributes, came to be endowed
with something

"ontological" permanence by members of
the political

like an

science pro-

fession, finally coming to be seen
as "Congress" itself, rather than
as one of a number of theoretically
possible

formulas for the

internal
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-.an,e,.nts of po„e. the..
accident

wU.

institutional

Pe.aps .1s conHatlon

essence-.^lc

suppression of awareness
of the political

of

.sto.ca,

was also a professional

forces .oth .as.ed
and

arranged

House Institutionalization
at this staae-«as
due to the
longevity of the arrangements.
During this period,
several generations Of academic
observers fledged and
«lted. and Initiated thei
r
own graduate students
Into the mysteries of
Capitol Hill
t.rn
And
the committee system
and the autocratic
power of Its chairmen
and the
(

m

wondrous «„1nat1ons of the
Rules Committee persisted
and flourished
for them to study.
It was not until
Congress became severely
out of
step with crucial elements
of national sent1,nent
during the Viet Nam
war period that geological
forces once again
came Into

strata of 35 years' practice
began to

;nelt and

flow.

™t1on

and the

This Is neither

to say that the House
had not had Its professional

critics all along,
nor to deny a swelling tide
of professional and
political criticism of
the ineffectiveness of the
House qua Institution.

But what actually

happened, under extraordinary
circumstances not unlike those of
1910,
was that reforms followed in
the wake of pressing urgency
to deal with
national questions and a series
of national crises, and
this urgency
manifested itself in the reforms
of the late 1960s and early
1970s.
If there Is a lesson in this
history,

it Is that the House either
will

not or cannot stir Itself to reform
Itself in ordinary times, and
that
given a leadership vacuum without.
It has shown Itself unable to

generate the institutional coherence
necessary for positive action
from within.^^''
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The importance of the
relationship between Congress
and the
executive branch-and the
difficulty of making clean
distinctions between the internal" affairs
of Congress and exogenous
influences upon

either its institutional

fate or internal

When we look at so.e of the
so-called
surfaced within the institution
fifty years. Ill

It was

fr™

devel

op™enf-bec«es clear

refo™" ^ve.ents

which have

time to ti.e during the
last

the case for both the
Legislative

Reorganization Act of 1946 and
the succession of refo™
^ve.ents
which transformed the House
between
1965 and 1975,

1-npetus involved the members

that a primary

consciously expressed concern
that the

balance of powers between the
legislative and executive branches
be
set right.
In the view of many members,
Congress suffered from a

plethora of procedural, substantive
and hierarchical

ills which

required remedy if it were to carry
out its Constitutionally mandated
functions.
than

a

Chief among these was its incapacity
to perfora any other

negative role

in

government with respect to the initiation
of

broad policy.
In this

section, we will briefly examine some of
the major

steps which the Congress has taken on the
way

to

turning substantive

and extraordinary power over to the
executive branch; succeeding steps
to recover itself; some of the unintended
consequences which followed

from these, and the conditions which held
there--for both the mem-

bership and the political

science profession--at the onset of the

.
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liberal

refer, ^ve.ent which
has recently succeeded
1n changi ng so

much
We have already touched
briefly on so.e of the
obvious high

points in the pendulum swings
of power between the
Congress and the
Presidency during the nineteenth
century.
The twentieth century
tells
a somewhat different
story, one which I think
reflects almost uninterrupted decline in Congressional
power and influence and which
has
left us with profoundly
changed attitudes about what
constitutes
proper relations between the
two branches, and where
responsibility
for the initiation of policy
should lie.
The causes of this decline
can be found in a series of
actions, incrementally taken
decade by
decade, to transfer primary
responsibility for the initiation and
execution of key governmental functions
away from the legislature and
to
the executive.

The rationales behind such shifts
have usually been

accompanied either by allegations or
demonstrations of breakdown
the efficacy of House action.

most clearly seen

in what

This substantial

call

I

in

shift in power can be

the structure of interbranch rela-

tions, i.e., in the institutionalization
of agency outside the

Congress, but not in veto-overrides, bipartisan
consultations or
periods when the executive and the legislature
found themselves members of different parties and struggled with
one another to accomplish

little until

the next election could come along and throw
the ball

decisively into someone's court.
the structure of relations

I

Examples of the kind of changes in

think important include both the Budget

and Accounting Act of 1921, and the behavior of the
House during
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Fran.,,-„

.ooseveU's f1.st ten..

fus,on and

Each provides evidence
of Ho.se con-

surrender of substantive
powers to the executive
branch
The Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946
and the
a

refo^s which swept
the lower chamber In
the early 1970s were
both collective attempts
to
remedy Imbalances which
followed upon the first
two.'^^
Beginning as early as 1900.
the prerogatives which
Congress
had enjoyed. If not exercised,
nearly without challenge
since the
Civil

war came under repeated
and increasing pressure
by a series of
"strong" presidents-including
McKinley. T. Roosevelt and
Wilson-who
had their own ideas about
necessary programs, foreign
policy, and the
locus Of primary responsibility
for initiating and
controlling
domestic policty..
m summing up the entire period since
then. Robert
Dahl has written:

^e^prT^-::^ -C!!.- -sident
^^rtja^rrf-^^; poiici^Lffi ^--^^

bro.en

co:s'ov°:rthe

By far the most important
place to find evidence for this
is
in the budgetary process.

drawing up the federal

Until

1920,

there was no central

system for

budget or for its consideration by
Congress.

The Secretary of the Treasury would
compile estimates of the spending

needs of the various executive
departments, and these were submitted
to the House, which

in

turn referred them to eight diferent
conmit-

tees, each of which would report an
appropriation bill without

reference to total expenditures or revenues.
of these practices was

a

The cumulative results

steadily growing national

debt which, by 1919
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had reached the then
astronomical

sum of $25 billion,
amidst

a rising
tide of^cr1tic1sm>rom
both the well of the
House and the country
at
large.
a bill finally passed,
and signed by President
Harding,
became the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921.
The measure directed
the President to prepare
and transmit to Congress
each year a budget
Showing federal revenues and
expenditures for the previous
and current
years and estimates for the
succeeding year.
It set up a Bureau of
the Budget as the executive
agency which would do the
actual work, and

created

a

General Accounting Office to
assist Congress in exercising

oversight of the administration of
federal
implementation of policy.

Almost at

a

funds and therefore the

stroke, then, the power of

Congress to set policy through
stipulating spending levels was
transferred away: "the president's
exclusive jurisdiction over budget
totals gave him an advantage over
Congress for half

a

century.

"^^^

The consequences would be incalculable.
The student of Congress is never
certain whether the plethora
of viewpoints which can be brought to
bear on
in history is a blessing or

a

curse.

of the 1921 act, and the general

a

given issue or moment

Despite the foregoing evaluation

assessment that here, if anywhere,

began the real erosion of Congressional

power which has taken place in

the twentieth century, many who were on the
scene at the time hailed
it as a breakthrough which enhanced both the
prestige and the real

power of the Congress.

All

we can do is to note, again, that pre-

sently apparent future goods are particularly elusive when
it comes
Congressional

reforms.

to
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In launching

the new executive budget
system in iQ^i

was an individual in the House
[the chair.;n ofThe
Appropriations Committee] who could
put on his hat .nn w.i^
to the other end of Pennsylvania
Avenu
d

U

o

he

Meanwhile, the era of committee
hegemony and party control of
the House continued.
The record of party
high-handedness which the

Republicans accumulated throughout
the 1920s was matched by the

Democrats once they found their hands
on the levers of power

in

1931.

During the 1920s, as the minority party,
they had been controlled by
small

a

group of southerners, some of whom had
entered the chamber

during the first decade of the century.

which owed its power

to

its seniority,

Dominated by this group,
the now ascendent Democrats

were largely able to resist demands for
reform on the part of the
newly elected freshman class members who,
naturally enough, sought

reorganize the arrangements of power within the party
own numbers.

By 1933,

to

to

reflect their

the nearly two-thirds of House Democrats who

were from states outside the South had succeeded

in

getting the party

to set up a Steering Committee to oversee its affairs.

But the suc-

cess of this innovation was limited: during the 73rd
Congress, as we
have seen, the Rules Committee became the implement of choice
of the

House Democratic leaders who used this device

Committee.

This was the Congress which

to

bypass the Steering
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^•uuyriL

uu

tne House

floor under sopri^ii

"r^r^^^Al>

order, and shlrplTlfL-^eTde'bTte^u"'"^^"'^' ^^^'^^^ ^^^^^
The colloquial

term for such procedures
is "gag rules" and
the

question can at least be raised
whether it was proper for
the
leadership to acquiesce in stopping
the mouths of Congress
that it
might enact such measures as
the Emergency Banking Act,
the Economy
Act, the Emergency Relief Act,
the First Agricultural
Adjustment Act,
the Tennessee Valley Authority
Act,

Recovery Act.

and

the National

Industrial

When the Rules Committee, in
1934, brought in

a

that would bar, for the duration
of the session, any amendment

rule
to

any

appropriation bill which conflicted
with Roosevelt's economic program
enacted during the previous year.
Minority Leader Bertrand Snel 1
spoke
up

...

saying that he had never been opposed
to special rules
so long as they were "fairly fair,"
[he] called this "the
most VICIOUS, the most far-reaching special
rule" ever proposed.
No majority, he said, had "ever
dared bring in a rule
that not only hog-tied and prohibited the
members from
expressing themselves on the legislation in
hand, but even
extended throughout the entire session of
Congress. "118
Snell was joined by all

of the Republicans, 84 Democrats,

and

five Farmer-Labor members in voting against
the rule, which passed

nonetheless by

a

bare margin, 197 to 192.

The point is not to pass judgment on the historical
or social

merits of Roosevelt's programs.

What counts here

nated in the executive branch, rather than

in

is

that they origi-

the legislature,

and
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that their passage was secured
largely at tne expense of
the substantive and wide-ranging debates
among the membership which
should have
preceded such crucial

and important changes
in the relations
between

the state and society in
the United States.

about Congressional

Given what we now know

tendencies toward paralysis in
times of executive

branch weakness, perhaps this
was the only way that the
institutions
of government were capable of
organizing themselves for action
in a
time of acute national crisis,
but we are going to take the
view that
this form of action was contrary
to that which the designers
of the

Constitution had intended.

Roosevelt himself was no doubt
aware of

this, but seemed willing to waive
the Constitution in order to
help

the country solve its problems.

reflected

in

His attitude toward Congress
was

his opening address to the
Seventy-third Congress:

I
come before you
not to make request for special or
detailed egislation; I come rather to
counsel with you who
like myself, have been selected to
carry out a mandate of the
whole people, in order that without
partisanship you and I
may cooperate to continue the restoration
of our national
well-being and, equally important, to build
on the ruins of
the past a new structure designed better
to meet the present
problems of modern civilization. ... Out
of these friendly
contacts we are, fortunately, building a strong
and pennanent
tie between the legislative and executive
branches of the
government.
The letter of the Constitution wisely
declared a
separatio n, but the impulse of a common purpose decl^rp^ ^
union -^^^ [Emphasis added.
.

.

.

—

.

I

Roosevelt succeeded
tely resulted in

a

in

achieving this "union," which ultima-

permanent change

in

the minds of most people about

the proper structure of interbranch relations.

political

On

the level

action, the new scheme worked flawlessly only until

of daily

FDR sent

his famous scheme to pack the Supreme Court over to Capitol Hill

for
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approval.

„

the

.es.UIng fu.or. the
Republicans and conse.atWe

Democrats decided to .and
together and

to «o.<

In

tande..
Hlsto.1 ans
the emergent
combination the "Conservative
Coalition" and th1 s
union was so successful
that It outlasted the
other and pers1st7;or

call

near,, thirt. .ears.^^O

By wielding effective
power on the Rules

Co™i«ee,

the coalition was able
to defy the Democratic
leadership b,
acting as an effective
check on Its ambitions.
It did so b, refusing
to clear labor legislation
and other Actalnlstratlon
programs.

While

the views Of members of
the coalition on social

were

In

conflict with those of

^st

and

econ^lc Issues

Democrats In the House.
It is

important to note that they
reflected the legislative
preferences of a
bipartisan majority.
Fr« 1939 to 1956, the coalition
won almost all
Of the roll calls on which
Southern Democrats and
Republicans opposed
Northern Democrats.
The success rate during
this period falls below
eight percent only once.l^l
The problem
as usual

was that this

bipartisan majority did not show
itself capable of initiating
policies.
If Roosevelt's "union"
between the executive and Congress
.neant,

in

terms of its daily operations,
executive initiative and

Congressional

ratification, then the conservative
coalition

inaugurated

period of Congressional

a

strength solely in the area of

Its capacity to refuse, while
providing little in the way of
positive

accomplishment.

This system,

such as it was,

seemed to replicate

inside the Congress what the Congress
was now being reduced

respect

to

the rest of the government:

to with

its strength, and the strength

of its members, lay in its capacity to
obstruct rather than

to create.

.
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Finding lUtle

create, then, 1t provided
obstruction in plenitude

to

and succeeded in blocking most
of the proposals which
Roosevelt and
later Truman were to make in
the domestic areas of civil
rights, labor
law and social welfare policy.^^^
By 1945,

irritation with this unhappy record
had begun to

mount, and the end of the war found
many in Congress and the
political
science profession in a mood for reform.
A report by the American
Political Science Association summed
up the problem as it appeared

to

many who were in positions to know:
Congress must modernize its machinery and
methods to fit
modern conditions if it is to keep pace
with a greatly
enlarged and active executive branch. This
is a better
approach than that which seeks to meet the
problem by
reducing and hamstringing the executive. A
strong and more
representative legislature, in closer touch with
and better
informed about the administration is the antidote
to
bureaucracy
Notice what is being warned against and what
is being advo-

cated here.

First, the warning is not directed against the
presidency

per se, but the "bureaucracy" which humbly acts in
his name.
novel

complaint

in

the history of our institutions,

much of it before 1945.
the conduct of the U.

S.

It

is

It

is a

for we do not hear

symptomatic of sea changes not only in

government and the nature of its institu-

tions, but also in the assumptions tacitly held by educated mass
opi-

nion about the proper character of those institutions.

Roosevelt had

done more than simply borrow the cadences of Lincoln (i.e., "to build
on the ruins of the past a new structure

.

.

."),

he

had successfully

initiated what amounts to the third American Revolution.
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There are really two kinds of
criticism which the American
Political Science Association of
the day might have leveled
at the
Congress: the Association could
have looked either at the
degree to
which it fulfilled its formal
institutional role, or it could
have
focused on the content of the
legislation which Congress passed
or

obstructed.

We might borrow a heuristic
device from students of

literature at this moment, and say
that the Association could
have
focused either on institutional form
or legislative content.
Here we
have a critique of institutional form
based
on the

failure of the

legislature to pass particular measures
then being originated by the
executive.

The Congressional

legislative process, then, is being eva-

luated solely in terms of political
judgments about its failure
on executive proposals.

This kind of critique of institutional

to

act

fom

isn't all that one might expect, however: the
institution of Congress
is not seen as having grown weak with
respect to executive branch

power.

Instead,

it is held to be out of step with it.

^^^"'"^^ is that the

what

is

initiative ought to lie on the executive side;

politically demanded

is

that Congress modify itself to serve

the necessities embedded in that assumption.

To this student,

the assumption and its consequences follow from

upon the liberal

"

a

both

misplaced emphasis

agenda of the late 1940s and the successful

developed by the Conservative Coalition
say "no.

What is

in expanding

tactics

its own powers to

But the possible long-range consequences of fundamental

change in our institutional

Coalition and

in

arrangements, both in the actions of the

the proposals

in

favor of Congressional

adaptation

.
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launched against it, go begging
here.
fate of any particular agenda.

What was important was
not the

What was important was
that the

conservative Coalition made it
impossible for the majority
party to
enact its program of government,
and this meant that it
was making
extremely difficult for the
Congress

to

enact much of anything,

it

mto

the vacuum stepped the
executive branch, as any historian
might have

expected.

Meanwhile, Congressional

ducted along the lines of

a

positive action had now to be
con-

coalition politics-shifting
alliances of

ad hoc groups were now to be
assembled as a prior condition to
the

passage of bills.

This,

in

turn, made it even more difficult
for the

majority to govern, and the House began
the outside world.

to

look dilatory and balky to

And so it became possible to begin
the custom of

running "against" the Congress, which
not only marked an important
step in its institutional

decline, but also served to provide ample

ammunition to those who would strengthen the
Presidency at its
expense
Be these things as they may,

the American Political

Science

Association offered the studied advice that Congress
adjust itself

meet the changing times.

to

Advice of this sort is rampant throughout

the literature of the period and can be seen to
characterize one of
the three basic arguments which Davidson and Oleszek
noted are peren-

nially advanced

proposals fail

in

to

the cause of Congressional

reform.

note is that Congress, having "adapted"

What such
its ini-

tiative over domestic policy by thrusting it into the hands of the
executive, first in 1921 and then

in

1932,

is

now urged to make
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further adaptations of the
same order.

We note that if Congress
1s to

"keep pace." it cannot be
Congress which sets the pace.

Agency,

in

the minds of most commentators
had irrevocably passed to
the

executive, and the literature

is

accept the situation and adapt.

nal

replete with comments that
Congress

"^^^

As the members of Congress
themselves took steps toward interreforms, the language of adaptation
began to become more concrete,

and the long and sustained campaign
to "modernize" the national

legislature at last began to focus on
the particular problem of its
"efficiency."

For those who sought reforms,
adaptation for pur-

poses of efficiency translated into the
necessity for streamlining and

restructuring the committee system

to

weaken its powers of obstruction

without damaging its effectiveness

in

drafting detailed legislation.

But note that the intentions of the members
differed from the inten-

tions of the scholars: members of Congress
didn't talk much about

adapting to the presidency.

What they wanted was to reassert the

power of their institution.
Of all the external stimuli to reorganization, ...
the
growth of executive power is undoubtedly the strongest.
By
1946 this phenomenon--triggered by the great depression
and
augmented by the second world war--led reformers to view
a
reorganized Congress as a way to redress the imbalance of
power that had developed between the branches. ^27

But it was the committees, after all, which developed public
policies,

decided which proposals were important and which not, presented alternatives to executive branch proposals, drafted complex legislation and
had oversight responsibilities.

Davidson and Oleszek emphasize how
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important the members of Congress
thought the committee
system was
the overall strength of
the legislature:

to

Like members of the Select
Committee on Committees of fhp q-^h
Congress, the reformers of 1946
bel i pvpH th^f
the committee system
strengtLL
ss
sel
his^^L
necessary because Congressmen
were concerned aboui the
growing power of the executive
branch, and recognized the

L

^

K'rgo^^rTmln^f Ik^^^-"^

'

-e,u\1

The product of this reform
movement was the Legislative

Reorganization Act of 1946, specifically
designed "to provide for
increased efficiency in the legislative
"^^9
branch of the government.

Modernization of the standing committee
system was its first aim.
was widely held that a crucial
step in buttressing the coimnittee

it

system lay in straightening out the
tangled snarls of conflicting and

overlapping jurisdiction which frequently
set the various

co.miiittees

at odds with one another and added yet
another set of formal barriers
to the attainment of either consensus
or policy.

Hence the Act moved

to make the committee structure more
formally elegant by reducing the

number of standing committees.
Congressional

control

It

also attempted to strengthen

over the budget, reduce the workload of

Congress—which was becoming overwhelming—and improve
staff assistance to individual
committees.

130

the quality of

representatives and standing

Hence, altogether, the number of standing committees

was reduced and their procedures made more formal, public
and
regular.

m

At the same time,

The entire legislative domain, as it was then understood, was
set forth and divided into categories, each assigned to a
separate standing committee.
In the process, obsolete com-
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mittees were eliminated or
consolidated

resoonsibil

i

t.

fn.

What went absolutely unanticipated
at the time were the consequences that would follow the
provision for reduction in the
number
of committees.

The jurisdictions of the
eliminated committees were

apportioned among the remaining and
newly-created ones, but primary
responsibility for it was delegated
to permanent subcommittees.
These
bodies thereby took on

a

new permanence and influence,

for they began

gradually to emerge as independent
centers of House power, and,
as the years went by,

flourished in the darker and less
inspected

corners of the House.

Other measures taken
strengthen the Congressional

in

the 1946 Act included steps to

power of the purse.

The Act directed the

House Ways and Means, the Senate Finance, and
the Appropriations

Committees of both houses

to

including estimates of total

Committee's report was

to

prepare

a

legislative budget each year

receipts and expenditures.

The Budget

be accompanied by a concurrent resolution

for adopting the budget and fixing the amount to be
appropriated.

At

the same time. Congress attempted to lighten its
workload by prohi-

biting the introduction of four categories of private
bills and pro-

vided limited professional

staff support to each standing

committee--an innovation which would turn out
consequences

a

mere 30 years later.

Finally,

to

have truly horrendous

the Act required

that,

for the first time, lobbyists register with and report their expen-

ditures to the Clerk of the House.
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Regarded as

a

ultimately did Uttle

breakthrough at the time of
passage, the Act
to

realign the areas of
jurisdiction either

within Congress or in Its
relations with the executive
branch.
reduction of the nu*er of

The

co,„m1ttees proved to be niainly
cos.etic.

The provisions for the legislative
budget turned out to be

"unworkable" and the

Acfs provision

for a Joint Con„mttee on the

budget which would set an
appropriations ceiling by February
15th of
each year was implemented twice
and
then abandoned.

The Regulation of

Lobbying did not go far enough, and
the reduction of the number
of
committees turned out to be only temporary:
new committees were almost

immediately instituted and subcommittee
proliferation assumed acute
proportions. 133

Finally, by reducing the number of
standing co.nmit-

tees and hardening their jurisdictional

lines,

the Act tended to

strengthen the seniority system, reinforce
committee autonany, and

inhibit the ability of the House
national

to

scope as time and political

the fore.-^^^

Samuel

grapple with public problems of

change invariably brought them

a

to

Huntington summed up the act as follows:

The net effect of the Reorganization Act was
thus to further
the dispersion of power, to strengthen and to institutionalize committee authority and to circumscribe still
more the
influence of the central leadership. 135
In general,

then, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946

should be studied for what it can reveal

about the problems which

faced the Congress at that time, and which it was

again

in

1974.

136

But it will

to

confront all over

provide the historian very few examples

of constructive acts successfully undertaken to solve them.

In

my
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estimation, its most important
long-range consequences lay in
the dramatic increase in the number of
joint committees and subcanmi
ttees
which followed

in

its wake and the proliferation
of supporting staff

everywhere upon the Hill.
the centrifugal

These developments strengthened
the hand of

forces within the body and, as
Huntington has indi-

cated, weakened the central

authorities of Congress.

Decline in the

powers of Congress continued.
The era extending from 1946 to 1965
was characterized by

a

Congress dominated almost continuously by
its committee chairmen and
the conservative coalition-a Congress
of which neither its pro-

fessional

students nor the general

citizenry expected very much.

While time quickly outran the reforms of
1946, events seldom intervened to alter the increasingly common practice
and widespread

viewpoint that the primary responsibility of Congress
was

to

implement

the President's programs--or obstruct them if it
were able to so

choose.

Some crucial

Congressional

point with respect to the problem of

initiatives over policy was passed about halfway through

Eisenhower's first term.

The shift did not escape Clinton Rossi ter,

and Galloway cites his The American Presidency

at some length:

The point was reached and passed in a press conference on
January 13, 1954.
During the first session of the Eightythird Congress Mr. Eisenhower had submitted few proposals to
Congress and had exerted little continuous pressure in their
behalf.
Observers were wondering aloud whether he was aware
of the change that had come over the Presidency or of
Congress' need for guidance.
But as the second session
approached the President began to gather steam, and within a
few days of the opening of Congress in 1954 he was sending
over detailed messages outlining his wishes on farm policy,
social

security,

foreign policy, labor, and finance.

And now
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P»;ess

conference this exchange took
place-

away or to look good. ... He
was going to work for the r
enactment.
Make no mistake about that.^
That was exactly
what he was in the White House
for and what he Intended to

Twenty-five years ago this remark,
especially as and to
wnom delivered would have brought
mo^t members of Congress
spluttering to their feet and set the
President's few
remaining friends to shaking their
disbelieving heads.
Even
as late as ten years ago it would
have been considered a qratuitous insult by the die-hards and
a show of bad taste by
the moderates in Congress.
In 1954 it passed unchallenged
and even unnoticed, exceot by those
whose reaction was,
Wei 1
1 1' s
about time. "137
,

Meanwhile, for his part, Lyndon Johnson,
arguably the most

effective majority leader the Senate has ever
seen, took it upon himself to support his President against the
political

forces of the Taft

wing of the Republican Party and the Conservative
Southern wing of his
own.

1

38

Though never one to blindly support any program
that did not

or could not be made to coincide with his interests,
Johnson's basic
strategy of cooperation with Eisenhower reflected his
understanding
that limited but real
they did not control

goals could be achieved by Democrats even though
the presidency.

While this action resulted

in

solid legislative accomplishments, it further institutionalized executive initiative over broad policy.

Few students of Congress,

however,

whether seated members or holders of academic credentials, seemed

to

question the emerging arrangements, and Johnson's legislative successes were widely applauded.
Again, it is important not

to

underestimate the significance
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Of these developments.

First, the relationship
between the executive

branch and the Congress had changed
fundamentally

in

less than

a

generation; second, both the
participants on the Hill and the
observers in the academy not only
accepted these changes, but strove

throughout the late 1950s and 1960s to
put their shoulders behind the
wheel

could.

of this historical

development and edge it along as best
they

Third, when criticisms of Congress
were leveled, they were

usually couched

in

terms of its inefficiency in carrying
out executive

branch proposals, rather than questioning
the alteration in

interbranch powers.

As

for those times during which the
Congress was

undeniably productive and performed its job
well, Huntington has made
it clear that we should not confuse the
personal

with long term evolution

power of individuals

the functions and powers of institutions:

in

At times individual central leaders have built
up
impressive networks of personal influence. These however
have been individual, not institutional, phenomena.
The
ascendency of Rayburn and Johnson during the 1950s, for
instance, tended to obscure the difference between
'personal
influence and institutional authority.
With the departure of
the Texas coalition their personal networks collapsed.
Rayburn 's personal power and prestige," observed
Representative Richard Boiling, "made the institution appear
to work.
When Rayburn died, the thing just fell apartT"
Similarly, Johnson's effectiveness as Senate leader, in the
words of one of his assistants, was "overwhelmingly a matter
of personal influence.
." [After Johnson's
successor had
taken power] ... The majority leadership role was uninstitutionalized and the kindly, gentlemanly, easygoing qualities
which Mansfield had had as Senator from Montana were not
changed. ... The power of the President has been
institutionalized; the powers of the congressional committees
and their chairmen have been institutionalized; but the power
of the central leaders of Congress remains personal
ad hoc
and trans i to ry. 139
'

.

.

,

For Huntington, then, the powers of Congress itself depend upon
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"institutionalization" of power

in

its central

leadership.

One meaning of "institutionalization"
is that the practice
so
designated takes on an aura of
permanence in the minds of
those who

have occasion to be aware of
it; one consequence of
institutionalization is that it gives rise
to practices and arrangements
as

appearantly permanent as their causes.

And so, by the mid 1960s,

Robert Dahl was able to write:
If Congress were to do no
more than to consider the princinle
^'^^^ ^-utive, it

ZZ''''

LT^^^ntrtoru^O

From about the mid-60s onward,
pronunciamenti generally critical of

Congress began to flow from the pens of
the academy, which proceeded
to discuss current problems as though
Congressional

attempts to

strengthen its hand against the presidency
had never taken place.

Most of the criticisms will be familiar,
and

so

should be also the

absence of any Whig strains in the lamentations:
increased
Congressional

strength was to be sought not

imbalance of power between the branches, but

efficiency of operations.

Samuel

in
in

order to redress any

order to increase its

Huntington, again, praised the effec-

tiveness of Congress in providing for specialization
but criticized
it, as we have seen,

for having "failed to combine increasing spe-

cialization of function with increasing centralization of
authority.

"^"^^

Holding that the basic function of representation in

the twentieth century had passed from the Congress to the administra-

tion, he went on to echo the sentiments which the profession had

expressed

in

1945,

and noted that Congress was facing an "adaption
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crisis" which involved three
major aspects of its existence
as an
institution: its affiliations,
its structure and its
functions.
It
had insulated itself from the
new social forces of the
twentieth century, dispersed its internal
power into hopeless chaos, and
reduced
its role as creator of legislation
to one of delay and
amendment.
A mere six years later, in
1971,

Development proceeded

to

the Committee for Econo.nic

unburden itself, seeing Congressional

problems primarily in managerial

terms:

In this perspective, Congress
has two primary responsibilities.
One IS to reconcile or compromise
divergent
interests so that the informed will of
the people may find
The other is toVeview program
\" legislation.
IZul-l^''
execution and agency performance in order
to check tendencies
toward improper exercise of executive
authority or perprograms.
Both functions are indispen^^Mf'
sable, but Congress as it now operates
is unable to fulfill
either satisfactorily. 142

The Committee went on to recommend that
Congress absolve

itself of its sins by (1) streamlining [sic]
its committee structure

because adequate coordination between its decentralized
power centers
was lacking, and (2) bringing its methods, approaches
and structures
into conformity with the dynamics of

a

changed polity.

What all of this was building up to was yet another widespread

movement for reform.
professional

While it would take an extensive review of the

literature from, say, 1950 to 1970 to document this

thoroughly, there is a real

difference in tone between the complacency

of Dahl's 1965 view, and that of the Committee for Economic

Development written only six years later--the same year,
which Polsby wrote his essay "Strengthening Congress.

"^'^^

in

fact,

This did

in
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much to sum up the developing
viewpoint that Congress was in
trouble,
and that its troubles were largely
organizational.
Taken together,
the articles by the Committee for
Economic Development and Polsby

'

express by implication that for many
observers there existed what we
can only call a causal relation
between
the

internal

organizational

problems of the Congress and its external,
institutional weaknesses.
Polsby advised that we "consider the
ways in which the House and
Senate organize to do business as
a

a

means of gaining insight into how

legislature can cope with the complex demands
of

neous society,

including the rest of

a

a

large heteroge-

big government. "144

He went on

to make three specific suggestions which
would incrementally improve

the capacity of the Congress to function
effectively.

raising the fundamental

He ended by

difficulty, saying that while incranental

reforms may not appear to accomplish

a

great deal,

they give recognition to the continuous needs for
institutions to provide means by which they can respond to
outside demands, yet at the same time retain the capacity
to
exercise independent choice ... and seek to enhance the
participation of these institutions in the processes of
policy-making by improving their capabilities rather than
destroying their power. I'+S
.

.

.

Change was not, for once, to remain incremental

As the next

.

wave of reforms coalesced into action, it became clear that the members involved conceived their task less in terms of augmenting the

powers of the institution of Congress as
the hierarchical

a

whole than with dismantling

structures of seniority and the committee system

which had successfully stymied their particular efforts
legal

and social

reforms.

to

bring about

Of course, strengthening the Congress
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against the Presidency was also
crucial: their desires for
increased
democracy and personal power
within the body were greatly
whetted by

highly misplaced penchants for
secrecy and deceit on the part
of two
successive administrations, each of
which strove to conduct the
war in

Southeast Asia with a minimum of
Congressional
generation of younger and more liberal
agitated

to expel

hindrance.

A new

representatives and senators

the conservative blockage,
upheld by Congressional

hierarchy, that threatened the
institution with ruin.

What they did

not anticipate, however, was the
anarchistic incontinence that would
fol low.
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House as the
general

-
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°^^"d^^g':^duate courses, to learned
monographs fnd echo
l^ri. J^c
^
""^1"^^°^^"^^
0^:
^'arha^'happen d,
^e "'sincri978 "sTco^n.lr
past Congr^ rs?oJ^arpr:c%?c:s°":^^t^f
It ^^^a^r^'to"
Congress of Lyndon Johnson's day no longer
exists
Thouah It
ture of the earlier period comprises
moft of whalpol t c^
ci^nt ^t".
now about Congress, it is important
that those who'
age of thirty realize that the
institution is no longer what they
studied in graduate school.
From the standpoint of a writer
of a PhD
change has brought the incan lrabie
advanftVlf
tage of drastically shrinking the
quantity of written materials for
which he may reasonably be held responsible.
For added d^sJu sion of
this subject, see Joseph Cooper and William
West, "The Congress onal
Career in the 1970s," in Dodd and Oppenheimer
(eds.). Congress
^
Reconsidered p. 92.
'

^y^^^'^"^

hv'pst"

^

•

,

lllwe are nowhere going to
attempt any kind of treatment of
the role Congress is, has, or ought to be
playing in the foreign
poncy area. The domestic side of its difficulties and history
provide ample material for a good sized cud for even
the most pedantic
student of U.S.
Government.
But I. M. Destler has pointed out what
ne calls a core pol i tical -procedural dilemma" in
foreign policy which
is parallel, if not identical to the one we have
been tracing through
Its consequences for domestic policy and the changing
nature of
government in the U.S.:
the tension which persists between the
requirements of representative government and the requirements of
effective government.
"In significant part, this flowing and ebbing
of congressional standing is a function of two factors:
substantive
preferences and the presence or absence of crisis. ... The second
factor, crisis, usually reinforces presidential power and the argument
that the president needs the flexibility to respond.
But the
deeper cause of executive-congressional conflict is a core pol i tical
procedural dilemma.
Americans want two things that often prove incompatible in practice:
democratic government (involving ongoing
competition among a range of U.S. interests and perspectives) and
effective foreign policy (which requires settling on specific goals
and pursuing them consistently).
To reconcile these competing needs
insofar as they can be reconciled, the framers of the Constitution
established, in Richard Neustadt's apt phrase, a government of
"separated institutions sharing powers." See: I. M. Destler,
"Executive-Congressional Conflict in Foreign Policy:
Explaining It;
Coping With It," in Dodd and Oppenheimer (eds.). Congress
Reconsidered , pp. 297-298.

^^^congressional Quarterly, p. 130.
"The focus of reformers
became much broader during the [Second World] war.
when the capacity of Congress as a whole to function effectively as a co-equal
.

.
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113
(Chicago: RanS^M^Na^ ly!^!^

Quarterly,

Congressl't^^Js-lig"''

Century Fu'nHepoVt

'

Origu^^an^^

Uhacr^^ T^^^^^M^^i^^T^^^

{

^^^Galloway, p. 318.

^l^Congressional Quarterly,

p.

131.

^^^Ibid., p. 132.

^^^Galloway,

p.

322.

V'

^

"'^^
Of the sL'ttern'DSaSir'wIna'or^hfr:''''
these years, see: John F 'm^
^y°'"T ^ Co ^rJatJJe r°.lV-V°"
pp. ya-107.

See also:

conservative Coalition

David E. Brady and Char p^ RmI
in the House?^ JourLl

'

'"™^er

TS^^^^^
l

I

nr^T-^-^^TT-'w^'

'

"CoaTTtT^TTT^TlTTrfthe

^^of
rese^ta? vel '-'tn'onHd'^^'^^^
Kepresentatives,
in Dodd and Oppenheimer,
Congress Reconsidered
pp.
'

,

l^loavid Brady and Charles
Bullock, 1981,

p.

198.

This article contains a good, brief
descrintinn nf
J'^^^^^^'
the uhistory and origins of the conservative
coalit 0 in the House
Note the point they make on page 210.
Conservative coll i tion not onl
weakened Democratic Party, it set in motion
a serious paUern ?hat
continues to this day: "party leaders are
faced with the task of
putting together shifting coalitions in
order to pass legis ation "
'^^'^
.''^
' ^^^^^^^ion of the Bal kanizal?on of
4.U

Amlrica

the Committee of Congress of the /\merican
!^^^^P^^^
D.i-^Political Science Association, The Reorganiz
ation of Congress
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 194b),
pp. 80-81.
Cit-d
Congressional Quarterly, p. 135.

^^^Davidson and Oleszek,

p.

3.

in

y
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''''''' ^^^'^^ °^9ht
divide the pro?;;sion weri
tl Z\rr 'h^h'
current di s?ussions°of'Lng
s
o
1
I
triages through the
literature to find colments'abi ? ro'
..^^^ Congressional
passivity and executive initi;,i-nwl
:

n

1

T

^r^^i^z^^zic^^'i^

discuss?:

to

'ZlT

ror:o".r^t?;™£i^eir^

become ever more fractional ized and
unmanageable
course to reject the assumption
that Congress i
which IS embodied in the part of this

t ?s poss ble
of
prooerlv oa . vl
staLe t bo ^Congre l al
accept the assertion that the House
i
o?h
fraclioLllpT!;
fractional!
zed and unmanageable.
Other examples of this viewpoint
^" ^^^^/^^l^^tion of articles edited by
Mann a d Ornste n we
^in^p^n
"'^'^^
°"
organizations, Congr ^
si tves^for
strives
for self-preservation, protecting
its autonomy and influence
^"^^ '^^^'^ successf 1 J io
Lter^irdpJn'n
externa demands ''n'r'^
while coping with internal pressures."
Again at
^^'^ "Congress is inevitably a reactive institu"
E?nn
^a^bin, in his "Delegation, Deliberation, and
ll
;
'^'o^^^^
the uNew nRole
of
Congressional Staff," in the same collection, page
i/U, notes that Congress is coping successfully:
"The increased use of
personalized, entrepreneurial staffs has helped
Congress retain its
position as key initiator of federal policy, despite
the growing power
of the executive branch." Barbara Sinclair in
the same collection
makes an observation which goes to the heart of the
problem for one
who seeks an evaluation of the institutional efficacy
of Congress in
ordinary times.
She finds the body at its best during crisis
periodsCongress is a reactive institution; it cannot anticipate.
It is not'
however, impervious to strong stimuli from its environment.
A crisis'
a strong clear demand from the public for
action, will produce a
congressional response, as it has throughout this century." See
page
220.
For Charles 0. Jones, executive initiative sets the pattern
of
action in government, and Congress is best off when it does not try
too hard to play this role for itself: "I have used the word
pretentious' to characterize the initiator role because I believe it
is inordinately ambitious for Congress to prepare itself to
initiate
comprehensive policy programs.
Having undertaken such a coinplex
assignment, a legislature may not know where to stop imitating the
executive." See Ibid., p. 234.
Finally, in the collection of
articles edited by Dodd and Oppenheimer, p. 345, we find Morris

JJf

'

'

T^l
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Fiorina undertaking a cogent di <;rii<:^inn nf .
"''^ ^''''^^^ ^^^""^^
institutional reform whi?h cou
d -nrrpL ,.
government to a variety of pre
' responsiveness of
sure^ It
"bringing congressional
re de Ual i ce^H:f -'^
l^^^^^ives into closer
." via
agreement.
the imnn^iHnn^;

1'

'

.

acce t without qJesttn'the'^^^tJ^n

Conqress^can'orshoMl'dM''.H

^t

lltlVrcll llZVs l^T

^^reement among scholars about whether

r if f

prescription.
The fact that, for the most part.
Congress does not
initiate major policies can, in its turn,
give ri
plural i?J of
scholarly viewpoints.
One such, as we have seen
is that
t should
'''' Congress
noi'the e ecue bran?h'%h'o'ulH"H'^'jJ°"
the Primary initiating agent in areas
of broad
DoMcv
it nn
distribution of particular goods.
"^'^
Givpn
Eh
'I
thisI Tlt^
latter approach,
the interesting question is whether
Congress
ran
be constituted to enable it to so act,\nd
what coSu?ons and circumstances seem necessary to make real Congressional
agency possible.

sH^a

126Galloway, History of the House

^^^Davidson and Oleszek,
128ibid., p.

7.

^^^Galloway,

p.

p.

,

p.

60.

13.

61.

l^^The Act is discussed at various lengths in
numberless
places.
Among them see: Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1973 ), pp. 16, 290; Congressional
Quarterly,'
135ff, et. passim; Davidson, p. 102; Davidson and Oleszek,
pp.
pp.
51-52, et. passim; Malbin, 1980, p. 165; and Galloway,
60-64', et.
pp.
passim.
See Weatherford, p. 179.
After three generations of
public pressure, committee meetings were finally opened to the public.
•
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Davidson and Oleszek,

p.

52.

Report: '1111^1^17^^^^^^^^^^^
3anuation Act,
subcommittee proliferation since fL„ hh K
u?^°
separate working groups in tte
House t.
i"^*'?'
'^'3^-"
the Select CommitLe on
"^P"--* '^^
Committees 111 1,'^^"^^!
^r^i^i^eJefomAme^^
Rept 93 9?6 ""t'/f'"^'^^^^^'

L

confusion'l'resp:c?l??y'S?evaUnf;n'h"'HPemerged since 1946

Mas, Jr^nlfl

i

-

r"!'^'^^"^^''

"J^^^^lictional
that had

.i^^^^^^el Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the
Century " in David B. Truman
ed J
ThrConqress and
America's Future (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-HiHTTl^^
^T
Twentieth

(

^^^Galloway,

,

63.

p.

-^^yciinton Rossiter, The American Presidency
(New York-

Note that even the landmark legislation
330
contained in the civil
rights bills of 1956 and 1960 was
Republican in origin ad pushed
through House and Senate by Rayburn and
Johnson only through t fuse
of what were considered fairly drastic
measures.

Putnam•s'so^l980);^^'
^^^Huntington,
l^^Dahl,

p.

p.

«LL^l^-lli^ (New

York:

G.

P.

22.

142.

^^^Huntington,

p.

19.

Committee for Economic Development, Making C ongress More
Effective: A Statement on National Policy by the Re search
and Policy
Committee (New York: Committee for Ecnnnmir npvplnpmp nt,
1971),

p.

1

143^|elson W. Polsby, "Strengthening Congress," in Nelson
Polsby (ed.). Congressional Behavior (New York:
Random House 1971)
pp. 3-13.

~

l^^ibid., p. 7.

1.
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^^^Ibid.,

p.

13.

CHAPTER
THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS:
INSTITUTIONAL PAIDEA AND

IV
THE COLLAPSF '
of
THE ISOLATi

OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER
It was now late in the
evening

about in-i^n

^,.a

^-u

^
chamber was crowded with over
three hundLd
of whom were anxious to
""''^
go home
LerJ til a P^p's'"^""'
'^"^^^ "^^'^
propose an amendment to [the billl
ll
k
'

orde?l
o^cf :nd
.uicU.

Tep^^tedir

ounde^S^;?s^^^a::^^^
Of the^House".:

r^^nfs^^h debate
''^Z^
conside:. :::^]^e^
^^Z^^^l,^
'f'ol

''^^''^ '''''
adoption'o?
tion or the
thrfb?n'l'''Rnn"
LbillJ.
Boiling demanded a roll call
vote
a<.
'''''' proponents a d op onen s
rushed tn'Ld^
"i!''''''
^'^^'"9
with their colleagues; the?
manned
Zl
J''''
the rit
doors ^leading
into the chamber and grabbed
members
a^
they entered urging them to vote
this way or that and the
''''''' advice'on how to vote f
llllTV''
asked by a colleague.
As the allotted fifteen minutes
for a
recorded vote slipped by, with members
following the tally on
the electronic scoreboards on either
side of the chamber
i?
became c ear that the bill would be
adopted.
Bollinq
sat calmly throughout the vote, remarking
to an aide that at
^^"^^^
democratic process to work.
^
^hl'pK f?i
203-165.
'
The Committee
.5
of the Whole rose, and the House voted
359 to 7 to approve
.

.

.

Davidson & Oleszek.
House passes Committee Reform Bill
8 October, 1974

Birth of t he Contemporary Congress:

The Reforms of the 197Qs

From the late 1930s to the late 1960s, a very
distinctive
type of House existed.
It took shape over several decades
response to the breakdown of the highly centralized and
292

in

constellation of nornis
quUe fa,nn[,r ^^1^'*^
t-on of political
scienti tssei on'tv .nH
reciprocity, specialization
^PP'-^^ticeship,
civil
accommodation, tempered partisanship and n^^^it ,^ !
Patriotism.
also distingulshed'by
It «as
the
hI^

co«ittees and commUtee

hL

^

L^ i.T

ch i .en' nd ll '.TZ
dominant status
of majority party units
such aftL
steering or p^H^y commit
.'%he pr' ;
'"t
style was accordingly
^^^''^''^'''P
highly Personal,
oerson,!
In]l
informal,
and consensus-oriented
permissive,

^l"md

^ouse was
at ful/;jr'eng?h' ailhe^'ul/'^'^r'^ ''''
political sC^nce! ConseoLnl'lt '''"'"^'^ revolution in

Like so many other movements
in politics, the reform
movement
of the 1960s and 1970s did
not appear sudden and
unannounced, as we
have seen.
In part, it grew out of
certain manifest failures of the

Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946;
tional
,

in

part it grew out of genera-

demographic and electoral changes which
had been held

abeyance during the World War

II

years only

the two major parties as the
1940s came to

to
a

reforms can be traced to fundamental
changes

begin to impinge upon

close.
in

country at large-now considerably more
liberal

in

In

part,

the

the ethos of the
in

its basic

philosophy than it had been before the
Roosevelt years.

Such

political
factors
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-.ained

,„

historical

t.e .ac.,.ound ror
a

consI.e.Me

t1,„e,

.nd .e,an to

exen

influence only gradually
and Incrementally.

If one «ere to

see. out an e,„bryon1c
incident, a

that would foreshadow ™uch
that «as

s,nal

change

1

to co.e,

one could do worse
than
to Single out the
imposition of the "dohnson
Rule" upon the Senate
in
1954.
Here we find a new
generation of party leader
seeking ways to

distribute power more widely
and equitably throughout
the chamber
Looking at the Senate fro.
the vantage point of
his new position as
Democratic Party leader, the
forty-six-year-old Johnson could
see the
drawbacks of a seniority system
under which only those
senators who

had considerable seniority
were able

to

serve as members on one of
the

"desirable," i.e., powerful,
committees.

-

now je^^a^
something about it.
He called a meeting of the
Steerinq
Committee of which as leader, he
was automat callTc alr.an
and by way of softening what
would be an unpopular orooosa

IT

'"^"^

^^"'"^^

?n':;aryi
e !
i
sions
ns and
nd under varying circumstancesWhen I was a boy in Texas, I was
a good friend of the
C rider boys, Ben and Otto.
Now Ben was older, and he was
kind of sturdy and outgoing and
popular among'the boys
nd
OttOj well he was more shy and
retiring.
So one day I was over there at
the Crider house
and it
'''""^
"^^^
I
asked
Otio
if
hern
.nf come over to my house for a
If he
could
day or two.
But Miz
Crider, when we asked her, she said,
'No.'
No reason, she
jusi said, no.
"And Otto, he began to protest, and
he said, 'But mama
why can t I go? Ben, he's already been
twowheres, and I
ain t never been nowheres!'"
And then, in case the analogy had
escaped anyone, Johnson
went on to correlate the less desirable
committees with
nowheres, and particularly this year when
there was such a
good crop of new Democratic senators-John
Kennedy of
Massachusetts and Stuart Symington of Missouri and
Mike
Mansfield of Montana, to name a few—wouldn't
it be a good
'

'

'
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idea to revise--not scrap,
mind you

iust revi^P

fh.

'^^^^ one good

committee?^

Johnson got the plan accepted,
first by the Democrats and
later, as Majority Leader, made
it the
rule of the Senate.

an early precedent then:

Here «as

those lower down the ladders
of the

seniority system would have
positions of power and influence
available
to them.

It was a kind of opening
wedge,

and it provided those who

looked up with leverage.

Throughout the 1950s, the general

level

of Congressional

legislative achievements was high, and
its public approval rating, as
measured by the polls taken at the time,
was consistently above the
60% mark.

This was due to the combined internal

and Johnson and the external

Congressional
vidual

influence of Rayburn

popularity of Eisenhower.

leadership successfully used personal

The

knowledge of indi-

member needs to informally enforce discipline
upon the Congress

with respect to important legislative initiatives.

At the same time,

however, the House found itself blocked repeatedly,
as it strove

to

enact liberal measures, by the continuously long-playing
and deeply

entrenched conservative coalition.

This minority now controlled the

Rules Committee--without the approval

of which no bill

reported by any

committee could reach the floor.

Much has been made of the genera-

tional, sectional

differences which separated the mem-

and ideological

bers of the coalition from the representative body at large in this

period,

3

and such factors were to play a crucial

role throughout the
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succeeding pe.o. Of
stru,,les ove. .efon,,.

I'be., ,„e*e.s of
acquiesce

u,e House

.a,

In

,

"

the .oun,..

p.evaned upon Spea.e.
«a.bu.n

to

in

their efforts to
enlarge the reralcit.
recaltitrant. ominittee
^
and
alter its balance of
power." «gdin,
Again
in 1965
iQfiR this
,n
same group, engorged
wUh new hlood by the Johnson
landslide, succeeded in
further
weakening the Rules
co«ittee, first 5. reinsti
tuting the lapsed

Rules When remitting
passed legislation to
Conference.^ ny 1967 it
had at last become
possible for an electorally
altered «ules Co™,ittee
to i,npose on itself
formal rules of internal
procedure and to diminish
-ts Chairman's powers.
These innovations enabled
the House as a whole
to provide substantial
cooperation to the Democratic
leadership and
ended ten years of agitation
for refo™, of the Coimni
ttee.^

Simultaneous with this came
another set of developments,
rooted

in

the Democratic Study
Group (,,SG). an organization
of

Democratic liberals co.„mitted
control of the House.

to

liberal

This group pushed

legislation and l.beral
for changes

dures and party practices which
at last resulted

Reorganization Act of 1970.

in

in

House proce-

the Legislative

Operating largely at the expense
of the

hierarchy of committee chairmen,
the Act served

malize^ pari iamentary procedure

in

to

liberalize and

for-

committees and on the floor of
the

House
But these were really minor changes
compared with what was

come.

The historical

tide was

running to the younger liberals

in

to

the

chamber, as the old conservative
southern chalrnen reached the ends of
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their careers, the civil

rights .nove.ent captured
the sympathy of the
country, and the ever-escalating
war in Viet Na. gradually
gave birth
to a congressional resolve
to shorten the
Presidential tether in the
foreign policy area.
Finally, the Watergate
scandals provided the
members of Congress with an
extraordinary situation in
which the

ilML-Xmite
of institutional

liberals, at last within reach
of the highest rungs

power within Congress, could
successfully open the

spillways of

a

for change.

Successive waves crashed over both
Congress and the

vast pool of stored up political

ambition and desire

Presidency, each leaving an altered
landscape behind it.

As we shall

see, it was the Congress that
would be the more changed, and
the

changes themselves would engender
unintended consequences--as institutional

changes usually do.

How might we sum up the forces which
swept up and over the

Congress at the period of greatest reforms
since the Cannon revolt of
1910?

They produced changes in Congressional

procedures and changes

in the structure and power configurations
of House institutions.

such, they constituted a fundamental
is held and exercised there.

upheaval

in

As

the manner that power

Since these internal

institutions, as we

have argued previously, provide the institutional
context for the

daily habits of life of the average member, they exert
the greatest

possible influence over his activities.
House institutions produced

even now beginning

to

a

To

the extent that changes

in

different House, then, they also are

contribute

to

the emergence of a different kind

of individual inember--one who, as he has gained influence and con-
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fidence with each successive
wave of
wdve
or chanap
Change, h.c
has k
been proportionately
enlarged in numbers and
emboldened in designs.
What follows is the
briefest sketch imaginable
of the reforms of
this period,
taken pri-

marily from the account of
Davidson and Oleszek.

This will

be here

presented to provide background
evidence for the notion
that
kind of House institution
has emerged.

ascribe

a

general

If one were to

a

new

attempt to

pattern to the politics of
this development.

say that changes in one area
of internal House
political

would

I

activity

themselves became the basis for
subsequent and more far-reaching
alterations later.
For example, neither the
Johnson Rule in the
Senate nor the reform of the Rules
Committee

signalled matters of great import.

in

the House at first

But these innovations themselves

insured that subsequent questions
of organizational change could
not
anticipate traditional modes of
treatment, and when the all-out

assault on the traditional committee
system finally came
system proved unable

to

exercise the vital

in

1973

,

that

functions of self-

preservation.

Substantive changes began in the Democratic
Party Caucus,

which first tentatively and then decisively
focused its attention on
the power of the committee chairmen who
had effectively ruled the

House since the overthrow of Speaker Cannon.

Elevated through the

autonomous processes of the seniority system and
acting as agents of
local

constituency interests, these individuals had long
prevented the

formation of effective national constituencies for general

issues

within the largely decentralized House.

situation

This had set up

a
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which many of the younger and
more liberal members had
found
increasingly nettlesome:

JK^n^rt^^^o^^^e^^^"

^r^T
"FrLdnf f

dence of members and diminis
ed pany oyalt '
party control." one writer
observed " ^ean^l'
from assuming responsibility

tl

for a nationrprog;am/'8^'''^^

Though the chairmen embodied
personal concentrations of
power,
they owed their influence to the
seniority
system itself-that effec-

tive and equitable mechanism which
the reformers of 1910 had
thought
could replace the arbitrary decisions
of party leaders in distributing

powers and privileges.

taken the personal

That the seniority system had effectively

element out of such distribution was
undeniable;

that it had also entailed other consequences,
equal
impact and as fully capable of giving rise
tion, was also undeniable.

9

political

resentment and opposi-

According to Davidson and Oleszek,

seniority overrepresents certain political
others.

to

in

factions at the expense of

The south, of course, was chief beneficiary here,
and Its

"apostate barons" worked together

to

inhospitable environment for liberal

make Congress an extremely

legislation as we have seen.

The

old Chairs were at odds with the national policies of
an increasingly
liberal

national

party

they reflected the electoral

the party as it had existed

a

victories of

generation earlier;^^ they tended

make their House careers their life's vocation and clung
until

well

to

to

power

into their seventh and eighth decades, effectively robbing

the middle ranks of the party of influence, and denying an effective

sphere of action to the energies and ideas of those who were

in

the

.
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pr1.ne of llfe.^^

As Davidson and Oleszek
note, "Not only does
such a
syste-n waste talent in the
niddle seniority ranks,
but it generates
frustration and resentment. "^^
The attack on the seniority
system,
when it ca.e, occurred on three
fronts:
first, fro. within the
caL

m-ttees themselves; second, from
within

a

rejuvenated Democratic Party

Caucus; third, through rules
changes which increased the
number of
leadership posts and multiplied
the powers and influence of
subc^nmittees

Revolts from within committees
were episodic and piecemeal,
and while they both served to
correct specific malpractices
within

limited areas, and reflected the
first effective stirrings of

widespread dissatisfaction, such
"localized" corrections of the errors
of power did not have fundamental
effects
upon party or House prac-

tices in general.

Nevertheless, the Education and Labor
Committee

experienced two revolts-one

in

1959 against Graham Barden of North

Carolina, and another in 1966 against Adam
Clayton Powell of New
York.

14

The Post Office Committee had its own fling
at the expense of

Chairman Tom Murray in

a

1965 revolt which "took everything away from

Murray but his gavel ."^^
But much more far-reaching and historically important
actions

were undertaken from within the Democratic Party Caucus.
nominally supposed

to

ratify the committee assignments made by the

Committee on Committees, had allowed this function
since 1951.

In

1965,

This group,

to

lapse unused

however, it rather suddenly determined itself

apply the rules, and strengthened

in

to

this resolve by the new influx of
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liberals following the previous
fall's elections, prevailed
upon
Speaker McCormack to call a second
caucus.

With this foot in the

door, the liberal

reformers struggled to establish
precedents for

caucus review of seniority
privileges-based on the notion that
neither committee assignment nor
seniority was an automatic right,
that each was

a

but

privilege granted by the caucus.

A number of actions

swiftly followed this refreshing
change

from the language of "rights" to
the language of "privileges."

Democratic supporters of presidential

Two

nominee Goldwater lost their

seniority in 1965; Adam Clayton Powell
lost his own seniori ty-though
not for supporting Goldwater-in 1967; in
1971 two challenges were

turned back by close Caucus votes.

Each of these actions helped to

establish precedents that would make legislators
more responsible

to

the Caucus.

Finally the frontal assault on seniority was launched
by the
Democratic Study Group initiative early

in 1970.

It was

proposed that

the Caucus select a committee to study the questions
raised by the

seniority system in general.

This move met with the approval

of the

Caucus, and Chairman Dan Rostenkowski appointed what was to be
known
as the Hansen Committee.

The Hansen committee's recommendations

further clarified procedures for selecting committee chairmen:

the

caucus would take up the recommendations of the Committee on

Committees one committee at

a

time, and any ten members could demand

separate Caucus vote on any portion of the recommendations.^^
and other innovations were adopted by the Caucus.

These

a
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Other challenges

to

the chairrnen followed,

McMillan, head of the District
of Columbia

Challenged in caucus and given

managed

to

a bad

m

1971, John

:on,,„1ttee, was

fright.

In

1973,

vigorously

the liberals

secure secret ballots in the
caucus, if requested by one-

fifth of the Democrats present.

insurgent hoi polloi

fom

This device, of course,
shielded

possible vengeful machinations
frcn above,

inasmuch as some of the powerful
chairmen were known

to

be capable of

holding grudges.
By the time that the 94th
Congress convened,

seniority

leadership had been decisively altered
and the traditional

ments were in shambles.

In

a

arrange-

series of actions taken in December
1974

and January 1975, the Caucus completed
the process begun by liberal

reformers ten years before.

First, the functions of the Committee
on

Committees were taken away from the Democratic
members of Ways and
Means and turned over to the Steering and Policy
Committee.

Second,

secret ballots were now to be taken on the selection
of all chairmen.
Finally, the chairmen of three committees were
actually removed by
votes of the caucus.

'"^

Davidson and Oleszek note that

a

third method of cir-

cumscribing the power of the committee chairmen and weakening
the
influence of the seniority system was the institutionalization of
sub-

committees.

In

terms of our own concerns with House evolution and

institutionalization,

I

think that this will

turn out to have been the

most important and far-reaching development of all.
.

.

.

Though not unknown in earlier times, subcommittees
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Reorganization
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This alteration had two major
consequences.
of the committee chairmen
was inversely related
nomy of the subcommittees.

to

First, the power
the vigor and auto-

Second, as the subcommittees
gained in

power and influence, the goals
of increased democratization
and
meaningful participation in the
direction of House affairs were
attained for a broadened stratum
of the membership.
At the same time,
however, we shall see that this
historical turning did not
necessarily
yield a more effective House, nor did
it serve to help redress
the

imbalances of power between the branches
that had steadily elevated
the Presidency for forty years.

Among the Hansen Committee recommendations
was

which had affinities to the Johnson Rule:

a

provision

no legislator could be a

member of more than two legislative committees,
no member could head
more than

a

single legislative subcommittee, and no
chaiman could

head more than one subcommittee within his
own committee.

Two years

later, the caucus further strengthened both
subcommittees and the

individual member of middle rank by enacting what
came to be known as
the "subcommittee bill

of rights."

This gave the subcommittees

greater autonomy from control by the chairmen of the full
coimnittees.
The writers for Congressional Quarterly outline this important
step as
fol lows:
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1]

Establishment of a Democratic Caucus
on each full cc^nmit
tee, forcing chairmen to share
authori t/wi th othe?
Democrats
The committee caucus was
granted

aulhoritv to
''''''''' subc^Mi 'ee''
jurfs ic" ons'"''to'''
jurisdictions
to provide adequate
subcommittee budgets
and to guarantee all members a
major subcanmittee ci^bign
assignment as vacancies opened up.

^'^7^^'

2]

Requirement that committee chairmen
refer legislation to
appropriate subcommittees within two
weeks, thus
'^'''"^'.1

^^'^l^'^S

them for committee action.
3]

orebills by not scheduling

The right of subcommittee chairmen
and ranking minority
members to hire one staff member each
to work for them on
the subcommittee.
The purpose of this staff assistance
was to help keep the subcommittees
independent of the
chairman of the full committee. 23
In

addition, subcommittees would be able

to

receive evidence and report to their full commi
ttees

hold hearings,
Note that the

.

basis for allocating subcommittee chairmanships
and memberships would

continue to be that old standby:

one's seniority on the full co.nmit-

tee itself.
This reform had two outstanding consequences.

First,

it

immeasurably strengthened the power of the subcommittee chairmen,
at
the expense of the chairmen of the full

committees, and considerably

decentralized House power at the expense of the leadership.

Second,

it benefitted the liberals who dominated Democratic Party middle

seniority ranks and who were therefore
the new subcommittee chairs.
to hold hearings,

in

line for the lion's share of

These were the individuals now empowered

initiate legislation and generally push for

activist role for themselves and their little committees.
tive effects of such developments were

to

a

more

The cumula-

further reduce the powers of

3U5
the Chairmen and force

leadership.25 and

to

the,n

to

adopt a

™re

consultative style of

drastically Increase the
.uantUy of hearings at

both the subco^ittee and
full committee levels.

David E. Price wrote

that "pressures for the dispersal
of authority and resources
show few
Signs of abate.ent."26 uote,
however, that sunk in this
pudding of

caucus and subcommittee reforms
was

a

large fat raisin of irony:

In one sense, the seniority
principle emerged even
stronger with the 1965-1975
innovations.
True
thfcaucus
was not committed, at least in
principle, to the idea that
sen onty need not be followed
inflexibi; in selecting clmittee chairmen.
Yet, the thrust of the reforms
was to
spread the benefits of seniority
beyond the s™ d'ng commit
tee Chairmen to the more than
130 subcanmittee chl?ri,en
Ironically, there were in 1975 more
seniority leaders than
representatives, and. w'lthtn tS
Ve%
tees ^Jhe
the ln°"''/'
seniority principle was extended to
apply to subchairmanships-again to circumscribe capHciou
rZ]ll'^
^ ^>uu:s
committee chairmen. 2/

TZh-

Those inclined to keep track of and
worry about such problems
as jurisdictional

politics within the chamber will not be
comforted by

noting that increased decentralization and
democratization entailed

a

leap in the order of magnitude of the number
of conflicting jurisdictions.

Although by no means the only factor involved,
this particular

problem contributed much

to

divide against itself and

confronted with general

to

the overall

tendency of the House

to

collapse into fits of paralysis when

issues:

3y the 1970s, jurisdictional entanglements seriously impaired
the ability of Congress to respond in a timely and

coherent
fashion to public problems.
Studies initiated by the Select
Committee showed unmistakably the disarray into which the
House's policy-making structure had fallen. Jurisdictional
conflict was endemic, and hundreds of such cases, involving
virtually every committee, were detailed in the staffprepared monographs.
Following the imperatives of bill
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?h:'s"L?urri$^dranl^^b?lu'5°:L'^^ histoncally

shaped
their o«n co,nm1ttee
^
ke«
t
9""!^^
mental agencies preferred tn hl'm
30vern?'
1t would be haLled%
''''
friendlv ra her
tees.
Once handled
a give
c^mftLp .
there by precedent.
The result ™s a !!;. h
, T"^'""*
of responsibilities that
often b^r
nl?
he
vaquest''''""''
"guest
resemblance to the House rules. 28

f

^

The result, then, was twofold.

First, the power and standing

of those in the middle
seniority ranks had been
increased and their

outstanding grievances redressed.

Second, the complexities of
bill

referral

politics were also increased,
and, therefore, the amount
of
time and energy required for
matters of fonnulating and passing

legislation were proportionately
dirainished.

The

final

outccne was

that the powers of Congress as an
institution were not particularly
enhanced, nor was the efficacy with
which it handled its

Constitutional duties improved.

According to Davidson and Oleszek, these
changes ushered

in

the era of 'subcommittee government"^^
„h1ch was characterized by

increases in the number of working units,
leadership posts, hearings
and meetings. 30

Note, however, that on their analysis,
these develop-

ments did not yield the greater benefits usually
held

to

follow from

the committee specialization and expertise,
and which Polsby and

others had praised earlier.^^ The average size
of House Standing

Committees had increased;

so' had

the number of committee and

subcom-

mittee assignments for which individual members were
responsible.
Indeed, the average member now had
the physical

a

total

of 5.56 assignments'^^ and

impossibility of carrying out this workload led

to
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widespread absenteeism and
.eeting-hopping-both, as we
shall see,
symptoms Of deeper evolutionary
changes
in our national

Davidson and Oleszek hold that
by this

ti,ne,

in

institutions

the early 1970s,

the

committee system was seriously
overextended33 ,nd that the
problem
ultimately stemmed from a lack
of adequate central
coordinating mechanisms in the chamber.
In other

words, from our own
perspective we can

see that the problems which
underlay Congressional

ineffectual

i

ty

in

1814 had returned, even though they
now had different causes and
took
a different form.
During the earlier period, a
rough system of actual

representation on the various committees
had made the formulation of
consensus virtually impossible; during
the 1970s, the consensus
problem was compounded by squabbles
over jurisdiction.
that the political question of "who

Constitution had adjudicated

in

is

great questions instead of one.

going to decide," which the

favor of the national

taken up anew inside that legislature.

This meant

It

legislature, was

therefore posed itself two

That this was and continues

to

be

primary characteristic of the jurisdictional
maze of subcommittees
the House will

the
in

become apparent soon enough.

It is important, meanwhile, not to lose
track of the fact that
all

of the reforms so far reviewed took place
within the Democratic

Party Caucus, and had not been extended to the
formal

rules,

and

therefore to the structure of institutionalization of the
House
itself.

However, by 1973, it was becoming clear

to

an increasing

number of members that the restructuring of the entire committee
system had once again become

a

piece of business that could not be

308

postponed:

increased their autonomy

Davidson and Oleszek provide several

which the House as
at this time.

a

actually

Anv 9ffnrfl\.

fundamental

reasons for

whole was persuaded to undertake
internal

refoms

First was the problem of decentralization:

Reforms involving institutional prerogatives
usually seek to
strengthen Congress as a co-equal branch
of government.
These might involve both a restructuring
of Congress' organization and procedures, and the redistribution
of authority
within the chambers.
They are designed to enable Congress
to
assert or to reassert control over governmental
activities
and constitutional responsibil i ties.^S
The lack of central

coordinating mechanisms and leadership within
the

chamber made it difficult if not impossible for
Congressto consider
the broad and general

questions at the bottom of public policy;^^

second, the committee chairmen, as leaders in some
sense of
party, were unrepresentative of the Congressional

a

national

members of that

party and therefore of that party as it had been articulated
by the
electoral
tional

decisions of the voters;"^^ third, the problem of jurisdic-

politics, as we have just seen, was on the way to becoming

insurmountable; fourth, and most important

in my view,

was the
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generally recognized need for
an effort

to

strengthen the House.

That some committees functioned
better than others was clear
39
enough,
and that, taken together,
the co™ittees constituted

a

structure of power within the
institution which contributed

its

to

weaknesses in the face of executive
power was becoming more widely
40
accepted.
As far as many members
were concerned, it was just

possible that "committee reform
might help to restore the health
of
the policy-making partnership
that the Framers had intended. ""^^
Such reasons introduce

historian to reckon with.

a

healthy dose of ambiguity for the

Some of these issues concern
individual

member power and career needs; some of
them concern factors which

go

to the heart of the problems raised by
the presence of parties in

a

legislature; some concern the perennial
conflict between actual

repre-

sentation and the need for coordination and
consensus within an

elected collegial
branches of

a

body;

some concern the balance of power between

mixed government.

Obviously, none of these can be con-

sidered "ultimate" or "final" or "the" reason which
most ccnpletely

explains why the reforms were undertaken.

It

should be clear,

however, that an absence or negation of actual, usable
House power

moots all other questions.
Unlike other congressional bodies, the Select Committee did
not begin with those habits of cooperation that can develop
when members work together year after year.
Its members had
to learn to work together as a group and master their subject
matter, all within the span of a single Congress.
Their
assignment, moreover, was a complex and delicate one,
demanding a working knowledge of every one of the House's
standing committees.
The task had not been undertaken in
twenty-eight years, nor had any of the members ever served on
a reorganization commi ttee.'^^
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This select Co™ittee
was

a

bipartisan affair" to
which the

Democratic .e.nbers were
appointed

Boning, and
in

Speaker Albert and
Representative

the Republican ,„e*ers
by minority leader
Gerald Ford

its political

principles, it see.ed to
be an ideological
,„icrocos.

Of the House itself;^
in its actions it
exhibited

co«n

tenst,cs

«

to House

co«ittee procedure:

,„any

of the charac-

it held hearings,

it

delegated specific areas of
responsibility to its individual
.e*ersand in general it refused
to adopt proposals
which a majority of the
committee were convinced stood
absolutely no chance of
passage by the
wider body.
Since the history of the Select
Committee's deliberations and
the fate of its proposals are
the subject matter of Davidson
and
"^^'^^'^'^

there is no need to detail

exhaustively here.

them

What is important to note is
that in concentrating

on the problem of enabling the
House to come to grips with the
broad

and general

questions of national

concern which were emerging during

the 1970s, the Select Committee
attempted to substantially alter the

structure of the House Committee System,
and failing
with changing the jurisdictional

boundaries that separated some com-

mittees from others, went so far as

to

propose the outright abolition

of some committees and the formulation
of new ones.

attempted

to

rest content

to

In

addition, it

strengthen the role of the Rules Committee in
assigning

bills to the various committees for deliberation
and tried
the power of the Speaker as well.

part, not adopted:

Its proposals were,

to

enhance

for the most

the Republican Party generally supported

the draft
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resolution brought forth by
the co™ittee. but
the De™ocrats-„ho
after all, had the ™st to
lose as Individuals-refused
to go along
and decided In the Caucus
to relnstitute the
old Hansen Co™ittee
instead.
This group, ill-prepared
to

perfo™

In

six weeks a task

which had occupied the Select
Co«1ttee for over a year,
nonetheless
succeeded in formulating an
alternative plan which retained
of

so.ne

the select Co™ittee's
suggestions with regard to
procedural

changes,

while simultaneously divesting
those proposals of nearly
every schene
that Involved substantive
committee reorganization.
Nonetheless, it
was the proposals of the Hansen
Committee rather than those of
the
Boiling Committee which were finally
adopted by the House.
Davidson
and Oleszek sum up:
H°!!'' ^Pfo^^d.^hen It adopted the Hansen substitute
mild dose of comimttee reorganization.
In effect
the
House adopted the version of committee
reorganization that
legislator would
tn .p^in'^-^U'^''^^''^^'^"'^
have to
relinquish a committee, and no committee
was abolished.
Responsibility for major policy areas (energy
environment, and so forth) remained scattered
among several
standing committees.
Some committees (Ways and Means) w-re
still overworked and others underworked.
... The jurisdictions of several major commi ttees--Appropri
ations
Armed
Services, and Rules--were basically left
untouched.
The
reshuffling represented little change from the
status quo. 46

!af
was a

•

,

Note that what had taken place here was an
action unprece-

dented in modern times.

Not since the days of "King Caucus" had

party committee dared to take over

completely rework

it."^^

All

in

a

all,

alternative proposals did not add up

a

House committee's measure and
however, the Hansen Committee's
to

a

very great deal

of reform

and this, of course, was the secret of their success in
the House as

a

:
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Whole.

With hindsight, it is easy
to see that the
fate suffered by
the Boiling Committee
proposals followed as an
unintended and unan-

ticipated consequence of reforms
already taken, i.e., by
the rise or
emergence of subcommittee
government and the distribution
of power

articulated by that rise.

What is most important
about Davidson and

Oleszek's account of these events

is

not the specific
characteristics

of the Select Committee's reform
proposals, but the political

through which they were formed and
the manner
defeated.

wart

a

In

in which

process

they were

essence, the plan for committee
reorganization-

fel

1

ath-

newly entrenched and quite sanguine
power structure which was

not about to relinquish recently
acquired advances in its own

fortunes
committee reorganization plan, the
^^^^^ P^^'^^P^ -^^^^ a fundament.
T^^?"'
tal
conceptual miscalculation.
They assumed they were
dealing with a decision-making structure
of standing committees rather than one whose power had
passed in large measure
to the subcommittees.
The focus on full committees was
understandable, in view of their historic primacy
in Congress
and the attention paid them by the
plethora of scholarly
writing from Woodrow Wilson to the present.
Yet recent
changes inaugurated by the House Democratic
caucus in 1971
and 1973 have accelerated a shift from committee
government
to subcommittee government.
Subcommittees have assumed
increasing authority and independence in legislative
decision
making at the expense of the standing committees and
their
chairmen.
The dispersal of power bestowed upon more legislators a power base to nurture and protect.
Thus, committee
realignment is a more dangerous minefield than ever before.
It must accommodate not only the committee chairnien
but more
than a hundred subcommittee leaders as well.
Predictably, a
majority of subcommittee chairmen opposed the reorganization
proposals in H. Res. 988.^8

Li.r^^r

^''^^i^S.^P

It is therefore possible to see that the political

which the Boiling plan was derailed

is

context in

more or less the same as that
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wt^lch persists in

the House of
Representatives to this
day-despite
•

occasional and intermittent
changes which have been
inaugurated since
that ti,ne.
Here is how Dodd and
Oppenhei.ner su™ up the
entire period
Of House reforms:

Iequ:nc;t™F^:nhereliah??^^iS"^^1^

^-^^-^-^

^---oul5^^s:i^1^o^^lrte^^ch^t?s"^^/^i:?e^

sen?oru!
seniority

bypassing the norm of committee
increased the number and

VSI'a
Second, Z^^^
the reforms

giving him considerable control
over the referral of leaisla
tion.
A fifth change, which was
not actual y part of thesi

cr auo'n'in'

'^'^^

^97^?

Hou1e'Budget'?l?«:e?'"

congressional

wafthe

budget process and

Finally, the defeat of the Boiling
Committee Drovision<;
restructuring committee jurisdictions
left the maze of
'""^ subcommittee jurisdictions
relati-

ve^ untouL'd?^^^"'

What we see, then,

is

that the party caucus--but not

necessarily the party leadership-has regained
control over the

distribution of positions of influence within
the House.
tial

mechanism of the seniority system

The

is no longer guaranteed

imparto work

with automatic regularity, but its extent and
reach have been
increased.

Reforms made in terms of the general

interest to

strengthen the House were undercut by particular
interests which had
only gained the power to undercut them by virtue
of reforms already
made.

Outside interest groups, lobbies and support staffs joined
the

subcommittee chairmen

in

building the opposition forces that defeated
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the

Boning proposals.

Altogether they probably
provide

bas,s for the prevention
of farther reforms.
the caucus will

a

strong

Whether the new power
of

last remains to be
seen.

There are three important
lessons in the history
of proposed
reforms and the battles to
which they give
rise as that history
is

presented by Davidson and
Oleszek.
.matter of jurisdiction;

The first involves the
general

the second concerns

the

importance of personal

power and influence within
the chamber and the third
concerns the role
of special interest groups
as supports of personal
power.

Jurisdiction can be seen as

formal

a

division in law or

authority of the realm of
justiciable matters by

a

court or legisla-

ture.

What happens, in effect, is
that the legislature examines
its
universe of responsibilities,
subdivides this into particular
areas,

Aristotelian fashion, and assigns
them
action.

In

to

subsets of itself for

practice, in the common law tradition
of the United

States, such subdivisions have been
refined, evolved and solidified

according to the dictates of political
we moved into the 1970s,

a

power and legal

set of broad and general

precedent.

As

problems began to

Impinge upon the central government which
were not only urgent and
important, but cut across the general
tional

jurisdictional

areas embodied.

lines of the logic which tradi-

Matters concerning energy and

the environment provide the most outstanding
examples.

notes that even as late as 1976, jurisdiction

in

Morris Fiorina

energy matters was

divided between eleven subcommittees from six standing
committees,

50

making Congressional

action on such important questions
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almost impossible

to

achieve.

one Of the fundamental

But "energy" had quite
simply not been

categories or organizing
concepts in the

,ninds

of the members of Congress-not
even as recently as the
late 1950s.
With regard to rapidly emerging
problems, then, it does not
seem

unreasonable to view the institutionalized
jurisdiction
any particular point in time as
In this respect the

representation of

a

Congress at

past reality.

institution literally faces its
future backwards,

and while the jurisdictional

of past practical

a

in

structure is also

experience-and,

to work for over two thousand

as

a

valid fonnal ization

such, embodies practices known

years-it can

be

seen as an elaborate

and deeply ingrained institutional

habit that makes it extraordinarily

difficult for the assembly

with novelty.

to

deal

The second lesson that can be gained from
Davidson and Oleszek
is probably older than any known turning
to precedent:

men in power

are loath to part with it, and it was this
reluctance to see them-

selves overruled which defeated the Boiling plan
for committee reorga-

nization.

The surprise for many had come at the moment
that the

supposedly liberal Democratic caucus voted

Committee for the Boiling Committee.

to

substitute the Hansen

Majority Leader O'Neill best

explained why the caucus voted the way it did:

"The name of the game

is power, and the boys don't want to give it up."^^

The third lesson is in some

mys

an extension of the

second;

it has to do with the emergence of coalition politics as distinct from

party politics, i.e., with the emergence of alliances that come into

existence

to

suit the purposes of the moment as opposed to such as are
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founded on long range programs
or plans of government.

The Boiling

Committee reforms were defeated
by the liberals
within the Democratic
party allied with their usual
foes, the chairmen of
the few remaining
exclusive committees, plus the
chairmen of those committees
destined
for cancellation.
The members
of this internal

aided by their personal

i

tion were

staffs and the staffs of
the potentially

affected committees, and further
strengthened

efforts of external

ad hoc coal

in

their aims by the

interest groups whose past
political contacts,

campaign contributions and inputs
into the legislative process
had
been formed within the context of
the prior existing jurisdictional
and power structure.

We shall

politics later, but just now
not have expected

a

I

all

return to the matter of coalition

want to point out that first, one
would

reform movement such as this one to have
been

blocked by liberals, and that second, their
successful forays against
the Select Committee were made possible
by the democratization and

decentralization which had themselves been
institutionalized only
few years earlier.

a

Reforms which benefitted the individuals in

Congress, therefore, seem to have had the consequences
of preventing

subsequent reforms that might have benefitted the
institution
whole.
dual

as a

Nor could solutions to the twin difficulties raised
by indivi-

and institutional

powerlessness been approached

in

reverse order:

had the reforms with respect to individuals not been
undertaken, it

would have been even theoretically impossible

to

attempt changes in

the organization of power and authority throughout the institution.

That changes of the first order prevented those of the second.
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however, could not have been
predicted.

Representative Boiling

described his victorious opponents
as follows:
'"iddle-rank liberals
are going to use anv exrii<;p
prevent change simply because
they like i^whe e they are
Now they re not just time
servers-some of them are preUv
good men and women who feel
strongly that their

wriu iiKe tteir'-oa'Sr^'k
wh^lU^
zneir pads.
They

contribuJin

sub[om"e r

P^^^^-^^^'^ little

critical'' Z'''' 30ing to devise
a variety of techniques
^nH
and IS
they 11 join with any allies
they need to.
And they're'
very dangerous. 53
To sum up all

of these developments,

the key to understanding

the contemporary Congress-as that
Congress revealed itself through

its opposition to the Boiling plan-is
decentralization of power and
the rise of the subcommittee.

In

what follows, we will trace the

emergence of the autonomous "entrepreneurial"
member on the level of
the individual, and the increasingly
institutionalized and powerful

subcommittee on the level of the organization.

The individual

member

has been raised to uncommon stature by his
position on

a

and by his ability to separate crucial

concern from

those of either

a

party or a national

issues of local

interest.

subcanmi ttee

Since his own posi-

tion depends upon the faithfulness with which he
addresses the first,
he is held to no high standard with regard to the second
or the third.

Highly trained and proficient in local

district politics, he is at the

same time less inclined to strengthen and defend the institution
of

Congress than at any time since the late Federal

Mayhew have put

period.

As Cover and

it:

party voting has reached new lows
reforms have
been decentralizing ... the House Democratic Caucus has
been used less for making policy than for weakening committee
.

.

.

.

.

.
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declined preciX.lT']"'
^«
^e'? e?? 'S^
'"""T''
can be seen in the shoddv hanHiL!
declines
*
recent years.
P"^'^'"
In short
u
°^
is Characterized by
'^''"^^ "80s
«eak SarJ; le^d^^h'
"""'"'^'-archical
committees, a vast arrav
H^'"'
'^''^^ '"^^^rs
can do the r own thina ^nd .n^?'?'"!"
member 1ndi vid^al
't e co g e ^.e shan'b '""l''''
i
.

::n\^
a

iL":/°de7:^tr^]fr

reversion

i

dVVT^"^

"^^^

ton^e^rrlg^^Vc^s^l^^t^ll^L-ts^^n^sI

^^^^^^^^S^^T^^^^^^^^-^i^^^t^^^
and the Pred ominance of P artim u^

Member
T.^„r."'t7

over General InteresTs

politics is exploitive.

What -Ise i^
°f the'Sashl
"P^'""^'""
t
sysLem
em'for
ror T^coZ'^'J.
a second, more serious
reason.
Public oolirv
emerges from the system almost
as an afterthought
The shaoe
of policy IS a by-product of
^
the way the systeirooeratL
rather than a consciously directed

llJ^",^"'^-

Tth

effort to deal
so ci
Congressmen know that the s ecific
iTnJf'Tl'
impact of broad national policies
'
on their districts
difficult to see, that effects are hidden,
so to speak
They
know too that individual Congressmen
a^e not held responsible
for the collective outcome produced
by 535 members
congress
Thus, in order to attain reelection,
congressmen
focus on things that are both more
recognizable in their
impact and more credible indicators
of the individual
congressman s power- federal projects
and individual favors
tor constituents.
In order to purchase a steady
flow of the
latter, congressmen trade away less
valuable currency-their
views on public policy.
The typical public law is simply
the
outcome of enough individual bargains to
build a majority.
Maybe that s just politics, but we don't
have to like it and
political scientists need not construct silly
defenses for
1
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Majorities are built

in

Congress, not elected to it.

So

far,

we have attempted to explore some of the
characteristics of the internal

House institutions that determine and constrain
action on the

floor of the House before anyone ever rises

to

speak.

Internal

House
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mstnutlons were originally

Intended to aid the
process of consensus

building by enabling Congress
to focus upon
great nu*ers of matters

centers of power within the
body, and hence bec«e
platfo™s for
Obstructionism and give rise
to a kind of
Congressional

paralysis,
such institutions thus
exercise functions that are
clearly vital to
the whole body, yet which
are far removed fron
the floor, fr«
the

theoretical

nerve center of its activity.

Here we take another step

away fro. that vital center,
this ti.e going beyond
the legislating
institution Itself to the local
district origins of the membership.
From the standpoint of
consensus building and institutional
function, this is a move away
from the politics of fonnal
aspects of
the organization of House agency,
and toward its "raw" political

aspects, in the sense that we are
shifting

fr™

the dispositions and

distributions of acquired power to its
necessary conditions.

construction of majorities

in

Congress is

a

If the

consensus building process

undertaken to instantiate some policy,
election to the Congress
follows

a

consensus building process of its own.

internal Congressional

No member of any

consensus is free to consistently
oppose the

wishes of his district if he expects to
preserve that external consensus upon which his position depends.

This is the most obvious

fonii

district Influence upon members of Congress
as they act both individually and collectively.
Less obvious than possible direct district
pressure on members, but perhaps more Important 1n our era, is
what local

district

of
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representation .a. be co.ing
dual

to ,nean

m'ten^s of

the focus on Indlvl-

.e.ber actlvUles. I.e.,
the kind of policies

in

the service of

Which the .e.ber .ay focus
his energy and organize
his ti.ne.
the Classical model of the
representative, he who was
sent

Under

to

legislature, if he was

a

the

delegate, could expect to
be cupelled to

undertake policies or courses
of action on questions
that involved the
polity as a whole according
to
the wishes of his district.

If he was

a

representative in Burke's sense, on
the other hand, he could
probably count on keeping a clear
conscience no matter what happened,
but
in any case, consultation
with the district was not a
great concern.

Under the emerging regime, however,
the activities of external
consensus building that occupy the
representatives are incremental, highly
diversified, and unremitting in their
demands on his time and attention.
a

Local

district consensus must be created
and maintained, not by

few great, but by hundreds of small

as vital

acts, each of which is perceived

or favorable by some piece of the
electoral mosaic, which

must be pleased

in

most of its parts if the whole is

favorable picture of the candidate.
issues of a national
The logical

to

register

a

To the extent that this is true,

import have difficulty entering the picture.
place to begin exploring the relationship
which

the Congressman has with his district is what
David Mayhew has called

"the electoral

connection."

Mayhew adopted the heuristic device of

assuming that
United States Congressmen are interested in getting
reelected--indeed, in their role here as abstractions,
interested in nothing else. 56
.

.

.
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He continuously argues
for his second
fundamental

throughout the book.

This Is,

assumption

s1.pl, stated, that In
acting to

enhance their reelection
prospects. Congressmen

c«e

to

discover that

electoral

rewards are conferred upon
members for the positions
they
take publicly and not for
the actual effects they
achieve In the
world.
It's not whafs done. Ifs
whafs said about It that counts.
For Mayhew. this ultimately
means that It Is nonsense
to speak of the

goals of Congress in terms of
collective goods:
It may occur to the reader
that the earlier discussion of
''''
° 0
' collec
s
IrllZJ Tutr''' °" '"^^^^'•s like regulatory
policy
members
li
u
cou d have been portrayed as
seekers of effects unable to
'^%,^i"'="'ty Of gfnera^'Jnrconective
u'lZlt^oT
action.
But to argue this way would have
been a
mistake.
The notion of members as seekers
of effects needs a'
''''
for positions'!'
''''''''' ''''''''

'ITU

noTeffeas.s"?
If,

then,

it is a matter of empirical

research for Mayhew to

discover that the typical member of
Congress does not act
achieve "effects" that are

in

order to

in

the common interest, what sorts of

effect does the member seek, and how does
he

go

about pursuing the

quest?
What emerges from Mayhew'

s

analysis is that the member of

Congress, qua member is formed primarily by
the nature of contemporary

re-election pressures'.

As those pressures have changed,

relationship between the typical member and the general

so

has

body.

the

For

Mayhew, Congress has become professionalized and promotes
careerism

among its members. 58 He thus defines the body as "an assembly
of pro-
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fesslonal

pursun

politicians spinning out
political careers.""

of a career requires
continual

re-election.

Which Congressional
candidates win party
nominations
local

primary, rather than by
caucus or convention.

ditional

ties between

.e*er

successful

Now the «ay in
is by direct

This weakens tra-

and party.^^ Morris
Fiorina, who follows

Hayhew pretty closely at
ti.es. traces al, of
these developments back
to 1910

I'eadership^rthTbe'glnn'^no'of'^thi:

ToZidi'

'^t:^"^"^"

reJa^n tte?;
became

.e

neb

Z^'""

J

I

° h

f

""^'""^^

I''

p-"s^o=^:i^^^ty:n^\?

^^^^

-^-^

'^'^ congressmen wishing to
'''''

"^^df^^dual'vl""

"s^dirtrict^tlar^S-

d1rt:?^l^r?i;?r"

around the chamber gave individual
tunny to take actions to enhance members a greater od nor
their rlelect on efforts
The seniority system was the
natural response to a qrouo of
°'
''''' '''' d?stribu'?ed ^o^r^
w del^v^o'^Lo'"'''^^"^'";
^roup of standing committee
chairiien
Ttt^lli
t^^"^
'''"^^'"9 committees in 1910)
who would
thl' positions by
t ^in their
attain
the automatic workings of the
seniority system.
Acceptance of the seniority system
gave

lhe"J.f/Jo^^r^:ss^%^^^^^

''''

natio^a/^pa'^t^i^rin

That members, acting on their own
behalf, are able

to

improve their

chances of winning reelection is
supported by the electoral
of incumbency. ^2

^^^^

advantages
"

advantages which accrue to them

through their office, not only can they
retain their positions, but
they can do so with

That they must

so

a

statistically-significant margin of safety."

use the office as a condition of retaining

becoming recognized.
tion first over all

it is now

Fiorina notes that those who do not seek reelecother goals get weeded out.^^
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For Mayhew, then, congressmen
.ust constantly engage in
activities related to reelection.^^
A.ong such activities,
three are priniary.

and all

of these are directed
beyond the legislature.

activities are:
position-taking.

1]

The three

self-advertising; 2] credit-claiming;
and 3]

The meaning of the first
should be obvious.

One

puts one's name before one's
constituents as often as possible,
preferably in the form of messages
which have little or no issue
content.
The object is simply to become
as well-known as possible.
Dan Flood,

for example, was well

shaking hands.
impressed.

known for turning up uninvited
at weddings and

The family would be grateful;
their friends would be

The day would be

a

success.

Everyone would have been

immensely cheered by that wonderful
Congressman Flood.
The second election related activity,
credit claiming, is

a

bit more complex and more portentious in
its implications for
Congressional

action.

Here the representative tries to demonstrate

that he has been responsible for getting
the government

something desirable.

to

do

The best way to do this is to traffic in
par-

ticularized benefits, i.e., to secure "goods" that
can be distributed
among individuals or groups back home in the
district.

What counts

is that the recipient unit be of such a scale
that it can recognize

the congressman's efforts and applaud his good works.

While some par-

ticularized benefits require legislative action, such as the pork
barrel, the greater part of them are comprised of casework--thousands
of favors performed for individuals who encounter separate dif-

ficulties, usually in obtaining government services.

To

their succor
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the valiant representative,
or

a

„e.ber of his staff,
immediately

hastens.

Thus the constituency
co,„es to see the
representative as a
personal contact In government,
a cutter of red
tape and a supplier
of
goods-1n Short, as valuable and
valued."** o„ similar
principles were

once constructed the wonderful
city machines of 19th
century taerican
urban politics.
The third reelection activity
which continually preoccupies
members of Congress is that of
position taking.
The representative
makes clear and striking
pnoruuici^ on the issues of the day, sta-

tements of the form, "I oppose
the President on this," or,

favor of an immediate freeze on
nuclear weapons."

"I

am in

Such statements are

fundamentally harmless in that they
seldom yield concrete results or
require the member to do anything.
But they do enable him to sound

good, and they play well

on the evening news.

Why are such apparently trivial

bureaucratic activities so important?
keeping incumbents incumbent.
Congressional

and largely ceremonial

or

First, they are crucial

to

Second, however,

a

review of

history makes it clear that while not new,
these prac-

tices have assumed

a

much larger role than previous both in
the daily

life of most members and in making up the
member-district rela-

tionship.

Hence they point to deeper developments within
the legisla-

ture and perhaps to changes in the meaning and
substance of

representation itself.
vity,

the

Among such important changes in member acti-

following should be noted.

some cases wind up acting as principal

First,

individual

members in

lobbyists for clientele groups
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the1. app.oaches to
pa.t1cu,an-.ed .enefUs.

cn,es

.,.e

cona. constUuendes

Those

f.o,„

ten. to .e.ote

o,. machine

™ch

t1,„e

to

distribution Of benefits;
those fro.
upper-.l.^e-Cass bases t«
tend
dea, 1n positions.™
Third, the satisfaction
of electoral

-quires re.ar.abl, little
zero-su. conflict a.ong

-kes

It possible

t.e
to

needs

.ne.nbers.^^

and this

for the. to collectively
act to .eet their
separate

needs.

This becomes particularly
Important when «e turn
to the polltics of congressional
spending decisions, as
«e shall see.'^
in general,

however, the full

connexion" do not emerge until

implications of the "electoral

the goods-distributing
representative

1s seen In the context
of subcommittee government.

Fiorina notes that

marginals have disappeared,
as the new system has
developed, because
congressmen have found it possible
to base their reelection
on noncontroversial activities-such
as

their casework and pork
procure-

.ent-rather than upon other kinds of
traditional activities which
lead to controversy and tend
to divide the district.^^

provide them with

a

good deal

This tends to

of independence from their
fellows,

because on such issues as direct
constituency service, procedures
have
been worked out to make compromise
and consensus absolutely
painless.
Further, to the extent that members
of Congress are on their own
with
respect to seeking reelection," they
are also on their own with

respect
seats.

to

depending on the national parties

This,

in

to

help them secure their

turn, leaves them on their own with
respect to par-

ties when they take their seats in
Congress and find their separate
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ways to their far-flung subco.n.i
ttees

^ittees themselves are related

to

.

Mayhew notes that the subc.n-

the reelection process
here

described in that they provide
small group settings in
which individual congressmen can make
things happen,^^
^^^^
^^^^^
cialization in Congress is, at
bottom, a quest for credit.^^
When we

combine all of these factors we
get two kinds of disaggregation
or
decentralization within the chamber,
both of which follow the

emergence of particularized goods
as central

to

the daily round of

activities of members, and both of which
historically came after the

democratization and reform movements of
the 1970s.

These are the

structural disaggregation of the subcommittee
system, and the political

disaggregation of

a

weakened party system.

At the beginning of the 93rd Congress,
there were 143 subcommittees in the Senate and 132 in the House.
With disaggregation earned to this extreme, the number
of members covering
subject areas becomes small enough to permit
relatively easy
^
^
credit claiming.//
This system, as Mayhew repeatedly asserts, serves
the reelection needs of members remarkably well.

constraints to follow

a national

party program, and free to take posi-

tions that serve his own advantage.
of the typical

Each is free of traditional

Therefore, the key characteristic

contemporary member of Congress is that he pursues

self-interested aims in

a

legislative and political environment that

has evolved in support of an ethos of decentralization.

fessional

The pro-

literature has begun to designate him the "entrepreneurial

member. "^8
The forces fueling the individualistic tone of the present-
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day Congress remain strong.

As far

Piori-io„.

tzZuT"." !i^':r::Hs

As we shall

personal

see later,

the entrepreneurial

member sustains his

power through Washington networks
as well.
At first glance, the self-interested
entrepreneurial member

looks like the participating, educated
citizen of

democracy or city-state.
classical

a

crucial

classical

difference.

The

assemblies held and used power to jointly
carry out collec-

tive aims.
aims.

But there is

a

Members of Congress, collectively carry
out individual

The earlier legislatures determined the
disposition of the

polity with respect to common policies and
problems; our contemporary

Congress excel Is at the distribution of particular
goods.

As Peabody

notes, "members are relatively free to follow the
dictates of their

consciences and to pursue the interests of their districts. "^^
this is all

they follow, we are in trouble.

"institutional

universal

i

The outstanding

If

form of

sm" now practiced in Congress is neither the

pursuit of common aims and goals nor

a

collective approach to common

problems, but takes the form instead that members of Congress
protect
each other so that all can keep their jobs.^^

Two important con-

sequences follow.
First, in recent years, the rate of retirements from Congress
has increased to the point that retirement from Congress now exceeds
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electoral

defeat as the primary factor

in

the

turnover of seats,

cooper and Wesfs analysis of
this phenomenon indicates
that even
though congress as a whole
succeeds in promoting the
re-election chances of its members, the
personal

declining fast.

returns they get from the
Job are

Members individually face
higher "costs" and lower

"benefits" in struggling to keep
their seats.

For example, upon resigning
his senate seat

in

1978,

Senator

James Pearson remarked:
Several factors are pushing in
on us today.
We havp an enor
mous increase in the amount of
business to be done ^nd a
great increase in time pressure.
And the parochal demands
from back home are greater.
People today, more than ever
before, expect you to come home to
your state just about
every weekend. ... if this government
ever falls,
t won't
be from any external pressure.
It will be because those
'''''
''''
Tr^^inte'pl^'ror'^t'hfnk.^a'^"^'"'^

What this means, as Cooper and West see

it,

is that the

incen-

tive system of the House has changed,
diminishing the stakes that

older members have
decline
reforms.

in

in

acquiring or exercising authority, and that
the

such authority accelerated precipitously
with the 1970s

With the subcommittee dilution of power inside
the chamber

comes the increase

in

particularized-and often trivi

members' time from the folks back home.

In

a

al

--demands on

sense we can say that

the self-interested expectations which so many ordinary
citizens have

with respect to government are resulting

inclined individuals to Congress.

in

the

selection of similarly

Those with "higher" aims, who used

to make service in the body their vocation, are giving up.

Representative Otis Pike (D-NY) recently remarked:
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Being expected to put in a
full day's work at the
office and
a full night's appearance
on the banquet circuit
can ae? ?n
^°
be and has come to be a bore
P^nni^
'^^ople L
bug me more than
thev !i<;pH
they
used to.
They are asking their
government to do morp
for them and are willing to
do less and less for
... So much of the work is nit-picking trivia. 84thernse ves
,

.

•

•

•

It should come as no surprise,
then, that some older members

get tired and disgusted and worn
down by the service orientation
of
the job, and quit.^^

Among those who remain, "particularized

legislation," in Mayhew's phrase, becomes
the only game

in

town.

The second problem that arises with
the emergence of the

entrepreneurial member and the quest for
specialization is

what

I

call

the

institutional paideia of Congress.

a

matter of

This term here

refers to the process of socialization to and
education in the folk-

ways of

a

body which has its own culture, traditions
and positive role

in government.

The student of classical

find that the members of the national

politics is dumfounded

legislature are resigning their

seats, not because there are greener pastures

tainly the case

in

el

sewhere--as was cer-

the nineteenth century--but simply because

not want to be there anymore.

to

Members of the boule

,

they do

the signoria

,

and

the Parliament were not widely noted for resigning their seats.

Why were those seats attractive, and why was it usually
law, revolution or terminal

place there?

The answer,

a

matter of

illness to get someone to relinquish his

in

word, was power, and the fact that "the

a

boys don't want to give it up."

What seems to be going on in the con-

temporary Congress is that the members are being forced by cir-

cumstance

to

give up power in

a

number of ways; unanticipated ways;
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ways Which were not
forestalled by defeat of
the Boiling c.n.ittee
refo™ proposals. The old
apprenticeship system 1s
gone, the "in

order to get along, go along"
rule has been repealed.86
authority of those
by no .eans ended.

tional

in

senior positions has declined
even though it has
This factor is crucial
to a weakening of
institu-

cohesion that can hardly lead

to

anything but

a general decline
in .e™ber loyalty to Congress
itself.S? Barraged by
trivial demands
from outside, the individual
^e*er becomes an entrepreneur in a
body
Of professional politicians
who have little incentive to
seek the good
of the Congress itself.
But. less inclined to keep
the institution

strong, less bound together by
the paideia or syste,n of
acculturation

which is always necessary to make
individuals members of institutions,

how can it be expected that modern
members mobilize themselves singly
and severally to maintain the power
of the legislature against the

spreading influences of bureaucracy and
executive branch?

Fiorina

notes that
increasingly, the individuals members can
achieve their
primary goals independently of (and even in
opposition to)
the ends for which the Institution was created. 88
•

.

.

So where Mayhew and Cover saw a "reversion
to the original
QQ
constitutional design,
Fiorina sees a perversion of its ultimate

aims.

Whether the Constitutional design has proved adequate

to

carry

out its aims is not something that we will take up in
this place.

The

point is that whichever of these interpretations seems more
plausible,
we have

a

serious problem.

Having looked at the increase of interest

in

matters which
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concern ,„e.bers 1n thei.
local particularity,
„e now need to turn
closer examination of the
kinds of legislative
action that the

congress normally or typically
takes.

According

to

the rise of the Individualistic
or entrepreneurial
fugal

force when it co.es to
legislation.^^

Tho.as

Mann,

E.

member Is

to a

a

centri-

Here, again. 1t Is Impor-

tant to distinguish between
the localized Interests
of districts and
representatives and the possible
generalized Interests of a
national

constituency which Congress. In
Its governing rather than
representing
function, has a constitutional
obligation to carry out.
The professional

literature Indicates that there

1s a

considerable difference

in the efficacy with which
Congress carries out each kind of
respon-

sibility.

Following Mayhew again, we see that
members mobilize with ele-

gance and efficiency on particularistic
issues.
stage simple referenda on Bills.^^

They do more than

Instead, they mobilize activity,

determine the content of measures and
effect the way legislation
implemented.

92

And when will

they mobilize?

tele (i.e., interest group) scrutiny.

analysis,

a

When motivated by clien-

Mobilization is, in the final

matter of having an audience,

a

matter of public2" par-

ticipation, just as Wilson claimed

so

long ago.

the public itself has changed.

is

no longer moved,

capable of being moved, by
issues.

a

It

is

The problem is that
as

it once was

daily press of important national

94

And, unfortunately, without a national

constituency, there is no movement on national

comment on the dominance of local over national

audience,

issues.

a

national

One final

issues should do it:
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members are increasingly de-emphasizing
their role as
formu ators of national policies-a
controversial role after
^"^Phf^zing their role as ombudsmen who str
fear
fnl^lit
into tne hearts of incompetent or
arbitrary bureaucrats
increasingly tolerate members' posif.-nnc on major
^'^'l^.''^
tions
national policies.
What does it matte? if
one s representative is a conservative
or a liberal
Republican or Democrat? One vote of 535
can't make'much difference.
But as subcommittee chairman or
ranking minority
member, the representative in Congress
has been a whiz at
getting water treatment plants and mass
transit feasibility
Moreover he or she kept the old coke ovens
from
llfnl^\
being shut down by EPA and tracked down
umpteen lost social
security and veterans' checks. Why give up
the incumbent's
seniority and experience just because of
disagreements about
the MX or national health care?95
.

.

.

What Fiorina is describing is

kind of tradeoff between

a

representative and constituency on the daily routines of
representing
and governing.
an occasional

The public,

so

it seems,

sin of position taking,

forgives the representative

an occasional

lapse on a major

issue, so long as he provides the district and its constituent
groups

with the services and favors they have come to expect.

This amounts

to a kind of absurd doctrine of "entitlements" with respect to consti-

tuent demands and representative responses.

constituency which goes begging.

On measures lacking particularized

benefits, intrinsic member interest

vanishes.
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fundamental

Again, it is the national

in

the

impact of such legislation

For Fiorina, what all this adds up to is
"mix"

of Congressional

a

change in the

activities.

At this point, the tale begins to grow murky again.

I

have

held that there seem to be two kinds of issue area, and distinguish

between them according

to

their form.

First is the particularistic

issue or good which can be distributed more or less equally across the
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country, district by district-or
at least

sufficient to secure the support
of

a

in

a

nu.ber of districts

majority in Congress.

Closely

associated with this are the rise
of the entrepreneurial
.enber and
the bureaucracy which oversees
the administration of
such goods.
Second are goods, someti.es
distributive, sometimes not.
which concern
the nation as a whole.
With regard to these generally
broad and

Inclusive problem areas, the
professional

consensus is that Congress

has considerable difficulty acting
upon them.

Yet our fragmented

Congress constantly acts and passes
hundreds of major pieces of

legislation each year.
vity.

Indeed, Congress is

a

hub, a beehive of acti-

Twenty-three thousand people work on Capitol
Hill,

if we

take

the notion that the pursuit of
particular, at the expense of general,

aims is the primary motive force

in

Congress today, we will be able to

show that most of the primary characteristics
of what Fiorina calls
the "Washington system" follow easily.
are:

The primary characteristics

the emergence of a new form of politics
within the assembly

which we will call coalition politics and which
is encroaching upon
older forms; the growth of personal

and committee staffs and the

increasing importance of staff roles in lawmaking; the
convergence of

particular interests, caucus politics and staff influence on
the
legislative process in general

and upon the budget annd spending pro-

cess in particular, which results in spending patterns that now
seem

beyond political control; and the spreading bureaucratization of the
syustem, both inside and outside the Congress itself, which defeats

reform attempts and

is

undermining the collegial

processes of the
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national

asse.bl,.

Meanwhile, the activities
of Congress, as it
goes
about its dail, business,
are becoming increasingly
ritualized and
e.pty Of real political
content.
If the Congress
is no longer-or

:nay

soon no longer

be-a collegial

bod,,

if

its .ne.bers are resigning

because they are losing power,
and if its deliberations
no longer
carry real national weight,
then we shall have lost
it.
And Congress
was the centerpiece of the
Constitutional
design.

The Predominance

°IZ^Zt^cuTar;Ov^

Nothing renders Congress less capable
of action than
neea ror it,
... the fact remains that Congress is athennn
^
derous decisionmaking body, more
adept at delayi g
d
d
uting legislative proposals than
'taking clear-cut decisive
""""^h, such as those of
1933 and I'qdi' ?ln'''''
'^^'^t^^'
^"'"'
"^^^^^ times
.i :. process takes
the lea?,
legislative
time.
One reason is of
course, structural:
Congress is large and complex!
But a
more fundamental cause is political.
In Congress there are
lots of conf icting opinions and
objectives to be reconciled
and no underlying base of agreement
that allows a
congressional majority to govern with
parliamentary ease.
In
the absence of overwhelming consensus
conflicts over
po icy are represented in the
Congressional parties
factions that have to'be accon^"^^
^nn'^^n"?
modated before Congress can make any decisions
at all
Majorities are built in Congress, not elected
to it: hence
Congressional politics is coalition politics.^B
.

These remarks were written in 1973

,

.

.

before the final wave of

reforms had transformed the House.

Congress has sat

session for 194 years, and there

little even remotely compatible

is

in

continuous

with its basic grant of powers that hasn't been tried
there.

every development of the past 20 years that could

or emergent can be found

in

be

Almost

pointed to as new

some earlier era if the student is willing

335
to look hard enough.

Yet the professional

these pages, expresses the
consensus that

appeared

arnong

us.

literature, as reviewed
a

In

"new" Congress has

What makes the present
body different from
Its

predecessors Is what Fiorina
called the "mix" of Its
activities
1
e
the reigning division of
powers, the rules according
to which It organizes Itself and the kind
of politics that occupies
Its membership
every day.
In this section I
want to briefly discuss
what Is called
"coalition pontics," a process
through which groups of
members, organized sometimes formally,
sometimes informally, come
together in c^i-

m-ttees and on the floor

draw up and to pass legislation.

to

While

Congress has long been renowned for
its facility of obstruction,
the
methods through which it acts
positively are more complex and
more
obscure.

Coalition politics is particularly
Important at this time,

not because it is

a

truly novel

development, but because the current

context-of weak parties, weakened leadership,
member and

a

the entrepreneurial

strong executi ve-not only provides
the background for the

emergence of coalition or caucus power,
but contributes

to

the

progressive weakening of customary institutions
that formerly mastered
the legislature and bent it to the conduct
of its business.

would require empirical

While it

studies to establish this definitively,

I

think it could be shown that the portion of
legislation either passed

directly or strongly influenced by In-House coalitions
as opposed
the party leadership,

is

in

a

period of marked Increase.

We are here concerned with coalitions of two kinds:

those which have some formal

to

organization, perhaps Including

first,
a

name.
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an office and even paid staff
.embers.

The congressional

memberships

of groups of this sort is drawn
from one or both parties
and these
individuals exchange information about
impending legislation and act

collectively

to

organized around

block or influence it.
a

Such coalitions are usually

single interest or issue.

The second kind of

coalition may be, but is not necessarily,
an outgrowth of the first.
It comes into action in cases where
members find themselves united in

opposition to or support of specific proposals
for differing reasons.
An example of this second kind of coalition
can be found in the ad hoc

group that emerged

in

opposition to the Boiling Committee refoms.

Two of the prominent components of this group were
the entrenched

chairmen of the standing committees, who found
themselves under
attack, and various scattered individuals who had
strong ties to orga-

nized labor, itself strongly opposed to Boiling's
suggestion that the

Education and Labor Committee be separated into two committees.
nothing formal or habitual conjoined committee chairmen

to

While

members

with ties to labor, in this particular instance they formed an

alliance which can only be termed ad hoc and which, nonetheless, succeeded

in

fulfilling its aims as thoroughly as any solemnly incor-

porated House institution.

The refonn movement was diluted.

The activity of coalition building itself is generally

understood
operating
the House.

to
in

take place at the behest of the executive branch,

conjunction with the leadership of the majority party
At least, this is the form with which most students of

Congress would normally begin.

It is the easiest to

understand

in

.
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because the most visible, and
our discussion will begin
here because
we shall see that the
difficulties faced by the
contemporary

leadership

in

building majority coalitions
are canplicated by the

emergence of these special

What

I

interest fon.al

and ad hoc coal

i

t ions

want to show is that the expanding
influence of the new coali-

tions represents the onset of

parallel

to

a

new form of internal

House politics,

the older forms, but having
a different basis of
electoral

and financial

power and

a

different way of bringing its opinions
and

influence to bear upon the general

body.

Much of the legislation pro-

posed and passed by the new coalitions is
drawn up and supported at
the behest of single interests of both
the economic and ideological

varieties and therefore constitutes, if one
is

to

believe Woodrow

Wilson, private business.

First let us look at coalition politics as
House organization and House rules.

a

consequence of

As we have already seen, the 1910

revolt against Speaker Cannon produced

a

decentralized House in which

the majority party leadership could no longer command
the various

organizational

units.

Both party control

and Speaker's prerogatives

over committee appointments and the Rules Committee had been considerably weakened.

Some students may take the view that these

changes made it easier for individual members to vote their consciences and represent their districts; some may emphasize that the problem

of building majorities had been redefined.

In

either case, what mat-

tered now was that, from the standpoint of the leadership, majorities

were hence to be solicited instead of commanded.

Further, since the
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committee chairn,en held independent
sway over diverse
centers of
power, the majority party
leadership under Speaker
Rayburn found
Itself having to function largely
as petitioners of
c«,„1ttee support
and floor managers of committee
legislation:
In

sum, by 1940 the role and
power of the oartv
substant?
1!°"^^
lly aUeTed
" h''^
Thouoh'
h^ leadership
Though the
retained responsibil 1 tv for and ron
•

.

.

9"^-^^""
dirlcuon in the conVuTt c,f'"f,r»'''''°'r'''
business, 1t now had to operate
within a
fJ:\
I
far harsher
set of constraints than in
1910.
At
the
floor
stage the leadership usually
had no choice but to engage
in

~L

«jor1ties'b^hi
part
pa
t cular
Ur bn?r?hrf
bills throughhT'^^:"?
bargaining and maneuver
At thP
committee stage, the leadership was
often forced to
in
intricate and prolonged negotiation
with committees and
leadership was now p aced n a
nnluln^'r'"'
J"?''^'
position where inability
to accommodate an organizational
unit would mean failure to pass party
legislation, unless it
' '"^Jonty of such strength and inten^nv
sity that It could force a vote on
the floor through the
of opinion in the House or the use
of a mechanism
cM^h'f^
such as a discharge.
The result was that by 1940 the oersonal, political skills of the leadership,
rather than its
sources of institutional power, had become
the critical
determinant of the fate of party programs.
The painful process of assembling majorities
through

bargaining and maneuver has been with the leadership
ever since.

Most

of the coalitions in question were based on
party and region and all

were of what we might call the ad hoc variety, i.e.,
they had no formal

meetings or organizations.

But one in particular came into being

at this time which was to serve as

a model

for others that would begin

arriving on the scene nearly forty years later.

vative coalition, about which
up.

a

This was the conser-

dense and lush literature has sprung

Its motives were primarily negative,

i.e.,

to

block liberal

legislation, and its success over the years has been remarkable.

It
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too was an ad hoc coalition
for the ,nost part,
but aohn Manle.
reports
that old Joe Martm and
Howard W. Snilth were
not above getting

together for Infonnal

bnis.lOO

Inter-part, conferences
with respect

What interests us here

interests, "Two souls with
but

a

Is

that an Infonnal

to

certain

association of

single thought," as one
observer put

it, could co.e together
without organization and
without fanfare and
exert enorrnous negative power
over a period now approaching
fifty

years.

In

his well

known

Charles L. Clapp provided

Th^_Congr^^
a

classic picture of the
conservative coall-

tlon in operation, using the
rules that govern debate In
the House
prevent House action. These
particular events

occurred

in

1950, on February 22.

February 22 fell on
^'''^''^
^EPC bill on
that
tt^lTtl
day.
The Southerners wanted to
avoid that.
First there
was a quorum call, then a roll call
on dispensing wUh the
reading of the Journal.
After that came the readin of
^^^'^^^^11 ^ddress.
When that was concluded. Gene
rnx of
nJ^r^"
Cox
Georgia rose and said, "out of
reverence to the memory
^
of George Washington I suggest we
adjourn.
I
move we
adjourn. Then there was a roll call
on the motion to
^^"^^
question of taking up Calendar
u^H^'"'!!*
u^^^
Wednesday, and there
was a roll call on that.
It was 11 in
the evening before we began consideration
of the bill
We had to exert every effort to keep
members on the
floor.
The opposition was watching all the
time.
Every time
there was a quorum call, a group of the
Republicans would
leave the floor.
John Bell Williams of Mississippi walked
through the aisles on the Democratic side
saying, "there is a
cotton caucus in the cloakroom," and many
Southerners would
walk off the floor leaving a quorum absent.
Finally, at 11
p.m. Speaker Rayburn over-ruled a point of
order that no
quorum was present on the grounds that it was dilatory
a
similar point of order had been made just a few
minutes
before.
Then we began consideration of the bill and passed
It at 4 in the morning.
In that situation one rule had been
brought up after another which resulted in a form of filibuster in the House. The rules can be used in that way. 101

Ihf

to
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By virtue of its longevity and
success,

the conservative

coalition has become what can only be
called an informal but
"permanent" potential

obstacle

effectiveness is subject
vocal

to

to

liberal

legislation, and while its

fluctuations of electoral

strength and

intensity, every winter of dormancy
has been followed by

hyperactive spring of negative access.

a

The impulses it impedes

generally come from the leadership which,
even

in

its reduced role as

bargainer and solicitor, continues to hold
ultimate responsibility for
transforming the anarchically inclined House into
an agent.

Combined

with executive branch influence, the majority party
leadership has

usually borne the brunt of the struggle of getting the
House
the ball, and we will

to

carry

begin our examination of the contemporary coali-

tions with Barbara Sinclair's work on the problem of attaining
consensus as it is faced by the leadership 102
.

internal

j^h^^ she

finds is that the

changes of the 1970s have vastly complicated and even changed

the conditions which confront the leadership, and that the problem
of

attaining consensus is more difficult than it was
Sinclair divides the Congressional

103
.

questions in

Rayburn's time.

agenda into "issue areas,"

following the scheme laid out by Aage Calusen
Decide

in

in

his How Congressmen

She then tests to see whether Congressional
a

given area reveal

viduals, by assigning each member

consistent voting alignments of india

numerical

"support score" deter-

mined by the number of times he or she voted liberal on
such as social welfare.

votes on

A support score for a group,

Democrats or Northeastern Republicans,

is

a

given issue

say House

the average of

its me'.ibers'
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scores,

104

and allows Sinclair to determine
whether the exposition of

voting alignment groups has changed, or
whether it

movement

in

the economy,

1970s.

possible to find

the substantive positions of determinate
groups.

What does she find?

regional

is

On questions of government management
of

Republicans and Democrats both began to split
along

lines during the 1960s, and these splits
deepened into the

105

Regional

splits within the parties also appear during
this

same period with regard to the other major areas she
singles out,
i.e.,

social

welfare and civil

liberties.

(Questions of foreign

policy are more confused, because the reactions of the various
voting
blocs to questions of this sort depended to

which party held the White House at

a

a

considerable degree upon

given moment. )^°^

In

one of her

notes, however, she makes an important distinction:

Democrats from all regions seem to be more willing to
follow party lines on those issues, especially broad economic
ones, considered by the congressional leadership and the president to be crucial to the party program, so long as their
constituency interests are not fundamentally compromised.
Unfortunately, for the president and the leadership, the
latter condition excluded many of the most crucial issues
such as energy.
.

.

.

The energy issue, as it arose in the 1970s, is cited so often
in the literature that it is paradigmatic of what is being systemati-

cally neglected by Congress.
issue,

a

rational

society.

general

issue.

It

It
is

is

neglected because it is

a

true that the establishment of

and coherent energy policy would benefit the general
It

is

broad
a

order of

also true that no matter what its method of treatment,

there would be powerful

interests that would find themselves adversely
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affected,

it

is

precisely such interests
which are able

leverage upon the

,ne,nbers,

to

exert

undermining party programs
either by giving

rise to ad hoc coalitions, or
single interest coalitions,
either of
Which is capable of preventing
positive action by the general
body.

Sinclair's analysis shows us
the 1970s.

a

House changing rapidly during

Member coalitions have found
new bases for ccnmon action

in response to changes that
began to take place in the
national

tical

agenda, 1969-1976.108

poli-

Sinclair has shown that when the
general

public strongly urges changes in
the national

agenda. Congress usually

responds with realignments of House
voting blocs on questions of

policy legislation.
several

Here, what seems to have happened
is that

broadly based sentiments for policy
change impinged upon the

Congress simultaneously from different
constituencies
regional

areas.

in

different

Congress, always responsive to particularistic

constituency pressures, shifted its internal
composition accordingly.
But the result was no new set of potential
majority alignments with

regard to the new agenda.
on the broad general

Instead, the problems of majority formation

questions became even more difficult.

Now the reputation of the House Democratic leadership
rests,
in part, on its success in gaining passage of
presidential

priorities.

-[-^^5

^^^^

^^^^ ^^^^ difficult by the entry of

entrepreneurial members who, while not
sis,

a

subject of Sinclair's analy-

arrived upon the scene and declined to vote

in

fixed or predic-

table patterns--making it necessary for the leadership

their support again and again.

m

In

to

solicit

common parlance, this means that
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the leadership had to expend
scarce political capital

.anted to win

a

vote.

its supplies Of capital

every ti.e

But. as with any banking
or financial

U

syste.

are neither infinite nor
infinitely renewable.

Sinclair also finds that the
percentage of those who are
consistently
supportive of the leadership
increases as their seniority

increases. 112

Clearly, then, party loyalty
is positively correlated

with increased personal

power in the chamber and an
increased stake in

the efficacy of its operations
as

already seen of the shift

in

a

legislature.

Given what we have

power away from the most senior
members

and its decentralization
throughout the subcommittee system,
it should
come as no surprise to find that
the leadership confronted an

increasingly unpredictable and intractable
party membership after
1969.

The result was that

coalitions were quite fluid; few Democrats
were highly
reliable across all issue areas; few could
be written off.
AS a result, coalition building was
more complex.
The number
of members the leadership had to contact
and persuade had
grown.
Gauging the probability of winning was
more difficult, and so was deciding how to spend
scarce time and
resources.
The frequency with which the House
leadership
lost votes which it subsequently turned around
is indicative.
The list for 1979 includes the debt limit
increase bill
an
amendment cutting the State Department's authorization
by 19
percent, a "killer" amendment to the stand-by
gas rationing
bill, the second Budget Resolution, an amendment
immediately
terminating oil price controls, and the Panama Canal
Treaty
implementation bill conference report.
In each case, the
leadership's position prevailed on the second attempt--clear
proof that a winning coalition could be fashioned.
That a
skillful and active leadership lost the first time shows
how
difficult it is to gauge what, and how much, needs to be done
to

win.-"-^-^

As we saw earlier, the problem of majority formation has been

further compounded by rules changes:

by the decentralization of House
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power; by new member Impatience
with the old nor.s of
apprenticeshipand b. the rush of new
members to participate
full, at the c.mittee

and floor stage as soon
as they began their
ten.s.

Changes have also resulted

in

a

Note that these

severe decline in
inter-committee

reciprocity, undermining one
of the most secure means
the House has
developed for facilitating the
formation and passage of
legislation:
"9° ^^'^^ the committee" no
longer
0^ amendments offered on ?he
During the 87th Conaresf ?4n

Jeld^'TlnL^^'\r'
'J'"^^
"^"^b^^
"^^^^
nit rose
.^cf'^f
floor
astronomically.

recorded votes were taken;
during'the 95th

What we are seeing
more is

to

come.

is a

'

IMo U^

legislature verging on chaos.

These amendments aren't harmless.

rewrite legislation and can utterly
transform

a

bill.

But

They are used to

Sinclair points

out that the leadership, unable to
predict voting outcomes and

in

constant danger of getting "ambushed
on the floor''^^^ has been losing
not only its ability to elicit or even
to

force consensus, but also

its ability to exert some kind of quality
control over legislation

itself.

The implication is clear:

insofar as committee specializa-

tion and expertise are needed to draft
workable and reasonable law for
a

highly complex society, the benefits conferred
by the cornmittee

system and its members' long years of specialized
service can be swept
away in an instant by

a

wave of ill-considered amendments, urged on by

the inexperienced and the uninformed.

While this is not the most

"democratic" of possible interpretations of recent developments,
and
tends to lay the question of "representation" aside, the
complex sub-

ject matters with which the contemporary Congress concerns itself
make
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the question of the relationship
between the c.n.ittee
structure and

legislative competence one that
should not be begged.
Sinclair finds, with Mayhew
and Fiorina, that the
"re-election
constituency" is a crucial influence
upon .embers"

voting patterns.

These are the "people who have
supported the member with their
votes
in past elections. "11^
From the standpoint of coalition
foanation.
however, all is again not well.
The reelection constituency
is

increasingly heterogeneous, the
number of "hot issues" like energy,
is
on the increase, and national
politics is becoming "more intense. "^^^
As we saw earlier, controversial
the special

broad questions tend both to
arouse

interests and divide the electorate,
and the member who

takes evasive action when such issues
come up is simply trying to

minimize the damage he can do

to

himself by speaking clearly.

same time, those who succeed in tacking
special

onto

;Tiore

general

At the

interest amendments

bills protect themselves by enhancing their
"credit"

with important parts of the home constituency.

But tensions abound.

Sinclair notes that there may be disagreement
between

a

member's

"supportive elite" back home and the re-election constituency
in
general.

This can cause the member considerable discomfort
at elec-

tion time, and provide ammunition to his opponents
should they be able
to alienate important segments of the constituency with
quotations

from his record.

The House leadership generally tries to persuade

members to vote their own views, since these usually are close
those of the leadership and of the supportive elite.

usually comply when he can do so without giving rise

to

both

A member will
to

harmful

and

346

raucus publicity, but since
the national parties
and the president
have little Influence upon
,„enbers' re-election
chances, their blandishments can affect House voting
patterns only marginal ly.
are some of the factors
which now contribute to
the growing tendency
Of .e*ers to rewrite bills
on the floor, and add
to the growing power
of fo™al and infon^al caucus
groups to act independently
of central

party direction.

That bills are now easily
rewritten, after the conmittees
have
done with them and despite the
efforts of the floor managers
and tacticians to restrict debate and
amendments, is another key to

understanding the contemporary Congress.

The entrepreneurial

member

has arrived; he tends to join ad
hoc coal itions easily, and majority

coalitions sponsored by the leadership
reluctantly.

He always keeps

an eye out for the clientele and
constituency groups who have

supplanted the national

parties in providing him reelection security.

The circumvention of party and leadership
interests, more often than
not results in floor dilution of broad
legislation as the various members strive to protect the special

hearts or their pocketbooks

.

interests that are close

their

Hence, the end product, again, is more

likely to satisfy local and electoral

rather than national

While House party alignments continue

to

regional

to

be

needs.

very important, and

blocs seem to be growing in importance, the role of the
ad

hoc or special

interest coalition, and the kinds of politics

it gives rise, must now be factored into any general
sis of internal

House politics.

to

which

review or analy-

Such coalitions are rapidly becoming
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one of the crucial

elements that dete^lne which
Ue.s on the politi-

agenda will be treated as
"national" and which of
these, In turn
will become policy.
They are also unexcelled
at picMng apart certain
kinds of broad legislation and
sending them down to defeat.
cal

Therefore, Sinclair's work, which
see.s cautious enough in its
initial
emphasis on the problem of coalition
building faced by the leadership,
exposes a host of problems which are
new to the twentieth century
House.

These developments point toward
deeper changes in certain

underlying aspects of the political
philosophies of House
well

as changes

in

their attitudes toward practical

;nenibers,

politics.

as

The

following quotation sums up some of the
contrasts between the House as
it was at the time of the Cannon revolt,
and its present-day internal
pol

i

tics:
In an age when party regularity is
far from an overriding
consideration, it is difficult to appreciate how
important
party was in the House at the turn of the century.
In this
period the great majority of members in both parties
subscribed to the doctrines of party government.
Representative government was seen to depend on the existence
of a responsible majority which had the power to rule
and
which, as a result, could be held accountablefor
perfomance
Only under such conditions, it was believed, could the
people
effect their wishes. The individual representative was
thought to be elected on the basis of a party's platform and
was therefore regarded to have an obligation to support party
positions, even against personal convictions or desires. ^21
_

It should be obvious,

kind of organization and

a

then, that a coalition or caucus is one

party is another.

Parties can be seen

as broad based alliances of a wide variety of interests, which band

together in order to gain power and use it to satisfy the diverse aims
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of their constituencies.

somewhat broad ideological

Party programs thus tend
to enc.npass a
range and, when formalized,
reflect the

processes of bargaining and
compromise and tradeoff activity
through
which a statement of an intended
distribution of goods is collectively
determined.
The promise of such a distribution
encourages the members
to act together for the program
as a whole.

Party organizations per-

sist over time because they begin by
establishing general agreement on
a program and then try to enact
it piece
by piece.

If all

are to

benefit, each must support most of the
program-at least in those
areas where negative constituency pressure
is not overwhelming.

"coalition," on the other hand, is

a

diversity of individuals who come

together for the purpose of furthering
interests, or even

a

A

a

relatively narrow range of

single interest, and who act together with

respect to that interest alone.

Coalitions are not generally held

together by wide-ranging programs or platforms and
indeed, it is often
the case that those who comprise them act together
with respect to the

single thing in question, allies at one moment and
enemies the next.
Although two of the earliest groups (the Democratic
Study Group and the Wednesday Group) were partisan and
oriented toward broad approaches to policy and congressional
activity, the more recently established caucuses tend to be
bipartisan and interested in specific issues.
Such a trend
does not imply that single-issue politics has come to dominate these groups or the Congress as a whole, but it does
mean that most caucuses have organized around sets of issues
... or a particular point of view that affects a wide range
of issues (for example, the regional "lens" of the New
England Caucus) .123
.

.

.

We have seen that each member pays attention primarily to his

district, and to the specific requests and demands of clientele groups
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Which originate there.

Hence it is possible to
see the Congress

replicate this pattern as
.e.bers whose districts
resemble one another
find common ground for
legislative action. Mayhew
calls this
congressional

activity the

sennci^^

^^^^
it is those segments of
the electorate that are
well organized for
political action which succeed
in deriving benefits
from this system,
as opposed to those individuals
who (simply) have intensely
held

preferences.

Some clientele caucuses represent
nationally organized

groups which happen
as,

to

have electoral

for example, the National

representatives one by one.

clout in many districts, such

Rifle Association.

These "target-

Others keep tabs on the Congress
as

a

whole, rather than on individual
members, and exert pressure on behalf
of their interests at appropriate
moments of subcommittee and full

committee deliberations.
agricultural

This tends to be the method preferred
by

interests such as the Tobacco Lobby.

A straightforward

analysis of organized interest activity is
complicated by the diversity of such clients and by the number of
stages in the legislative

process at which they might assert themselves.
In general,

however, we can sum up the current state of

majority coalition building this way.
degree of cohesiveness of party votes

Cooper and Brady hold that the
is

positively correlated with

the concentration of power in the leadership

has declined. Congressional

government.

1

?6
"

.

government has become coalition

This means that Congressional

from a hierarchical

As party cohesivnness

pattern to

a

politics has shifted

bargaining pattern, and that the pro-
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cess of building majorities
has become

coalitions.l"

whUe coalition

a

constant search for

activity to block legislation
is rela-

tively easy to orchestrate,
the problem of positive
action daunts
liberal groups, which find
that they must fo™ally
organize if they
are to have any success at all.^^^
In what follows.

I

am going to lump together
the two different

kinds Of coalition activity,
that which marshalls forces
in order to
pass specific programs or kinds
of legislation, and that
which
coalesces on the floor to reject or
amend bills which have emerged
from the committee system.
I
realize that these are analytically
separable, but what is most crucial
here

is

to

explore the problem of

positive action and the dominance of
special over general

interests.

While Sinclair studies the problem
of consensus building as
faced by the leadership. Burdette
Loomis directs her attention to the

caucus groups which have sprung up among
House members themselves.
She has provided
mal

House groups.

study of forty recently organized formal

a
"

and infor-

what this study shows is that when the

leadership confronts the general body, it faces

organized into coalitions which tend

to oppose

a

legislature already

entire bills whenever

such bills contain provisions inimicable to the
interests they represent.

Each of the groups included in Loomis'

terized by its focus upon

a

s

study can be charac-

narrow range of issues.

According to

Loomis, the Democratic Study Group was the first of these
to emerge
1958.

During the 1960s, two more were formed, then the Black Caucus

in 1971,

nine more by 1975, and more than 20 additional

since

in
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1975.130

For L00.1S. the emergence
of such groups

1s no epiphen^enon.
She provides what ,n1ght be
called the standard account:
they arose

out of Changes in constituency
pressure and widespread .einber
impatience with national party
agendas.
She studies these formations
because they provide a focal
point for us to see changes in
the rela-

tionships among members and changes

in

the institution of Congress.

Prior to 1958, then, the institutions
of Congress did not provide for or include organized
subgroups outside those institutiona-

lized by the party/committee structure."!

the political

frustrations

of members during the 1960s and the
reforms of the 1970s changed these

conditions as we have seen, but Loomis
holds that the caucus, as a
general

form of organization, is a function
of member pursuit of self-

interest and the search for alliances which
can protect such
interests.

Loomis presents

a

profile of four different caucuses or groups

which are "similar in their representation of
identifiable
interests." 132
II

They are:

The Congressional

Black Caucus; the

Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition; the New Members'
Caucus;
and the House Steel Caucus.

^"^^

While there are obvious differences

between them, they are, with the exception of the New Members'
Caucus,

concerned with capturing government largesse for important clientele
or constituency groups.

Hence they act on the basis of distributive

theories of justice and seek primarily economic goods.
sents

a

Table

in

Loomis pre-

which the names of the forty groups are listed and
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some of their .ost Important
characteristics arrayed,

that Table here instead of

a

i

am Including

more exhaustive summary
of her study. ^^4

The groups span the ideological

spectrum and the econ^nic

hierarchy, and some of them are
famous or notorious, depending
on
one's point of view.
Some are organized with
specifically econanic
aims in mind; others have social
agendas.
Few are concerned with a
national constituency, and none
has been organized with the
intent to

promote the vitality of national

institutions.

represent an impressive array of special
virtue of having organized itself,
tion to feather its nest.
a

is

aggregate, they

In

interests, each of which, by

now in

a

greatly enhanced posi-

This last is furthered in those cases
where

given group has been designated

"Legislative Support Agency" which

a

means that Congress has generally decided
that it

important source of information with respect

to

is a useful

its area of concern.

While it may appear that these groups present
us with
theoretical

problem by representing

public space,

a

and

a

heterogeneity of interests in

a

believe that such is not the case, and that the best

I

that can be said of them is that they add
sentation to government,
and the national

a

assembly.

organization of special

a

layer of unelected repre-

layer that falls between the local

district

The distinction between the contemporary

interests in Congress and the representation

of diverse interests in the classical

assembly lies

in

what might be

called the "one-pointedness" of the modern enterprises, the almost
technical
selves.

singularity of purposes and types seeking to promote themIt

is

important to note that coalitions of convenience fly no
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TABLE

1

'NONOFFICIAL" GROUPS IN
THE ^^^^^^^^
CONGRESS
AS OF JANUARY 1979

Bicam-

Membei

eral?

HouM PaniMn

No
No
No
No
No
No

United Democrau of
Congress
iMth Caucus
CongTess.onal Hispanic
Caucus
jotn Caucus

Hepublicaru

Wednesday Group

Northeast Midwest Congressional Coalition

No
No
No

House Congressional Steel
Caucus
Ad Hoc Congressional Commit-

Paid

Funding

Staff

Sources*

Conference of Great Lakes

Congressmen
Congressional Ad Hoc Monitoring Group on South
Africa
Metropoliun Area Caucus

House Ocean Policy Advisory
Committee
House Fair Employment
Practices Committee
Congressional Port Caucus
Congressional Shipbuilding
Coalition
of Congress for

Peace Through Law
Coalition for Peace

Through Strength
Environmenul Study Conference
Congressional Cleannghouse on
the Future
Solar Coalition
High Altitude Coalition

Forum on Regulation

O.D.S.C.

3

D.C

No

Class

,n

Yes
Yes
Yea

1

Demog

C

3

Class

0

1

C

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

B
B
B
B

3

C

Ideol

15

C.D.S

Class
Class

No
No

No
No
No

Indus.

F

Demog.

7

O.C

Yes

Indus.

F

Region

3

O.C

Yes

Indus.
Vol

F
F

Region
Issue Set

Vol.

2

F
F

O.C
O.C

Occup'n
Demog.

No

Yes
Yes

Issue

No

Issue

No
No

Vol.

Indus.

Ideol

No

1

Yes

No
No

Vol.

No

Vol.

No

Indus.

Geog.

No

No

No
No

Vol
Indus.

Issue

No
No

No
No

No

Vol.

Issue Set

No

No

No
No

N.A.

F

Vol.

No

S

Issue Set
Issue

Vol
Issue

1

Geog.

Yes

No

D

Yes

CD

Yes

Yes

I

No

No

Vol.

S

Issue

No

Yes

Vol.

F

Issue Set

7

O.C.D

Yes

Yes
Yes

Vol

Issue Set
Issue Set

Yest

Vol.

F
F

0

No

9

C,D

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Vol.

B

Vol.

F

Issue Set
Issue Set

Vol.

F

Issue Set/

Yes
Yes

Vol.
Vol.

Yes

Indus

F

Sen.te

rucu8«a. b = bingle-luue

No

3

C

Yes

Yest

0

No

No

No

F

Issue Set
Issue Set

No

No
No

F

Issue Set

No

No

in

Congress
bep.r.1* counterpart jroups
exiit

20

Ideol

Mixed

Geog.

Congressional Clearinghouse
on Women's Righu

Vietnam Era Veterans

Vol.

Ideol.

Qualified as Legisla-

twe Support Agency^

Vol.

Congressional Suburban Caucus

r

Group
Bond^

Yes-

tee for Irish Affairs

Textile Caucus

Indus.
Lnclus.

Indus.

No
Yes-

Congressional Rural Caucus
Blue Collar Caucus
Congress women 8 Caucus

Vol.

No

Congressional Black Caucus
New England Congressional

B
B
B
B
B
B

Vol.

Indus.
Indus.

BipartiMn Group*

Caucus

Vol.

No
No
No
No

F^publican Study Committee
95th Republican Club
96th Republicans

-w.

Issue

Focwf'

Groups

Democrats
Democratic Study Group
Democratic Research
Organ.zafon

Members

s/iip'

1

The group bond can

be
variety of diWerent fsctori: ideology
demogrsphy, geogr.phicsl feature or region, a
amgle itaue a ki
ol laaue*. occupation,
congreaaionai ciaaa
' C
- Clerk. hire. D - Due.. S - Sub«:nption.. 0 -

Outside
House Administration Committee designation
as legislative
support group (96th CongreM, 1979)
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regular party flag.

These economic and social

to promote the general

interests do not striv.

welfare so much as they try

to

precipitate
Changes in existing practices
which will be of direct
benefit to themselves.
Hence it is not unusual for
certain industry groups to
press
for the imposition of import
tariffs and quotas in selected
areas,

without giving thought
export trade.

to

the national

balance of payments or overall

Similarly, other groups come
forward to press their

particular moral or ethnic concerns,
seeking legislative authorization
for programs which have not
surfaced
as

realignment and which would be costly

part of

to

a

national

administer.

agenda

If such

interests are seen in this way, then it
becomes possible

to

special

tar both

those of the Left and those of the
Right with the same brush, and

perhaps show that with respect to neglecting
the viability of Congress
as an institution with a national

constituency, they have more in

co.n-

mon than first appears.
It has already been stated that these
organizations have a

palpable and growing effect on legislation.

ticipation of their membership is often

a

The positive par-

necessary condition for the

formation of many majorities, and the legislative activity
of those

members who have enrolled

in

their lists can be highly effective.

Very often it turns out that, with respect to the act of
legislating,

what they do not alter by amending, they block by opposing.
balance of their activities may indeed be
those interests

in

to

The

promote and strengthen

whose name they have come into being, but these

same activities also serve to weaken the only institution

in

which a
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politically.

^alancm, of .I.e.e
1„.e.ests can u.e
pUce ope.,

This 1s no simple
.atter on the level
of theory.

Voung's analysis showed.

and

Regi onal
as

The parties themselves
have long stood for

p™9ra,ns «h1ch have often
.een drawn up to change
perceived l.palances
socal and economic power
throughout ^erlcan

-

society.

,n

the one

case, as Young showed,
the blocs which
emerged In the Federalist
period evinced a lack of
statesmanship and led to
a paralysis 1n
Cohgress that ended only
with Jackson's election
In 1828-a development that did nothing to
strengthen the Institutional
position of
congress.
In the case of
parties, the history of
their successes has
usually hinged on converting
a substantial portion
of the electorate
to their views.
Perhaps Congress Is the
proper place for a minority
to attempt to build a
national constituency for
Its programs; perhaps
there Is no other available
forum.
But these new groups are
different.

They are more than affinity
groups and less than parties.

Many are not concerned with
even so broad a range of
affairs as are
embraced by regional Interests.
Instead, they have narrow foci
and
very often are In no position
to persuade a national
majority to
follow them.
Congress:

This goes to the heart of the
matters now beleagering

what sorts of Issues should be
raised there?

In my view,

only those which can be shown
to belong on the national agenda.
Therefore. Loomls's work echoes what
is becoming
theme In these pages.

a

general

She finds that the growing power of
special

356

interests Interferes «1th
Congress's ability to
discover and serve
general one:

I5re"f:nr"r:,r°!adTst?ol""^'"^
?he Congr^ss1nd^';;ta.^' °
^

interests. 135

r

substantial

...

a

are to formalize
°^

e^::"th:':JI???:

numbers of particular

Oodd and Oppenheimer link
these developments not
only to the
constituency pressures with
which we were concerned
in the last section, but to the subcommittee
system itself.
Their analysis
shows

that changes in the formal

institutionalization of the House,
i.e.,

the rise of subcommittee
government, have led to the
appearance of
other institutions, not expected,
and that one apparent
consequence is
that the quality and frequency
of dialogue between those
who disagree
has diminished rather than
increased:

As power has shifted from
committees to subcommittees cm
rnittee decisionmaking has moved
to work groups with far
re
homogeneous

^

environments.
In other words, when
one cuts^
committee jurisdiction into a variety
of
egments and qiv's
each subcomm ttee one segment to
review, that egment w n
include within It a fewer number of
pol cy concerns
Cuttina
''''

P^*^'^^

and p^l^ci

reZZi'^Uil
responsibility T'V'''''
for decisions in the discrete
subcoimni ttees
encourages particularized single-interest
groups ?o disengage
from umbrella lobby groups (that is,
lobby groups that aggregate numerous interests in a policy
domain into one lobby
effort) and expend concentrated effort
on the particular subcommittee determining the fate of their
particularized
interest.
Concerned with only a few policy interests
these
subcommittees are apt to become the captives
of these'clientele groups.
The move to subcommittee government
thus has fueled the
rise of single-interest groups in Congress
and augmented the
power of particularized lobby groups, increasing
the probability of clientele dominance of congressional
pol icymaking..i-^D
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SO goes the rise of
particular over general

level

Of the s.bco.a.i ttee.

interests at the

Brady and Bullock go
considerably farther

than this.

They focus not on the
subcommittee but on the floor
they discover that the
fragmentation of Congress
and the rising
special

interests has national

and
of

the

implications:
'''''

ZZtiZTr

great'lfto'thi
House 'tha? Tunl^T^^^^^^ ^^^^^

contributed

-

the

^^'^^

^ros^beit'^r^r^^^^'.^^^"^^^

l:^if'^'^^i^i.^^i^^^

---^

^^ps

ti-

lt is early to begin writing
seriously of Balkanization in
view, but not too early to see
that as the variety of
particular

;ny

demands multiplies, and as the
effectiveness of the new organizations
serving them increases, the ability
of the Congress as an
institution
that serves electoral requirements
of any sort is placed under
increasing strain.
Congressional

Consensus is

a

necessary condition of

agency, and the aggregation of
special

omnibus bills is but one of several

interests into

possible kinds of legislative act.

The hard, synthetic, integrative, broad
and general questions are
going begging because they are controversial.
cial

The new caucus and spe-

interest groups multiply the number of
controversial

attributes

of certain questions in proportion to their
strengths in the chamber.

Now if we define the national

actually votes upon, then it

agenda in terms of those issues Congress
is

clear that the special

groups play

a

role in setting that agenda for which they have
received no electoral

mandate.

And they need not go to the floor to do so:

it is possible,
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wording through the subc».1ttee
syste..

to

craft one's specia,

ai,„s

mto

the complex legislation
which Is the handiwork
of these s.nal!
institutions of Congress.
In ten^s of the proble.
of positive action

then. When the subco^mttee
syste. works at all-an
eventuality that
is becoming Increasingly
proble™atic-1 1 works best to
serve the specialized interests who are
well-acquainted with Its back
alleys and
by-ways.
Nor is this all.
tee level

If

controversy is increasing at the
can.nit-

and on the floor, and special

increase through House institutions,
it

interest influence is on the
is

also rising rapidly about

the individual member from outside
the chamber.

The waves lap and tug

at him as he goes about his rounds
in the district.

They toss up

liabilities of an unprecedented sort in
the form of an electorate
which, in its several

parts, absolutely will

not forgive his taking

the "wrong" stance on whatever question
is dear to their hearts:

Culver recently gave a speech to the Wisconsin
Democratic
Convention on single-issue politics, in which
he said
Strident and self-righteous groups of voters are
proliferating in number and narrowing in focus."
He said that in
the past politicians could count on the
support of groups not
each of which would agree with them every time,
and "being
right ^^on most of the issues most of the time
was more than
enough.
Now, he went on, "for each narrow, self-defined
lobby ... the worth of every public servant is
measured by

single litmus test of ideological purity.
Taken together
the tests are virtually impossible for any office-holder
who
hopes to keep both his conscience and his consti tuency. "138
a

If the member can tear himself away from the embrace
of such

groups back home--as indeed, he must if he
sentative of

a

district--and return

to

is

to

the Hill,

function as
he

a

repre-

finds himself
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Plunged into

a

Washington

questions at Issue see.

c«.nit.

to

.e ze.o-su..

upon Which one Is able
to vote only
the

forn,

no less riven

In which they are
cast.

If

cont.ove.s.

The

They see™ to he
questions

Vs"

or

"„o"-o. at least this

1

constituency pressure is
one of

the ultimate sources of
these developments, then
that pressure is
sweeping the Congress along
towards an agenda of
problems for which
the custcnary legislative
methods of bargaining and
tradeoffs are

inappropriate.

It

is

impossible, for example, to
draft

a

bill man-

dating the partial construction
of nuclear power
installations in a
given area, or, perhaps, a
bill mandating the
construction of small
ones, in an effort to appease
both those who would end
the national

dependence on fossil fuels and
those resolutely opposed to
nuclear
power.
Unfortunately, for the average
member, the lines of battle
have been drawn well

in advance, and

take on the fundamental

:-.ight

The interin, is filled with

a

the notion that the entire
House

question de novo does not seem to
arise
kind of mutual

adversion with respect to

such issues that dries up the kind
of communication and dialogue

which, on or off the floor, only the
Congress can provide even
theory.

Congressman David

R.

in

Obey (D-Wis) had this to say about
it:

"Yes. government is getting bigger, but
whafs eating this
place alive is the growth of one-issue
groups-pro and antiabortion, pro and anti-B-1 bomber, pro and
anti-nuclear
power.
Neither side wants to listen to the other.
Consensus
can t be achieved.
You take that kind of pressure, add the
ract that one-half of the people in the
Congress were elected
in the last five years, plus the
fact that the party system
is collapsing, and you see the fragmentation
and frustration.
Moses couldn't lead the country today. "139
.

.

It would be quite reasonable for anyone at this
point to say

s
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that the foregoing analysis
sl.pl, l„„-eates that
the natur. of the
Pluralistic groups «1th
effective access to
Congress Is changing
that
a different .ma of
soda, and technological
order presses upon
our
antiquated Institutions with
a,,

the force of historical

change, and

that the responsiveness
of Congress, the
advent of the relative
anarch, we see there now
1s a positive thing.
Congress Is alive and
well.
It "represents" the
tensions and conflicts of
the various
active and organized political
and social forces
extremely well.
Indeed, with remarkable
sensitivity.
To this there are two
responses.

First, the Congress exists

not only to bring controversy
into the public space and
air it. but to
deliberate about it collectively
and to resolve it as
succinctly as
possible, so that the government
and the polity can ^ve
forward,

congress must act; It must decide.

Its specific function is
to meld

alternative arguments and positions
into decisions that will
apply to
all collectively, and not
simply to each severally.
In order to
accomplish these things, members who
do not agree with each other
must
be encouraged to talk with one
another and to work together.
Indeed,
this was one of the most Important
aspects of House service until

fairly recently.!"'^

Second, in the absence of

a

Congressional court

of ultimate resolution of conflict, the
political questions do not
ebb, and the wheels of government
continue to turn.
It is no longer an open question, however,
whether it be

Congress which does the turning.

Most professional

students, at least

as far back as Huntington, agree that the
responsibility for taking

361

the initiative on
..oad questions .as
fallen to the
p.esi.enc..
T.ls
can now be t.aced to
the three decentralizing
forces we hav^
Just
reviewed:
the subcommittee
s.ste™. the entrepreneurial

M

,„e.ber and

hoc and special

the

interest coalitions in
Congress.

To the extent
that these forces complicate
the consensus building
tas. of the
leadership, they contribute
to Congressional
Inaction.
To the extent
that Congress fails to
respond to urgent general

questions, the presidency .oves to fill the
void, either through
requesting additional
powers from a compliant,
because confused, Congress,
or through
thousands of insignificant
extensions of its prerogatives
via the numberless agencies of the
executive branch.
The result is an
evolution
in our political institutions
which is moving forward
apace, an
evolu-

tion which neither we ourselves
as citizens nor our
representatives in
Congress have had opportunity
to debate and to decide.
To sum up. then, the important
consequences of the present
Congressional system are:
(l) that "public policy
emerges frw the

system almost as an afterthought; "1*1

(2)

that new sources of obstruc-

tionisni and inaction have emerged
in the House and Senate
142
alike;
(3) that therefore the powers of Congress are
"largely

negative";^^^ and (4) that the
present forces are pretty firmly

in

place:

nnht
fight l^'^T^T.'^
harder than ^^u^^^
those

elimination of an agency or program
with a generalized interest in effi-

ciency or cost-cutting. 144
In a sense,

hailed as

a

then,

the pluralism which was once so widely

strength of our Federal

system may be on the verge of
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devouring 1t.
hands.

All

those hung., .ouths.

All

At best, the non-partisan
special

those eager, grasping

groups represent

a

wil,

acquisitive people for who.
government has beco,ne an
infinite store of
easily obtained goods, and
they flock to it, like
the ladies at the

bargain counter in Filenes,
elbowing and pushing and
shoving
the front.

"Every person for itself?"

to

get to

Roger Davidson, in .ore

restrained terms, describes the
present system thus:
These Capitol Hill groups,
needless to say, mirror the ore
sent state of interest
articulation and aggregIJ?on in
the
political system at large.
That is to say, policy concerns
' ^ultiplic ty 0
grouDs b t
?m?! !n''''^^'''^*'"^^^^^
little
aggregation takes place.
Few developments have been

declinf'o? ?

'''''

't'"H"'r"'i
traditional political parties and
the expan.
tirl J:
^
traditional
producer
h'"/!'''^3'°"P'n^?l.
^

professional
aq
?cuUur!l''hr'T^''^';
agricultural
--have been added

business, and
plethora of groups, some with
quite specific concerns (the famous
"single- interest
groups ), some with an ideological
cast.
Lobbyists represent
such diverse interests as individual
business firms ciUes
counties, states, beneficiaries of
hundreds of government
programs, antiabortionists, born-again
Christians, nuclear
power advocates and opponents, and all
sorts of consumer and
environmental interests.
It is not the narrowness of these
groups that IS novel, but rather their
number and range, and
their unwillingness to accept brokerage by
political parties.
Faced with such a confusion of voices, it
is little wonder
that legislators seek not one party label
but many, shaping
their images in terms of their factional
allegiances.
In
turn, these groupings provide multiple
access to information
and voting cues, permitting members to
participate, however
superficially, in floor decisions that once would
have been
controlled by party leaders or committee experts. I'^S
,

a

We can decry and condemn these developments,

what they cost us

in

terms of government action in

But they are also costing us something

in

a

if we will,

for

common interest.

terms of power.

If govern-

ment is being increasingly influenced by single-interests,
it may be
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-ch

1nte.ests.

othe. wo.ds, we.e 1t
posslMe to cut .ac.
specU,
1nte.est influence.
.ig.t 5e possible to
cut .ac. t.e po«e.
and
s-e Of the central gove^nent.
This at least Is one
^plication that
can .e drawn fro. the
wort of Donald Morgan,
who too. a so.ber
view of
our future iTore than
fifteen years ago:

U

too7

^r:^:':l^t^^^^^±-^^

tion. local

and personal

poi/t?:arjs::riii pt:

tLTr.

'°T''"

Lif

!'ff

9otSnts
geographical

isola-

:i?rto"::ag°g:ra^;: '""-"Kt^z
-alnt
e 0 -the'cons

rt

w^s":^^ :;^dev^t?(helr:;ln1i:ri""^'

^

f^^^^"^

^^^^^-^^^^^^^Hcr^^^
Structural
Enclosure ot the Pu&TTc^paci;

Power may change in terms of its
distribution to political
actors, or in terms of the
institutions which form and order it
and
which, in a sense, stipulate the
actual conditions sufficient for

holding and using it.

We seem to be living through
a period of rather

rapid evolution and change in both
the powers of certain key positions

within, as well

as

tions of the U.S.

in

the relationships while hold among
the

government.

institu-

Some of these changes are more dif-

ficult to perceive than others, those between
individuals positioned
in personal

networks being, perhaps, the most difficult.

In

this sec-
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t1on

want to explore briefly
the increasingly
bureaucratic natur. of
the entire U.S. government
in order to show
that this development
is
gradually bureaucratizi
ng the once-col legial Congress.
In order to do
this. I will need to briefly
describe both formal and
infoanal changes
in our existing arrangements.
On the fon.al side, we
have already
examined the birth of the
subcommittee system and the
fragmentation of
House power which followed.
Rather than examine such
internal
I

congressional
will

problems as coalition building,
however, the point here

be to concentrate more fully
on the daily lawmaking and

legislating activities of individual
members of Congress as they serve
on subcommittees.
We have mentioned the emergence
of subgovernments
in passing.

Now we will

also turn to the activities entailed
by the

close relations that hold between
subcommittees, agencies of the exe-

cutive branch, and the special
Congressional
tion.

In

voting and bill

interest groups whose effects on
amending habits we saw in the last sec-

other words, here come the iron triangles.

Providing

a

bridge between such formal, i.e., legally
constituted by Congress, and
informal

Staff.

aspects of our changing institutions, is the
Congressional
This organ of government, which some have called
"the third

House of Congress" was encouraged to grow by the
Legislative

Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970, and now appears

in

the service

of individual members, subcommittees, full committees,
select committees, conference committees, House caucuses and even special
ces.

It has

where it

is

also begun to show up in the professional

taking on the dimensions of

a

problem.

task

for-

literature

The staff exercise
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variety of functions, so.e
useful, so.e not, and
affect legislation
floor activity, and the
reach of Congress
throughout government and
society,
our task will be to see
whether the large staffs
of the present day serve to augment or
diminish the powers of
the Congress that
they were instituted to
strengthen against the spreading
powers of the
imperial presidency. 147 our
basic question:
does the staff, in
a

general, free the Congress to
perform its legislative functions,
or is
it enmeshing it so thoroughly
with the rest of a canplex
government
that it is changing the very
nature of Congress as an
organization at
the expense of its powers as a
general

interest body?

We will

answer
this question largely on the basis
of information gathered on
the

informal

side of change:

from personal

power networks, infonnation

networks, ^ssue networks, the growth
in information that staffs
can

make available

to members,

and the daily round of ritual

in staged "events" which members
follow every day.

participation

Changes of this

latter sort are called "informal" here
because they were not specifi-

cally legislated by Congress but have simply
followed, almost by accident, from the formally-mandated "reform"
legislation passed by the

legislature at various periods. 148
There are two phenomena that it is necessary to
clarify at the
outset.
collegial

First is the contrast in both form and efficiency,
between
and bureaucratic modes of organization.

Second is the dyna-

mic relationship that connects the Congress with those
executive

branch agencies which were given birth

in

legislation.

Congress

creates, say, an executive agency and later that agency returns

to

act
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tion and the quality
of the ends produced
by coli.n.y uuucea bv
collegial^
bureaucratic organizations:

as opposed

to

If one reviews the
standard accounts of the
state of the

congressional .ind at the ti.e
of passage of the
Budget and Accounting
Act Of 1921. one will fl„d
that they depict a Congress
acting on just
such an understanding of
Us situation as this. The budget
seeded to
be unmanageable and the
spending levels determined
through legislative
co.pro.1se had led to a severe
outbreak of national outrage.
Feeling
guilty and humiliated and
quite unable to cope «1th the
c«.plexity of
government finance. Congress finally
handed the entire messy
business
over to the executive branch
which, it «as supposed, would
coordinate
spending policies and check the
excesses of porkbarrel ing and

particularlsm.151

i„

other words, the inefficiencies
of collegial

modes of procedure were thought to
be radically unsuited
ties of a complex budget process.

to

the nici-

Disregarding its Constitutional

grant of powers over the raising and
spending of funds. Congress chose

efficient control over spending levels by
transferring a tremendous
reservoir of power to that branch of
government best organized for the
bureaucratic disposition of spending decisions
by special 1 sts. 152
Hence, at

a

stroke, the powers to regulate and to
distribute were

passed from the collegial and anarchic and
undisciplined, but nonethe-
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both as an influence over
and

a

constraint upon further
legislation.

Rather than the competition
that prevailed throughout
the 19th century, these two factors
comprise
the basic

Interbranch d11e..a that

has impinged on the legislature
for more than 50 years.

First, let us turn to the
matter of bureaucracy, with
which no
one can be more helpful, or
more tediously familiar,
than Max Weber.
Sharing a common generational
vantage-point with Woodrow Wilson,
Weber
saw the coming of the bureaucracy
for what it was:
a clear and

straightforward replacement of older,
less efficient state foms by
newer and more efficient forms.
As an instrument of social
regulation
and the impartial distribution
of
goods, no other form of human
orga-

nization could rival

it.

The following quotation will

to the reader as the Gettysburg
Address, but

I

be as

familiar

include it first

because it is fundamental and second
because what follows will be
based upon it:
The decisive reason for the advance of
bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical
superiority
over any other form of organization. The
fully developed
bureaucratic apparatus compares with other
organizations
exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical
modes of
production.
Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of
the
files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict
subordination,
reduction of friction and of material and personnel
costs-these are raised to the optimum point in the
strictly
bureaucratic administration, and especially in its
monocratic
form.
As compared with all collegiate, honorific, and
avocational forms of administration, trained bureaucracy
is
superior on all these points. And as far as complicated
tasks are concerned, paid bureaucratic work is not only
more
precise but, in the last analysis, it is often cheaper than
even formally unremunerated honorific service. ^"^^

Weber goes on

to

distinguish between the modes of daily opera-
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less elected. Congress to
spreading hordes of experts,
a bureaucratic
Officialdom whose interests were
administrative and whose
individual
careers were patterned along
the lines of a permanent
civil service
rather than on those fluctuations
of fortune which always
haunt the
elected.

But in handing away

either unable or unwilling
a

a

to

set of responsibilities
which it was

claim for itself, Congress
set in motion

chain of consequences with the
power to forge its own links.

Weber

is

helpful

in

Where

pointing out the utility of bureaucracy
for

accomplishing specialized and highly
detailed tasks, Theodore Lowi has
some interesting things to say about
the effects which massive alterations in the policymaking process can
have for the politics that sup-

posedly oversees it.
In

his article,

"Four Systems of Policy. Politics and

Choice, "153 Lowi starts with the assumption
that "policies determine

politics. "154

Since government coerces, he says, it follows
that an

aggregation of countless small coercive measures
provides the context
in which politics takes place.

While some policies directly affect

behavior, such as the application of general

rules to particular

cases, others achieve their ends by working through the
environment of

conduct, i.e., by acting upon the processes through which the
ends of

policy are achieved. 155

j^is is important because through this for-

mulation we can see the relationship which Congress established first
with its environment and ultimately over itself, but now indirectly,
as it moved to institutionalize certain executive branch agencies and
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expand the role of

Us

own staff throughout the
policymaking process.

The following details are
provided primarily to
illustrate the fonn of
this relationship, because it
constitutes the fundamental
structural

constraint upon the institutional

liability of the contemporary

Congress, and hence upon the real

powers of its individual
members.

Dodd and Schott have provided
us with what amounts

to

the

standard account of the primary
characteristics of interbranch relations, as those relations have
institutionalized since 1974.156 Like

most students of Congress, they begin
their story at some time prior
to making the points that really
interest them.

the turn of the present century.

They start back at

They note that by this time Congress

had already created an administrative
state, and that this state form,
in turn,

influenced the emergence of the modern Congress. 157

then go on to deal

exhaustively with several

themes.

They

First among

these is that of the administrative state itself,
which they see as
the product of countless acts of

cutive branch agencies for

a

a

Congress struggling to create exe-

variety of purposes.

Today,

cies have become their own centers of power and the focal

particularized interests, and these developments are shown
important consequences for national

such agen-

points of
to

have

politics:

Different agencies cater to different clientele and interest
groups, are subject to varying degrees of presidential
control, responsive to different political influences,
responsible for different programs, influenced by different
professional cultures, and conditioned by unique histories.
This balkanization has produced an administrative structure
extremely difficult to coordinate, direct, and control.
Yet
it is supposedly the servant of Congress, not its equal, and
certainly not its master. 158
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Having found balkanization
on the executive side
of the
government, they turn to the
legislative, where the.
see a Congress
.arked by a decentralization
which has steadily
Increased since the
Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946 gave Co«ittee
government an
unneeded impetus:
A primary drawback of
committee government i^ th;,t itc

co-51nrter•^n^^^
tion.
Moreover, while the number of
committee chliroerson.
was small enough to allow
informal coordination
they each
protected jealously their [sic]
own prerogat ves and d^d not

sm:;r^numb1rs^lu^°d

h^M^lflo'el.fsl

The reader who recalls our
references to jurisdictional

squabbles and the prerogatives of
seniority should not be surprised by
any of this.
Committee government, however, led
to something called

"subsystem" politics, the improved version
of which is at the heart of
Dodd and Schott's analysis. They
explain that the various conittees
began to develop their own peculiar
personalities and group lives
go along with their respective jurisdictions. 160

to

the same time,

the norms of courtesy and inter-committee
reciprocity blunted opposi-

tion efforts to prevent passage of cocnmittee
legislation that might

actually have been supported by only

a

Congressional

minority. 1^1

Hence institutionalization eased legislative promotion
of special
i

nterests.

Meanwhile, on the executive side again, the policy implementation process often entailed considerable elaboration of
the legislative guidelines established by Congress:
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^'^''^ Tmplenientation occurred incrrasinolv ft
^^^^ "^'^trative levels
and were made by c?vil
se,!ant1
appointees.
To be successful inn l'"''"?:"'^'^"" political
"^any policy areas,
interested groups of cuLln^
^^^^^derable
attention not solely S Ihe
nresldP^t °' congressional
leaders but on actors at tL^cns
party
?^
^^^governinental
level-on congressioLrcnm^-tf
committees and bureaucratic
^
°
agencies.162

IT"

^

This process of decentralization
became increasingly
elaborate
throughout the 1950s.
It entailed a conservative
political process,
far from the well of Congress,
in which key personnel
from within the
agencies and the committee
system established networks
of friendships
and working relationships
with interested citizen
groups that endured
for decades.^" Remember
that permanent officials never
and senior
committee members seldom suffer from
the possible ill-fortunes
of

electoral

reversal

and loss of position.

This tendency toward insulated
politics was reinforced bv the
large number of subsystems that
emerged as the national
government grew-a phenomenon one
observer has ^duea
cal ed
creeping plural ism. "Ib4
During the reform period of the
1960s and 1970s Congressional

power was dispersed

to

the subcommittees, and their
responses shifted

away from the committee chairs and

committees. 165

to

the

full

standing

The results could not have been anticipated:

see the appearance of an arena well

here we

suited to the needs of the

entrepreneurial member, one which enlarges his
powers, his turf and
his opportunities for creditclaiming.

The rise of subcommittee

government
meant

a

vast proliferation in the number of congressional

372

congressional actors increased thf n K
subsystem relationships increased
instead of 5n„r*""-°^
be1ng the key actor in
'^"""'"^e chairs
the proara?ns .^h
ticular department, the number
°^ '
?f eaU?.tf"'V"
authority doubled/tripled?
'"9" <^1^^'"
quadrupl|d!li6'°''

This point is crucial, for
it touches on the

unsolved, and probably
unsolvable problem in

democracy:

if the

in the assembly.

a

™st

fundamental

representative

representative is to represent,
he .ust have power
,f the

internal

institutions of the assembly
grant

the individual member power
at the expense of those of
the general
body, however, the grant of
power to the individual is
ultimately null
and void.
Perhaps this is putting the
case a bit too strongly;

perhaps member power is

a

function of member interest combined
with

member perception that he or she
political

life that matter most.

is

in control

of those areas of his

This notion of member power,

however, rooted as it is in the member's
own assessment of his position may be entirely too subjective.

We will

return

to

this matter

below.
The second paradoxical

outcome that Dodd and Schott find

following the reform period should be obvious:

instead of clearing up

obstacles to legislative initiative and oversight,
the proliferation
of subcommittees has not only retained those
obstacles, it has

multiplied them by spreading them more widely and
deeply throughout
the chamber.

... if subcommittee government is not balanced by party
leadership, by central planning committees, by incentives and
mechanisms for independent bureaucratic oversight, then the
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^

sub-committee government
power, this isVec?::iTwha?

0!!
SpTned.i^r^

exacerbated in

^'^P--

The consequences of these
two paradoxes are
widespread and
serious.
Fro. the. Dodd and Schott
draw direct implications
for the

current dynamics of the
Congressional budget process
which ensued, and
see it as having become a
"war between the parts
and the whole."169
They discuss the by now
byzantine structure of la^aking
activity
Itself, as each bill
full

faces an enlarged number
of subcommittees and

committees on its way to the floor.l^O

They discuss the dif-

ficulties decentralization raises
for Congressional oversight
of the
administration and its treatment of
Congressional ly instituted
programs.l^l Finally they
sum up the effects which
decentralization
seems to be having on both the
legislative and executive sides of

government.
The policy process in the executive
branch appears at times
to be as truncated, disparate and
pluralistic as in our
national legislature.
Both Congress and the bureaucracy
exhibit many of the same characteristics
that surround their
processes and, hence, many of the same
n^nM^!'""^ ?2
problems.
There are a number of parallels between
the way
Congress approaches policy formation and
the way the executive branch approaches policy implementation.
The executive
branch is not really a strict hierarchy in
which decisions at
the top are passed down the chain of
command, but is instead
pluralistic, with a number of competing centers
of power and
expertise, each with their [sic] own institutional
histories
norms, and outside power bases— anal ogous
to the numerous
power centers of Congress that have proliferated
with the
development of full subcommittee government.
If the national
legislature can be termed, as we suggest, "subcommittee
government," then perhaps it is not too farfetched to
suggest
that the executive branch, in its implementation of
public
policy, may be conceived of essentially as "bureau

government.

"1'"^
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What are we seeing hereT

Centralized government

U

undemocratic, and decentralized
government leads to chaos
on general questions
and the sheltered protection
of special Interests
on matters of
detail.
Dodd and Schott «.e a
number of arguments and
presentations

Of evidence to show that the
gradual coincidence of fo™
and function
between executive and legislature
constitutes the basis for
unprece-

dented relations between the
two.
real

downward shifts of power,

groups or agencies.

m

In

to what

both cases, there have been
very

were previously subordinate

both organizations, the
decline of

hierarchy as the major control
mechanism for the administration
of the
174
whole
has contributed substantially
to

this downward shift.

This,

they claim, leads also to an
increase in the collegiality of
superiorsubordinate relationships within the
bureaucracy
The decline of
.

collegiality within Congress as

a

whole, then, seems to be in the
pro-

cess of being supplanted by its
emergence within the subordinate units
of both branches where much of the
real work of government and many

important political decisions now take
place.

Here is how they

begin to sum up these developments:
As power has shifted downwards in
Congress (i.e.
from the
committee to the subcommittee level) we have also
witnessed a
downwards drift in the executive branch from the
department
or agency to the bureau as the central focus
of activity.
We
have seen as well the rise of "single interest"
lobby groups-a decentralization of interest group politics.
The result
has been a proliferation of "mini-subsystems" in which
the
political process revolves around a subcotnmi ttee, a
bureau
and one or more single-interest lobbies.

What follows from this?

First, it is clear that

point of entry into subsystem politics for special

a

crucial

interests is the
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congressional

subcommittee.

Decentralized and increasingly
articu-

lated by specialization, these
organs of Congress become
more manipulable as their respective
spheres of influence have
narrowed to a
short list of areas.
In addition, to the new
mechanisms of

Congressional

altered

in

interest groups, the subcommittee
system itself has

such a way that the organized
are better served.

Second, the proliferation of
interbranch subsystems creates

a

politics of decision and implementation
over which Congress has littl
e
institutional capacity to exercise
centralized influence or
control.

179

Questions of general

interest go begging and no one is
so

positioned as to be able to assess the
aggregate impact of the
thousand decisions taken daily throughout
the subsystems.
general

institutional ethos of Congress, as it is at
present, is con-

tinued pressure for more decentralization and
internal

coupled with member resistance
power.

Third, the

180
In

to

democracy

reforms that might recentralize

other words, the entrepreneurial members, from
their

relatively elevated roosts in the subcommittee system,
actively plump
for further strengthening of those centrifugal
so much to weaken the general

body already.

of government operations, having moved
tutes

a

to

forces which have done

Fourth,

the daily process

the subsystem level, consti-

self-perpetuating power base of interbranch interest networks

maintained by those who share common fields of expertise, experience
and influence. 181 These networks, like the subcommittee members within

Congress itself, have been known to resist the kinds of reform that

might move the locus of decisionmaking back up the hierarchy

to

those
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levels Where publicity and
electoral pressures
constantly l.plnge on
those ..ho «ke the .ey declslons.l^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^

^mating re.ar. which John Gardner
n«de before

a Government
Operations
Committee hearing on executive
branch reorganization In 1971.

^2u^'r.?"'2l'"^

°'

'

^ep^ssentlt Jes ofa
^s^de
bureaucrats, and (3) sel"ec?ed

Ibers
Congreis"''!':^'"'^
Participants in such durable
alliances do not w^^nt th«
departmental Secretaries strengthened
A d theToppose even

%

reorganization that might shak '
'"^^^^^
Shifted to another
.
riin
the congressional leg of tSe
trinity
may oe broken. 'Tf'llr;^
If the departments are
reorganized a
stranger may appear on the bureaucratic
leg of the 'triangle
Particularly resista^to
Iuc^°
such change.
ha'nal "'Tf'
It lll'll'''''
took them years to dig their
particular tun^^^^
want'tSe vau?t
moied"l83'''

Tui^nT'TX''''^^J^^^
•

Ly^TbX

Dodd and Schott conclude that the root
causes of the decline
of Congressional

authority lie neither with the bureaucracy
nor with

the presidency, but within Congress. 184
j^^^

^^.^^

Davidson and others, as the outcome of Congress's
inability

^^^^^^

to orga-

nize itself such that it can provide legislative
leadership and

authoritative oversight of executive branch activi
ties .185

^ave

traced the history of organizational confusion and
reform efforts
within the Congress in the preceding pages, and the
apparent

helplessness of all such efforts

to

the legislature to the presidency.

stem the flow of power away from
In

general, the evidence supports
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Dodd

arid

Schott's contention that

"^^/^Pt Congress so
immobilized that it ha^ ^ftlr,
and strong
rol\^\;\,^^%S:?^?3??a^^t]:rrta;:.fBl ^^^^^^^'P

S

But the historical evolution
of our national

passed beyond the point of being
merely
follow from the confusions of

a

a

institutions has

set of consequences that

decentralized legislature.

ces are, and have been, at
work here.

Other for-

If Congress has

difficulty
overseeing its works, if it has
problems exercising control, or
even

understanding, over

a

polymorphous bureaucracy, we must
also note that

it once acted positively to bring
the bureaucracy into being.

once there, the political

And

forces generated by the deposition
of power

in the executive branch returned
to work with the Congress and
stayed
to influence it and to change it
profoundly.

For Congress, the

bureaucracy is an environmental problein.
To the extent that the subgovernment
systems now have primary

responsibility for the enactment and oversight
of government policy,
we can say that with regard to much of
domestic policy. Congress has

become no more than an adjunct of the Administration.

The key to this

is to be found in the efficiency of bureaucracy,
which Weber pointed

out so long ago.

Bureaucratic methods characterize the executive

branch approach to problems, and at the same time, this
approach is

incompatible with the confused and sometimes ambiguous processes of
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political

debate and ccnp.o.nise
that always plague
assembled bodies of
-n. Hence, the Congress began
by sharing its
duties with the ,noreefficient Administration,
but wound up adopting
its methods.
But
methods Of procedure and
action engender habits
of .ind, much as
the

environment of established and
enacted policies influences
the politics that co-nes after it.
Congress began to think
.ore and .ore in

technical

and bureaucratic

tenns as the issues which
confronted it

became more complex and its
own internal
smaller and smaller pieces.

structure refracted into

Thus it began to turn
political

or

general

considerations into areas of
specialization and expertise that
could be handled compatibly with
the structural and
jurisdictional
demands of the increasingly
bureaucratized executive branch which,

after all, had come to constitute
the most important constant
element
in its daily working environment.

undergoing such

a

process of

evolution, the Congress has become
less and less like

a

collegial

In

and more and more like an administration.

evolutionary dilemma simply enough:
big government.

It

body

Fiorina has summed up the

"Congress does not just react

to

creates it."^*^^

In our context it is decisive that
in the administration of
mass associations the trained career
officials always form
the core of the apparatus; their discipline
is the absolute
precondition of success. This is increasingly so,
the larger
the association is, the more complicated its
tasks are and
above all, the more its existence depends on
power
Increasingly, the real work in all organizations
is done'by

the salaried employees and by functionaries of
all kinds.
Everything else has become window-dressing.

Two remarks are appropriate here.

First, Dodd and Schott are

at some pains to emphasize that the classical Weberian
characteristic
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Of hierarchical

control

appears to be on the
wane In .uch of .odern

organ1zat1on.l39

^^^^

professional Izatlon of the
Public service and to the
Increased emphasis now
being placed on
collegial as opposed to
subordinate-superior relationships.
The key
to understanding this
particular aspect of the
contemporary Congress
does not lie in trying to
match some diagram of its
organizational
structure with that of the classical
Weberian paradigm.
Instead, what
counts is the growing professional
izatlon of the Congress, which
Fiorina pointed out. and the growing
size and professional izatlon
of
its staff, to which we shall
turn below.
Further, if we are to accept
the notion that collegiality is
replacing hierarchy, we need look
no

further for supporting evidence than
special

in

the issue networks promoted by

interest coalitions and groups, and
the personal

networks of

power through which individuals move
back and forth between the executive and legislative branches of
government.

Collegiality, after all,

seems to have become bypassed in Congress,
except within the subcom-

mittee system itself where members work
closely with one another, but
share responsibilities for narrow and
specialized issue areas.

Therefore, what collegiality seems to exist is

to

be found

in

interbranch relations organized along the fissures
that divide and

separate one technical area of jurisdiction from another.

In

terms of

the daily operations of government, such fissures
seem to have

replaced the great geologic divisions of power that were originally

mapped out by the founders.
Our second remark concerns the "window dressing."

For some
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Observers, particular,, the
anthropologist J. Mclver
Weatherford the
substance Is quietly draining
a«ay fro,,, ,„any of the
dally activities
Of the legislative process,
and a

Mnd

of ,„ed1a ritual

is ,„oving

to

center stage, «h11e the staff
works behind the scenes
with increasing
responsibility for the real work
and assu.es ever larger
grants of

power,

we will

turn to this analysis
shortly.

What .natters here 1s
not Whether Weber was literally
correct, but whether he
foresaw the

actual

lines of development that
democratic governments would
follow

1n the 20th century.

With regard to the increasing
specialization of

tasks and enhanced Influence of
salaried «np1oyees over elected
officials, it seems that he was.

Now who are the people who fill
these roles, who actually
attend the meetings and the lunches
and the skull sessions that
supply
the living tissue of human connection
between Congress, interest
groups and executive agencies?

Proceeding

fro.n

the standpoint of

Congress, many of them are not members of
Congress at all, but members
of the Congressional

staff.

Staff is ambiguous:

it can be seen as the formally constituted

The essential

attempt by Congress to cope with

a

nature of Congressional

changing environment by providing

sufficient conditions of its own bureaucracy.
can see it as a development typical

Or,

following Weber, we

of mass democratic

societies which

have reached the point where most of the real work
is performed by

armies of hired functionaries.

There was

a

time, back in the foggy mists of the nineteenth

century, when many members of Congress didn't even have their own
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Offices, let alone

a

secretary, let alone

a

staff,

what did exist

«ere personal

aides and a very tin.
support staff consisting
pr1.ar1l,
Of Clerks and secretaries.
Throughout this period,
and up until a few
decades ago. the elected
representatives of the people
debated

compromised and reached
decisions about the nation's
legislative business on their own.

.«;-"2S

SSI..-';;!;"' "

s...,,

According to Malbin there are now,
altogether, 23,528 people

busily at work on Capitol Hill,
energetically supporting the 535 members of Congress.
Are the 535 helped or swamped
by the 23,528?
Not
all

of the 23,528 work on legislation.

Some are in charge of

constituency-related casework, some work in
the Library of Congress or
for the G.A.O.
But many are staff
employees who work directly with

members or organs of the Congress
ness.

in

the daily conduct of its busi-

For Malbin there are four kinds of
staff with legislative

influence:

committee staffs, legislative aides on personal

staffs,

some support agency staff, and the staffs serving
the leadership and
ad hoc groups. 191

Malbin considers committee staff

most important, and it

is with this

to

be by

far the

sort that his book is chiefly con-

cerned.

What are the major characteristics of this staff and what
does
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was llslTZsT^^^^^^^^^
Act Of 1970
large as they had been
^^"^
^'^'^^
'
in iqIt [709
''''''
committee staffs were abou^
Senate
thrpp f
^""9^ (^35 versus
232).
These numbers keo? am In
y"^'
''''''
committee staffs ne
'"'^^^
rirSoub .d
^^^^
(to 1,217) while those in ihl
^
1979
^ouse increased tripled
2, 073). 192
(to

1

Ztl'l

second, more staff means
more information c.ning
into membersoffices, thereby strengthening
Congress's ability to cope
with a
complex world, and simultaneously
raising administrative
problems for
every member.
Each representative now
has his own little
bureaucratic
operation to oversee and
orchestrate.
^^.^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^.^^
for credit claiming and
public exposure leads members
to hire aides
"^^1^
^^'l^s and amendments bearinq
^h^.-;
kI!°
their bosses'
names instead of helping the
bosses understand
what IS already on the agenda.
The result is fhat the new
staff bureaucracy and the workload
it helps creal threaten

n

tL^^S^^^:v^r^"t^^sl:d^?9^

'

P^P^-r J.ust as'sJ^e^^L"

In addition to unleashing
a flood of information
on Congress,

and bureaucratizing its members'
offices one by one. Congressional

Staff has also begun to play
staff began to be developed

a

in

political

role.

Professional

co.miiittee

the 1920s on the House and Senate

Appropriations Committees and on the newly
formed (1926) Joint

Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. 195

But the Staff were not

forever to remain nonpartisan and professional.

were authorized

to

As more committees

appoint staffs, more staffs were designated

"majority" and "minority."

By 1962. committee staff in general

ceasing to facilitate the work of entire committees
and moving

was
to

pro-

:
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mote particular pol1c1es.l96

The reforms of the
1970s strengthened

this movement immeasurably,
for many of the subcommittees
were
authorized to hire permanent staff
to buttress their
power and make it
possible for them to hold hearings.
Such staff were invariably

designated "majority" and "minority."
With these developments, the
power and influence of staff members
took a quantum leap, for not
only
were they the ones who gathered the
information which made hearings
possible, their own personal and
partisan preferences inevitably came
into the selection process.

At this moment we are still

in

the

full

flood of that increase in staff members
which threatens Congress at

very fundamental

a

level, and the irony is that this
increase was insti-

tuted in the name of democracy and with
the intention of strengthening

Congress
In the House
staff growth and internal democratization
have gone hand in hand.
The staff increases on House committees in the 1970s resulted largely from the 1973
House
Democratic Caucus's "Subcommittee Bill of Rights" that
liberated subcommittee chairmen from the control of the
chairmen of full committees. As a result, most of the
committee staff increases in the House during the 1970s have
been at the subcommittee level.
Since then ... the
distribution of staff resources has become more widespread.
This broader distribution both results from and reinforces
internal democratization, as more members have the staff
resources to pursue their own legislative ends.^^^
.

.

.

.

Not only have staff numbers increased

.

in

.

recent years.

The kind of

Individual who fills these positions has altered radically.
do we find the dry,

came to fill
make

a

a

No

longer

professional, technically oriented individual who

permanent staff position in the old days and stayed

career of it.

to

Instead, a new kind of person is coming down to
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Washington.

This individual

is young,

bright, usually

a

lawyer, and

usually intent upon .aking his
or her time spent as
a staff .e.nber a
stepping stone to a ,nore
powerful, better paying
position so.ewh..
ire
else. 198 ^t the mercy of
their Congressional employers
and under

pressure to build network connections
and some reputation for
legislative creativity, these individuals
give expression to their
ambitions
by seeking first to have
innovative legislative ideas,
and second to
make sure that those ideas are
written into various bills.
When such

staff impetus is combined with
the inability of most members
to keep
track of the multitude of complex
issues now moving beneath their
noses, qua district representative,
subcommittee chairman, subcamnittee member, caucus member and party
member, it is easy to see how the

staff might come to exert influence.

It is not

influence over the detailed affairs of
influences will

a

difficult to gain

preoccupied employer.

inevitably be of the sort which the specialist
always

exerts upon the generalist.

Regardless of any formal

distinctions in

their respective positions, many representatives
must turn
personnel

to

Staff

to

learn the details of the hundreds of technical

staff

questions

about which they must decide every session.
But problems arise for both the Congress as an
institution and
for the political

autonomy of its individual members- -i .e.

for those who advocated the hiring of additional

their personal

power in the first place.

,

precisely

staff to increase

When staff actively enters

the domain of policy formation, and this is what has been occurring,

it becomes a semi autonomous political

force of its own, capable of
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influencing the Congress from
within, and capable of
shaping the
framework within which the
individual .e.ber disposes
of particular
questions.
This re.narK is not intended
to i.npute either
sinister
motives to, or to adduce
unwanted legislative
consequences fr^ staff
practices.
But it must be noted
that a changing workload
and public
policy environment led Congress
to hire more people who,
once in
place, came into existence as

political knowledge and power.

a

parallel

structure of infonnation,

And now the two, Congress
and its

staff, are inextricably entwined,
one elected and one not.

The Staff's influence, we have
said, pervades the
^^^^e in that ro'cess is ^ore importa
tant
han'?hrr'r
than
the first:
determining Congress' agenda
And
no stage have the newer-style
staffs had
geaer"
impact on
the way Congress works.
It is the one point in the
orocess
where the interests of the members,
the goals Sf the sJaff
and the position of staff in the
Washington issue network
come together to influence what
Congress does. 199

r

'

It is impossible to underestimate
the importance of the poli-

tical

leverage at stake in the simple question
of agenda setting.

No

one who has studied politics or history
can avoid noting that the
first item in the minds of political actors
from Lenin at Petrograd

Roosevelt at Yalta, has been

to obtain

an agenda

that will

to move smoothly through a succession of
intended aims.

bodies and legislatures, the task of agenda setting

is

In

enable them
collegial

usually carried

out by members of the assembly or by its leadership.

Here we have

case where the legislative membership participates

this crucial

matter, along with their hired servants.
the butler who ought to come to tea.

in

to

It is a little

a

like asking
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Different members and diffprpntaitterent committees
use their staffs
different ways. For Mai
n
bi

in

purposes thi.
purposes,
this iis .u
the same thing as
sayin, that they have
different Mnds of staff.
So.e .e*ors Keep the
staff under tight rein,
allowing the™ to su^arlze
a legislative
situation and present
alternative options,
others loosen the reins
somewhat, allowing staff
to criticize existing
approaches and suggest
alternatives. The loosest
reins are held by
.e™bers who let the staff
take the lead, while they
content themselves with
providing political
authority and support. Malhin
notes that this third
kind of staff has
been dubbed "entrepreneurial
staff because these are the
ones notable
for coming up with Ideas
that they can "sell" to
meters. Thus

entrepreneurial

'

s

staffs help advance the
enterprise of credit-claiming

for both the representatives
whom they serve and for
themselves as
they pursue their own career goals.^OO
Clearly, it Is the entrepreneurial staff, as opposed to
the traditional, professional,
career

oriented, non-partisan staffs,
which raises problems for the
practice
of representative government.
The basic and overwhelming dilemma
that confronts the Congress
In

Its staff relations.

overwhelming demands of

In Malbln's
a

view. Is this:

given the

large and co,„plex government and

neous society. Congress needs a wealth
of Information
carry out its Constitutionally mandated
duties.

infonnation upon its staff.

The staff,

if

a

heteroge-

it is to

It relies

for this

for its part, generates so

much information, at office, subconimlttee
and committee levels alike,
that both individual members and the general body
are swamped by

a
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flood of information.

workload.

Congress cannot handle
this staff-generated

As ™ore and more papers
get stuffed into the

tube, the Wheels of the
machine

decreasing velocity.

Urn

with increased friction
and

Eventually, we can expect

A complete clogging up of
all moving parts?

that the old machine

is

feeding

.

.

what?

.

Or will

a

fire?

somebody decide

overloaded, inefficient, not
up to the tasks

of the modern world, and must
be junked?

We are in this waiting

period now.
Once he has described the basic
situation, Mai bin goes on

point out
internal

a

number of attending difficulties.

politics.

to

Staff has its own

Staff members wrangle over
jurisdictions and

policy alternatives much as representatives
themselves do
in subcommittees and on the floor.

in

caucuses,

Staff politics adds a third level

of politics to those traditionally
studied, i.e., that which goes on

among members in Congress, and that which
goes on between me,nbers and

their electoral

constituencies.

by one order of magni tude .^^^

This third level

co.Tipl

icates matters

Further, with their own schedules and

outlooks foreshortened by the urgency to gain credit,
entrepreneurial
staffs encourage representatives to "avoid thinking of
the long-range
impacts of the policies before them"^^^ and encourage the
kind of

short-run achievements which can be accomplished

in

and the results of which can be readily publicized.

single session

a

Finally,

times staff has been known to supplant members of Congress.

ference committee, meeting to resolve differences over

benefits bill

in

1977,

never gathered together to meet.

a

someA con-

G.I.

Instead, the
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work was done when

sa« as issues of principle'
;
sal
the"'"; LTf
compromise was no simple
split-the-d ffe;ence Iffll
t\
find some canmon ground
between the 1nte?Ists
bers of the House and
Senate the staffs h^i ^f
'""^
"'^^
imaginative new fonnulat1on^s1gn1f^cInt^S
rh.^
aw
These fon^ulations/some
ff'I
'
^"Le'n'

cfZ'J

Malbin's discussions-of staff
roles as "filters" of the
information which comes to inembers^^^
of rivalries between

legislation-and oversight-oriented
individual s;^^^

of a conmon staff

tendency to prematurely leak
results of investigative hearings,
or

publicize their own hypotheses, while
neglecting

to

to

announce when pro-

jected scandals are not borne out by
evidence;^^^ and of the manage-

ment problems that follow when one
person

is

in

charge of a

subcommittee staff of thirty that generates
sufficient information
sustain

a

public hearing one of every two days
Congress is in

session- together suggest that
control

to

the problems of coordination and self-

that have plagued Congress throughout its
history are can-

pounded anew by its staff.

The difficulties

that beset Congress in

the Federalist period now appear among the
supporting staff members

who through their numbers present the body with
what might be called

"bureaucratic" problems, and through their political activities
make
those of the general

body all

the more difficult of solution.
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Nor are the problems
of the new .egl.e
.erel. organizational
and political.
They extend to the
quality of Congressional
understanding of the legislative
matters.
Simply p.,. .^es the
«eU=r
Of 1nfor„,ation and technical
expertise now raining down
on Congress
help the hu.an beings who
toil there perfo™
better service for the
country or not? Are they any
better able to deal with
the issues of
the day In ter.s of the basic
principles behind the.-as
the earliest
Congresses were so concerned to
do? ,Malb1n presents one
very clear
exa,nple, of a debate on a
very broad question,
which suggests not:
analysis in the natural gas
debate of
1977 'lOM rlt
1977-1978
can f'^"^'"^^
tell us something about
the wav Conare^'r
information have changed over
the pas! two dica
IT^'L"^
des.
When Congress debated the
issue of natural qasnrice
deregulation In 1955-1956, virtually
all of Us quant ta4e
the'a3min?
a"
arguments about costs and sunnlipc
°"
Judgments and as uS
O S
from flltt
''^V''''
should be
be?ed took ni!nf
bered,
place kT'before any of the econometric models
used
by the analysts of 1977-1978 had
been developed.)
On the
other hand, the 1955-1956 debate was
probably more detailed
and more sophisticated than the
ones of the 1980s on the
questions raised by price regulation and
on
thp'^cnr^J'
monopolistic or oligopolistic control
?n%h
.''''^^"i,'^^
in the industry.
Thus, the fact that there was more
quantitative information available in 1977-1978,
and the fact
that Congress used its enlarged staff
to help it cope with
the econometric technicalities of this
information, do not
settle whether the senators and representatives
of 1977-1978
were themselves any better informed than
their
predecessors. '^^y
tion While TJ/T.
tiln^Te
all of its

mJ-

^

It seems then,
all

its computers,

that for all

its technological

advances,

for

its armies of attendant staff lawyers and
Ph.D.'s,

its regression analyses and piles of tables and
statistical

data

covering miles and miles of computer print-outs, that
Congress

is

in
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no position to .e

spread before

an'mtenigent .se.

of t„e

„eaU.

of

thus

U.

'Me.be.s toda. are s1,„pl,
too busy and not
sufficiently Knowledgeable"
to do that sifting
of all this material
which
alone could strengthen
their intellectual
grasps of the technical
.natters at hand.
The following passage
fro. Malbln's boo.
su^s up the

current state of affairs
pretty well:

T

'''''
co^l^oi o^ertL^'a^n
a'%o^^?L"^ia?r
therefore, that as more and
more of Cona;e<;J
i
.ittees and subcommittees ado
t'thls'??
ty
"? e"effe"ct
"
'"''^'^
been
!to L
1
Stan
nL'aVh^''^' f'''
S^n^^ating more work for
Conqress instead nf h
^^^'^ting workload,
uur
orcrncerns
concerns ahlf
about rn"
Congress's independence and about
its ina

f

n^fffr^Tn'"

u

LT'

f

^""^^^^^^-^gly fractional ized workload
11
Both will have to be weighed^

care?ul .
' ^^^^""^ assessment of the
effect if
of rJnn"'
Congress's new use of staff on the
leaislativp
legislative
branch's ability to do its job. 211

If the student of Congress
sees legislation as its output
and

voting as its activity, he will
institutions.
will

If,

focus on its internal

politics and

however, policy is his emphasis and
his concern, he

find himself talking about the
politics of the administrative

state.

In

classical

conceptions, what we call

come of political deliberations.

Students of classical

those who deliberate and who decide.

what was once united

in

"policy" was the out-

In

the assembly hall

politics study

the modern state, however,
has become separated and

widely distributed throughout the sprawling
architectural maze of
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^dern Washington.
fonow

the Classical

However aw.ward the
,«ve .ay
.„o<1e1

then

U

we

we .ust follow
the paths of thos;
who

erate an<..ec1.e. out
of the wel

H-n.

see,„.

1

Gen-

of Congress an.
away

fr« Capitol
This .eans following
staff .e,nbers up
Pennsylvania Avenue where

haunt their progenitors
by bringing something
of the bureaucracy
Into
the structure of
Congress Itself.^^^
congress's c«„.1ttees
«.e
consensus building difficult,

„

and the address of
broad and general

questions next to Impossible,
the tas. of overseeing
the activities of
the executive branch
bureaucracy see. equally
beyond It.
While
the

contemporary literature on
the oversight problem

Is

voluminous, little
of substance has been added
to Wilson's summation
of that essential
difficulty. What Congress
has set up. It cannot
control:

[:?^Jhe"Ad^min"?s%rit?^nV^^^::r;^e°"sL^^?:r^.T^^^^^^-"^
clous investigations wfllchTt"fr«
Its spasmodic endeavors to
dispel or confirm suspicions
of
malfeasance or of wanton corruption
do not afford it more
than a glimpse of the Inside
of a small

^tt^Zl^'X^^^

prov nee o^ federal
°' <'"'9"'"9 officials can alwLs
holdd It at arm s length by
ho
dexterous evasions and concealments.
It can violently disturb,
but it cannot often
fathom the waters of the sea In
which the big e
fis
o
the
^-^net st1?s^ w1tho^\''^
cl':i:si^^g";^:

ZVJ^'r^-

Therefore, we find that the
Institutional

powers of Congress,

far from being Increased by the
staff which provides It infomation,

or the bureaucracy which carries
out Its mandates, are overwhelmed by
a

surfeit of the one, and confounded by
Its Inability to monitor the

other.
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J. Mclver Weatherford
approaches the whole question
of the

bureaucratization of the Congress
from the standpoint of
anthropology
instead of political science.
He begs or ignores
certain questions,

particularly those arising from
law or organization.

Many in our

field would find him weak on
the role played by legal

institutions in

any society.

His strengths,

however, are in "off-beat"
areas that can

provide insights for the rest of
us.

Anthropologists do field work in

primitive societies where they
investigate
questions.

For our purposes. Weatherford

works and the collective uses of
ritual

'

to

a

number of fundamental

background in kinship net-

s

posit and sustain shared

world views are particularly helpful.
Weatherford does not think that Congress
is

a

bureaucracy.

Nor would he agree, necessarily, that
the "bureaucracy is out of

control."

For Weatherford, what counts is not the
formal

rela-

tionships and the academic and legal problems
raised by the oversight
question, or questions of recursive interbranch
influence.
ters to him are the informal

bonds that connect people together.

within this limited domain, he shows that
able to exercise

government

is

a

What mat-

to

And

ask whether Congress is

reasonable degree of control over the rest of

really beside the point.

What counts, in his view, is

that certain members of Congress exert considerable influence
over

important parts of government.
the sort anthropologists relish,

The key to this analysis, which is of
is

the personal

When he looks at the role of Congressional
personal

staff,

or clan network.

Weatherford sees

networks radiating out from senior "big men" in Congress.
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These are more fan,il1al

than strictly
bureaucratic:

^^'"'^'"3 politics in India
calls
bu^eaucraci^
°^ ^^'^""^^ retainers
coalesce around ind^viduarn^iiti
setting, the underlying
' bureaucratic
princ Ml ;,?"^
^
relationship of pat^rto''
^„
ach^'orthe^M OM^^
employees of Congress is thP rii-«n+^f
/
^'"^
the 535 members of Congress
^"'^^ of
n t
become clients of othe^m^^ber
^'''''?

VrLLl

^

a'^'^:e

shall lee''^

Other branches Of gov:rn::;?"^fh:
^er an^^gT^^s^nor^^
closely resembles the ancient
legislatures of Romf
Byzantium and Greece than it
does the moder
legislatures
'^^'^'^^"^^^ of
Great Britain, Germany, Canada
or France. 214
When members arrive in Congress,
they begin the process of

building up clans or staff networks
to assist them.

The choices they

make are crucial to their career
patterns and help determine what
sorts of legislators they will turn
out to be.^l^ committee chairmen,
for example, are not only in

a

position to recruit extensive personal

staff networks, but incorporate committee
staff into their clans as
well.

A very powerful member of Congress,

such as Senator Kennedy is

or Senator Muskie was, can retain control
over the entirety of such

networks-even when moving from one committee
assignment

to

another.

For Weatherford, such shufflings at the formal

level

change

little at the substantive level of power:
The nominal jurisdictions and the titles belong to
the
facade of Congress.
As part of that facade they are
rearranged every other year, when new shingles are made and
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congressional

CapUol H111 itself
appointments or

«ve

clans

as

,nay,

individual

and often do. expand
away fr«„

staffers gain executive
branch

to other positions of
power within Washington,

vet their clan-alliances
persist over ti.e, and

a wel

-organized clan
can continue to operate s.noothly,
even after the death of
its chief.
1

Crosscutting the fonnal organization
of government departments,
political parties and lobbies,
these extended
clans fon« the network base

around which government operates.

(Note that the "fonn" of these

arrangements is more or less the same
as that of the iron triangles
described by Dodd and Schott. but
that what ultimately connects the
participants

is

not "interests" ^er se, but
their relatedness to one

another by clan membership.)

Among other concrete examples,

Weatherford cites that of John Stennis, head
of the "military clan"
which, even now, is bringing us the
Tombigbee Waterway, an immense

project orchestrated not through the Public
Works Committee, as one

might expect, but through the Army Corps of
Engineers.^^''

This is the

old military clan of the Senate, the
patriarchy once headed by Carl
Vinson, and subsequently passed on. first

Edward Herbert and finally to Stennis.

approaching its end, and Sam Munn

is

the

to Mendel

Rivers, then to

Stennis's tenure is
likely heir apparant.^^°

power of such informal organizations extends far beyond
the Senate

chamber and

is

exercised through more than the simple force of law:

The
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of Congressional Clans
^'
P'^'^
.nanifes?
itself
rt r"""^^^lons
'f'^
between the bureaucracy and
the nitionii lln?
the most important relltio
s
n
ov r
et
pointed
out by Lord Brvce in hi<; nina^L^i^u
?
A.eri^a. thisTonnect
"
e"
ing^wM^hlhr^'^l^^"
notices and has the scanties^'mLnTo?
f"" '''''
,

L

'

f

:ncKin'g'!"2f

Weatherford says that Congressional
clansmen stream down
Capitol Hill

in

a

perpetual

torrent,

filling the cavernous halls
along Pennsylvania Avph.ip ;,nH
''''' ''''''''
'^'y become co:. ss 0 ers
the
^nl
Commission, directors of the
National
^nin
Endowment
for the Arts, assistant
secretaries for the
Department of Commerce, and officials
of every part of the
government from the Corporation for
Public Broadcast?ng to
tne Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
Behind ev.ry oak
simulated-wood conference tab e in
the
r??v
'^'^^ '''''''' brandishing
"
colors of his
h rSn?
'T''
Hill clan and
congressional sponsor. 222

Z

It would be foolish to confuse
the power of Congressional

clan

networks with the powers of Congress or
to mistake the political

influence of the one with the institutional
The formal

and legal

viability of the other.

framework of institutions, through which
we

manage our collective affairs, both defines
and limits the uses of
power in our society.

At the same time, such institutions are
not,

because they cannot be, structured

to

embrace networks of shared

interests and experiences, networks which sometimes are
based on
something like the elective affinities of Goethe.
bind the influential
its operations.

institutional
informal

Yet such networks

together in every society, and are essential

to

Unfortunately, there seem to be times when the fonnal

framework defines the horizon of possibilities for the

networks, and other times when real

political

power flows
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along the lines of the
personal connections
established by every
class
and generation.
The recent drastic
Increases In staff size
and
influence strengthen the
positions of the networks
at the expense of
the «st public institutions,
and as such ,„ay
constitute a ,naJor formative step in the gradual
emergence of a not-yet-seen
pennanent
structure of political power
in the nasclent culture
of the United
States.
On the other hand, network
Influence «y be temporary,
but
given the nature and complexity
of the political tasks
at hand, and
the confluence of forces
represented by subc»»1ttee

gover™ent and

Congressional

clanbuil ding,

I

do not see how this could
turn out to be

the case.

Although
influence,

I

I

have dwelt somewhat at length
on staff power and

hope that the reasons for the
emphasis are obvious.

First, subcommittee government
is one aspect of a
decentralization of
Congress that goes to the heart of
its internal organization and

institutional

function.

Staff inembers get their careers
started here

and then either move into the
bureaucracy or stay to work closely with

other former staff members who have.

As clients of elected represen-

tatives, they also exist as elements in
informal clan networks that

translate the de jure authority of Congress
into real
power.

and

immediate

Second, the increasing refinement, striation
and canplexity of

institutional

forms and government organization pushes
these indivi-

duals into narrower and narrower spheres of active
concern, in which
they pursue ever more technical

and specialized tasks.

ments are attributes of bureaucracy, and

I

These develop-

have tried at least to

397

indicate the existence of

a

kind of institutional

"feedback" that

flows through the networks to
influence the fonn, function and
power
of the Congressional nerve center
which gave this set of
developments
its initial impetus.
All of these developments
can be subsumed under
the rubric of interbranch relations.
They seem to point to a Congress

which faces an ever-constricting sphere
of action, an ever approaching

horizon of possibilities.
There is one additional

function of Congressional

factor with regard to the role and

staff that needs to be pointed out.

the source is Weatherford.

Again

Here we are concerned with the public

space functions of debate and deliberation
that constitute the philosophical

raison d'etre of Congress.

What Weatherford'

shows is that the "public" nature of Congressional

s

description

operations has

somehow gotten perverted from the open conduct of
publici business

in

the eyes of public2, to the presentation of ritual perfonnances
of

stylized activities before

a

which it has grown accustomed
politics.

It is as

up in medieval

Globe Theatre

media audience in
to

televised forum to

look for entertainment rather than

though we had decided to dress our representatives

costumes and put them on
in

a

London.

a

stage replica of the old

What Weatherford shows is the extent to

which most of the work and many of the real

decisions are still being

carried out, right where they have always been, behind the scenes, but
that in this case, the representatives, by spending increasing amounts
of time before the cameras, are being squeezed out of the real
cal

process.

This has come about,

I

politi-

think, because Congress remains

a
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public body with public functions
to perfonn, and maintains

a

semblence of public responsibility
by parading before the
camera
eye.

Weatherford'

caricature.
quotation.

s

s

account is less than an analysis
and more than

Though it is longer than usually
thought proper for
I

a

a

include it here because, better
than any other published

source, it sums up one very important
dimension of the daily life of
the average member.

Students of Congress who have had occasion

to

seek

interviews

among the members themselves have
doubtless had the experience of

spending twenty minutes with
office, hearing a bell

a

busy representative, starting in his

ring somewhere in the distance, and
then

running with him down the hall, into the
Congressional
and over to the Capitol

subway system

building where both jam themselves into

packed elevator and ride up, amidst

a

a

flood of jokes, to the entrance

of the chamber itself where the representative
and the student

necessarily part company.

Throughout this burst of activity, some

sort of colloquy is supposed to be taking place--if the
member can

concentrate well enough to reply and the student well enough to
take
notes.

Since this rushed and hurried aspect of daily life seems to be

the rule rather than the exception these days, Weatherford is correct
to emphasize the proportionate increase in the

ri tual

ization of that

life and the production by Congress of what he calls its "ritual

record."

Meanwhile, behind the badly oiled and clanky screen of such

media performances, staff specialists and technical experts busily
fine- tune the public's business.

the demands of ceremony
centuries,
r^UuIf an^th'^™"^^
have crept through the
^..f/^P^^yl "9 record
Congres 'like
over one legislative
forum'after
othe

f

.-1^g"ar?L:f^f-o^p\S-,1„---

is spent

'^^^''"'9 f™'"
announces the subiect „Mrh J
^ sheet,
?'
^ra.e importance,
and welcomes the
vfsUors who .r "'f
distinguished and
dedicated experts
ihill'tS
issue, the senato^ 1,
^^'^
I's ?o Z'T.J'"'']''
Plaming about the
upcoming meeting with a 4 H^lnh
.
batch of documents thrust'at
signs a
hi^ k
As soon
as another senator tumbles
^^^r^t^--^in o tL"''
"''^^ '^^s handful of
question cards the or« d?„^
^
''^ ''^^"'"S
to him and xcuses himse
f
'he JL'rH'"^"'
Senate floor, where he ore^ents
*° '^'^^
f^l

f

t^TL

If

'

^^'^'^s

^"other round of disarmament

Presented because the bells ring
and the
''''''^
b^'k
the
fori vo?e''%''''^'''''
of the room with all the
.^"""^"9
other
sen^^orr he asks
t' if
senators
anyone knows what the vote .night
be on
Before they can decide, they are
in the crowded hill in
front
Surrounded by lobbyists and by
aides
tryinc
to fL'Jr^''''''''' ' '''^^'^
gi
1
ti e'^ass?s
assistant
ant'n?n
pinned against a fluted column
on the
c H
^"^^^^ to get closer than twenty
'
.
feet
""L^^^
to one
another,
the aide gestures a set of
prearranqed
''is
9°
'''' ''''
one'"" Stni'^nt'r' ""''l^
topic, he hurries into the
rh^mhJ
I
chamber registers his vote, and
tries to get

linh^!

fi

L

-

^

back to the

''''' ^^"^tors leave the chamber.
SittL with two other senators for
Sitting
the ride back to the
office building, he asks if anyone knew
that vote was
an about. One thinks it was a motion towhat
table the motion to
reconsider the addition of $5 million to
build halfway houses
.spouses.
Another insists he heard something about
Lt"! of, honor commemorating
aI medal
John Wayne's heroic services
to the American nation.
Before a consensus can be decided
tney arrive back at the office building
and each rushes off
to his next appointment.

tells him that he must
'"'^ ^'^e
go Sack
hearing because two
con«nittee
teachers from h?! T''""^
testify as representatfves
^tfte.are about to
Of Se
State Education Association
P»l'tically active
h»
""1"" ^'''^^
Hearings, the teachers are ^l.i. t
t^e
f'n'shed,
but he interrupts
to welcome them Restate
?hff™ „
and distinctio^of the
^I^^S^ave subject
°
witnes es aL""

Ttl^^
tl
M f

ho

ri;S

^;=;9^I"9

~ny

•

is not

for anofher

^ '"™^^™

than telling them that he h.^

several wepk^

ThonV

^

^^'^'^^^

on

o r

f°lks

the past

Each day for a member of
Congress resembles the ^rhprini«
of a film actor, which indeed
a number o^po fticians
mav
have been prior to entering
public service
An
ac?nr
in several different
productions at once and m s? rush'f
om
'

POlHician'enters o
sce^e °?rcLch:d\'°
by a '''-T''waiting assistant for a few moments
^nH^h
and
then performs the role.
His particular performance nav
have no relation to that of the
actors who appeared just
before or after him. but the pieces
will
ina coherent fashion afterwards by the be edited together
staff
The im^or?Int'
''' ''' appet'ance' n r 0
Se^vot d ''r'' ''f
' '""^
^^^1' he asked the question
o? the witness, he introduced
of
the bill, he co-sponsored the
amendment, he spoke the sentence. The
staff can ^ssue all
the press releases and printed
speeches to show that this
made him a prime mover. The one
question can be turned into
a probing inquisition on paper,
the one-minute speech into
three speeches of oratorical grace
spread out throughout the
day s record.
The picture with the President of Italy
-an be
released to the press with a long explanation
of the
senator s active participation in Italian-American
concerns.
he film clip of his welcoming the
members of the State
Education Association in the ornate committee
rooin can be
shown on local television as proof of his
sincere concern

TJj.

I
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^^^^^"^^'^0 synboKzation
of what he appears to be
doL
Politicians have become <:r.ori
figures who preside over
'"^t^«l--cere,non1al
and ^nS^l
u'"
"''"^
appropriate dash of au?ho?
tv
?hPv h«/'"'°"
official mana.
°^
'
Symbolic^ v t-h-^ f-^^^"
stage as the star^f the
eve^t buJ t e r«[ f'"^'''
decisions occur
backstage.
The member of r^nnAoef I.
these public appeTances
'"^"^ °^
each
f.^T'':backstage
where the decisions are ,n!rt»
°/
^° """"
'^"^
rites of legi Ut on for hi^f. k'
"^'"^ '"'"l^^"
its
actual sublCnce 223

"

A_Notejiri_jthg Budget and Spending
P rore^

'^\1^9lslation. there

?or'vefo™"
Ucular'?e™on„.-

''''

'

is always a majority

P^-

'

Russell Long

Representatives,
are told today, of will
discipline, and restraint, and this
budget control bill is
going to cure all things.
Everything and everybody s
going to be reformed
.is going to be hunky-do^y and the
goose IS going to hang high.
If we just pass 'thi
bi'l
we
will have brought into play all
the will, all of the
restraint and al 1 of the discipline
that is necessary to
balance the budget, stop inflation, and
restore fiscal
sanity.
Do not believe it for one minute. 224
inere has been TTrv''
?hereMs'beIn
a lack, we

.

.

.

.

.

There is nothing even remotely complex
about the matter of

government spending.

modern government

Indeed,

this is perhaps the only attribute of

to which we can

ascribe "ontological

"

reality.

Money, after all, is tangible; more so than
any possible ideology or
theory or alignment of political

weighed, gathered
the

in

interests, for it can be counted and

from the people through judicious application of

force of law, and disbursed with a finality paralleled
only by the
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end Of ,1fe Uself.

The 90.ern.ent. ,i.e
any other entity which
has

to co.e to grips with the
.atter of ,„oney, has
methods for acquiring
1t and projects upon which
to lavish It.
In general, It
benefits

acquirers and spenders alike
to know, .ore or less,
how ™uch they are
acquiring and spending, and
therefore how .uch they will
be forced to

borrow or able to save should
their acquisitions and
disbursements get
out of balance.
Hence both the acquisition
and disbursement of funds
are facilitated by something
we have come to know as an
accounting

process.

Wildavsky has made it pretty clear
that those involved

in

the

spending processes of the U.S.
government, whether they find themselves on the executive or legislative
side of the government, begin

their annual deliberations from

a base

figure which reveals the

approximate level of spending for various
agencies and programs

current year.

in

the

From this figure it is relatively easy
to go on and

compute how much you intend

spend during the following year and

to

what you intend to spend it on.
But politics raises its ugly head.

What happens to this

simple and straightforward and altogether reasonable
situation when we

concretize it, so

to

speak, and toss it into the maw of a feverish and

overwrought government?

In

a

is instantaneous and pandemic:

word:

all

hell

breaks loose.

Conflict

about the methods of computing the

base; about the form in which budget requests and projections
are to

be tendered to those who have the authority to decide; about the

distribution of that authority between the executive and legislative
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branches.

Behind

al
,

such conf, icts ,1es
a deeper one:

bnter struggle against

there are

those who desire to
spend less.

One need

search no further afield
than Dante to find
an ipage for this:

side^L'd on''the'oJhe*r'"'wrth'ir..?H
main force of chest ih^i ^i^eh n 5°"^'

In Dante's

image, the misers move
toward the right, the

spendthrifts toward the left.
all

""'^ °"
weights by

And the weary futile round
goes on to

eternity.

The clash between hoarders
and wasters embroils both
the executive and legislative branches;
it reaches out to the
professions of

journalism and economics.

Even members of the political

science pro-

fession become caught in its eddies,
and this last raises difficulties
for the student of Congress who
would evaluate its budgeting and

spending practices:

the ultimate criteria for any
professional

luation of this aspect of Congressional

eva-

life are to be found in the

hoarding or wasting hearts of the various
commentators.
Once we have drawn this elementary
fault line through the

scholarly and political

landscapes, it is then possible

few of the lesser political

a

point out

a

problems that loom between the student and

his comprehension of Congress and money.

picture of

to

We have already presented

a

heterogeneous Congress, populated by entrepreneurial mem-
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bers. d,-sor,a„1zed

want of part, aisc1p,1„e
and subject to the
sudden appearance and
disappearance of ad hoc
caucuses
These and
other disorders can be
traced bac. to «hat
the .e*ers of the
political science profession
are wont to treat
as "c^petlng cla1,„s."
Beyond
these, however, lie
difficulties to baffle
the logician.
Aaron
wndavs., starts his
„Uh what we
could see as a purely fon„al
proble. In the theory of
resource allocation.
Should budgets reflect
the views and needs of
those In the
field, so to speak, or
should they be a reflection
of the overall picture ds seen from a central
point?
a

.

Pol1t1«oLthOufeir^

iUl ZZ"^l\lT"llV.'
'^^^-^-^
P^r^^esf ol

'

totals to be deter-

ag^enc^^eT:?e^^dd1^^;^^.^^rr-

a^T:r.::^?ha?"t;:^ete\Tthl

i:"4^<;Ts"I

•

impossible for spending total
s\o be dete^ ned ent rel bv a
top-down" process, because that
process would reaur' that
no l^its below which
govern,nentr
pending ^ould be
r»r'
In1"^o1:do^:^

-L^sls^^rt^Vll-LVttne

fn"^;;e°r?^terlc1i:!i?6-

u«??f

-"^^ -

Alan Schick begins his somewhat
magisterial
same process with

a

f

^

^-^-1:^

X

treatment of the

similar conundrum, though what
interests him is

the struggle for power itself,
rather than any distribution of
goods

which may ensue:
While legislative norms propel Congress
toward the fragmentation of power, budgeting invites the
concentration of
power.
Budgeting necessarily involves the pulling
together
of disparate interests and perspectives
in a reasonably
comprehensive and consistent decisional process.
Budqetinq
demands attention to the relationship of
the parts and the
whole, to the linkage of tax and spending
politics, as well
as to the priorities accorded to the
competing claims for
public resources
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Such dilemmas are inherently
unsolvable. but they
plague the
theoretical rationalizations
of oolitiV;,!
or
..^
political actors
at every point.

They

are worth noting, however,
because they help us to
see Congressional
spending decisions as outcomes
of a political process
which attempts
to come to grips with logical
and organizational
paradox through an
unruly and divisive clash of
heterogeneous interests.
As such, the

budgetary process in Congress
unequivocal

provides the scholar with

intersection of critical

Here, if anywhere, the
organizational

a

theory and practical
and political

focused and

difficulty.

problems that pla-

gue the legislature should become
evident; here, if anywhere, it

should be possible to determine
whether special or general
have come to hold sway over the
institution.
to square a general

interests

The great problem is how

doctrine concerned with the maximization
of public

goods with a kind of claim that
essentially refers to allocation to

particular sorts of individuals and groups,
for purposes which may not
be "public" at all.

The budget process,

through its very finality,

displays the distribution of power and resources
throughout the

government and among its various clients more
clearly than any other
political

activity.

Taken as a whole, the Federal budget is a
representation in
monetary terms of governmental activity.
If politics is
regarded in part as conflict over whose preferences
shall
prevail in the determination of national policy,
then the
budget records the outcomes of this struggle. ... In
the
most Integral sense, the budget lies at the heart of the
political process. 228
A history of budgeting and spending in Congress vvould be

almost as voluminous as

a

history of Congress itself.

Fortunately,

in

406

this as in so .any other
areas of its institutional
•nade

a

great turn 1n the 1970s
when

and I.pound.ent Control
Act of 1974.

U

1He, Congress

passed the Congressional

Budget

The legislative history
of this

act, the reasons for which
It was undertaken,
and the Institutional

changes It wrought are all
ground pretty well covered
Places.229 ,,,,

^

^^^^^ ^^^^^

In

other

^^^^^^

^^^^^^

parts of the act as briefly
as possible, describe
the unalterable
institutional constraints within
which it operates, ask
whether the
reforms it embodies have succeeded
in realizing the aims
for which
they were undertaken, and
seek to discover whether
it has the potential

to

restore Congressional

power over the budget.

Prior to the passage of the 1974
Act, the budgetary process
in
Congress was beset with conflict
and confusion.
Alan Schick has
referred to it as

a

war between the parts and the
whole. 230

Congress would take the budget submitted
It into small

pieces, parcel

it by the President,

the end of the legislative session
to
It was often

the case

that Pew within

Congress were even aware of the emerging
budget totals.

decentralized legislative process resulted
was merely the sum of

a

chop

these out through the committee and
sub-

committee system and wait until
find out what it had created.

to

^^^h year

in

a

Thus the

budgetary process that

series of Isolated, competing and unrelated

actions. 231

Ellwood and Thurber discuss six kinds of politically
important

difficulty that followed from these chaotic practices.
tremendous growth in Federal

spending and

a

First was

ballooning national

a

debt.

407

second «as t.e loss of
.,>ect Concessional
cont.o, o.e. spend1„,
levels occasioned
the «1.esp.ead
1nstU.t1ona, Uation of
.an.ato..
spend,ng, I.3., an increasing
percentage of Federal
outlays could not
^e altered 1„ a given
year without changing
the basic authorising
statute Which had set up a
particular spending program
in the first
place.
Third, profound changes
in the national
econ»„y had put an end
to the constant, annual

Increases in revenues,
forcing Congress to
Choose a.ong alternatives,
when it had grown accustomed
to annual

across-the-board increases

in

accompanied by radical change
itself, reflecting

a

expenditures.
in

This development was

the composition of the
Federal

budget

shift in spending priorities
as the percentages

Of the budget alloted

to

were roughly reversed.

defense and to direct payments
to individuals

confronted with hard choices between
defense

and social

programs, some reformers wanted
to unify the budgetary
process to clarify alternatives
and make the difficult choices
stand out

against the background of overall
budget totals.

Fourth, the

existing, uncoordinated budget
process made it next

Congress to determine or to carry out
Fifth, in the face of

a

a

national

to

fiscal

Impossible for
policy.

lack of budgetary infonnation.
Congress had to

rely on the information supplied it
by the 0MB to help it evaluate
the

President's spending and programs.
tiative and

a

monopoly on empirical

This left both political

Information on the Executive side.

Sixth, the impoundment of funds by the
President, i.e.. Mr.
refusal

to

ini-

Nixon's

spend money appropriated by Congress for specific
programs,

had assumed unprecedented dimensions after
1972, and threatened

to
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create

a

Constitutional crisis
cn<;i<; of
r>f i^r- ^
Its own as Members
found the
Congressional preroqativo
ogativ. over
o^Pr taxing
t;,vin^ , ^
and spending threatened
at its
very roots.

^

Perhaps we can fairly su.
up these problems by
saying that
they were all manifestations
of the institutional
weaknesses of
congress, consequences of
its chaotic and
decentralized internal political

processes, and of the elaborate
division of responsibilities
reflected in the organization
of its committee system.
Hence, the
budget process established by
the 1974 Act is an attempt
to redress
these problems and to serve
as an integrating mechanism
for the

separate tax, appropriations
and authorizations processes
which continue to function on Capitol
Hill.234
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
give Congress a comprehensive
and consistent means of making
fiscal

choices and setting national

priorities.

Here are its purposes,

according to the Act:
Congress declares that it is essential:
to assure
control over the budgetary processto provide for the Congressional
determination each^year of
the appropriate level of federal
revenues and expendituresto provide a system of impoundment
control; to establish
national priorities; and to provide
for the furnishing of
information by the Executive branch in
a manner that will
assist tne Congress in discharging its
duties. 235

pffJ?^
effective Congressional

'

In pursuit of these aims,

institutions:

The House and Senate Budget Committees,
and the

Congressional Budget Office.

procedures,

a

the Act created three new

It also provided a new set of budgeting

timetable for budgetary actions and

a

change in the

fiscal year, requirements for standardized
budget terminology and

1nfo™at1on .0.
presidential

p.esi.enfs ...^et.

provisions fo. cont.on

impoundments. 236

Ellwood and Thurber
provide
^viae
¥
process:

a

s-jrrinrisjccinct
summary of the new

The new congressional
budgetary Droce<;<; <:Afc n ^ u
October 1 as the
beginning of the fiscal
vear
nn m
must submit a curre t
^^^sU.nt
services
day after Congress meetrhl mL.budopr'"^';
fifteenth
°"
^u^?
-St adopt at^e1s^"t:^^S cu^"
esoluuons'^^'"^^^o^s
one on or
before May 15 (before rpvpn.,« Innnt" "^^^^
been passed) aid the
''''
oth r ^
been taken on all
'^^^
appropriations MIU)
'

:

Z^XTTi^''''''

general 'nage's'^'urinfo'lt'^on
llT''''
paratlon, and sub™ s o
o?c nqress onil"^K

budget

;

0

'ho

is a d

T'^^V'
""g^^slonal

This brief sketch does little
justice to the extent to which
the new procedure embodies
provisions designed to enable
Congress to
attain a complex set of aims.
Despite widespread alarm over
rising

budget totals, the traditional

functions of the allocations and

appropriations committees, when combined
with the perennial contest
between hoarders and wasters, meant
that Congress could not simply
subscribe to

a

set of arrangements which explicitly
favored spending

cuts over increases:
To have done so would have curbed
the legislative power of
Congress by making future outcomes
dependent on budget proce^
dures rather than on majority will. 238

^

Furthermore, member support for budgetary
reforms was con-
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tingent upon bipartisan
support for such
proposals.
Schick's analysis, the new
process had to be neutral

Hence, on

with respect to
spending levels, and it
attains this through the
so.ewhat contradictory nature of the two
budget resolutions.
The first resolution
lays
out spending targets rather
than ceilings, and
preserves the power of
the Appropriations
Co^ittees to determine specific
progra. outlays
The second resolution
applies to revenues as well
as to spending,
and

once this has been adopted.
Congress cannot take action
that would
raise spending above or lower
revenues below the amounts
fi^ed in the

resolution.

"By treating tax and
expenditure legislation in the
sa.ne

way. Congress signified its
intent to establish

not foreordain any of its
outcomes "239

a

process which would

.

congress thereupon provided

itself an escape hatch of the sort
which any student of President

Eisenhower's speeches might well admire:

according to the rules, once

the second resolution has been
passed. Congress "cannot violate"
its

self-imposed budget restraint.

Nevertheless, Congress "can revise"

its budget decisions by adopting
I

a

new resolution at any time.

think, lets the horse out of the barn. 240

This,

what can "spending

restraint" possibly mean if the Congress
can raise totals whenever it

desires?
So goes the script at any rate.

improve Congressional

Budget Committee
for overall

in

control

Essentially,

it attempted to

over budget matters by instituting

a

each House that would have primary responsibility

coordination of the various spending proposals which arise

from both the executive and legislative sides of the
government.

To
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aid these committees in their
tasks, the Congressional
Budget Office
was instituted to gather factual
information and free Congress
fr.n
its longstanding reliance on
the executive branch for
information and
hard figures.
These provisions and others,
including the anti-

impoundment measures, have been in
place now for eight years, and
it
is possible to see whether the
new institutions have succeeded
in

moving Congress smoothly through the
pages of the script, and whether
such movement may be sufficient to
restore its lost control over

spending.
downs:

In

general, the implementation process
has had its ups and

conflict has arisen within the decentralized
Congress, as any

student of its history might expect, and Schick
maintains that

... the new process enlarges the potential for conflict
within Congress because it expands the scope of
participation
and compels Congress to make more explicit
budget choices
than before. '^^lA full

blown description and analysis of the new budget
pro-

cess and its various consequences would occupy considerable
space.
The legislative history of the 1974 Act is complex.

The provisions of

the Act are also complex, as are the relationships between
those pro-

visions and the intentions they attempted to embody.

would have to be placed

in

These factors

the context of a complex legislature which

is rapidly changing, not only in terms of the composition of its

fnem-

bership but also with respect to its underlying consensus about basic

spending priorities.

Neither of these last two is uniformly reflected

throughout the Congress to any degree.

In

addition to all

this,

there

is the tangled web of interbranch relations explored by Wildavsky.
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Rather than attempting to
cover this extensive
ground here
I
will
Sl.ply allude to so.ne of
the major problems
which confront Congress
wUh respect to taxing and spending
issues, and note that
while th.

Short-term configurations of
these dilemmas have been
affected by the
new legislation, the
underlying context has been
little
changed.

First and most important,
for Congress as for any
political or
legal agent, is retention
of control over
matters that lie within its

Jurisdiction.

This has plagued the
legislature since the last
quarter
of the nineteenth century,
and attempts to solve it
have followed one
upon the other, at least since
passage of the Budget and Accounting

Act of 1921.

At the present time. Congress
is in danger of losing

control over spending in two ways,
both of which appear to be beyond
the reach of the procedures
instituted by the Budget Act.
First,

spending targets for

a

variety of programs are set within
the execu-

tive branch before being gone over
by members of Congress in
various

committees.
efficient, it

Wildavsky has made it pretty clear that
it
is

is

not only

prudent to rely upon expenditure targets
set by admi-

nistrative agencies when their representatives
have proven themselves

competent and responsible .^^^

^^^^^^^^

politically expedient

method of computing various budget totals
annual

is

to

draw up and evaluate

expenditures via an incremental procedure--i

.e.

,

adding or

subtracting at the margins, based upon the preceding
year's

performance-rather than
justifications for

a

to

completely evaluate all of the political

given program in

a

given year.

very good reason for thinking otherwise, it is safe

Unless there is
to

assume that the
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reasons for the Initial

institution of

a

program still hold ^43

Wildavsky Claims that .embers
of Congress themselves,
despite thei r
highly developed capacities
for specialization,
have neither
the

ti-me

nor the expertise to
exhaustively evaluate every
spending proposal
that emanates from within
the bureaucracy,
iron triangles and subgovernments aside, then, the
sheer complexity of these
domains indicates that responsibility
for spending targets be
shared between those
nominally charged with providing
the money and those who
are involved
with its actual disbursement
on a daily basis.
Formally, this looks

like

a

permanent loss of power for
Congress,

budget process has been but
partially able
information-gathering powers of the CBO.
unavoidable.

If

Congress, it is

a

loss which the new

offset through the

to

Practically,

it amounts to a "loss of
control
a

such loss seems

over the purse" for

loss which Congress has brought
about for itself by

virtue of its past spending decisions
and of the organizational
tures that are necessary to implement
them.

I

struc-

can think of but a

single possible method through which
such "lost" power might be

regained for the Congress:

wipe the authorizing legislation off
the

books and dissolve the structures of
implementation.

Since neither

Congress nor the American public would stand
for this, the loss is

permanent as

the. pel

Thus we have
Itself.

At best,

the bureaucracy.
tural

evolution.

i

tical
a

as

desire for the programs in question.

Congress which does not compute the budget by

it arrives at spending projections

We could call

this

a

in

tandem with

loss of power through struc-
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T.e second .1nd of loss
of Congressional
control over spending
levels .ay .e ™.e directly
amenable to change by
Congress than the
first.
This dimension is less
a function of
governmental structure
than it is a .atter of
statuatory requirement.
The 1960s saw
a pro-

found Change in national

Of the budgetary pie.

spending priorities as
reflected

in

divisions

The relationship between
spending for matters

Of national defense and
spending for social welfare
programs was
roughly reversed. This is
generally known as the
"welfare shift."
Many expenditures of the
latter sort constitute what
the literature
has coine to call

"Mandated" spending because
disbursements are

,nade

directly to individuals, and
the focus of the enabling
legislation is
upon program goals instead of
spending
levels.

Dennis Ippolito

explains:

Entitlement programs mandate the
payment of benefits to recipients who meet requirements established
by law
ndeed
a"
''''
two
P^^t
decade
suggest
?haTln!f"'''-'''^''^'°"^
that beneficiaries may have what
amounts to a property right
n their benefits.)
The major portion of entitlement
spending is accounted for by trust
funds, such as social
to
the annual appropriations
"^^.^^^J^^^
oroce^.^' Entitlements
fnl?.^'''
process.
that cofne from general revenues
usua ly require annual appropriations,
but that is essentially a tecnnicality; the legislation
that created the
program, not the appropriation, dictates
the amount soent.
expanded this type of mandatory
.LnT'^^^L^l
S''^^^^^
spending, the budgetary
weight of entitlements has increased
dramatically.
In fiscal 1967 entitlements
accounted for 37
percent of total outlays and about 60 percent
of all
uncontrollable spending.
By 1980, entitlement spending was
60 percent of total outlays and almost 80 percent
of all
uncontrollable spending. 244
(

^

What counts is that such programs are placed outside
the purview of the new budget process.

Further, it doesn't take

a

genius to
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see that this raises
absolute hell with fiscal
policy.
For those who
believe that there is a
connection between federal
spending levels
interest rates, the cost of
capital available for
borrowing or investment in the private sector,
and the necessity for
policy flexibility
with respect to this equation,
the notion that such
flexibility has
.

become statuatorily out of
bounds nullifies one of the
possible
substantive consequences of the

act and voids one of its
essential

aims.

Ippolito ends his study of the
budget process with an extensive

list of suggestions for bringing
spending levels under control,
including the reevaluation of all
entitlement programs, and even
looks
favorably upon a Constitutional
Amendment to put limits on spending
levels.

His point is that the new budget
process has failed, and he

marshalls the truly amazing 1970s
increases
followed its adoption as supporting
evidence

in

spending totals that

.^"^^

For Ippolito, then,

the new process has failed to check
the predilection of the

authorizing committees:

as these committees sought support
for

progressively higher appropriations, they took
the position that an
authorization should reflect the financial needs of

a

program and not

the budgetary condition of the government.

But Ippolito cannot have it both ways:
have control
fiscal

either Congress must

over spending totals, or it cannot engage in making

policy.

Constitutional

limitations on spending constitute

a

completely unprecedented kind of constrain upon Congressional
action.
In the

final

analysis,

I

fail

to

see how such formal

limitations

differ from the constraints impsoed by mandatory spending itself:
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With regard

to

fiscal

consequences, how is it
different

to

say that
spend as opposed to saying
that it .ust not spend^
As
presently constituted, then,
Congress is not really
f.ee to decide
What it will spend because
so .uch of what it
actually does spend 1s

congress

out if its hands to decide

in

get the following result:

fiscal

a

given year.

Pre. this tautology we

policy suffers.

effects of entitlement programs
on Congressional

freedom to decide are

pretty much the same as those
which would follow

limitation on spending.

The practical

a

Constitutional

At the same time, it should
be clear that the

realm of possibilities covered by
the Budget Act

more restricted

is

than first appears, but these are
not deficiencies that can be
traced
back to the new budgetary process
per se.

Therefore the first two problems confronting
Congress, i.e.,
the role played by the bureaucracy in
the accounting process, and the

percentage of annual expenditures that has
been made mandatory by statute, leave Congress little room to maneuver
as it struggles to assert

its prerogatives over budgeting and spending.

facing the Members with respect to these issues

ween the general

Now
is

a

third difficulty

the conflict bet-

and the particular as these are embodied by
the

appropriations and authorizations committees respectively:
Members of Congress respond to two sets of pressure when
they
act on authorization and appropriations.
Through the
authorizations process, Congress demonstrates its responsiveness to particular interests; through its appropriations
decisions. Congress deals with the financial limitations of
the federal government.
The basic political conditions that
led in the past to different authorization and appropriation
outcomes have not been fundamentally altered by the budget
process.
The continuing gap reflects the ambivalence within
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such increment 1n Budget
Cc.fttee power necessarily
would have to
come at the expense of
existing committee power
centers.
The

Appropriations committees, for
example, retain responsibility
for
individual spending measures,
and

struggles over turf with
the new

Budget Committees are common

in

both Houses.

At the same time,

however, the new committees
have succeeded in making
members of
Congress in general more aware
of the consequences which
particular
spending measures have for
the overall budget.^^
Further, there is
increasing evidence of a dramatic
dropoff in the creation of new

entitlements since the implementation
of the Act made their
steadily
climbing costs evident to everyone.^^^

such changes reflect increased

attention to budget figures at the
expense of program needs and can
be
at least partially attributed to
the
new process.

While the new

Budget Act does not specifically take
power away from the older committees, it has established new epicenters
of power, and by making it

necessary that the traditional

institutions take the new ones into

account, can be said to have further
decentralized and complicated the

Congressional

budget process:

Prior to the Act, the parts of the budget were
cordoned off
from one another.
Tax policy was made by a single set of
committees; appropriations went through their own
process;
authorizations had their own committee roots and routes
'The
Budget Act means that there is hardly a single financial
decision that can be made via one set of committees
alone.
Revenue decisions involve both the tax and the budget
committees.
The budget committees share spending power with the
Appropriations Committees. The wills of all these committees
have to be concerted in the development of the congressional
budget. 250
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s

L wi

budgetary role of ConarP<;^
an adjudicator o buSgel y'
la?^
congress goes on reco^dln^u'

'

strained by the

jllTT

'of'

c1 ic"

This raises a complex and
difficult issue:

earlier,

a key

'''''
'll

r^^

as

I

indicated

fact about the new budget
process for both Schick and

Ippolito, is that even though
spending and revenue ceilings and
floors
are set by the second budget
resolution. Congress has the authority
to
alter them afterwards should it
be so disposed.
This may be a practical

necessity,

forced upon Congress by spending
shortfalls, endemic

conflict, or the logroll, but it makes
logical

nonsense of the thesis

that the new process really contains
enforcable or coersive stipulations over spending levels.

Schick sees the matter in this way:

The act directs Congress to make peace
through the channels
and procedures of its new budget process.
The Act facilitates the search by enabling a congressional
majority to do
whatever It wants to do.
It can peg the budget numbers at
any level it prefers and change them as often
as it wishes
Whenever Congress can organize a majority in support
of any
budget position, it will be well on the road to
budget peace.
But what happens when Congress is so split and
individual
members cross-pressured that a majority cannot be
mustered
behind any overall course of action? We pose this
question
now to suggest that political strife within Congress
rather
than the "Rube Goldberg" design of the 1974 Budget
Act represents the greatest threat to the hopes and survival of
Congressional budget reform.
Congress did no more than negotiate a treaty in 1974.247
It is therefore likely that Congress may find itself suspended

between paralysis caused by internal conflict, and ever-rising
spending levels adopted by its several parts at the behest of special

interests--unless the new Budget Committees succeed

in

exerting real

419

All

Of this can be seen
as the result of
Congressional

to balance budget control

att.npf

„1tn other legislative
values, such as «1n-

talnlng the role of the
legislature as the representative
of diverse
interests.
This Is the perennially
unresolvable tension.

Representation pulls Congress
toward the fragmentation
of power.
Budgeting's essential purpose
Is the coordination
of »any decisions

The ultimate effects of the
new process therefore
depend not upon Its
efficiency, or Its effects upon
budget totals, but the extent
to which
it can maintain an uneasy
balance between these conflicting
Impulses
and needs.

These three factors, i.e., that
Congress jointly c«nputes

program budget totals with the
cooperation of executive branch agencies, that nearly 60% of total
outlays are "uncontrollable," and
that
the centrifugal

forces of the legislature are at
odds with the basic

requirements of budgeting, define and limit
the scope of application
of the Budget Act and its potential

Congress over the purse.

In

to

increase the power of the

addition, there are

a

number of par-

ticular problems which must at least be
mentioned if the Act
receive

a

balanced evaluation, and if we are

likely to succeed or fail
enacted.

As we shall

in

see,

to

is

to

decide whether it is

realizing the purposes for which it was

this is far from being a matter of making

a

straightforward eval uation.^^^
First, the Act was supported
ders and wasters alike.

in

its legislative phase by hoar-

Conservatives hoped it would serve as an

instrument for the enforcement of fiscal

restraint, Liberals hoped to
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use 1t to shift spending
priorities in favor of the
poor and elderly,
and to institute a .ore
stimulative fiscal policy.^"
,,,,
^^^[^
its preferences into the Act.
and saw what it wanted
to see when it

turned to examine the finished
product:

the permissive ones got

targets in the first Budget
Resolution, while the hardliners
got
ceilings in the second.^^^ g,,,
conservatives and liberals have
been

disappointed by the budgetary turns
Congress has taken since 1974.

Conservatives bemoan the deficits;
liberals the increased share of
the
overall budget going to the defense
sector.
Ippolito. a hoarder as
anyone can see, holds that not only
has the Budget Act failed
restrain Congressional

urgently needed.

He

to

spending, but also that further measures
are

favors statuatory or Constitutional

limits on

Congress's power to spend:

What is needed to bring Congressional spending
under control
IS something that will control Congress's
political weaknessclearly, the only way to combat this political
weakness is
less rather than more Congressional discretion
over

'

spending. '^^^

Neither

a

contemporary liberal

period could agree with this.

nor a Whig of the Federal

Ippolito would give up the most inpor-

tant power that the Constitution gives to Congress in order
to save

money.

Perhaps this is the time for Congress to cash in its chips and

get out of the game, but

I

don't think so.

What counts in the moment,

however, is not the potential controversy that might arise over

Ippolito's views, but the simple fact that, along with many Members of
Congress, his conclusion is based upon

a

figures themselves and what they reflect:

long look at the budgetary

rising expenditures, rising
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deficits, an increasing percentage
of federal outlays going
for
interest on the national debt, and
rising interest rates.

Alan Schick takes

a

different approach.

figures, but at the process itself.

schedule?

He looks

Does Congress keep to the

Does it listen to its Budget
Committees?

Congressional

Is

waster, but

a

the process of

budgeting instituted by the act serving
as the script

that Congress follows on its way to
making decisions?
Schick is

not at the

a

very politic one.

I

suspect that

When given the oppor-

tunity to comment on the rising deficits
and expenditures, he tends to
look the other way.

process as

a

For Schick,

it is erroneous to

regard

a

budget

means of limiting the government's size or
expenditures.

Sixty years of presidential

budgeting did not produce this result.

Since

a

and

procedure for rationing limited resources among claimants,
the

a

budget process is both an opportunity for claiming
resources

process itself can result

in

higher expendftures or provide a mecha-

nism for restraining the growth of government.
tes depends on the political

itself.

Whichever side domina-

environment, and not the budget process

The budget process is neutral.

Indeed, unlike Ippolito,

Schick does not even decry the notion that so much of current govern-

ment spending

is

"uncontrollable." Instead, he holds that mandatory

spending is simply the result of

a

wilful

decision by Congress

favor non-budgetary values over budgetary control.

to

The balancing of

budgetary and competing values is, for Schick, one of the major successes of the congressional

budget process.

Needless to say. this evaluation completely begs the question
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of fiscal

policy.

neutral.

Schick, .0 doubt, is aware
of this.

The process is

Contress must retain its freedom
to decide how to use it.

The Choice of ends varies with
time and circumstance, but
it ultimately is the result of a political
process which Congress has been

elected to carry out.

This means that any poss^'ble
evaluation of the

budgetary process must be procedural

rather than substantive, and his

ultimate evaluation of the Act and its
consequences unfolds entirely
along procedural

lines.

Wildavsky's analysis is empirical and fraught
with matters of
detail.

He appears

to

have no axe to grind.

Both critics and defen-

ders of the budget process have strong arguments
and commit omissions.

For Wildavsky, budgetary reform had its genesis in
the tension between
the particular and the general.

legislators were unhappy with the collective consequences of their individual choices.
They liked voting for
spending but not for taxes.
They got their way.
Individual members of Congress won but Congress as a whole
lost; individual and collective rationality were at odds. 258
.

.

.

.

.

.

Like Schick, he emphasizes that Congress is an independent
body that operates
power.

in

an environment of fragmented and dispersed

It has many committees,

not one, and these specialize preci-

sely because detailed information is necessary if the collective body
is to exercise budgetary control.

being made in Congress before 1300.

This argument, we now know, was
But specialization breeds con-

fusion, and if Congressmen confuse themselves they will not be able
act at all.

Therefore, they need mechanisms to reduce the number of

decisions to be considered at any one time.

The new budget process,

to
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then, can be seen as an effort
to institutionalize
aids to
calculation.
He also notes that the
CBO has immeasurably

strengthened the hand of Congress

in

its search

for infonnation .^^^

But information alone is not
sufficient.

Whose?

For example. Congress as

a

Which infonnation?

whole has not yet been able
to

determine how to calculate the base
or starting figures for
year. The House Budget Committee

a

given

has used a "chairnian's mark,"
while

the Senate Budget Committee under
Muskie listed three possible indica-

tors for action on any given budget item.^^l

p.^^

standpoint of

establishing firm control over spending
or fiscal policy, it

is

disheartening to consider that the range of
the figures embodied by
these starting points is quite large.

Nevertheless, there have been accomplishments,
and Wildavsky

discusses several.

ment

is

First, Congressional

knowledge of economic manage-

much improved since passage of the Act,^^^ for
the body is now

able to confront total

figures in the budget resolutions.

This means

that Congressional understanding of the relationship
between the size
and makeup of the federal

more sophisticated.
been met.
Schick.

budget and the economy as

Second, the process works:

This, as we saw,

is

a

whole has become

the deadlines have

the criterion most satisfying to

Wildavsky then raises the question of substance.

What have

been the effects of the Act upon spending itself?
This question is more easily asked than answered.
The difficulty is due not only to the short history of the refonn
but also to the requirement of estimating conditions that
might have been (what would Congress have done without the
reform?) but that now can never be.
To know whether Congress
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that everyone agrees
on wh t ihe r^oL"lf'"'
supposed
accomplished.
For the orecl
n,,^

J

f

to

have

For the philosopher, this
connection between an actual
and a
possible past could have
interesting ratifications
that go to the
heart of what we nean when
we say that any innovation
"works" at all.
Wildavsky, occupied with other
.natters, presses on.
He notes that it
would have been politically
impossible to specify the size
of budget
deficits initially because
specifying the size would have
destroyed
the possibility of high and
low spenders reaching
^^^^
agreement.
He
also notes that the concept of
strengthening Congressional
"control"

over the budget is itself
problematic:

obviously. Congress should get

the spending it wants, rather
than be constrained to operate
within
some predetermined level.
Furthermore, control does not mean,
for

Wildavsky, that Congress is necessarily
better able

to prevail

against

the Chief Executive:

Interaction between Contress and the
Executive Branch is so
strong ... that parts of each institution
are likely to be
^9^i"st the other, and simple comparisons are
suspect.
Besides, the idea is to control the content
of budgets
not
merely to prevail over others, however
foolish they may
In general,

he notes

that without a central

committee that

controls all decisions, as on the Cabinet model.
Congress has
choose which committees it will support.
and one it must be free to make.

to

This is a political choice

The basic

thrust of the refonn was
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that it would institutionalize
and choose new
co,„™ittaes of its own
rather than rubber stamping
those of the Executive.
Whether Congress
trusts itself enough to
do this, or whether
budgetary power will
pass
by default to the
Executive Branch is now
.2^6
being

dete^ined

For Wildavsky. the Budget
Con,.1ttees have succeeded
,„ore in
predicting outco.es than in
Influencing the..^" ,,,,,
datlons tend to be predictions
about future Congressional
actions.
Since these co,n™ittees know
that other c™,.ittees will
not accept
budget directives that change
priorities radically, all they
can do Is
content themselves with trying
to create
a

sense of 11,„lts.

cated earlier, this effort has
been successful

of Members of Congress with
respect

to

in

As indi-

changing the ethos

spending totals.

The great problem plaguing
Congress.nen today is the seeming

size of the budget deficit.

If Wildavsky is correct,

the new process

cannot be held directly responsible
for rising deficits, though
1t „ay
be judged guilty by association.
The Budget Resolutions attempted
to
stipulate what will be spent and how large
the deficits shall be.
Clearly, the capacity to estimate
accurately has a great deal

with the fate of spending and deficit
projections.
are too low and supplemental appropriations
turn out

Congress must at the same time vote
cits.

to

to

do

If estimates
to

be

necessary.

increase the size of the defi-

The accompanying publicity unsettles those
who may have to

answer for such votes come election time.

For this reason, the desire

of Congressmen for stability in their contacts with
executive branch

agencies is on the increase--but the Budget Committees
themselves do
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not have stable memberships.
of every ten years.

Instead. HBC members can only serve
four

Wildavsky sums up the basic dilemma
here:

People learn to play any system. The
budget reform enablPs
Congressmen to make intelligent decisions.
There is a basedepartures are identified; calculations are
possible; votes'
are large enough in number to be discriminatory
but not so
large as to be overwhelming.
Beyond this point, procedures
can be permissive but they cannot be
compelling.
If the
House and Senate Budget Committees stick
to totals
they
wonder if they are predicting rather than
controlling expenditures.
If they try to alter the character
or cotnposi tion
of expenditures within totals, they threaten
all power of
otner committees.
Fiscal conservatives are unhappy because
$oO to $100 billion deficits are not their idea
of control.
Liberal spenders complain because the Budget Committees
are
another obstacle to their desires.
So it is not surprising
that before Congress has totally tested this reform, new
reforms to improve it are being proposed. 269

Complicating the problem of estimates is the fact that we have

entered a period of economic uncertainty

in

which neither revenue nor

expenditure levels can be predicted with the accuracy of ten years
ago.

This leads to constant, incremental

to fiscal

efforts to adjust the budget

reality as that reality changes over the course of

But this new necessity tends to reinforce the political

a

year.

predilections

of Congress to ignore the ceilings stipulated by the two Budget

Resolutions whenever these are perceived as inaccurate or inconvenient.
In

general, then, an estimate of the efficacy with which the

new budget process contributes

determines the financial

whether the observer

is

to

the wisdom with which Congress

affairs of the government depends first upon
a

hoarder or

a

waster, and second upon the

extent to which that same observer thinks that the chaotic internal
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processes of Congressional
politics should determine
budget outco.es
Clearly, statuatory or
Constitutional limitations
would l.npose a partisan interpretation of
historical necessity upon
the long-range practices of an institution which
was Intended to engage
in political

action and set policy.

As fiscal

reality changes, so does
the general

sense of the country about
what the ultimate spending
priorities
should be, i.e., whether the lion's
share ought to go to the
defense
side or the social welfare side
of the budget.
The country reflects
its sentiments through the instrument
of the ballot, and the c«-

position of Congress, not to mention
its disposition, is affected
accordingly.
Does this mean that we need to come
away from

new budget process with

a

sort of perspectival

a

review of the

relativism?

Do we just

throw up our hands and say, "Where you
stand depends upon where you
sit?"

Do the conceptual

and procedural

conundrums reviewed by

Wildavsky finally come down to his saying
that Congress might or might
not succeed in centralizing its budget
processes under the direction

of the Budget Commi ttees--but we can't tell yet,
and, anyway, it's

ultimately

a

sense, yes.
sal

matter of political will and political power?
As

I

indicated earlier when

I

In a

discussed Ippolito's propo-

that mandatory spending and entitlement programs be sharply
cur-

tailed, the possibility of substantive change in our institutional

arrangements

is

limited by the desire on the part of the American

public for the programs embodied in current spending measures.

Were

one to approach this from the standpoint of the separation of powers
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or Of congressional
control over the purse,
it is clear that
the
institutional framework has
evolved such that the
context within which
such questions are posed
has been profoundly
changed.
Take the
separation of power, for example.
The interbranch structure
of subgovern.ents and iron triangles
not only constitutes an
elaborate
syste. for the distribution
of power, in part away
fro.n elected representatives, but also exists
to serve needs of
individuals throughout
the wider society, needs
which Congress has determined
can be legiti-

mately so served.

Against this it

is

ment might be rai sed-unl ess
one were

difficult to see how any arguto

claim that the political

processes through which members of
Congress are selected for office
are themselves not legitimate.

There is, however, another
question, one which has not been
determined by the new budget process,
but the outlines of which can be
discerned through the new arrangements.
This question concerns the
gradual

"bureaucratization" of the Congress, and Wildavsky
touches

upon it in his discussion of the
Impoundment sections of the 1974 Act:
The issues brewing over impoundment are
suggestive of a
general executive-legislative clash.
Part of this clash is
over an Executive Branch perception that
Congress is thought
to be not only concerning itself with
overall policy direction but increasingly dictating program
composition and the
day-to-day running of government. The Executive
views this
as impinging upon the flexibility of the
Administration
stifling creativity under the guise of control.
Congress'
general distrust of the Executive and especially
the 0MB
comes at a time when government is getting more cotnplex.
A
fear inherent in this distrust, voiced by both
Congressional
and Administrative sources, is that as Congressmen
take on an
increasingly activist orientation, they will spread themselves too thin and be forced to rely increasingly
on staff;
the trend would lead to the gradual bureaucratization of
Congress .-^'U
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Obviously, this 1s the
perspective of tabers oP
Congress who
are beginning to sense
that matters are getting
oot of control.
This
'3. and has been, our position
throughout this dissertation.
;Vner1can
institutions are undergoing
a period of evolution
as rapid as that

being undergone by certain
sectors of terican industry,
is hardly the place to
chronicle
the possible causal

hold between the evolution
of technological

while this

relations that

instruments and industrial

fonns within the econo,.y.
and the simultaneous
explosion in the numbers and power of unelected
servants throughout the government,
we can
recall the basic tenet about
public space and political change.
When
substantial alterations are
undertaken in the institutional
arrange-

ments of power and the society in
question is

a

polity, then altera-

tions of such magnitude ought to
be taken up and considered,
in

public, through the political process
and made subject to delibera-

tions and decisions by the representatives
of the people.

isn't happening.

U

the United States a "polity?"

But this
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1.1] What is a public space?
it be used?

For what should it be used?

questions which
In

Why do we need one?

I

How should

These are some of the

have tried to illuminate throughout the
foregoing.

turning to the matter of conclusions, however,

I

find it impossible

to bow to the ordinary convention and
present a set of systematic and

interrelated arguments along which
like fish on

a

string.

Instead,

I

could array my central

findings

I'm going to follow Aristotle's own

methods here, and simply indicate, through
448

a

series of numbered
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paragraphs, so.e of the
difficulties to which

cepts see.

to

give rise.

In

no case do

I

see

of

,ny

central

think it possible to

con-

am' ve

at exhaustive or co,nplete
definitions of basic concepts,
nor do
think it is possible to
discover arguments for
following or

I

not

following certain courses of
action; arguments that would
have universal validity.
Instead, we live, as I've
tried
to

point out here, in a

particular historical «.ent. In
the context of political
that are in part derived

f-orn

and in part illuminate a
tradition of

discourse and thought about
politics that
political

tradition.

In

institutions

I

have called the republican

line with this tradition and
its intentions.

think that the following should
be seen as areas of central
concern
for those who would strengthen
or perhaps refonn the institutions
of
I

the present government of the United
States-or criticize them along

traditional

lines.

1.2] Of the three central

concepts in this thesis, public

space, citizen and common interest, the
key now seems to be the co.mnon

interest.

This is so because it is only through

a

developed notion of

the truly common that it is possible to
reflect critically upon what

citizens in public spaces may actually be doing,
and therefore
decide whether special
interests.

If we

to

interests are in fact prevailing over general

find citizenship and participation actually working

to promote the goals of partial

interests--as seems

with Congress today-then it

possible to say that the public space

is

to

be

the case

is not giving birth to that issue for which it was originally
con-

ceived, and that therefore, by

a

kind of teleological

argument.
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Congress is not really

a

public space.

But such an argument

fro.n

con-

sequences depends upon the coherence
of the concept "public or
general
interest."
2.1] What arguments of the preceding sort
indicate, however,
Is that the "common interest" now
stands in the position that other

kinds of "transcendental

theories of political

argument" have occupied in alternative

life.

It has been

the case

for most thinkers in

most places that some kind of standard of
morality or justice external
to politics and to daily political

life had to be invoked in order to

make some kind of meaningful evaluation of that
life possible.
attempting to restrict such cricial
of

a

standards to the political

In

actions

given polity, both Aristotle and Machiavelli willingly
ran the

risk of making it impossible to find some court of appeal

outside of

whatever the constitutionally legitimate ruling group might decide
do- -as long as that group held its power by virtue of

ment or constitution.

Alternative approaches

a

to

mixed govern-

theirs have rested

to

upon such notions as that of "God" or "Natural Law," and the historical

stage is now, in our time, taken up with the notion of "Universal

Human Rights."

The first two have been rather thoroughly demonstrated

by philosophers to be incoherent and the third,

I

suspect, will be

liable to similar critiques.^

In

showed

that there is no transcendental

in

his fourth antinomy,

or concept which could make

evaluation necessary

,

a

general, it seems that what Kant

given course of action or theoretical

may well apply

interest as fully as it does

being

to

to

the notion of a common

the concepts God, Natural

Law or Human

2
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Rights.

All

may be a matter of taste or sentiment.

2.2] For many social

scientists and thinkers, especially
since

the second World War, the concept of
"social

life" has moved into the

position once held by these older concepts,
as Sheldon Wolin was at
such pains to show, and in effect have become
the transcendental argu-

ment for many students of modern politics.

The development is not

new, but its influence is increasing.

The [19th] century endowed society with a status
as distinctive as that previously accorded the political order,
surrounding it with the affectionate metaphors that another
age had reserved for the church, personifying it as the
lifeforce ultimately shaping politics, economic life, and
culture.
The century had adopted the article of faith that
no creation, no object, no thought, no act could be rightfully called "mine." Everything was society's and
creativity— art, literature, religion and phil osophy--were
stripped of mystery and exposed as "expressions" of society.
All shades of opinion unanimously agreed that economic production must be analyzed as a social process in which it was
impossible to single out the contributions of single individuals.
Although it fell to the socialists to exploit this
particular line of thought into a justification for the abolition of private ownership, property was merely the most
spectacular casualty among privacies of all kinds.

Wolin's critique obviously follows from that of Hannah Arendt who
attacked the "social" as

a kind of catchall

category within which the

"political" was in danger of being submerged and lost forever.

But

the "political," as Arendt showed, is partly the result of individual

skills which must be acquired through experience and are not given
all

men equally at birth.

Therefore it

is

to

necessary to seek criteria

for admitting selected individuals to participation in public life or
the public space, in order to ensure that all

such individuals possess
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the capacUies needed
there and to separate
the fit

fro.n

the unfit.

Such distinctions and
experiences, she claimed, are
needed to ,nake it
possible for "political life"
to function in such
a way that the
good
of the general order is
served and that at least
a few individuals
develop What Arendt saw as
the higher existential
potentials that
alone are uniquely human.
Nowhere does she allege that
such a life or

course of personal development
will ever be available

to

al

1

.

Her

critics, naturally, have taken
umbrage with the elitism behind
this,
and attacked her in the name
of a theory of social equality
ultimately
derived from Christianity.
In our time, the problem
of equality refuses to go away, and its strength
may be seen in the unquestioned
posi-

tion that the social

has assumed in comtemporary
analyses of

collective life.

Arendt and Wolin are correct about
the role that

the social

If

has assumed in contemporary political

it no great leap to claim that the social

thought, then

I

has not only succeeded

think
in

supplanting participatory politics as an organizing
category with

which to study collective life
done so by virtue of being able

in
to

the twentieth century,

but it has

insinuate itself into the place

where the transcendental argument once stood.

In

so

doing,

it serves

to remove from collective memory the notion that
the full capacities

of the individual

human person could only be developed by par-

ticipating with other members of the community
that would affect them all

in

common.

in making

decisions

Yet if we would disparage the

erosion and loss of the political and the emergence of the social, we
still

need either to support our own critique of contemporary politics
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with an alternative "transcendental
argument," or explain why it i
s
possible to get along without one-while
simultaneously maintaining
point of view that

is

in

any way critical

a

of contemporary political

practices.
2.3] How might we characterize a clash
between contemporary
social

theory and classical

ference over transcendental

political

arguments?

thoery, other than as
In

a

former times, such

difa

clash

of views would have been labelled
"religious" precisely because it is
in the nature of such arguments to be
based on metaphysical

assump-

tions that are undemonstrable per se, have
pretensions to universal

validity, and are clasped to the breasts of their
respective adherents
as a consequence of either a leap of faith or

a

conversion experience.

On this argument, politics in the twentieth century
occupies the place

that religion held

in

the

sixteenth.

2.4] Bernard Bailyn argues that the American revolutionaries

did not really believe in Human Rights--despi te what Jefferson
wrote
in the Declaration of Independence.

3.0] Let us return to the concept of the "common interest."

Suppose it can have no justification beyond the claim that it must be
being served if political

stability exists.

In

other words, let us

assume that if the common interest is not made the object of attention
by the key political

actors in

a

polity, a) that that polity will

decay or decline or otherwise come to some kind of

a

bad end:

and b)

that those whose interests are habitually not taken into account will

make trouble for whoever takes things into account.

In

making these
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assumptions we have Machiavelli with
us-though some may see the
assumptions as counter-factual, and
others may think that

the question.

I

am begging

How might we think through the
notion "common

interest," not qua philosphical conept,
but qua possible object of
political

action?

3.1] My contention throughout this thesis
has been that the

common good can be served through the melding
of
interests into

a

heterogeneity of

synthetic political judgment, arrived at
collectively

a

by those whose vital

interests are to be affected by that judgment.

Hence, the kinds of political

results incorporate

a

decision from which the common good

number of elements, and these are heterogeneous

both with respect to economic and political

power, and with respect to

epistemology--i.e., that different existential positions entail
different approaches

to

the same problems.

judgment made collectively

is

a

The essence of a political

compromise among the various partial

views that appear in the decisionmaking process and which together

synthesize the manifold of their plurality into

a

decision.

Froin

the

standpoint of the individual or of the competing group, ic offers but
a

partial

fulfillment of aims.

3.2] It is the easiest thing in the world

mon interest is
social

in

threats have
in

a

the polity.

see what the com-

time of war: it is that interest in surviving as

and political

ceives an external

to

a

unit which unites a country at the moment it per-

threat.

In

the

foreign policy area, then, vital

way of rapidly inducing

a

unitary self-consciousness

But the notion must be applicable to the domestic side
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wen. because

the state does act in
the domestic sphere
and because

there clearly exist issues and
questions which, once decided,
will
affect the entire society for
good or ill.
3.3] Domestic issues are of two
sorts.

require measures applicable at
all times and
the polity.

First are those which

in all

places throughout

Government regulations of commercial
activities provide

one example, for the SEC and
the FASB lay down rules which
everyone to
whom they are applicable must follow.
Second and :Tiore difficult are

measures involving the distribution or
redistribution of particular
goods, or which undertake to provide
services either to everyone, or
to selected parts of the citizen
body.
to being universal.

Some distributions come close

Among these are public transportation,
the postal

service and environmental

regulations.

Others are more particular.

Defense contracts, AFDC and public universities
are examples of the
sort of domestically distributed good
access.

to

which not everyone has

Hence this kind of good is made available

to

a

population on the basis of discriminatory criteria

in

order, we must

assume, that all may ultimately benefit.

here are clear enough, it

is

subset of the

While the examples given

the domestic policies of this latter sort

that give rise to heated disputes and,

in

fact, much of the substance

of American party politics.

Conflict arises over partial or local grants of goods because
local

solutions to "general" problems are always discriminatory and

can be implemented only through

goods and services by the state.

a

manifestly unequal distribution of
It was precisely such

activities.
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undertaken by the Congress, which
Woodrow Wilson saw

as

lying at the

base of the corruption he saw spreading
through that body.

For

Wilson, private interests were being
served and public goods were
being ignored in the rush for the log
roll.

Arendt's question:
private?

Hence the centrality of

where is the dividing line between
public and

Under what conditions might it be shown
that "all" benefit

when "some" benefit disproportionately?
transcendental

Do we need some kind of

deduction to demonstrate that

a

given policy decision

is really in the common interest, or might
an affirmative decision by

the elected representatives be sufficient
justification for it?

3.4] Here,

Hannah Arendt.
through which
really

a

I

think,

it is necessary to part company with

Her attempt to establish
a

a

set of universal

criteria

public-private distinction might be established

reflection of

a

search for moral

standards external

to

is

poli-

tics from which it might be regulated or judged.

Let us go back for

moment to the work of Werner Jaeger upon which it

is clear that so

much of Arendt's project

is

based.

Jaeger's studies

in

classical

logy led him to insights about the nature of Greek political

which Arendt attempted to apply

to

the present era.

example, Jaeger came across the word pol iteuesthai

,

take part in civic life, or the life of the polis."^

phi-

life

At one point, for

which meant "to

What

I

now think

Hannah Arendt did was to read Jaeger and then start with an image of

that crowd gathered

in

things that concern all

the public

space.

"Public affairs" are those

and only that crowd.

a

So. on the basis of the

image, she attempted to draw the line between public and private.
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Since the "public" is separate
social

fro.n

the

life are none of its business.

"social," the affairs of
nJow

there is a contradiction

here:

for Arendt, politics takes
place in the real, of freedom,
that
is, after the necessities of
life and the issues of survival
have been

settled for the individual

participants.

Once in the realm of

freedom, they can take up any question
whatsoever.

assembly is to be free
to take up,

to

decide to take up whatever matters
it wants

it has to be free theoretically
to take up social

should it so decide.

If we

assembly that operates

in

a

the circumscription.

matters

don't allow this, then we are left
with an
highly circumscribed realm, and this

pushes us back into the search for

Arendt'

But if the

If Natural

a

trascendental

Law can't fill

argument

to

justify

this void, neither can

image.

s

3.4.1] Therefore, the assembly itself can be the only
ultimate

judge of where the line between public and private
actually falls and
it follows that "the social"

legislative action.
social

realm can be the legitimate object of

This is consistent vyith Aristotle, for whom

background conditions partially determine political

political

forms,

spaces and the kinds of activity and substantive decison-

making that will go on

in

such spaces.

3.5] If we can find no transcendental

argument or external

standard to use in evaluating the actions of an assembly or government, are we forced to give our reluctant approval

government or an assembly might decide
"common interest" incoherent?

Is

to

do?

it impossible

Is
to

to

anything that a

the notion of the

show that a
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legislature or polity could ever be
mistaken about what its con.non
interest is? Again, let us return
to

for

legislature or assembly

a

to make

a

basic precise: it is
possible

decisions that not only can

adversely affect the fortunes of the
polity as

Us

collapse and destruction.

that it

is

If

whole, byt lead to

a

this is true,

it oiust also be true

possible for an assembly or legislature
to make decisions

which will enhance the strength or
vitality of the polity.
such

a

Acts of

nature then, whether they be advantageous
or the opposite,

affect what

I

am calling the "common good."

3.6] We need to ground the notion of the common
good in

something specific enough to enable us to
distinguish policies that
serve the entire polity from those that do not,
and at the same time

make it possible for

a

governing assembly to move

calamities when it desires to do so.
notion that there exists

a

"national

to

ameliorate local

Suppose that we start with the

constituency."

This is not an

aggregation of partial constituencies, but exists simultaneously
with
them.

It is

the national

not necessarily the case that the needs or interests of

constituency are fulfilled when those of the partial

constituencies are met.

To take a phrase

from the logicians here, to

say that "the interests of each have been met" is not the same thing
as saying, "the interests of all

have been met."

While it is not true

that denying the interests of each will serve the interests of all, it
is no more true that serving the interests of each will

interests of all.

So,

serve the

somewhere, the interests of all and the

interests of each must diverge.

This is why "aggregation" does not
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provide an accurate accounting of
the kind of collectivity
that

Aristotle meant

to

designate with

"

Koinonia

."

3.7J Another approach to deternining when
a particular policy

or distribution of goods may or may
not be
be found in the inescapabil

distributions:
the notion of

i

ty of political

i.e.. in the adversarial
a

legislature or assembly

in

the common interest may

conflict about such

system which is entailed by
in

which competing interests

are brought to bear in the decisionmaking
process.

assertions that such and such

a

The truth-value of

policy or distribution may or may not

be in the common interest can only
be settled politically-thai is,
to
the extent that such assertions provide
the basis for ccnmon action.

The truth or falsity of such assertions can
never be demonstrated

categorically and finally.
policy is

in

Hence, to demonstrate that such and such

the common interest requires collective
acceptance of the

outcome of debates.

Acceptance is shown when those

to

be affected

accept policy outcomes without offering further conflict and
without
needing to be coerced into following them.

If political

"truths" are

those which are actually acted upon, their ultimate justification
must
lie in the intersubjective process through which their acceptance
qua

truths

is

established.

Hence the predominance of local

treatments of

specific problems over the abstract formulations of theory in actual

assemblies.

Hence also the widespread resentment against "socialisms"

and "imperialisms" of all

jected

to

sorts, under which localities chafe when sub-

the unifonnity of deci sions--and taxes--imposed from afar.

If there are not prior restraints discoverable upon the range of poli-
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genera, ,00., then

on,, possi.e chec.
0. restraint
,.st .e foon.
the adversarial process
itself.
Therefore, political
truths are
not Objective, the. are
intersubjective.
That something is
.rong .th
this argument as a defense
of the probability
that a given assembly
w^ll find its way to
the c.nmon good can
be inferred from
the career
Of Alclbiades in the
Athenian assembly.
By the time the
general will
had worked its way. the
Athenian folU was in
shambles.

-

4.0] Aristotle took it as axiomatic
that human societies
are
divided up mto distinct
classes and that different
classes hav» different interests. He did
not suppose that classes
can be abolished.
The reader of such historians
as Thucydides, Livy,
Machiavelli, and
Guicclardlnl is inclined to agree.
The notion "class"
points out much
more than mere economic
distinction.
It points out differences
of
life experience, psychological
development, attitudes toward
others
and conceptions of justice.
Revolutionary experiences in
the twen-

tieth century, which have attempted

to do away with

class distinc-

tions, seem to have inevitably
foundered on elements in the
human

psyche that are as resistant to change
as traumatic experience.

what motives and experiences can the
individual

be

Induced to

consciously strive to alter the
representation he holds
of his primary formative experiences?

political

Witn

in his heart

Such experiences underlie his

views and are the substance of what
must be changed if the

psychological attitudes which support class
distinctions are

altered on the way to abolishing classes
themselves.

to be

Some individuals
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can be expected to be able
to work to change their
attitudes,
others
can be expected to resist.
On balance, there see.s
to be three things
that a society bent upon changing
or refoming itself might
do with
respect to class distinctions:
first, the revolutionary
group, or if

successful, the nouveau regime

,

can shoot its class enemies.

Machiavelli recommended this; Stalin
carried it out.

Agents of History might attempt

a

program of "mental

Second, the

rectification"

and seek to use political methods
to reform the psyches of
those

needing to be reformed.

Mencius recommended this method
and Mao

Tse-Tung carried it out.

In

the latter case a problem
arose, however,

between the revolutionary moment and the
social nirvana:
involved in implementing the mental

those

rectification campaign began

to

disagree about what changes constituted reform
and what changes
embodied reactionary assumptions.
logical

heterogeneity over

a

compromised by definition.
tional

Therefore, they fell

into epistemo-

problem that could not be negotiated or

Meanwhile, the Chinese economy and educa-

system collapsed about them.

So much

The third method is to try to effect

a

for "zero-sum" solutions.

compromise between the various

classes through political means such that each gains some of
the goals
it seeks, none attains everything it desires, and institutions
are

founded such that no class is able
the state and use it to despoil

to

take over the instrumentality of

the others.

This notion is embodied

in the republican tradition.

5.0] The basic idea behind the public space conception of

politics

is

that individuals bearing with them different private and
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class interests will gather together
in

a

public place at appointed

times and deliberate and compromise among
themselves in order to

effect policies with respect
common.

to

those things that affect them
all

The notion that the participants in
such

an agenda restricted to all

a

politics consider

and only common problems embodies
the

assumption that the effective capacities of
such

a

group are somehow

related to the extent of its responsibilities:
the less it tries
do,

the more effective it will

5.1] Both theoretical

to

be.

and historical

that there are two deficiencies in
a

in

a

experience have shown

"pure" public space mode.

First,

large assembly is really not an effective way
to deal with matters

of daily administration and finance.

Matters of detail

are,

it turns

out, better left to those who have some familiarity
with them, and

lengthy assembly debates over "small" concerns amount

everyone's time.

It

is

to

a

waste of

better, therefore, to delegate some tasks,

either to experts or magistrates, or

to

leave them to be decided

within the localities where they arise as matters of immediate concern.

that it

The second fundamental
in

difficulty with

"pure" public space is

a

fact does not always result in policies that are manifestly

in the common interest.

Majorities can sweep over assembled bodies

like whirlwinds, carrying all before them, and by the time the disturbances have died down, policies are

in

pursued had the atmosphere stayed calm.
rhetoric.

place which might not have been
This is among the effects of

Another kind of unexpected consequence of decisionmaking

by large gatherings is that it is possible for

a

group within the

.
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assembly to consistently muster
majorities such that minorities
are
systematically created and their
interests ignored. ^ This is

not in

the common interest because it
tends to divide the polity
and speed

the institutionalization of divisions
which have an interest in

changing the form of government itself.

The possibility then arises

that politics could be supplanted by
more violent means of making

decisions that affect the generality of
society.
5.2] As

a

consequence of such developments, two
patterns of

adjustment have historically arisen
assemblies.

First is what

I

will

to comprise

call

the soveriegnty of

"functional" co.nproinise

a

Both administration and executive organs have
in fact frequently arisen to direct the daily affairs of the city when
the assembly held

sovereign power.

magistrates but

From the Athenian assembly, then, arose not
only
a

smaller assembly or boule of 400 men, which
met more

frequently than the larger body and made decisions with
respect

implementation of policies.
"social" compromise.

It

mework.

The second kind of compromise is the

is based on

class interests and the need

the

to

to

the

inescapabil

i

ty

of contending

contain them in an institutional

fra-

This seems to have been embodied in the mixed government

theory itself: given the existence of opposed classes, each would be

given control over some part of the state, but these

all

would be

required to act conjointly when matters of general policy were
determined.

Recall, for example, Machiavel

1 i

'

s

.

be

suggestion that the

Provost, drawn from the popular element, be empowered
sions taken by the aristocratic Signoria

to

to

veto deci-
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5.3] The theory of .ixed
government put forth by
Aristotle
the ,nost practical fo™
of government likely
to endure for
the

-Jority

Of ,„en in the majority
of states.

assembly at its center.

e*odies

a

legislative

,n

Aristotle's theory, this
assembly .as to
be "soverieign" in four
«ays.
First, in the sense
that members of the
magistracy were drawn directly
from it; second, in
the sense
that it

always had the power to
override decisions .ade by
the magistratesthird, by virtue Of the fact
that the assembly was
open to al
1

of

the

Citizens of the polis and hence
not only represented
but actually
embodied those social forces
which were the source of
legitimate
authority in this for. of state;
fourth, the magistrates
were always

"temporary officers, drawn

in

relays from the general

rank of citizens for Short ter.s and required
to take their decisions
in public or
report those decisions directly
back to the assembled
citizens.
At
the end of their tenure in office,
officials were publicly evaluated
and judged by the assembly and
held accountable for their
acts.
If

approval was forthcoming, rewards
followed.

If disapproval

was the

consensus, jail, ostracism, the seizure of
one's property or even

a

death sentence could ensue.
5.4] The theory of mixed government, then,
was an important

development

in

the history of the idea of what
properly constitutes a

"political compromise."

Instead of deliberating, bargaining and
ulti-

mately voting an agreement, the citizens attempt

to

structure

a

general one into the organizational apparatus of
the state itself,

dividing power between permanently existing social

interests before
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the assembly gathers or a particular
debate takes place.

In

practice,

'

the assembly becomes the arena of political

element

in

action for the
"popular"

the state and the ultimate court
of appeal

branches are unable

to

move forward.

when the various

Sometimes, it is the ultimate

source of power or access to magisterial
position, but specific appli-

cations of the mixed government idea have
varied widely as we have
seen and are subject to the vagaries of
tradition as well as

a

host of

other forces.
5.5] What is important is that a general compromise
between

classes may be carried by

a

permanent division of power among several

branches of government, rather than hammered out at
each particular

point in an assembly.

In

such a case, diverse modes of political

pro-

cedure are incorporated into the modus Vivendi of the
state and the
imbalances reflected

in

the outcomes of a given proceeding are compen-

sated through its conflation with the others.
5.6] Whether the ancients were correct in asserting that the

mixed government structure would long endure by dividing power among
the most important political

superficial

blocs in

glance at the historical

a

state remains to be seen: a

record provides little assurance

that republics necessarily last longer than other forms.
and Venetian oligarchies each enjoyed stability for nearly

years.

The Republic of Florence,

in

which Mahiavelli

The Spartan
a

thousand

served, lasted

from 1494 to 1510.
6.0] The task that confronts those who gather together in the

public space can now be outlined.

They need to serve the common
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interest or national constituency by
making collective judgments
about political

problems that concern them severally.

truths, as we have seen, are solutions

to

Political

conmon problems which are

"true" only insofar as they are the results
of a political

agreement.

6.1] What the public space makes possible is
the integration
of a heterogeneity of political

through adversarial

interests into synthetic judgments

proceedings that resolve themselves

of deciding what is to be done with respect

to

in

the process

the general

life.

If

we start by assuming the existence of disagreement,
some variant of an

adversarial

system is entailed by the notion of

a

legislature or

assembly in which legitimately competing interests are
brought

to

bear

in the decisionmaking process.

6.2] We have said earlier that political

competition arises

over the location of the dividing line between "public" interests and
"private" concerns--or between the issues that involve the collec-

tivity and the troubles that involve the interests of the individual
or group.

Another way of formulating this polarity

is to

ask which

issues can be "legitimately" raised in the public arena, or how we go

about recognizing norms that express and regulate general izable

interests?

It is clear that conflicts of interest arise with respect

to possible courses of action by the state.

conflicts of interest arise

in

It

is also clear that

the sphere of private life.

When is it

proper that conflicts in the private sphere become the object of

attention and decision by those whose activities take place
public sphere?

in

the

Which specific conflicts of interest are such that the
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fom, of their disposition w11,
affect what Is cannon or
general

to

the

col lecti ve?

6.2.1] Let us go back
ciation.

to

the Greek

notion of koinonia or
asso-

According to Aristotle, there
are many kinds of association

within

a

polU,

the virtue of which is justice.

society.

First there is the political
association of the
addition, there are num-

In

berless less encompassing associations,
each with its particular end
or raison d'etre
Some are religious,
some familial, some are based

.

on commercial

village.

activities, some have to do with the
locality and the

Each of these lesser associations
is held to be able to deal

with those matters that it was formed

to

deal

sistence as an association can be seen as
cess.
deal

Only the political

a

with.

Indeed, its per-

rough indice of its suc-

association, properly speaking, is able

to

with the matters common to everyone because
only the political

association embraces all of the citizens and
ciations.

What the members of the political

mon is citizenship or membership
This is
personal

a

specific status,

a

in

all

of these lesser asso-

association have

the political

specific grant of

a

in

com-

association itself.
particular kind of

power that is conferred upon the individual by the deliberate

act of those who have preceeded him
Now the United States is

a

to

citizenship.

koinonia of lesser associations.

The most important of these are the several

states, but there are

literally thousands of groups of all kinds which have come into being
for

a

variety of particular purposes.

accepted

in

the U.S.

While it is not generally

that the government should step

in

to

regulate
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the interna,

affairs of such lesse.
associations. It has

w1de„ he,d-at least
legULately
competition

c«

to be

since the Hew Deal-that
the government .a,

step in to lay do«n the
ground rules for conflict
and
a,nong

private associations.

By the arguments
advanced

in

(2.2) and (3.5) above, this notion
that a government may
legitimately
regulate the relations between
conflicting groups in the
private

sphere is valid.
6.2.2] From our standpoint, the
implementation of such

a

doctrine would not have been
possible wihout the capacity
of Congress
to effect internal compromise
between competing claims.
This

acknowledgment of the legitimacy of
competing claims had
simultaneously in two spheres.

to

take place

First, among the citizenry,
who

pursued their particular interests

to

the point of clashing with
one

another and stopped short of armed
struggle; second, within the well
of the Congress itself, where
representatives of the various interests
came forward and agreed

to

regulate their several

6.2.3] When the Congress succeeded

conflicting claims of opposed interests
acted

in

the manner of a classical

in

in

relations.

mediating between the

the private sphere,

public space.

it

The common interest

was served by confining class and economic
conflict to the political
realm, and the success of the compromises there
achieved was evinced
by the subsequent obedience of all

taken.

parties to the decisions there

Clearly, the entire process depended upon acceptance
of the

legitimacy of opposed claims by each of the parties

in

the conflict:

The capacity to accept competing claims as legitimate

is

the
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necessary precondition of coinproini
se
Insofar as I view mv
opponents as .norally wrong, co.npromise
becomes appea einent
f my own claims are unjust,
I
can press them only out of
unwarranted self-interest. Tolerance in
a society of c^npeting interest groups is precisely
the ungrudging
.

''''''' ''''''''' 'o exist and
be pursued
our ued""'"^h?.'
Ir"
This economic
conception of tolerance goes quite
naturally with the view of human action
as motivated by
interests rather than principles or norms.
It is much easier
to accept a compromise between competing
interest
than
between opposed principles which purport
to bp objectively
valid.
The genius of American politics is
its ability to
treat even matters of prinicple as though
they were conflicts
of interest.
(It has been remarked that the genius
of French
politics IS Its ability to treat even conflicts
of interest
•nterebc
as matters of principle. )6

6.3] Given the foregoing considerations, it is easy
to see how

Sheldon Wolin arriv.ed at the following considerations
when he took up
the questions of what

a

"political

problem" is:

The importance that interest had assumed in Roman
political
practice and thought added a new shade of meaning to politics
and heightened the distinctive character of political
action.
The Romans had realized instinctively that the legitimizing
of interest not only entailed a limited form of action, a kind
of domestic diplomacy, but that the multiplicity of interests
presupposed as well the incomplete character of solutions to
political issues.
If political activity was centered around
interests, the attendant problems had to be resolved on the
same basis; that is, on the basis of claims that conflicted
precisely because each claim had a particularity that set it
off from other claims.

'Harmony is very easily obtainable in a state where
the interests of all are the same, for discord arises from conflicting interests, where different
measures are advantageous to different citizens.'
(Cicero. De Res Publica I, xxxiii, 49.)

The rivalries for power and advantage taught the Romans
something else about the odd status of a political problem.
The common spectacle of competing groups, each headed by
experienced leaders with roughly the same patriotic motives,
yet each asserting a different policy for the same problem,
could not help but raise questions about the nature of the
problem itself. What was it about a political problem that
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It may indicate that that
which is represented in the
United States is

undergoing

a

process of change which shifts
the focus of represen-

tation away from local
have no geographical

districts and to specialized
interests which

base.

Perhaps special

interests and not

districts have been that which is
represented

in

Congress since

Wilson's time.
In his Political

Representation

in

England and the Origins of

the American Republic, J.R. Pole
raises the notion that what has

actually been represented

in

periodic historical change.^

the American Congress has undergone

Who or what has been "represented"
in

Congress, i.e., districts, persons, property,
interests, or

principles?

Pole's argument shows that any and all of
these have been

represented at different moments on this side of
the Atlantic.
From Pole's discussion, we can make

a

number of inferences.

First, when we consider the representative function
of the Congress we

should note that "representation" itself is
can designate not only

a

a

complex concept which

number of possible relations that might hold

between representative and represented--such as the competing doctrines of "virtual" and "actual" representation--but also that the repre-

sentation may be of either principles or interests.
the contemporary Congress, we find that

justice come forward

in

a

When we look at

variety of principles of

the various debates that take place there, and

that these are not always correlated with the material

interests of

various constituent groups.

Controversies over abortion and admi-

nistration policy

America are two examples.

in Central

Both prin-
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ciples and interests, then are able

press their claims to power
and

to

goods under our present system, and
it would be false

to claim that

either predomonates consistently,
or that either exhaustively
characterizes the system of "representation"

it has evolved in the United

as

States.
The second inference we can draw
from Pole is that not only

are

multiplicity of kinds of goods represented

a

they are liable to change over time.

change.

They embody procedural

in Congress,

but that

Our institutions evolve and

forms and institutional

arrangements

that are articulations of compromises and
victories about power
arrangements.

That such arrangements are fundamentally
fluid, no stu-

dent of the Cannon revolt can deny.

That they have been in

a

more or

less continuous state of change since the founding
of the republic

could be demonstrated with the materials

I

have brought forward on the

history of the Congress.
7.2]

Given these assertions,

I

think it not unreasonable

claim that with the reform movements of the 1970s, that which
actually represented
tional

in

to

is

Congress has changed along with the institu-

arrangements which embody that representation.

The evidence

has been discussed in detail, but recall: the rise of the entrepre-

neurial member, the increase in staff influence, the decline of

central
toral

leadership in the House on the part of either party, the elec-

connection, the bureaucratization of the legislature, and

finally the rise of caucus or special
House.

These represent centrifugal

interest voting blocs in the

forces.

As elements in the poli-
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tical

equation of power within the
House itself, they co,npound
the
difficulties inherent in arriving at
the synthetic judgment
that

signifies consensus.

Many of these groups, whether
they demand

something predicated of interests,
like the steel

lobby, or something

predicated of principles such as those
who oppose abortion, demand
something specific, i.e.. they are seeking
to attain goods which cannot be compromised.
In seeking a political
rapprochement with such

individuals and groups, the traditional
leadership strategies cane

to

nothing: it is no longer possible, in
bargaining with them, to propose

that they and their opponents alike give
up something.
stake is zero-sum.

Therefore, alternative leadership and floor
stra-

tegies are called for, and these seem

occurs at present is

What is at

a

to

have been forthcoming.

new kind of bargaining.

"I'll

What

give you what

you want, all of what you want, concerning this little
affair of
yours, but in return, when my turn comes, you must give
me all of what
I

want."

Coalitions are built up out of such agreements but note:
the

resulting Congressional majorities are aggregations predicated
of
bargains rather than compromises about the attainment of particular
goods.
nia

They are not the synthetic political

of judgments of a koino-

.

7.3] As the critics of special-interest legislation and social

spending programs have vehemently attested, compromises of the

logrolling variety have been all too frequent: bargaining and tradeoffs have characterized much legislation since 1974, especially

spending and taxing areas.

Phlanxes of interest groups mobilize

in

the
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clusters of Congress.nen to pass
measures which benefit selected
portions of the electorate.
This is private business.
If sufficiently
powerful, such clusters need not
compromise in order to raise
majorities.

The problem is that compromise
on public or general

questions
is difficult to attain precisely
because such issues divide
consti-

tuencies, give rise to epistemological
versial.

heterogeniety

,

and are contro-

Controversy, as Fiorina pointed out,
threatens the

re-election chances of representatives
and
Nor is this all.

capacity of the special

is

better avoided.

The process seems to work in reverse

The

interests to provide obstructions to
the

enactment of broadly-applicable policies has
been enhanced by the formation of special caucuses and the emerging
independence of individual
members.

David Price has pointed out

a

perfectly clear example of the

kinds of difficulties which beset members of
Congress and its committees alike as they attempt to solve "large" problems
which affect dif-

ferent constitutiencies in different ways:

Opposition to President Carter's welfare refomi package came
from Agriculture Committee spokesmen who saw replacing
food
stamps with cash payments as detrimental to farm interests,
while many of those working to salvage the bill were mainly
concerned with giving hardpressed state and local governments
financial relief.
Safeguarding district water projects or
agricultural commodity programs was often a higher priority
of legislators than identifying with the broader fiscalmanagement and consumer viewpoints that the president
adopted.
This is not to say that members of Congress are
incapable of taking broad-gauged policy initiatives.
Indeed,
as we shall see below, they are increasingly motivated to
gain stature in nationally visible policy areas.
Nevertheless, a general tendency exists in Congress to give
priority to constituency based interests, to aggregate the
demands of groups and contintuencies in such a way as to
minimize tradeoffs and conflict among them, and thus to
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reject or modify presidential proposals
that are

aimed at
redistnbutive or other "universal i stic"
objectives
''^'^'^ ^^^^^^^ ^ P-^hant for
"d?rtr?b^utive"';^??J?csT"^

Whether the influence of special

interests is positive with

respect to the logroll or negative with
respect
end result is

a

kind of institutional

to

obstructionism, the

paralysis of Congress with

respect to the general welfare, and this
paralysis can be discerned

behind the badly-oiled screen of apparent
political activity.
individual

As

congressmen become increasingly independent of the
party

structure and increasingly able

to

build their own organizations and

raise their own money, the sphere of mutual cooperation
changes from
the attainment of synthetic judgments in

a

open central

arena to

shifting networks of power that come into being for the sake
of
serving specific special

interests.

The produce of such arrangements

constitutes much of contemporary legislation.
7.4] What is the result of such practices?

First, Woodrow

Wilson's critique continues to be fundamenally valid: the public forum
has been replaced by the committee or subcommittee, and all of the

expertise and legislative power embodied by these organs does not

diminish the fact that the broad, general
interest" of the national

pet and forgotten.
the national

consti tuency--i

interest--the "common
s

being swept under the car-

Robert Paul Wolff pointed out the consequenses for

constituency:

there are some social ills in America whose causes do
not lie in a maldistribution of wealth, and which cannot be
cured therefore by the techniques of pluralist politics. For
example, America is growing uglier, more dangerous, and less
.

.

.
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^?

^''^ in.
The reason is that natural
K?
public
order, the cultivation of the arts,
are not
the special interest of any identifiable
social qrouo
Consequently, evils and inadequacies in
those areas cannot be
remedied by shifting the distribution of
wealth and power
among existing social groups.
To be sure, crime and urban
slums hurt the poor more than the rich,
the Negro more than
the white-but fundamentally they are
problems of the society
as a whole, not of any particular group.
That is to say
they concern the general good, not merely
the aggregate of
private goods. To deal with such problems, there
must be
some way of constituting the whole society a
genuine group
with a group purpose and a conception of the common
good.
Pluralism rules this out in theory by portraying
society as
an aggregate of human communities rather than
as itself a
human community; and it equally rules out a concern
for the
general good in practice by encouraging a politics of
interest-group pressures in which there is no mechanism for
the discovery and expression of the common good. 10

llM
beauty,

.

.

.

7.5] Wolff has the germ of the right idea.

What is in order

is not to seek a wholesale condemnation of pluralism.

of a transcendental

In

the absence

argument, the only test we can discover for the

"fairness" of a public policy is that such

a

policy is fair by defini-

tion if none of the parties subject to it find it intolerable.

something

is

missing.

But

The pluralist solution is insufficient, not in

the sense that it is "wrong" but in the sense that it is incomplete.

The overwhelming majority of professional

students of Congress,

beginning with the general advocacy of strong Presidential

leadership

in the 1960s, but rising to a crescendo of irritation following the

1970s reforms, is that "the broad and general questions are being

ignored in our national
served."

legislature, while special

interests are well

This sentiment, or its equivalent, appears someplace in the

writings of virtually every student of Congress whose work has been
incorporated into this study.
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7.6] The old Whig «ord for what
now underlines both
the practical efficacy and the
institutional power of Congress
is "disunion."
There is good reason to
suppose that its underlying
basis was

strengthened by the 1970s reforms.

Let us recall Young's
description

Of the effects of "disunion"
upon the Congress during
the great
national crisis of 1812:
"'^ administration saw
the fulfillment of everv
wor t ^^"^''f
prophecy of the governmental
community's structure
attitudes toward politics and power,
and its remoteness frm
the citizenry.
Jefferson's leadership having
already
collapsed, the Presidency was
restored politicany to the
place defined for it constitutionally
and structurally ?n thP
community-a position as outsider to'
and lac ?ng
e
h^o
^
authority over, the establishment
on Capitol Hill '^^'is
unifying influence removed, all the
divisive forces inherent
in the social organization and
values of the congres onal
community were loosed. The party
shattered to piece and
Congress could not govern, pluging into
factional stride at
the very moment of rejecting
presidential leadership
Leadership in the nation thus fell to a
legislative body
whose organization and values rendered
it wholly unequipped
to lead, and obliged it to follow, a
distant and divided
citizenry.
Policy initiative thus passed to a
Congress
unable to mobilize itself, much less the
populace for the
pursuit of any consistent policy. A nation
on the brink of
military disaster was thus embarked upon
erratic and mutually
contradictory courses of action dictated by
transitory factional combinations at the seat of government.
It was total
victory for the principle of government by
"separate and
rival interests." The Presidency slept;
effective power
resided nowhere; an anarchy of groups reigned
over the
nation.
As a wise historian put it, "government, in
the
sense hitherto understood, became impossible.il

^

7.7] What we want to do, then,

but to add to it.
cal

is not to

throw out pluralism,

What we want to do is to try to affect the politi-

climate in the United States such that at least

ness that something like

a

a

nascent aware-

"common interest" actually exists

here--however incoherent it may appear

as a concept.

The reason, as
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we noted in (3.6) above and
as should be a.ply clear
fro™ Young's state:.ent. is that it is possible
for Congress
to

act in such

a

way that,

with regard to specific policy
areas, it either weakens or
strengthen^
the nation as a whole.
7.8] There are both easy ways and hard
ways to begin to evoke
a

common sense that there is

attending.

a

common interest and that its needs
want

The hard way would be to attempt
to educate the general

populace of the United States to some common
apprehension of the concept.

The easy way would be to start with
the legislators themselves,

and to search for means to weaken member
dependence upon special

interests-particularly
cial

resources.

in

the area of the constant search

for finan-

Reforms could be made in the electoral process,
which

costs too much and which forces representatives

to

turn to special

interests in order to raise the vast sums for election
campaigns as

currently constituted.

The television industry,

for example, could be

obliged to carry campaign advertising for free, and the
duration of

election campaigns shortened as it is

in Britain.

At the same time,

the salaries of representatives could be raised to the level

middle management--which they equal
neration.

in

responsibility but not in remu-

Let's say about $350,000 per year for

about $450,000 for

a

Senator.

of upper

a

representative and

Given the overhead that the average

member must meet, and the competitive pressure which business
to exert for the services of the talented and the diligent,

increases would be equivalent,

I

think,

to

is able

such

the Greek practice of

paying poor citizens for constant attendance at the assembly.

Any
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businessman will attest that "vast" fortunes
cannot be built up from
such salaries.

Further, with respect to the internal

politics of

Congress, the hand of the party leadership
simply must be strengthened
both with respect to control over committee
appointments and control

over the agenda.

The reason for this is that party
platforms embody

synthetic, if partisan, apprehensions of

Perhaps what all this amounts to is
notion of virtual
all

a

a

multiplicity of interests.

suggestion that

revival

a

of the

representation, if suitably constrained, wouldn't
be

bad.

8.0] It is not too late to make one observation about the

nature of the power of the member of Congress qua citizen.

As members

of assemblies which shared in sovereignty, citizens of Florence,

Members of Parliament, and those who sat in the State Legislatures
during the time of the Whig experiment
duals in the power of the institution.
social

status,

their personal

capacity of the institution as

in

America shared as indivi-

While enjoying

power was in part
a

a

a

privileged

function of the

whole to carry out its aims.

Now let

us look at the consequences of the rise of the entrepreneurial member,

who has his own organization and center of personal power, and the

emergence of the special

interest group as that which is capable of

exerting an exogenous influence on Congress, as it were, and forming
Congressional majorities almost without regard

institution.
dual

member?

to

the will

of the

Do these developments enhance the power of the indivi-

The decentralization of power in the chamber in general

leads, as we have seen, to increasing Congressional

paralysis and

a
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long-term loss of power from the
legislative to the executive
branch
which now not only initiates policy
but is an integral

budget and spending process.
mental

As a consequence,

part of the

the locus of govern-

agency has moved away from the Congress,
even in those areas

where the Constitution most firmly
stipulated that it remain.
Furthermore, the complexity of the contemporary
U.S. government has
given rise to the "oversight problem"-much
discussed in recent

literature--which is one way of measuring the
inability of Congress

to

make sure that other agencies of government
follow up on the policy
initiatives which it lays down or undertakes to
finance.

When all of

these factors are taken together, what happens to
the "power" of the
individual member?

If that power is to any extent dependent upon
the

capacity of the institution to carry out its collective aims,
then
that power is diminished as the power of the institution is diminished.
i

If

Congress is losing power,

so

is

its membership,

and so are

ts members.

8.1] In many historically prior instantiations of the mixed

government form, it was the practice of the Magistracy
the assembly to dispose.

to

propose and

That is, the magistrates proposed what poli-

cies were to be carried out and the assembly either ratified or vetoed
its proposals.

The purpose of the Congress, as defined by the

Constitution, was to initiate, define and determine domestic policy.
Its power to do so was guaranteed by its control

disbursement of funds.

over the raising and

Over the course of its history, however, the

U.S. government has so evolved that these powers have ebbed away,

in
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large part as
itself.

result of the inability of the Congress
to discipline

a

So once again,

as in Greece,

Florence, and even the England

of George III, we find that the greatest
part of contemporary broad

based policy initiaves originate in the
executive branch rather than
in the Congress.

8.2]

have here identifed the "public space" with
the

I

Congress while realizing that the basic notion need
not be restricted
to the arena of national

politics.

Public spaces exist in state

legislatures, at political conventions--though without
the lawmaking

capacity—and

the New England Town Meeting.

in

The reason for trying

to equate the public space with the Congress here was
to try to main-

tain continuity with the tradition that gave rise

attempt to define it in such

a

sovereignty.

If there

be

"politics" is

a

is

to

to

the idea, and to

way as to bind it to the notion of
any cogency in the claim that

specific kind of human activity, and that

a

set of concerns is appropriate to it, then we must be able
the claim that the political

limited
to

support

association per se is greater than and

different from other, lesser associations.

If

sovereignty can be

attached to the powers of the group meeting

in

the public

effort is saved with respect to whats needed

to make

space, some

the basic

distinction between the political and other forms of collective life.
9.0] Is it possible to come to

a

set of definite conclusions

about the nature of Congressional procedures and the powers of the

institution?

Not unequivocally.

occurred to me as

I

Here are some thoughts which

concluded my review of that literature.
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9.1] Public space unifies and synthesizes

interests and views.

So does

the Federal

Budget.

diversity of

a

But Congress chops

the budget up into little pieces, and chops itself
up into little

pieces, and these pieces decide the public business in
public qua
pieces, rather than as representatives of the whole.

quite accurate.

No.

That isn't

The Committees do represent the body politic in some

sense, having been elected to serve in the first place and
sent to

their respective duties by other elected representatives of the
people
in the second place.

Hence they "represent," but the formula of that

representation is different from that of the Congress as
Given this, what, exactly

is

behind the insi stence--which

whole.

a

I

share with

Wilson--that somehow or other, things are qualitatively better when
the Whole Congress, qua representatives of the Whole Country get

together to decide the fundamental questions?
9.2] How fundamental are the thousands of individual

appropriations in the Federal Budget

in

a

given year?

Obviously, the

authorizing legislation is important, and exists when passed by the

majority will of Congress.

What is to be settled after that are the

amounts to be paid into each account, following an annual

review of

the performance of the agencies that administer the particular

programs and disburse the various funds.

So what's the problem?

The

present procedures of Congress are more or less as Wilson described
them in 1885: the public business of the United States
the Committee rooms of the U.S. Congress.

is conducted

in

Since nobody can see what

they are doing in there, and nobody can understand--unless he happens
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to be a lawyer or an accountant--what they
are doing in there, their

conduct of business and that business itself are
not really "public."
This means, however, that the United States is
not functioning as

representative democracy in the classical
way to making

sense.

I

a

think I'm on the

substantive claim then: the franchise alone is not

a

sufficient to legitimize the conduct of government.
be conducted in such

a

Government must

manner that the electorate can see what is

going on there.
9.3] What the budget literature shows is that Congress repre-

sents

a

heterogeneity of interests; that Americans generally accept it

as legitimate that the general

body shall

take care of particular

interests, because most of the particular interests will be taken care
of.

This is pluralism, more or less, based on

a

distributive theory

of justice and the supposed premise that the government of the United

States is like

a

gigantic Sears Roebuck Department Store and that

every interest group has

revolving charge account.

a

This reduces our

politics to the form of our domestic economy--a competition between

consumers for the most goods--a Visa Card Politics, if one could bring
forward

a

new category appropriate to the times.

everyone else having
line of credit.

a

Nobody minds

high line of credit because everyone has

But this is

a

delusion: the state is in

a

a

fiscal

high
cri-

9.3] The present system works to blur controversy and hide

meaningful choices behind

a

facade of widely dispensed material

Further, by granting every interested party much of what

he

goods.

asks for.
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if postpones the day of making hard choices
between alternatives.
long as there is enough to go around,
the system will be o.k.
we are entering

a

majority does not seem to want the state

such

But now

new phase: there is no longer "enough"
to go around.

Some people want guns, some people want butter.

choices loom.

As

What puzzles the political

to

The electoral

grow too large.

Difficult

theorist in all this is how

large proportion of the population ever came to
take it for

a

granted that the government exists to dispense material
goods and
soothe them in their time of trouble.

Is

government like the "nature"

of some 13th century Romantics, an Ever Bountiful Murse, or
is it

a

way of organizing and empowering people to make decisions about
matters that concern them severally?

9.4] An elaborate legislative procedure has gradually grown up

over

200 year period, and this has finally replaced the kind of

a

public interaction and struggle that always used

parliaments and assembles.
and, as

I

to

take place in

We hear no more of rhetoric in the chamber

indicated earlier, the last place the professional political

scientist goes to learn about Congress

is

to

the floor of Congress.

Hence, it seems that our institutions are evolving: the United States

government
least

a

is

gradually turning into an elected bureaucracy, or at

bureaucracy some of the members of which are elected and some

appointed.

The politics that animates it has moved out of the well of

Congress and into hundreds and hundreds of small meeting rooms where
the elected and the unelected convene in an atmosphere of mutual

equality and debate together and compromise about

budget figures for
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programs that were instituted at the behest
of special

interests.

In

the long run, this is a dangerous
form of government, not because
some

people get excluded as the left holds,
but because the broad general

questions that vitally affect the United States
as

whole are not

a

addressed under this system.
9.5] If

quite happy.

I

I

could prove the foregoing conclusively,

would feel as though

I

lute.

It is,

in

such matters,

Instead, however, as is

the preceding judgment is not abso-

as Aristotle has led us to

nature of more and less.

would be

"Knew" something definite about

the nature of the contemporary Congress.

usually the case

I

expect, something of the

For example. Congress does manage to raise

the broad questions, even though it moves ponderously and may
take

years to do so.

It is

finally moving on toxic waste; it passed

a

nuclear freeze resolution; it is debating trade and tariff barriers
with all of the intensity that it did before the Civil War; it has
real

free-for-alls on the question of Federal budget deficits and the

balances between defense and social

spending; it is moving toward con-

taining Adminstration policy in Central America; it

is

legislation to control and regulate immigration; it

is deregulating

at work on

the banking and other industries.

10.0] Note that Aristptle's concept of
as a koinonia embraced the notion of

a

a

political

community

kind of communitarian synthesis

of interests, rather than an aggregation of conflicting aims held

together by
political

a

circle of power.

The koinonia is based upon ethical

assumptions shared by the community, and it

is

and

clear that if
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the synthetic acts of the assembly
are to have meaning for the
whole

polis, the notions held in common must
go beyond procedure and include
the substance of general

questions.

10.1] We find that in American society today,
a pattern of

conflicting ideas about justice itself now comes
forward in the public
realm.

Hence we will encounter logical

and political

any claim that the outcome of Congressional

debates is or could be the

kind of synthesis that was traditionally equated
with

interest.

objections to

a

canmon

But perhaps we have drawn the implications and
purposes of

the public space somewhat too narrowly:

as we have seen,

to

say that

the public space makes the emergence of the common interest
possible
is not the same thing as saying that every decision taken
there will

reflect the common interest

in

substance.

Perhaps the common interest

is also reflected in the procedures followed there: in bargaining and

tradeoffs, as well

as

in

unitary decisions.

advocate abandoning pluralism, and the need

Hence the reluctance to
to

add to it.

Altogether, this would make "the common interest"

a

multipli-

city rather than a unity, and include questions of procedure as well
as of substance under its rubric.

Thus it would emerge as an indeter-

minate concept, something that could not be defined
the actual

debates got under way.

a

priori before

Taking the "common interest" as an

indeterminate concept which combines substantive as well as procedural

matters in

a

process prone to influence by the best and worst of human

impulses, and not as

a

standard to which political

actors might be

expected to adhere, leaves the student of politics on firm ground,
think.

I
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